The Creeping Wahhabization in Pukhtunkhwa: The Road to 9/11
2011; Routledge; Volume: 30; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01495933.2011.561734
ISSN1521-0448
Autores Tópico(s)South Asian Studies and Conflicts
ResumoAbstract This article examines the interethnic politics in Pukhtunkhwa between the foreign "Wahhabis" (formerly known as the "Hindustani Fanatics" in India) and the local Pushtun tribesmen in the pre-9/11 era. It seeks to explain the inability of the early Wahhabis to coopt the Pushtuns with their Muslim "umma" narrative, as they sought to wage "jihad" against India and beyond from strongholds in Pukhtunkhwa. It highlights the persistence of the Wahhabis for almost two centuries in trying to "convert" the Pushtun to the sahih (correct) path of Islam (their version); the cultural roadblocks that ensured limited Wahhabi success in cleansing what they viewed as a jahiliyya society of mushriqun (deviant) Muslims who seemed to prefer their tribal identity over a religious one. It identifies the long-term repercussions of the Soviet's genocidal campaign (1979–1989) that led to the destruction of the traditional social fabric in Afghanistan's Pukhtunkhwa belt: the provision of an ideological opportunity for the Wahhabists to promote their Muwahiddun (unitarian) version of Islam through generous welfare and educational funding programs. It examines how the arrival of Arab "jihadis" in Peshawar, Pakistan in the 1980s marked the beginning of an indoctrination and co-option process that continues to this day, to the detriment of the Pushtuns' unique culture, language, and religious traditions/practices. Notes For the purposes of this article, Pukhtunkhwa is geographically defined as comprising the areas where the Pushtuns/Pukhtuns comprise the majority of the populace. Traditionally, "Pukhtunkhwa" has included the territory which straddles the Durand Line that arbitrarily demarcated the Indian subcontinent from Afghanistan in 1893. This artificial—albeit political—boundary divided some of the Pushtuns' qaums (tribes), Zadran, Wazir, Mohmand, Afridi, Muhammadzai, who simply ignored the invisible "Durand Line," which was a 100-year "lease" or agreement between the Amir Abdur Rehman and the British Crown. See Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002); Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 29, no. 3 (April–May 2006): 207–239; Christopher Blanchard, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 2008, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21695_20080124.pdf; Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and its Role in Terrorism (New York: Anchor Books, 2002); Vincenzo Oliveti, Terror's Source: The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences (Birmingham, UK: Amadeus Books, 2002); R. Upadhyay, "Islamism: A Historical Background: The Saudi Angle," South Asia Analysis Group, June 29, 2009, available at http://southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3282.html; Talip Kucukcan, "Some Reflections on the Wahhabiyah Movement," Hamdard Islamicus, vol. 18, no. 2 (1995): 67–82. For more on this "reformation" movement, see David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 2006). Sunni Islam—which is the largest denomination at around 85% of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims adherents—has four Schools of Jurisprudence (fiqh): Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, and Hanbali. The Hanafi fiqh is the most widely followed madhab (school). The influence of the Hanbali fiqh is concentrated primarily in the Arabian Peninsula, and is the most austere of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Historically, it has had the fewest adherents amongst Muslims. It has been written that this fact reflects the more rigid and restrictive features of Hanbali interpretations of how a Muslim should lead his/her life. For a detailed discussion on Sunni fiqh see Christopher M. Blanchard, Islam: Sunni and Shiites, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 2009, available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21745_20090128.pdf The contemporary Salafi (Arabic for "predecessor") movement's foundational tenet is that Islam as practiced by Prophet Muhammad and his companions represented "the ideal man" behaving as Allah would want him to and this early society reflected this perfect state. Salafism seeks to revive a practice of Islam that more closely resembles the religion during the time of Prophet Muhammad. While scholars of Islamic jurisprudence such as Joseph Schacht (1902–1969) recognized that the "gates of ijtihad" were "closed" within Sunni schools of jurisprudence (fiqh) around the tenth century (which signified that all necessary examination, and interpretation, of the Quran and Hadith had been accomplished by Muslim scholars, thus further inquiry was unnecessary), more recent scholars of Islamic law have challenged this assessment arguing that ijithad remains an essential component (farz) of the Sunni Muslim