Italy and the development of European energy policy: from the dawn of the integration process to the 1973 oil crisis
2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 20; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13507486.2012.697875
ISSN1469-8293
Autores Tópico(s)Twentieth Century Scientific Developments
ResumoAbstract This article analyses the history of Italian energy policy as well as that of Europe from the beginnings of co-operation until the bust of the first oil crisis. The difficulties in realising a united policy as well as the energy status of Italy and Europe until the eve of the 1973 oil shock are underlined. Then, the answers to the crisis as well as the attempts to address the energy difficulties in a united way are analysed. Keywords: Italian energy policyEuropean energy cooperation1973 oil shock Notes 1. For European energy policy the author refers to the attempts to create collaboration in this sector among Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands (also including United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark from 1973, with the accession of these countries to the EEC). 2. Regarding this point, the British Physical Society and the Cavendish Laboratory organised an international congress in July 1946, the first international congress in Cambridge after the war. The title of this important event was 'Fundamental Particles and Low Temperature': 'It was the occasion for a first meeting among physicists of different parts of the world which had not shared ideas for years. Besides, it was also an occasion of renewing old friendships and listening to what they had done' (E. Amaldi, Gli anni della ricostruzione, CitationInstitute of Physics Archives, University of Rome 'La Sapienza', File Edoardo Amaldi, Amaldi Eredi, 89E, p. 30; this text was subsequently re-elaborated and published in Giornale di fisica, 20, no. 3 [1979]; 186–225). For a study on the supremacy of Washington and European scientific reconstruction after the Second World War cf. CitationKrige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe. 3. With regard to Italy, the first problem that the scientists had to face was the eventuality that the peace treaty also prohibited the use of the atomic energy for peaceful purposes; this was avoided through the direct attendance of some Italian scientists at the Paris summit [for further studies cf. CitationFornaciari, Il petrolio, l'atomo e il metano: l'Italia nucleare, 1946–1997. Dallo sviluppo a un'irragionevole rinuncia, 12; CitationLabbate, Il governo dell'energia. L'Italia dal petrolio al nucleare (1945–1975), 11–13; CitationNuti, La sfida nucleare. La politica estera italiana e le armi atomiche, 1945–1991, 15–21; CitationSilvestri, Il costo della menzogna: l'Italia nucleare (1945–1968), 29–30]. Edoardo Amaldi together with Ettore Majorana, Franco Rasetti, Emilio Segrè, Bruno Pontecorvo and others, thanks to the support of the Chief of the Institute of Physics in Rome, Orso Mario Corbino, as well as to the activity of Enrico Fermi, were known as 'Boys of Panisperna street' [cf. CitationBattimelli, ed., L'Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare. Storia di una comunità scientifica, 3–33]. Amaldi and Bernardini were the greatest nuclear physics researchers in Italy. They collaborated since the beginning with CISE (Centro Informazioni Studi ed Esperienze), constituted in 1946 and considered the first step toward the development of nuclear energy in Italy [cf. CitationPaoloni, Gli esordi del nucleare, 384]. 4. For a study of the events and the discussions about European scientific co-operation during the years following the Second World War cf. CitationBelloni, Da Fermi a Rubbia, 58–94. For a complete analysis on the genesis of CERN cf. CitationBelloni, Sulla genesi del CERN; CitationKrige, History of CERN, iii: 3–38. 