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Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 18; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636410802678072

1556-1852

Dinshaw Mistry,

Global Peace and Security Dynamics

Abstract This article tempers the argument of deterrence optimists, who make the case that nuclear deterrence has maintained the peace between regional nuclear rivals. In particular, it challenges the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that “nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced” among regional rivals in South Asia. Examining two major regional military crises, this article notes that, first, nuclear deterrence was not the key factor ending these crises. Instead, nonnuclear factors involving American diplomacy, which provided the participants with timely exit strategies, ended the crises. Second, if these crisis-ending factors had not been present, there was a strong possibility of significant military escalation, and nuclear deterrence would not have averted such an escalation. The article concludes by noting that, in regions where deterrence optimism is not well supported, Washington may continue intervening in crises between nuclear rivals, and, anticipating such a U.S. approach, regional rivals could become involved in repeated military crises over the long term. The author acknowledges support from the Taft Research Center and University Research Council at the University of Cincinnati. Drafts of this article were presented at the Social Science Research Council, Washington, DC, 30 May 2004 and the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Philadelphia, 1 September 2003. The author acknowledges helpful comments from participants at these and other conferences and from the readers and reviewers of this article. Notes 1 For the debate, see Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003). 2 See Kenneth Waltz, “For Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 124 (see note 1). 3 For an early authoritative argument, see Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Paper no. 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Autumn 1981). See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (June 1982). 4 David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 87–119; see also the discussion in Peter Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 695–753. 5 Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993); Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organization, Accident, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 6 Peter Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,”International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–93): 160–87; Stephen David, “Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation,” Security Studies. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 773–78; Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 66–107. Neoptimists countered that such command and control problems are less likely to occur in new nuclear powers. Jordan Seng, “Less Is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 50–92. 7 For pessimists, see, for example, Scott Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (see note 1). For applications to South Asia and an optimist position, see Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005). For other positions, see Michael Quinlan, “India-Pakistan Deterrence Revisited,” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 102–16; several articles in “Special Issue: South Asia and Theories of Nuclear Deterrence,” India Review 4, no. 2 (April 2005). 8 Peter Feaver, “Neoptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 93. 9 Waltz and Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 6, 109. 10 David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 91 (emphasis added). 11 This is the stability/instability paradox, which notes that nuclear weapons make low-level conflict possible while deterring larger conventional war. For more on this issue in South Asia, see Ashley Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001); Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2001). For a critique of this paradox and a discussion of a reverse instability/stability paradox, see S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe,” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 127–52; S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 12 Waltz and Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 115. 13 See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” Journal of Social Issues 43, no. 4 (Winter 1987): 5–71; Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143–69. 14 Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 145. 15 Jim Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing,” World Politics 43 (January 1991): 169–95. A valid counterfactual analysis must be consistent with key criteria: clarity and specification of the antecedent and the consequent events; specification of the connecting principles between the antecedent and consequent; and minimum rewriting of historical facts. This article adheres to these criteria. For more on these criteria, see Tetlock and Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments, 16–25. 