The changing phases of the Niger Delta conflict: implications for conflict escalation and the return of peace
2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 9; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14678800903142698
ISSN1478-1174
Autores Tópico(s)Mining and Resource Management
ResumoAbstract This paper discusses the nature and dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict and traces the structural origin of the conflict to a dysfunctional Nigerian ‘state-nation’ that is a product of colonisation. The paper argues that the conflict is best understood as a process viewed in terms of nests or phases. Building on previous findings on the aetiology of African conflicts and contemporary scholarship on African politics, the paper identifies how different phases of the Niger Delta conflict interact to impel the conflict toward escalation. Consequently, it is argued that both the ‘marginalisation-relative deprivation’ and the ‘political economy of war’ theses have been instrumental in furthering our understanding of the conflict along different lines. However, the tendency for both perspectives to claim superiority over the other has meant that each only offers a partial truth and is therefore unable to explain the increasing intensity and longevity of the Niger Delta conflict. Indeed, it is shown how these theses feed into the discursive struggle between militants, militant entrepreneurs and the Nigerian Government in ways that allow for the commodification of the Niger Delta people. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of the emerging issues for the return of peace in the Niger Delta. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments instrumental in revising the paper, and York University (Start-up Research Grant) for financially supporting his research in the Niger Delta. Notes Uwafiokun Idemudia is Assistant Professor of International Development and African Studies in the Department of Social Science at York University, Toronto, Canada. His research interests lie in natural resource conflicts, corporate social responsibility theory and practice, and sustainable development. He is presently the co-ordinator for the African Studies Programme at York. 1. CitationEjobowah, ‘Who Owns the Oil?’. 2. Ibeanu, ‘Oil, Conflict and Security’; CitationOsaghae, ‘The Ogoni Uprising’; CitationWelch, ‘The Ogoni and Self-determination’; CitationVan Dessel, The Environmental Situation; CitationUkeje, ‘Youth, Violence and the Collapse of Public Order’; CitationIfeka, ‘Oil, NGOs and Youths’; CitationFleshman, ‘The International Community’; CitationIkelegbe, ‘Encounters of Insurgent’; CitationNaanen, ‘Oil-producing Minorities’. 3. CitationObi, Oil Minority Rights; CitationRoss, ‘Does Oil Hinder Democracy’; CitationOmeje, ‘The State, Conflict and Evolving Politics’. 4. CitationOkoh, ‘Environmental Degradation’; CitationOlojede et al., Nigeria; CitationWilliam, ‘Citizenship Questions’; CitationJike, ‘Environmental Degradation’. 5. 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