5. For a study of the creation of the European institutions cf. CitationVarsori and Ballini, eds, L'Italia e l'Europa: 1947–1979; CitationNöel, Le istituzioni delle Comunità europee. For a study on European energy co-operation cf. CitationCailleau, Energy: From Synergies to Merger; CitationD'Amarzit, Les entreprises publiques pétrolières et l'approvisionnement en énergie de la Communauté Economique Européenne; CitationD'Amarzit, Essai d'une politique pétrolière européenne, 1960–1980; CitationHassan and Duncan, Integrating Energy: the Problems of Developing an Energy Policy in the European Communities, 1945–1980, 159–76; CitationIppolito, Contribution a l'étude du problème énergétique communautaire; CitationLucas, Western European Energy Policies: a Comparative Study of the Influence of Institutional Structure on Technical Change; CitationLucas, Energy and the European Communities; CitationMatlary, Energy Policy in the European Union; CitationWallace, Webb and Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Communities. 6. In addition, European nuclear co-operation was also the reaction to declining coal production: according to the 'Armand Report', further nuclear development was needed to fill the deficit left by the exhaustion of coal deposits and to reduce dependence on oil producers (cf. http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/6761172f-1f18-45b0-a247-e50faedb0e5d/en). 7. The aim of achieving European energy independence through the atomic source nevertheless did not exclude international co-operation in the sector. In fact, in 1953 the President of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed the creation of an international body to both regulate and promote the peaceful use of atomic power (nuclear power), in his 'Atoms for Peace' address to the UN General Assembly. In September 1954 the United States proposed to the General Assembly the creation of an international agency to take control of fissile material, which could be used either for nuclear power or for nuclear weapons. This agency, called International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was created in 1957, after the Geneva International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (8–20 August 1955): it seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons (cf. CitationFisher, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the First Forty Years). 8. Cf. CitationElli, A Politically Tinted Rationality: Britain vs. EURATOM, 1953–63, 105–24; CitationHubert, La politique nucléaire de la Communauté européenne (1956–1968) Une tentative de définition, à travers les archives de la Commission européenne, p. 129 ff; CitationIppolito, L'EURATOM e la politica nucleare italiana, 20–45. 9. The energy question also appeared in the third part of the Spaak Report. This section contained a series of recommendations on the measures considered urgent, and energy was the first. Therefore, the European countries had also undertaken to set some proposals for a European energy policy when the institutive treaties of the EEC and EURATOM were signed [cf. CitationCurli, Le origini della politica energetica comunitaria, 1958–64, 98]. A few months later, a secret protocol of agreement was reached between the CEEA Council of Ministers and the High Authority, which had the task of producing some proposals to start a community energy policy. The first consequence of this protocol was the creation of a 'Mixed Energy Committee' that formed the 'Inter-Executive Energy Committee' (, 98–9). For a study on the Italian position on the creation and the choices of EURATOM cf. CitationCurli, La tecnocrazia nucleare italiana e le origini dell'EURATOM; CitationCurli, L'Italie et l'EURATOM: l'attitude des hauts fonctionnaires et des experts; CitationCurli, L'Italia e la scelta nucleare europea 295–313. 10. Cf. CitationNuti, La sfida nucleare, 120. 11. For close examinations cf., 120–31; CitationCurli, Il progetto nucleare italiano (1952–1964), 192–4. 12. Among the studies produced and following the Spaak Report, there were the 'Armand Report' and the 'Hartley Report', both published in 1955 in the sphere of OEEC. In developing energy policy each State had given priority to the development of oil because of its characteristics, such as cheapness, the ease of transportation and its flexibility of use, in comparison to the other sources. The great discoveries in the Middle East, North America, Latin America, the Soviet Union and, subsequently, Northern and Western Africa contributed to increasing the level of crude reserves, determining a remarkable diminution of prices (cf. CitationBairoch, Economia e storia mondiale; CitationLucas, Energy and the European Communities, 263). Therefore, the governments of all the industrialised countries had decided to abandon any immediate investment in the other existing resources (coal and nuclear energy). For this reason, the national energy policies were correspondent to the initiatives in the oil field [cf. CitationClark, The Political Economy of World Energy: a Twentieth-Century Perspective, 95 and following; CitationCurli, Le origini della politica energetica comunitaria, 1958–64, 95–7; CitationHassan and Duncan, Integrating Energy: the Problems of Developing an Energy Policy in the European Communities, 1945–1980, 482–88. 