A Crisis of Legitimacy: The Conservative Party Leadership of John Major
2007; Routledge; Volume: 21; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13619460601060488
ISSN1743-7997
Autores Tópico(s)Scottish History and National Identity
ResumoAbstract This article evaluates the insecurity of tenure that John Major suffered as leader of the Conservative party. It offers a chronological narrative that demonstrates that for the duration of his tenure as leader of the Conservative party, Major lacked the necessary authority within the parliamentary Conservative party to ensure his legitimacy as Conservative party leader. A range of explanatory themes are explored such as the circumstances through which he acquired the leadership; the betrayal thesis of the Thatcherites and the absence of a cohesive and enduring group of Majorities; and the lack of credible unifying alternatives. The article concludes that Major was the default leader of the Conservative party. Keywords: The Conservative PartyParty Political LeadershipLeadership ElectionsPrime Minister John MajorPost-Thatcherism Notes [1] CitationCocker, Contemporary British Politics and Government, 129, 191. Peele notes that the over-riding goal of the Conservative party is electoral success and that they can be ruthless about removing incumbent party leaders who are deemed to be an impediment to that objective, see CitationPeele, Governing the United Kingdom, 218. [2] Norton (ed)., The Conservative Party, 146–147. [3] Norton, ‘Factions and Tendencies in the Conservative Party’, 112 [4] As the article seeks to argue that the erosion of authority within the parliamentary Conservative party undermined his legitimacy as Conservative party leader, it is important to clarify what is meant by the terms authority and legitimacy. The parliamentary Conservative party should bestow upon their party leader their legitimacy as s/he has been rightfully elected as leader of the party. The parliamentary Conservative party should willingly confer upon that individual authority; thereby demonstrating that they recognize the right of the elected leader of the party to utilize the power aligned to the position: e.g. policy formulation, power of appointment. CitationHeywood, Politics, 5, 211. [5] The Conservative Leadership Election of November 1990 was activated by the challenge of Heseltine. In the first ballot, Thatcher received 204 votes to Heseltine's 152, but she failed to overcome the second necessary stipulation that the victor needed to gain 15% more of the votes of those entitled to vote than her challenger. Despite her initial desire to contest the second ballot, the erosion of support within Cabinet forced her to resign to ensure that Heseltine would not succeed her. [6] Detailed and informative appraisals of the 1990 Conservative party Leadership Election have been provided by the following. CitationWatkins, A Conservative Coup; CitationCowley, ‘How did he do that?’ 198–216; and CitationCowley and Garry, ‘The British Conservative party and Europe’, 473–499. [7] CitationMajor, The Autobiography, 334–335. [8] Major, The Autobiography, 334. [9] CitationSeldon, Major, 319, 324, 343. The procedures governing the election of the leader of the Conservative party stipulated the following. An annual challenge to an incumbent leader of the Conservative party was permitted within three to six months of the opening of a new Parliament and after that within 28 days of the opening of each new parliamentary session. In 1991 these periods were reduced to three months and 14 days respectively. The rule changes of 1991 also stipulated that to initiate a challenge against an incumbent leader, not only must the challenger have a proposer and a seconder, but that 10% of the parliamentary Conservative party must write privately to the chairman of the 1922 Executive Committee (who manage the election process) calling for a contest. CitationCoxall and Robins, British Politics Since the War, 168–169 [10] Seldon, Major, 379, 381. [11] CitationAlderman, ‘The Passage of the European Communities (Finance), 1–20. [12] Seldon, Major, 458. [13] CitationCrick, Michael Heseltine, 411. [14] Seldon, Major, 510–511. [15] Norton, ‘The Conservative Party’, 100, and Seldon, Major, 510, 513. [16] CitationAlderman, ‘The Conservative Party Leadership Election’, 316–332 and CitationDenver, ‘The Government that could do no right’, 25. [17] Seldon, Major, 572. [18] Major, The Autobiography, 620. [19] Initially, Portillo attempted to dissuade Redwood from standing. Once Redwood's candidature was announced, Portillo, who thought Redwood could not win outright but could precipitate Major's downfall, believed those who had supported Redwood would shift and endorse him in the second contest. (see Major, The Autobiography, 629) Before the formal announcement of his candidature, Redwood asked Portillo to resign and either support his candidature or stand himself with Redwood endorsing him. Portillo refused to do so and demanded that when he entered the contest at the second round Redwood should stand down and deliver his votes to Portillo. Redwood argued that ‘having done the dirty work’ he would be standing himself; see CitationWilliams, Guilty Men: 103. [20] Seldon, Major, 578. [21] Norton, ‘The Conservative Party’, 101. [22] Norton, ‘The Conservative Party’, 101 [23] Alderman, ‘The Conservative Party Leadership Election’, 323 [24] CitationGove, Michael Portillo, 338. [25] Gove, Michael Portillo 338. [26] Major, The Autobiography, 641–642. [27] Seldon, Major, 585. Crick denies a ‘deal’; Gove implies that a ‘deal’ was arranged: see Crick, Michael Heseltine, 419 and Gove, Michael Portillo, 338. Redwood argues the acceptance on Heseltine's part of his interdependence with Major, arguing: ‘I think that it is possible for two very sophisticated politicians to do a “deal” without actually expressing the words of the “deal”… I think they understood each other perfectly well and so it would have been possible for hints to be made and the necessary steps taken.’ (BBC, The Major Years, 5th October 1999) Crick's argument about the promise about the succession seems plausible. It would be impossible for Major to ‘simply deliver the leadership to Heseltine. If he had stepped down, then under party rules other candidates would have been entitled to stand, and Heseltine would almost certainly have faced opposition from Redwood and Portillo.’ Crick, Michael Heseltine, 419. [28] Norton, ‘The Conservative Party: In Office but not in Power’, 102. [29] Norton, ‘The Conservative Party: In Office but not in Power’, 102. [30] Conflicting accounts have emerged about the immediate reaction of Major to the result. Seldon argues that at no stage did Major contemplate resigning. Seldon, Major, 587. Stuart argues that Major came very close to resignation, before eventually (but unenthusiastically) agreeing that 218 votes were adequate. Stuart has also speculated on why Major did not resign. He argues that the campaign by loyal ministers to persuade Major to continue and the media interpretation that the result was sufficient were critical in changing Major's mind. Stuart argues that ultimately if Major had any doubts about whether he should resign ‘his colleagues gave him little choice in the matter’. CitationStuart, Douglas Hurd, 426. [31] Alderman, ‘The Conservative Party Leadership Election’, 329 [32] When evaluating the 1995 Conservative party leadership contest and the subsequent Government reshuffle, Gove observes that ‘division within the ranks of the right had denied a numerically more powerful faction the influence it might have wielded.’ Gove, Michael Portillo, 341. [33] Major, The Autobiography, 647. [34] CitationNorris, Changing Trains, 240, 242. [35] Alderman, ‘The Conservative Party Leadership Election’, 329. [36] Alderman, ‘The Conservative Party Leadership Election’, 330. [37] Seldon, Major, 628. In her speech, Thatcher heaped praise on the political acumen of Howard, Lilley, Portillo and Redwood and argued that the unpopularity of the Conservative party under Major was due to the fact that it his government was insufficiently Thatcherite. Williams, Guilty Men, 137. [38] Williams, Guilty Men, 157. [39] Seldon, Major, 629. [40] Williams, Guilty Men, 157. [41] Coxall and Robins, British Politics Since the War, 169. [42] Williams, Guilty Men, 1–2. [43] CitationGilmour and Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories, 373. [44] Ideological variables are not the only determinants of voting behaviour in Conservative party leadership contests. Political variables such as parliamentary experience, career status, age and electoral marginality and socio-economic variables such as occupation and educational background are also instructive variables. See CitationCowley and Garry, ‘The British Conservative Party and Europe, 473–499. [45] Ideological variables are not the only determinants of voting behaviour in Conservative party leadership contests. Political variables such as parliamentary experience, career status, age and electoral marginality and socio-economic variables such as occupation and educational background are also instructive variables. See Cowley and Garry, ‘The British Conservative Party and Europe, 479–480. [46] CitationCowley, The Parliamentary Party, 3–4. [47] Cowley, The Parliamentary Party, 3. [48] CitationGorman, The Bastards, 16. [49] CitationMcKie, (ed), The Guardian Political Almanac 1994–1995, 4. [50] Cowley, The Parliamentary Party, 14; Major, The Autobiography, 614. [51] Cowley and Garry, ‘The British Conservative Party and Europe’, 473–499. [52] There were 89 Conservative parliamentarians who supported the economically liberal, Eurosceptic and socially conservative candidature of Redwood. Cowley has calculated that approximately 75 (roughly 85%) of the Redwood supporters were aligned to Eurosceptic right of the parliamentary Conservative party, according to the Norton taxonomy of conflict. The Redwood support base and the anti-Major vote can be defined as overwhelmingly of the Eurosceptic right, but Redwood did not secure the support of all the Eurosceptic right. See Cowley, The Parliamentary Party, 13–14 and CitationNorton, ‘The Conservative Party, 94–95, 103. Seldon has speculated on the reasons why Redwood did not secure a higher level of support than he did amongst the Eurosceptic right. He concludes that many Portillo supporters did not support Redwood in the first ballot as they feared Redwood might do too well and undermine the candidature of Portillo in the second ballot. Seldon, Major, 586. [53] There were 89 Conservative parliamentarians who supported the economically liberal, Eurosceptic and socially conservative candidature of Redwood. Cowley has calculated that approximately 75 (roughly 85%) of the Redwood supporters were aligned to Eurosceptic right of the parliamentary Conservative party, according to the Norton taxonomy of conflict. The Redwood support base and the anti-Major vote can be defined as overwhelmingly of the Eurosceptic right, but Redwood did not secure the support of all the Eurosceptic right. See Cowley, The Parliamentary Party, 13–14 and CitationNorton, ‘The Conservative Party, 94–95, 103. Seldon has speculated on the reasons why Redwood did not secure a higher level of support than he did amongst the Eurosceptic right. He concludes that many Portillo supporters did not support Redwood in the first ballot as they feared Redwood might do too well and undermine the candidature of Portillo in the second ballot. Seldon, Major, 586. [54] CitationNorton, ‘The Conservative Party’, 102. [55] This is an assertion that has been advanced by the following academics. Norton has argued that if Thatcher had remained as leader of the Conservative party than her approach to European policy would have increased the possibility of an irrevocable split. See Norton, ‘Factions and Tendencies in the Conservative Party’, 104. CitationBaker et al . have argued that had Thatcher been replaced with either Hurd or Heseltine (rather than Major) then a more pro-European policy would have been pursued and a formal split would probably have resulted. See Bake et al., ‘1846…1906…1996? Conservative Splits and European Integration’, 420–434. [56] Seldon, Major, 389. Additional informationNotes on contributorsTimothy Heppell Timothy Heppell is lecturer in politics at the University of Huddersfield.
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