16 Estimates of the number of intruders vary from seven hundred to one thousand eight hundred. Most were from the Pakistan army's Force Command Northern Area (FCNA) and the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary unit that was later incorporated into the Pakistan Army's 10 Corps) and occupied high altitude peaks and positions. 17 There is an extensive literature on Kargil, from which the following description of events is taken. See, for example, Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning (New Delhi: Sage, 1999); Guns and Yellow Roses: Essays on the Kargil War (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1999); Shireen Mazari, The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2002); Ashok Krishna and P.R. Chari, eds., Kargil: The Tables Turned (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001); Gurmeet Kanwal, Heroes of Kargil (New Delhi: Indian Army Headquarters, 2002); Rajendra Nath, Musharraf's War (New Delhi: Lancer, 2003); Y.M. Bammi, Kargil 1999: The Impregnable Conquerred (Noida, India: Gorkha, 2002); Amrinder Singh, A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights (New Delhi: Motibagh Palace Patiala, 2001); and other sources cited in this article. 18 Although this account is disputed, Pakistani sources note that Pakistani troops occupied the watershed (their line of defense), which ran along the Line of Control to fill gaps in their defenses and preempt anticipated Indian military actions in these areas. These sources note that Pakistan's intelligence had reported disturbing Indian military activities in late 1998 and early 1999, such as the deployment of surface-to-air missiles, the retaining of two brigades from the Indian Army Third Infantry in the Dras sector, the induction of artillery, and plans for hot pursuit in this sector. In response, FCNA commanders proactively moved troops to defensive positions on the watershed. Mazari, The Kargil Conflict, 47–49; and author's discussions with Pakistani military officials involved in Kargil. 19 A very few officers from Pakistan's military planned and executed the Kargil operation with little civilian input. The army informed Prime Minister Sharif about military plans and activity in Kargil on 29 January, 5 February, and 12 March, but Sharif may not have fully understood the scope and consequences of the operation. Other issues also influenced Pakistani thinking about the Kargil operation. Pakistan's security elites considered some nibbling across the Line of Control (which they viewed as a temporary arrangement) to be acceptable, especially because India had also occupied positions on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control three times in prior years. Further, some Pakistani military officers considered the Kargil operation to be a response to India's 1984 occupation of the Siachen Glacier; they also saw it as a retaliation for India's 1994 interdiction of the Neelum Valley road (after which, around 1996–97, the Pakistani military made plans to impose similar pressure at Kargil); and some acknowledged the Kargil intrusion as a way to revive the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir. See Peter Lavoy, ed. Asymmetric War in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Mazari, The Kargil Conflict, 42–50; Shaukat Qadir, “Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999,” RUSI Journal (April 2002); P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Cheema, and Stephen Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2007), 124–25. 20 Three prior assaults on 26 May, 29 May, and 2 June failed, and Tololing was only captured after fresh planning, the induction of new military units, and the use of considerable artillery fire. 21 On 10 June, Pakistan returned the bodies of six Indian soldiers whom the Indian press reported were “mutilated and disfigured,” and this inflamed Indian public opinion. Press reports on 15 June noted that by this date, the Indian Army's casualties were 103 killed, 242 injured, and eight missing; on 28 June, the press reported India's casualties were 175 killed, 364 wounded, and nine missing; on 3 July, according to an army spokesman, casualties were 240 killed, 420 wounded, and nine missing. These figures undercounted casualties, and the eventual official Indian death toll was 524 killed and 1,365 wounded. 22 Raj Chengappa, “Nawaz Sharif Speaks Out,” India Today, 26 July 2004, 6–12; “Pakistan Seeks Early Talks to End Tension,” Dawn, 29 May 1999; “They Are Freedom Fighters, Not Intruders: Nawaz,” Dawn, 1 June 1999. 23 A.G. Noorani, “The Truth About the Lahore Summit,” Frontline 19, no. 4 (16 February-1 March 2002). 24 Prime Ministers Sharif and Vajpayee appointed Naik and Mishra as their emissaries to discuss the Kashmir issue in September 1998, and this emissary channel was functioning well—Naik and Mishra met in November-December 1998 and again on 27 March-1 April 1999—which is why it was activated during the Kargil crisis. 