13. Cf. CitationCurli, L'Italie et l'EURATOM: l'attitude des hauts fonctionnaires et des experts, 277–89; CitationIppolitio, Un progetto incompiuto. La ricerca comune europea: 1958–88, 68–70. 14. Cf. Cf. CitationCurli, L'Italie et l'EURATOM: l'attitude des hauts fonctionnaires et des experts, 277–89; CitationIppolitio, Un progetto incompiuto. La ricerca comune europea: 1958–88, 68–70, 69. European co-operation also had another organism, created in the sphere of OEEC in 1957: the European Agency for Nuclear Energy, given the task of the constitution of a common nuclear company (open to all members) and the co-ordination of existing projects (for further studies cf. CitationGoldschmidt, Il nucleare: storia politica dell'energia nucleare, 281–2). 15. Cf. Accord de coopération entre la Communauté Européenne de l'Énergie Atomique (EURATOM) et le gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique concernant les utilisations pacifiques de l'énergie atomique, Brussels, 29 May 1958, Washington, 19 June 1958, in Journal Officiel des Communautés Européennes», 19 March 1959, II, n. 17 309 ff. 16. Cf. CitationCurli, Le origini della politica energetica comunitaria, 1958–64, 112–13. 17. Cf. CitationBuccianti, Enrico Mattei. Assalto al potere petrolifero mondiale, 26; CitationRoncaglia, L'economia del petrolio, 61; CitationSampson, Le sette sorelle: le grandi compagnie petrolifere e il mondo che hanno creato, 91. According to Francisco Parra, Secretary General of OPEC in 1968, the term 'seven sisters' was pronounced for the first time from the same Mattei (cf. CitationParra, Oil Politics: a Modern History of Petroleum, 6). For a general study on the 'big seven' cf. CitationClô, Economia e politica del petrolio, 68–72; CitationJacoby, Multinational Oil: a Study in Industrial Dynamics; CitationLuciani, L'OPEC nella economia internazionale, 3–17; CitationMaugeri, Petrolio. Storie di falsi miti, sceicchi e mercati che tengono in scacco il mondo, 35–42; CitationMarcel and Mitchell, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East; CitationMitchell, Companies in a World of Conflict; CitationPenrose, International Oil Companies and Governments in the Middle East, 3–19; CitationRoncaglia, L'economia del petrolio, 61–87; CitationShwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers; CitationStork, Il petrolio arabo; CitationTugendhat and Hamilton, Oil: the Biggest Business; CitationTurner, Oil Companies in the International System; CitationVenn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century; CitationYergin, The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. For a general analysis of the international oil market and on the political control of the energy sources cf. CitationAdelman, The World Petroleum Market; CitationAdelman, The Genie out of the Bottle: World Oil since 1970; CitationBlair, The Control of Oil; CitationCowhey, The Problems of Plenty: Energy Policy and International Politics; CitationDurand, La politique pétrolière internationale; CitationGreene, Strategies of the Major Oil Companies; CitationEngler, The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest; CitationKaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era; CitationLevy, Oil Strategy and Politics, 1941–1981; CitationNouschi, Pétrole et relations internationales de 1945 a nos jours; CitationSafer, A Strategy of Oil Proliferation: a Study; CitationSolberg, Oil Power. 