tradition, despite the emphasis on blind obedience (taqlid). See, for example, Wael Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (1984): 3–41. Such contemporary scholars can be called "neo-mutazilites." Wahhabis/Muwahhidun reject the notion that the gates of ijtihad are now closed because, due to numerous accretions of innovations (bida), some interpretations of Islamic doctrine need to be reevaluated to prove that such practices sharply diverge from those of the Salaf-e-Saliheen and must therefore be rejected. In contemporary times, public criticism by Sunni Muslim clerics of Wahhabism has been virtually nonexistent, which raises a number of important questions: Is this silence due to the rise of "petro-diplomacy" and/or is this due to effective terror and intimidation tactics? A few Muslim critics in the West have included Italian-born Dr. Abdul Hadi Palazzi, leader of the Italian Muslim Assembly, Hisham Kabani of the Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA), Stephen Schwartz's Center for Islamic Pluralism, and Dr. Zuhdi Jasser's American Islamic Forum for Democracy. For more on the "salafi" see Quitan Wiktorowicz, "The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad," Middle East Policy, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 2001): 18–38. "Pukhtunkhwa" is the term used by Pushtuns to describe their homeland, which straddles the Durand Line between present day Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is a region where the Pushtuns have predominated for over two thousand years. In Pakistan, Pushtuns are in the majority in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa; they are also found in large numbers in urban centers of the Punjab (especially Lahore and Rawalpindi) and Sind (Karachi). They are also beginning to demographically challenge the Baluchis on their own home turf of Baluchistan as the numbers of Pushtuns there continue to substantially rise due to a number of factors. In Afghanistan, they are concentrated in the Eastern provinces such as Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Nangarhar, Zabul, etc., and in the Southern provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah. They are also found in isolated pockets in the north such as in Kunduz, Takhar, and Baghlan due to forced resettlement of Ghilji khels by Amir Abdur Rahman in the late nineteenth century. The sizeable Pushtun diaspora in the West from the Soviet invasion/occupation of Afghanistan is spread throughout Europe and also certain urban centers of the United States. James W. Spain, The Way of the Pathans (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 29. Benedicte Grima, The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 3–6. See Bernt Glatzer, "The Pashtun Tribal System," in Gerog Pfeffer and Deepak K. Behera, eds., Concepts of Tribal Society (Contemporary Society: Tribal Studies), vol. 5 (New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002), 265–282. A gem of a book on Pushtun tribal fighting/warrior culture is General Sir Andrew Skeen's Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the North West Frontier of India (London: Wellington Works, 1932). Other books on Pushtun warfare are Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press, 2002); Charles Chenevix Trench, The Frontier Scouts (London: Jonathan Capt, Ltd., 1985). For Pushtun warfare tactics during the Soviet occupation see Lester Grau, ed., The Bear Who Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (London: Frank Cass, 1991); Ali Ahmed Jalali and Lester Grau, Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters (St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Co., 2001). In Pushto, zar is gold, zan is women, and zamin is land. Historically, the social construct has required the defense of said property. Women in Pushtun society were/are considered for all intents and purposes the property of their family and khel, whose honor and chastity must be protected at all costs. See Vern Liebl, "Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A Short View," Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 2007): 493–512; Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (London: Macmillan and Co, 1958); Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); Spain, Way of the Pathans; Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (Austria: Akademische Druck, 1969); Frederik Barth, Political Leadership among the Swat Pathans (London: The Athlone Press, 1959). For more details on the Pushtun "character," see Victoria Schofield, Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 116–120; Caroe, Pathans, 144–146; Charles Allen, Soldier Sahibs: The Daring Adventurers Who Tamed India's Northwest Frontier (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2000), 95–98. Grima, Performance of Emotion. Willi Steul, Pashtunwali: Ein Ehrenkodex und seine rechtliche Relevanz (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 308, as quoted in Grima's Performance of Emotion, 3. For more on Pushtunwali see James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1963), 63–69; Spain, Way of the Pathans, 46–48, 129–130; Tanner, Afghanistan, 126–127; Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 165–178; Rashid Ahmed, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 112; Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 34, 58–61; Charles Miller, Khyber (New York: MacMillan, 1977), 99–100; Allen, Soldier Sahibs, 95–96. Akbar S. Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Stucture and Economic Development in a Tribal Society (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). Ahmed has argued that only Pushtuns living in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) can fully exercise Pushtun law because the conditions in the FATA are conducive to "doing Pushtunwali" in that they live outside the jurisdiction of the state and its judicial systems and are thus free to practice their unique variant of "justice" in cases involving badal. Ahmed points out that in the settled areas (non-tribal region of the North West Frontier Province [now known as Khyber Pukhtunkhwa]) where the State's judicial tentacles are well embedded, the populace is expected to rely on the police and the courts to resolve criminal cases. They do not, in short, have the freedom (from the State) to practice Pushtunwali. As a result, the Pushtuns of the settled areas like Peshawar, Mardan, Nowshera, Charsadda, Dera Ismail Khan, etc., are perceived by their FATA Pushtun brethren as falling short in being the "ideal Pushtun" who practices his way of life as tradition dictates. These perceptions create friction and insecurity between the various Pushtun factions since it suggests a hierarchy with the more "authentic" Pushtun at the top (from Khyber, South and North Waziristan); while the rest are "questionable" Pushtuns who do not, or cannot, fulfill all the requirements of Pushtunwali. In an egalitarian, acephalous society such as the Pushtuns, even the notion or hint of some sort of hierarchy is repugnant but not improbable, especially when it comes to "de-tribalized" Pushtuns. Pushtuns' most famous seventeenth-century warrior poet, Khushal Khan Khattak, wrote on Melmastia: "It goes to waste if you feed yourself alone; It gives satisfaction to have your meal in company." For an example of melmastia in action see David Lyon's Butcher and Bolt: Two Hundred Years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan (London: Random House, 2008), 88–89. The person(s) may be known or unknown, friend or foe, kin or not, but melmastia is expected once the individual(s) have crossed your doorstep/gate and into your compound or abode. Not only is hospitality to be provided, but also panah (refuge) if requested. The members of this household/compound de facto become honor bound to provide and protect for their "guests," at least in theory as understood as comprising the fundamental tenets of Pushtunwali. Spain, Way of the Pathans, 47. Spain writes about how a distinguished malik's influence is often reckoned by the number of people, i.e., men, he can feed/entertain. Thus, the width of a malik's dustikar (table cloth) and people attending usually indicate a man's importance. Furthermore, if the host offers a khanjar (dagger) or other such weapon or a Quran to his guest(s), this is indicative of the highest status the host(s) accords his guests to include a guarantee of sanctuary/protection. The obverse is if the guest is accorded no token of hospitality like a glass of water or some other token/display of hospitality. Such a situation is indicative of a hostile situation for a Pushtun will always at least make some symbolic display of hospitality to "save/protect face." Grima, Performance of Emotion, 4. In 2005, the ability of U.S. Navy Seal Marcus Luttrell to survive the extraction attempts of a "Taliban" faction in Kunar is one example of nanawati in action. The Pushtun villagers who found him (injured, alone, and hiding) and took him into their village were implementing the stipulations of nanawati by providing him with panah (sanctuary). The villagers saw from his wounds and his successful attempts to evade capture, a fellow warrior who now sought their protection. Refusing to help him and/or to betray him would have sullied their honor and reputation. By protecting him and ensuring his safe return to his own people, they had in their own eyes preserved their honor and done "Pushtunwali." It is likely that a second, secretly hoped for by some tribal members, benefit might be some sort of reward from his "people," the U.S. military. For more on Seal Team 10's ordeal and Luttrell's account as the sole survivor see Marcus Luttrell's Lone Survivor: The Eye Witness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10 (New York: Little Brown and Company, 2007). Grima, Performance of Emotion, 5. Ibid., 70. For Pushtun women the concept of badal was distinctive and was based on a form of equalized reciprocity between the womenfolk. This does not, however, mean that Pushtun