25 A.G. Noorani, “The Truth About the Lahore Summit”. 26 On Islamic states, see “OIC endorses Pakistan stand on Kashmir,” Dawn, 2 July 1999. As a result of diplomacy by foreign minister Aziz, the 1 July Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) conference issued a statement supporting a resolution of Kashmir, yet it did not offer Pakistan a clear way out of the military crisis with India. On China as a major supporter, see Hasan Akhtar, “Talks with Chinese Leaders Totally Satisfactory,” Dawn, 2 July 1999. Islamabad had made extensive contacts with Beijing—army chief Musharraf visited China on 26 May, foreign minister Sartaj Aziz visited Beijing on 10–11 June, and Prime Minister Sharif visited Beijing on 27 June. Islamabad publicly claimed that Sharif's talks were “totally satisfactory” because its joint statement with Beijing accepted that Kargil was linked to the broader Kashmir issue. Like the OIC, however, Beijing did not offer Pakistan a viable exit strategy for the crisis. 27 In a 23 June press conference, India's army chief, General Ved Malik, said that “if necessary we can cross the LoC [Line of Control] in the supreme national interest but the decision lies with the cabinet.” Krishna and Chari, Kargil: The Tables Turned, 273. On 26 June, in a speech in the west Indian city of Pune, Prime Minister Vajpayee suggested Indian troops may cross the Line of Control—a strategy he had ruled out just two days before. 28 Sharif discussed the crisis and military and diplomatic options in a 1 July meeting attended by army chief Musharraf, the secretaries of foreign affairs and defense, and senior officials of other security agencies. He briefed them about his visit to China, and he regretted that New Delhi was not willing to engage in bilateral dialogue. Sharif also discussed the possibility of visiting the United States to meet with President Clinton. “Nawaz Reiterates Call for Dialogue,” Dawn, 2 July 1999. 29 Washington's involvement began on 24 May with demarches to India and Pakistan; assistant secretary of state Rick Inderfurth met the Indian and Pakistani ambassadors in May (and some five to seven times in June); secretary of state Madeleine Albright also called Prime Minister Sharif and Foreign Minister Singh in May. Further, Albright called British foreign minister Robin Cook and undersecretary of state Thomas Pickering spoke to Chinese ambassador Li in early June. Talbott notes that “in all these dealings, Madeleine, Tom [Pickering], and Rick put the blame squarely on Pakistan for instigating the crisis, while urging India not to broaden the crisis.” Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), 158. 30 Zinni met General Musharraf and exchanged phone numbers with him during an earlier 21 April visit to Pakistan. During the Kargil crisis, he phoned Musharraf in early June and again in mid-June. 31 Bruce Reidel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House (University of Pennsylvania, Center for the Advanced Study of India, May 2002). Clinton also informed Sharif, “If you announce you're withdrawing in response to my agreeing to mediate, India will escalate before you even get home.… What I am prepared to support is a resumption and intensification of the Lahore process and a commitment on the part of the U.S. to work hard on this.” Talbott, Engaging India, 166. 32 Strobe Talbott called Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh, and Sandy Berger called Indian national security advisor Brajesh Mishra to reinforce Clinton's reply that the United States would not be party to any outcome that appeared to reward Pakistan's violation of the Line of Control. Talbott, Engaging India, 160. 33 This does not mean that the exit strategy was embraced by Pakistan's military—indeed, ties between Sharif and Pakistan's military remained strained in the months after Kargil principally because the military resented Sharif's order to pull back in Kargil. But the U.S. exit strategy gave Sharif just enough cover for a withdrawal in early July—observers have appropriately called it “simultaneously much-lauded [for de-escalating the crisis] and much-loathed [by Pakistan's military].” Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited Conflicts, 11. 34 Ved Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2006). 35 Owen Bennett-Jones argues, “Whatever the precise figure, the important issue is that Pakistan was still in control of a large area and would, in all likelihood, have been able to hang on to it for the remaining weeks of the summer.” Owen Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 100. 36 India's military was also unable to evict Pakistani soldiers from Point 5240, some one thousand two hundred meters from Point 5353, and therefore India's brigade commander Amar Aul led forces to occupy two heights, Points 4875 and 4251, on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, just before the 12 July cease-fire. This incident demonstrates how military hostilities were very likely to have continued without a cease-fire (and later, Indian and Pakistani troops clashed in a localized military encounter at these peaks in October). See Praveen Swami, “A New Chief for the Army,” Frontline 20, no. 2 (18–31 January 2003). 