18. On the figure of Mattei and Italian oil policy cf. CitationAccorinti, Quando Mattei era l'impresa energetica. Io c'ero; CitationBagnato, Petrolio e politica: Mattei in Marocco; CitationBazzoli and Renzi, Il miracolo Mattei. Sfida e utopia del petrolio italiano nel ritratto di un incorruttibile corruttore; CitationBoldrini, Enrico Mattei; CitationBriatico, Ascesa e declino del capitale pubblico in Italia. Vicende e protagonisti; CitationBruni and Colitti, La politica petrolifera italiana; Buccianti, Enrico Mattei; CitationClô, ENI (1953–2003); CitationColitti, Energia e sviluppo in Italia: la vicenda di Enrico Mattei; CitationColitti, ENI. Cronache dall'interno di un'azienda; CitationColitti, Enrico Mattei (1906–1962), 683–719; CitationDe Angelis, Enrico Mattei; CitationDechert, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi: Profile of a State Corporation; CitationFrankel, Petrolio e potere: Enrico Mattei; CitationGalli, La sfida perduta: biografia politica di Enrico Mattei; CitationGalli, Enrico Mattei: petrolio e complotto italiano; CitationLi Vigni, Il caso Mattei: un giallo italiano; CitationLi Vigni, La grande sfida: Mattei, il petrolio e la politica; CitationLomartire, Mattei: storia dell'italiano che sfidò i signori del petrolio; CitationMagini, L'Italia e il petrolio tra storia e cronologia; CitationMattei, Enrico Mattei, 1945–1953: scritti e discorsi; CitationMattei, Enrico Mattei, 1953–1962: scritti e discorsi; CitationMaugeri, L'arma del petrolio. Questione petrolifera globale, guerra fredda e politica italiana nella vicenda di Enrico Mattei; CitationMoffa, Enrico Mattei. Contro l'arrembaggio al petrolio e al metano: una vita per l'indipendenza e lo sviluppo dell'Italia, del Medio Oriente e dell'Africa; CitationMoffa, Enrico Mattei. Il coraggio e la storia; CitationMeyr, Enrico Mattei e la politica neoatlantica dell'Italia, nella percezione degli Stati Uniti d'America, 157–69; CitationPerrone, Giallo Mattei: i discorsi del fondatore dell'ENI che sfidò gli USA, la NATO e le Sette sorelle; CitationPerrone, Enrico Mattei; CitationPerrone, La morte necessaria di Enrico Mattei; CitationPerrone, Mattei, il nemico italiano: politica e morte del presidente dell'ENI attraverso i documenti segreti, 1945–1962; CitationPerrone, Obiettivo Mattei: petrolio, Stati Uniti e politica dell'ENI; CitationPietra, Mattei: la pecora nera; CitationPizzigallo, Alle origini della politica petrolifera italiana (1920–1925); CitationPizzigallo, Diplomazia parallela e politica petrolifera nell'Italia del secondo dopoguerra, 141–55; CitationPozzi, Dai gatti selvaggi al cane a sei zampe: tecnologia, conoscenza e organizzazione nell'AGIP e nell'ENI di Enrico Mattei, 141–458; CitationRoh, Enrico Mattei: chevalier des temps modernes; CitationRoncaglia, L'economia del petrolio, 146–50; CitationRosi and Scalfari, Il caso Mattei: un corsaro al servizio della repubblica; CitationSapelli and Carnevali, Uno sviluppo tra politica e strategia. ENI (1953–1985); CitationTerranova, La Pira e Mattei nella politica italiana: 1945–1962; CitationTonini, Il sogno proibito: Mattei, il petrolio arabo e le sette sorelle; CitationVittorini, Petrolio & Potere. Il racket dei petrolieri; CitationVotaw, The Six-Legged Dog: Mattei and ENI a Study in Power; CitationYergin, The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, 501–5. 19. After the death of Mattei, from being a researcher and oil producer ENI gradually became a buyer of crude from foreign countries, while reducing at the same time the development of its oil-refining capacity. The choices of the ENEL general manager, Arnaldo Maria Angelini, affected the development of an Italian nuclear policy. In fact, he opted for the suspension of investments in the atomic sector and for investment in oil thermoelectric plants, which were more convenient at that time. It was mainly the cheap price of crude and natural gas that suggested the carrying out of such policy that in every case did not imply the abandonment of the nuclear way, but rather prosecution of the current projects [cf. Ente Naztionale Energia Elettrica, Relazioni del Consiglio di amministrazione del Collegio dei revisori e bilancio al 31 dicembre 1963, Rome, 1964, pp. 30–32, CitationHistorical Archives of ENEL (ASENEL)]. 20. Cf. CitationIppolito and Simen, La questione energetica: dieci anni perduti (1963–1973), 143–70. 21. The content of the agreement was the technical and financial collaboration of the Import-Export Bank that had to go into effect in February 1959 [cf. CitationCurli, Il progetto nucleare italiano (1952–1964), 63]. 