women are not sympathetic to leveraging the male interpretation of this term according to Pushtunwali (revenge) when circumstances they (the women) perceived necessitated acts of revenge in order to restore honor, such as murders, robbery, and in the rare case of rape. Barth, Political Leadership, 82. In addition to these three, foundational tenets of Pushtunwali, there are many additional concepts that comprise the tenets of "doing Pushtunwali." These include itbar (Pushto for "trust," the foundation of Pushtun society. All business contracts are transacted on the basis with verbal guarantees based on itbar. Violation of itbar is considered conduct unbecoming of a Pushtun and dishonorable and contrary to norms of Pushtunwali); sialy (equality); roogha (reconciliation or compromise); barabary (equivalence); jirga (assembly); lashkar (armed militia); bota (means "carrying away" as in seizing property for "reimbursement" for unpaid debt); baramta (from Persian word baramad, meaning restitution by holding hostages for ransom till the accused returns the claimed property); teega/kanray (cessation of bloodshed between conflictual parties as in a truce); ghundi (from Pushto word ghund, meaning a political party but is a term used for "alliance" between two Pushtun sub-khels or even qaums to promote joint interests with an outside party and/or align together in blocs or ghunds to safeguard their common interests in the face of a external threat); tarr (a mutual agreement/accord to devise protocol for a particular issue between two khels or families); ashar/balandra (shared cooperative tasks); hamsaya (literal meaning is "neighbor" but in Pukhtunkhwa involves the abandonment of a man's home due to poverty or a blood feud and seeking protection/shelter from an elder of the tribe); zhemana (commitment); meerata (provision of justice via a jirga to punish members of a khel for deliberately killing weaker family members to gain their inheritance, land, etc. Usually a jirga immediately assembles to decide the course of action, which generally involves the establishment of an arbaki or a lashkar to go after the fugitives/culprits and bring them to justice); and soola (truce between aggrieved parties), etc. Charles Allen, God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad (Cambridge, MA: DeCapo Press, 2006), 2. What the British and other "foreigners" perceived as "treacherous" behavior on part of the Pushtuns, in the eyes of the Pushtun, such behavior was only treacherous in jang (war) when it negatively impacted one's immediate family or clan's interests. Any acts committed in jang to promote one's kin's interests are actually considered necessary, even commendable, with one caveat: excessive, unnecessary brutality is frowned upon by most Pushtuns. Allen on page 4 writes: "(in Pushtun areas) … the graves of Taliban martyrs … were notable for being covered with a whitewashed stone surrounded by green flags on poles and marked with a notice inscribed in Arabic (emphasis added) which Rahimullah translated for me: 'Haji Mullah Burjan, military commander of the Taliban Islamic Movement was martyred at this spot leading an attack against miscreant and illegal Rabbani forces at the Silk Gorge, while trying to bring sharia to Afghanistan."' This narrative is especially favored by the largest Pushtun tribe, the Yusufzai (sons of Joseph) of Mardan, the Barakzai (sons of Barak) of Kandahar, and the Afridi of Khyber/Tirah. For more on this narrative see H. W. Bellew, An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan (London: The Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, 1891), 190–197; Caroe, Pathans, 3–5, 10, 68. See also Itzhak Ben-Zvi's The Exiled and the Redeemed (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1957), 209–226. On p. 214, Ben-Zvi writes: The Afghan tribes, among whom the Jews have lived for generations, are Moslems who retain to this day their amazing tradition about their descent from the Ten Tribes. It is an ancient tradition, and one not without some historical plausibility. A number of explorers, Jewish and non-Jewish, who visited Afghanistan from time to time, and students of Afghan affairs who probed into literary sources, have referred to this tradition… that this tradition, and no other, has persisted among these tribes is itself a weighty consideration. Nations normally keep alive memories passed by word of mouth from generation to generation, and much of their history is based not on written records but on verbal tradition. On page 213 of his biography, Amir Abdur Rahman, a Barakzai ("sons of Barak") Durrani and Head of the Afghan State (1880–1901) writes: "Afghans are all Mahomedans of the Sunni sect… according to Afghan historians they are descended from the Israelites. They take their name of 'Afghans' from the word 'Afghana'; some of them being descended from Afghana, King Soloman's Commander-in-Chief; and others from Jeremiah, the son of Saul." For more see Abdur Rahman, The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, ed. Sultan