37 Bammi, Kargil 1999, 371. 38 Zinni would not agree to this, but Musharraf also raised, and Zinni agreed to consider, the possibility of Nawaz Sharif visiting Washington to resolve the issue. Anthony Zinni, Battle Ready (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 2004), 347. 39 Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, 100. 40 Jaswant Singh, “A Consequential India-U.S. Engagement” (remarks at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1 November 2006). Further, Indian satellites detected Pakistan's Ghauri missiles, and India conveyed its concerns about these missiles to international leaders. See also Talbott, Engaging India; Hussain Haqqani, Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2005). India also prepared four Prithvi missiles and one Agni missile for possible nuclear use during the crisis. See Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), 437. 41 On 26 June, Pakistan's prime minister stated India would suffer “irreparable losses” if it crossed the Line of Control. See W.P.S. Siddhu, “India's Nuclear Use Doctrine,” in Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 144. For other nuclear signals in statements by foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmed and by Pakistani senate leader Raja Zafarul Haq, see Samina Ahmed, “Nuclear Weapons and the Kargil Crisis,” in South Asia's Security Dilemma, ed. Lowell Dittmer (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 145. 42 Feroze Khan, “Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia,” in Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, ed. Michael Krepon (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), 85–87. 43 Talbott, Engaging India, 167. 44 Reidel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House. 45 These included ordering its eastern fleet to the West Coast in late May; conducting a joint exercise of the eastern and western fleets from 12–29 June; and, between 30 June and 14 July, moving its 108 th Infantry Brigade (its amphibious strike arm) to Goa and placing it on high alert. 46 Other authors elaborate upon this mobilization. Tellis and Fair note that India was undertaking a wider military mobilization and conventional force deployments. See Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited Conflicts, 56. India's former director general of military operations, General V.R. Raghavan, similarly notes that India started moving its major military formations toward their battle locations. V.R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” Nonproliferation Review 8, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001): 6. 47 Ved Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, 146. 48 Further, India's military leaders and the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) considered the political leadership's initial restraint decision (to hold back from military operations across the Line of Control) to be reviewable and alterable if the situation warranted. In addition, supporting the COSC view, the National Security Advisory Board had recommended to the CCS—via national security advisor Brajesh Mishra—that the Indian military should be allowed to cross the Line of Control, and Mishra conveyed this message to the CCS and to his U.S. counterpart in mid-June. 49 India's army chief indicated this on 23 June, Prime Minister Vajpayee mentioned it on 26 June, and on 2 July, India's national security advisor Brajesh Mishra told CNN that “though we do not want to escalate the conflict, the likelihood of crossing the Line of Control by Indian troops into Pakistan occupied Kashmir cannot be ruled out.” Times of India, 3 July 1999. 50 The Cabinet Committee on Security could have deliberated and delayed, but was not necessarily a restraining force on, military action. In military crises, it was routinely supplemented by the national security advisor and, when required for advice or information, by the service chiefs and senior civilian bureaucrats. It often took decisions in an ad hoc manner without the benefit of well-considered papers drawn up by experts and ministries concerned. See Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process, 176. 51 For example, in January 2000, Defense Minister Fernandes drew attention to the limited war option, and retired army chief General Malik noted that the “strategy adopted for Kargil, including LoC constraints [India's remaining on its side of the Line of Control], may not be applicable in the next war.” “Limited War Can Erupt Any Time: Malik,” Times of India, 6 January 2000. 52 V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), 65. 53 “All Options are Open: PM,” The Hindu, 20 December 2001. 54 Thus, in a 19 December speech to Parliament, Prime Minister Vajpayee noted that India had already exercised much restraint and that diplomatic initiatives were being explored, but that other (military) options were also open. Echoing similar views, commentator Raja Mohan (a member of India's national security advisory board) stated, “If Pakistan does not quickly respond to the demarche delivered by India last week to shut down the operations of the terrorist organisations on its soil, India would be compelled to use force against it.” C. Raja Mohan, “Between War and Peace,” The Hindu, 20 December 2001. 