22. From this point of view, for instance, strong Italian disappointment resulted in the missed development of the Ispra centre, which officially became a EURATOM common research centre in March 1961. For a general analysis of the Italian position towards the European programme on nuclear research cf. CitationVarsori, Italy's Policy towards European Integration (1947–58), 47–66. On the relations between Italy and EURATOM cf. CitationCurli, L'esperienza dell'EURATOM e l'Italia. Storiografia e prospettive di ricerca, 211–32. 23. Verbale della ottava riunione della Commissione direttiva del CNEN, Rome, 2 May 1963, p. 23, CitationHistorical Archives of ENEA (ASENEA). For further examinations cf. CitationCurli, Il progetto nucleare italiano (1952–1964), 68. Furthermore CNEN was about to face the most difficult moment of its history because of the so-called 'caso Ippolito' and, certainly, its importance in EURATOM was drastically reduced [on the 'caso Ippolito' cf. CitationBarrese, Un complotto nucleare. Il caso Ippolito; CitationAA. VV., L'energia nucleare e il caso Ippolito; CitationAA. VV., Il caso Ippolito. Quinta tavola rotonda organizzata dal Movimento Gaetano Salvemini, sabato 14 novembre 1964]. 24. CitationHartshorn, La politica energetica nella Comunità europea. 25. Cf. d'Archirafi, L'Italia e l'Europa di fronte all'economica nucleare. 26. According to the EEC commissioner Edoardo Battaglia [Parere sulle parti dell'VIII Relazione generale della Commissione della C.E.E.A. (Edoardo Battaglia), European Parliament, 21 July 1965, CitationHistorical Archives of European Union (HAEU), File European Commission, BAC 118/1986, 975]. Battaglia also observed that the European initiatives in such a direction 'if well coordinated with measures to take in the sphere of a common and general energy policy would have been able to economically strengthen the countries of the Community and also to reconcile them from the political point of view' (ibid.) 27. The Council of Ministers of the CEEA approved on 21 April 1964 a 'Protocol of Agreement' on the matter of energy through which the governments of the member States, 'persuaded by the necessity to realize an energy common market inside the European common market […] affirmed their desire to continue in their efforts to elaborate and to carry out a Community energy policy' (Protocol of Agreement on Energy Problems, Reached between the Governments of the Member States of the European Communities, Luxemburg, 21 April 1964, Official Journal of the European Union, n. 69, 30 April 1964, 1099–1100). 28. Cf. Memorandum by the Commission to the Council on the Community's Policy for Petroleum and Natural Gas, 16 February 1966, Supplement to Bulletin No 7-1966 of the European Economic Community, Executive Secretariat of the Commission, CitationArchive of European Integration (AEI), Internet Website http://aei.pitt.edu/30726. 29. Cf. CitationAdelman, OPEC as a Cartel, 37–63; CitationClô, Economia e politica del petrolio, 72–4; CitationCrémer and Salehi-Isfahani, Models of the Oil Market; CitationEl–Sayed, Organisation des pays exportateur du pétrole; CitationHartshorn, The Special Characteristics of OPEC and Importing Countries' National Oil Companies, 157–65; CitationJohany, The Myth of the OPEC Cartel; CitationLuciani, L'OPEC nella economia internazionale, 35–40; CitationParra, Oil Politics: a Modern History of Petroleum; CitationRoncaglia, L'economia del petrolio, 103–20; CitationSeymour, OPEC: Instrument of Change; CitationTeece, OPEC Behavior: an Alternative View, 64–93; CitationStocking, Middle East Oil: a Study in Political and Economic Controversy, 357–80; CitationTerzian, OPEC: The Inside Story; CitationTomajuoli, Petrolio arabo e prospettive di crisi energetica, 122–4; CitationYergin, The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, 479–98. 30. Nevertheless, the Commission of the European Communities approved on 18 December 1968 a document entitled 'First Orientation for a Community Energy Policy' to propose political action for the creation of a real common energy market, both in the middle and long terms, for the purpose of guaranteeing the supply of European countries, the stability and low price of supply and, at the same time, the protection of economic competition. 