Muhammad Khan, vol. I and II (London: John Murray, 1900). See also T. Hungerford Holdich, The Indian Borderland 1880–1900 (London: Metheun and Co., 1901), 54. For a more comprehensive assessment on the activities of the Hindustani Fanatics (aka Wahhabis of India), see William Wilson Hunter, The Indian Musalmans (London: Trubner and Co., 1876); Allen, God's Terrorists; M. Mohar Ali, "Hunter's Indian Musalmans: A Re-Examination of its Background," Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no.1 (1980): 30–51; Charles Allen, "The Hidden Roots of Wahhabism in British India," World Policy Journal, vol. 22, no. 2 (2005): 87–93. Shah Waliullah, born in 1703, was a contemporary of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab. Although Waliullah was neither a Nejdi nor an Arab, but an Indian from Delhi, their paths crossed in Medina where both relocated in order to study Islam. Both shared at least one teacher. Also an Indian immigrant, Muhammad Hayat of Sind—a Naqshbandi Sufi along the lines of the hardliner Sheikh Ahmed Sirhandi—taught a great many students in Medina to include al Wahhab and Waliullah. As a consequence of their studies, they encouraged ijtehad through a reexamination of religious law. While Wahhab went back to the Najd where he had little if any competition as a "learned scholar" (with the exception of his father and brother, both of whom repudiated his interpretation of what became "Wahhabism"), Shah Waliullah returned to Delhi where Waliullah operated in a highly informed religious milieu where his ideas were both challenged and tempered through debate. See Allen, God's Terrorists, 48–51. Shah Waliullah's eldest son, Shah Abdul Aziz, would become Syed Ahmed's teacher in Delhi. Like Waliullah, Syed Ahmed would visit Mecca and Medina on a Haj pilgrimage and stay in Medina to study under the Wahhabis. Ibid., 41. Ibid., 77. The attraction of Pukhtunkhwa to the Hindustani Wahhabis lay in the fact that the inhabitants were overwhelmingly Muslims, in stark contrast to the Indian plains where Hindus constituted the majority of the populace. Thus, in their eyes, Pukhtunkhwa was part of Dar al-Islam and a legitimate launching pad for jihad against Dar al Harb (Land of War) and/or Dar al Kufr (Land of Infidels). Allen, God's Terrorists, 81. Ground zero of the Hindustani Fanatics was a place called "Sittana" that was located on the eastern slopes of Mahabun Mountain, now submerged under water after the Government of Pakistan built the Tarbela Dam there. The title "nawab" or "nawaab" is derived from the Arab word naib, which means a deputy. Muslim rulers preferred this as then they could be referred to as the deputies of God on earth and hence not infringing on God's title, i.e., Lord and master of this earth. The term nawab is often used to refer to any Muslim ruler in north India. As luck would have it, Syed Ahmed's arrival in the Peshawar valley coincided with the Yusufzai and other Pushtun tribes' recent defeat by a punitive Sikh column. This was a critical factor in their acceptance of Syed Ahmed's group as potential allies (read: soldiers) against the Sikhs. A Haji is someone who has completed the Haj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, the holiest of Islam's two religious sites (the other being Medina). Allen, God's Terrorists, 81. This is the first known instance of a Muslim figure in the Pukhtunkhwa region who publicly declared himself "Amir ul Momineen." The next known personage to do so in this region was Mullah Omar (a Hotaki Pushtun from Uruzgan). On April 4, 1996, Mullah Omar wrapped himself in "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed," taken from its shrine for the first time in sixty years, and declared himself to a crowd in Kandahar that he was now Amir ul Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). "Sharia" is an Arabic word meaning "way" or "path." It refers to an Islamic concept, the wide body of Islamic religious law, and thus refers to the legal framework within which the public and private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a legal system based on Islamic principles of jurisprudence (fiqh). Allen, God's Terrorists, 87. In the Muslim world the "marriageable" age of females was based on the onset of puberty. It can be postulated that the Hindustani fanatics merely wanted to satiate their sexual urges through marriage with the only females available in the area and/or that this was a strategic attempt to embed their movement and its alien ideas within a rigid tribal construct by marrying into these Pushtun tribes. Allen, God's Terrorists, 88–91. Ibid., 89–90. Col G. J. Younghusband, The Story of the Guides (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1918), 89–90. The first military engagement between the Hindustani Fanatics and the British occurred in 1853 near Sattana. Inayat Ali led these Wahhabi ideologues, who were quickly defeated. The lesson Ali learned from this defeat was that they (the Hindustanis/Wahhabis) should not attack