31. Italy had vainly insisted on being included in this project since the beginning but its position was judged much too prudent and critical, while the accord of co-operation with Washington on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy signed in 1961 would have been in contrast with the Italian participation (cf. Réunion tripartite pour la séparation des isotopes de l'uranium par ultracentrifugation gazeuse, Letter of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to the President, Rapport n. 753, 19 March 1969, HAEU, File Edoardo Martino, n. 219). Nevertheless, Italy participated in the initiative taken by the members of the Union internationale des producteurs et distributeurs d'énergie électrique (UNIPÈDE) in 1969 – the European Electricity Industry Association – thanks to the ENEL general manager Angelini's proposal in 1968. This project foresaw the construction and running of a prototype plant of great power, equipped with a sodium-cooled breeder reactor. It should have been done in co-operation with EURATOM and it intended 'to accelerate the development of the breeder reactors and to use the competences and the available means in the Community in the most profitable way, avoiding duplications of programs and initiatives that, in the specific case, [would have] involved not sustainable economic burdens from the single countries' (Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica, Relazioni del Consiglio di amministrazione del Collegio dei revisori e bilancio al 31 dicembre 1969, Rome, 1970, 112–13, ASENEL). The three greater Community producers of electric energy involved were: Electricité de France (EDF), ENEL and Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (RWE). 32. Cf. Relazione del Comitato dei Rappresentanti Permanenti al Consiglio, Brussels, 3 October 1969, HAEU, File Edoardo Martino, n. 224. 33. In Italy, for instance, between the end of 1969 and the beginning of 1970 financing from the CNEN was approved for a Uranium Enrichment Program presented by the Gruppo Italiano Arricchimento Uranio. It provided for the development of the two known isotopic separation techniques for the creation of enriched uranium: gaseous diffusion and ultracentrifugation. There was also a French offer of co-operation in the common construction of a plant for the production of enriched uranium with a gaseous diffusion system. The initiative was taken by the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique and in 1972 was instituted an 'Association d'études' called EURODIF, made up of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, England and the Netherlands. Its purpose was to effect preliminary economic–technical studies in light of the realisation of a gaseous diffusion uranium-enrichment plant (cf. Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica, Relazioni del Consiglio di amministrazione del Collegio dei revisori e bilancio al 31 dicembre 1973, Rome, 1974, pp. 46–7, ASENEL). 34. Cf. CitationYergin, The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, 633–52. 35. Cf. CitationCricco, Dalla genesi del secondo piano Rogers alle premesse della guerra dello Yom Kippur (1970–1973), 95. 36. The situation of the international oil market confirmed in fact 'the need to accelerate the elaboration of a Community energy policy that allowed Europe to have an own energy structure suitable to its dimension of great consumer and importer of oil products and that it guaranteed sure supplying at a low price' [Relazione sull'attività delle Comunità Economiche Europee per l'anno 1971 presented by Italian Minister of the Foreign Affairs (Moro), Camera dei Deputati, V Legislatura, 27 December 1971, HAEU, File Edoardo Martino, nn. 27–8]. 37. For instance, the EEC Commission sent a communication to the Council on 29 April 1973, entitled 'Orientations et actions prioritaires pour la politique énergétique communautaire', in which the necessity of beginning a profitable international co-operation in the field of energy was affirmed; starting a 'climat de confiance' with the Middle East energy suppliers was suggested (Orientations et actions prioritaires pour la politique énergétique communautaire, Communication de la Commission au Conseil, Commission des Communautés Européennes, Brussels, 19 April 1973, HAEU, File Emile Noël, n. 81). This necessity of starting a 'climat de confiance' with the energy suppliers became a central point of the guidelines of the Community energy policy; some Western countries started to try to find a solution in connecting the import of oil to the support of financial initiatives in the oil-exporting countries for the purpose of tiding up their affairs and economies. These applications were not granted by the EEC Council, but a few months were enough to demonstrate their validity. On 19 July, in fact, the EEC Council introduced a directive 'to mitigate the effects of difficulties in the supplying of crude oil and petroleum products'. It was an attempt to delineate a common strategy to answer a possible energy crisis that let every member State take all the measures necessary to provide the powers to attenuate all energy difficulties for the competent authorities, especially those in charge of oil matters [cf. Council Directive to Mitigate the Effects of Difficulties in the Supply of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, Council of the European Communities, Brussels, 19 July 1973, art. 1, CitationArchives of the Council of European Union (ACEU), Intermediate Archives, 12136]. This directive was officially adopted by the EEC Council at the 252 session of July 24 (cf. Lettera del Presidente del Consiglio delle Comunità Europee, Ivar Norgaard, al Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Aldo Moro, Brussels, 27 July 1973, 12137). For a study on the previous years cf. CitationHassan and Duncan, Integrating Energy: the Problems of Developing an Energy Policy in the European Communities, 1945–1980, 159–75; F. CitationPetrini, L'arma del petrolio: lo 'shock' petrolifero e il confronto Nord-Sud. Parte Prima. L'Europa alla ricerca di un'alternativa: la Comunità tra dipendenza energetica ed egemonia statunitense, in CitationCaviglia and Varsori, Dollari, Petrolio e aiuti allo sviluppo. Il confronto Nord-Sud negli anni '60–70, 90–4. 38. The greater difficulties up to that moment were derived from the attitude of Paris and particularly from the suspicions of the Quai d'Orsay on US oil policy. 39. Cf. Lettre de l'ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne en France, Edward Tomkins, au premier ministre britannique, Edward Heath, Paris, 25 October 1973, Ministère de Affaires Étrangères Français (CitationMAEF), Archives Diplomatiques, Affaires économiques et financières, Affaires générales, 1967–1975, 419. Meanwhile, France had started a series of separate negotiations in an attempt to get a privileged position and, if possible, to obtain direct agreements with the oil producers. 40. Cf. CitationYergin, The Prize. The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, 606–32. 41. Actually, the Nine had already prepared, under the impulse of Italy and France, a joint declaration that was less pro-Arab compared to the following one approved on 6 November. On the one hand, in the first text, the centrality of UN resolutions 242 and 338 was stressed and, on the other, the availability of the EEC members to send own troops to garrison the demilitarised areas provided in 1967. The OPEC measures announced on 5 November had a decisive effect in order to re-examine the whole declaration in a new and markedly more pro-Arab text by the Political Committee of Nine. It was left to the United Kingdom to press for complete satisfaction on the Arab situation with the exception of the matter of the existence of Israel [cf. Lettera del direttore generale degli Affari Politici del MAE, Roberto Ducci, per il segretario generale del MAE, Roberto Gaja, Rome, 8 November 1973, Central Archives of State (ACS), Carte Aldo Moro, Serie 6, MAE, Sottoserie Visite e questioni diverse, Busta 57]. See also CitationRiccardi, Il 'problema Israele': diplomazia italiana e PCI di fronte allo Stato ebraico (1948–1973), 453–4; CitationMinisterio degli Affari Esteri (Servizio Storico e Documentazione), Italia e Medio Oriente (1967–1974), Roma, 1974, pp. 177–8. 42. Cf. Telegram n. 508 from Brussels to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Brussels, 6 November 1973, CitationThe National Archives (TNA), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in CitationHamilton and Salmon, The Year of Europe: America, Europe and the Energy Crisis, 1972–1974, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Vol. 4, Oxon, 2006, doc. 375. 43. In this sense, in its effects, the Nine's policy was successful because they had been exempted from the following 5% cut adopted in December. 44. For a study of the relations between the United States and the European Community during the oi
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