the well-trained British troops until they had a better preparation and an exit strategy. For more on this see N. C. Asthana and Anjali Nirmal, Urban Terrorism: Myths and Realities (Jaipur: Prem C. Bakliwal, 2009), 64. Feringhee is the Pushtun and Indian term for the British. It means "foreigner/outsider," yet it is generally only applied to European non-Muslims and at times has been considered a derogatory term. Ernest Gambier Perry, Reynell Taylor, C.B., CSI: A Biography (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench and Co., 1888), 261–296. For an excellent classic on the Corps of Guides see Younghusband, Story of the Guides. Ibid., 102–107, for more on the Guides actions in the Ambeyla campaign of 1863. Allen, God's Terrorists, 218. For a first-hand account of the Tirah campaign, see Colonel C. E. Calwell, ed., Tirah, 1897 (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1911). For more on the Malakand campaign see Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898). Viscount Fincastle and P. C. Eliott-Lockhart, A Frontier Campaign, as quoted in Younghusband, Story of the Guides, 212. While the Pushtuns were quick to call their military engagements "jihads," their motives significantly differed from those of the Hindustani/Wahhabis in that the Pushtuns used the term "jihad" to legitimize their generally predatory or protective actions and also to galvanize their kin to undertake these campaigns. For more on the Faqir of Ipi see Milan Hauner, "One Man against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the British in Central Asia on the Eve of and during the Second World War," Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 16, no.1 (Jan. 1981): 183–212. For a more comprehensive analysis of Juhayman's siege of Mecca see Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca (New York: Doubleday, 2007); Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix, "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisted," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 39, no. 1 (2007): 103–122; Sandra Mackey, The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1987), 229–239; Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud (New York: Avon Books, 1981), 478–491. Mackey, Saudis, 234–237. For more on Saudi Arabia see Mackey, Saudis; John Bradley, Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Enemy: How Washington Sold Its Soul for Saudi Crude (New York: Three River Press, 2003); Gene Lindsey, Saudi Arabia (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1991). Two books that are a bit dated but still useful are William Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981); and Lacey, Kingdom. Mackey, Saudis, 327–329. Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New York: Harper Collins), 131–132; Robert Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With the Mujahidin in Afghanistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 110, 126, 131, 233; Kurt Lohbeck, Holy War, Unholy Victory (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1993), 128–129, 184; George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 236–239. Iran's pan-Islamism under Ayatollah Khomeini did not extend to the Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia. Under his leadership the Iranian government cut ties to Saudi Arabia. Khomeini declared that Iran may one day resume diplomatic relations with the U.S. or Iraq, but never with Saudi Arabia. Iran did not reestablish diplomatic relation with Saudi Arabia until March 1991, after Khomeini's death. The mullah (not to be confused with alim or the ulema) has traditionally been reviled and/or has been less respected than the general male Pushtun populace and was seen as a grasping, conniving, illiterate member of society. This all changed in the 1980s, especially in refugee centers where dislocated members of various clans and tribes were forced to live. Thanks to the generous funding of Muslim charities from the Khaleej (Persian/Arabian Gulf) Arabs, these Mullahs were paid to spread the sahih (correct) word as espoused by the Wahhabi movement in the camps. This mission was generously funded through charitable assistance in these camps where only the most impoverished and desperate Pushtuns (and other Afghans) were forced to reside. Some of the largest Afghan refugee camps in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan (Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) were Kacha Garhi, Jalozai, Old Shamshatoo, and Panian. Two of the most well-known recipients of generous Saudi funding included Dr. Abdullah Azzam and his Maktab al Khidmat, and Osama bin Laden. There are no official figures readily available on the number of Pushtun males who have worked in Saudi Arabia between 1974 and 2001; however, some estimates place the number of Pakistani (to include Pushtun) men who have worked in the Gulf at 10 percent of the population. Pakistan's overall demographic figures have ranged fro
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