55 Sumit Ganguly and Michael Kraig, “The 2001–02 Military Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (Winter 2004–05): 290–324. 56 These three steps were noted in a demarche that Indian foreign secretary Chokila Iyer gave to Pakistan high commissioner Ashraf Jehangir Qazi in New Delhi on 14 December. 57 While Musharraf's government started to crack down on radical religious schools in Pakistan, Pakistan had long identified Islamic groups fighting in Kashmir as freedom fighters, and these groups retained the backing of sections of the intelligence, military, and the public; Musharraf's government therefore found it difficult to crack down thoroughly on them. 58 India also moved additional air assets to Rajasthan to neutralize similar movements by Pakistan and began laying thousands of mines on the border in Punjab and Rajasthan. “Mines Laid on Rajasthan, Punjab Border,” Asian Age, 26 December 2001; Sandeep Dikshit, “Strike Forces Moved Closer to the Border,” Hindu, 21 December 2001. 59 “Pakistan's Welcome Gestures,” New York Times, 3 January 2002. 60 “India Gives Musharraf Nuclear War Warning,” Telegraph, 12 January 2002. 61 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis, report no. 57 (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2006), 25. 62 Pakistan interpreted the missile test in two ways: (1) India was not satisfied with Musharraf's 12 January speech and was not ready to scale back the crisis, and (2) the new missile was Pakistan-specific, and therefore a clear signal that India was testing its military capabilities versus Pakistan. Khan, “Nuclear Signaling,” in Escalation Control, 89. 63 Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan to Cut Islamists' Links To Spy Agency,” New York Times, 20 February 2002. 64 See “No Decline in Cross-Border Infiltration,” The Hindu, 7 May 2002. 65 Howard French and Celia W. Dugger,|“U.S. India-Pakistan Mission Fails to Ease the Standoff,” New York Times, 16 May 2002. 66 Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Pakistan, India Close to War, Says Musharraf,” Dawn, 23 May 2002. 67 Celia W. Dugger and Howard W. French,|“To the Drums of War, India Expels Pakistan Ambassador,” New York Times, 19 May 2002. 68 “Delhi May Abrogate Water Treaty: Dixit,” Daily Times, 19 May 2002. 69 Barry Bearak, “Indian Leader's Threat of War Rattles Pakistan and the U.S.,” New York Times, 23 May 2002. 70 Khan, “Pakistan, India Close to War”. 71 “No Infiltration Across Border, Says Musharraf,” Dawn, 28 May 2002; “Pakistan Vows Its ‘Full Might’ If a War Comes,” New York Times, 27 May 2002; “Musharraf Pledges to Rein In Militants; New Vow on Kashmir Fails To Sway India,” Washington Post, 28 May 2002. 72 “New Delhi Reaction to Speech Regretted,” Dawn, 29 May 2002. 73 “Citing Tension, U.S. Advises Americans In India To Leave,” New York Times, 1 June 2002. Washington had picked up the significance of the standing up of three Indian strike divisions (which had been deployed in December but then stood down during de-escalation, and now moved to forward positions), and all indicators pointed to an imminent war. While continuing diplomatic attempts to halt war, U.S. officials also recognized that their efforts may fail, and in this context, they ordered U.S. citizens out of the region. Nayak and Krepon, U.S. Crisis Management; Sawhney and Sood, Operation Parakram, 82. 74 For example, on 24–26 May, Colin Powell phoned General Musharraf twice while traveling with President Bush in Europe. Powell phoned British foreign secretary Jack Straw three times to coordinate policy. Presidents Bush and Putin also issued a joint statement, and Bush urged Pakistan's president to “stop the incursions” of insurgents. See “Bush Joins Putin In Urging Pakistan To Curb Militants,” New York Times, 26 May 2002. In a twenty-minute phone call with Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated, “It is absolutely necessary to avoid a war, but there is a limit to our patience,” while in a news conference during talks with British foreign minister Jack Straw, Jaswant Singh asserted, “General Musharraf has had all the time that he wants since September 11…. It is vital that he sees the urgency of the situation.” See “Vajpayee Says There is a Limit to Tolerance,” Khaleej Times, 29 May 2002. 75 “India Tones Down War Talk as U.S. Presses Pakistanis,” New York Times, 4 June 2002. 76 Musharraf noted that “de-escalation alone” by India would not be enough, and also sought the “initiation of [a] dialogue process [and] reduction of atrocities within Kashmir. And when I say that, on defining it, it really means that as a first step, the [Indian] military should leave the towns and cities of Kashmir and be in the outskirts.”Washington Post, 27 May 2002. 77 Erick Eckholm, “Pakistan Has Rounded Up 1,430 As Part of Plan to Curb Militants,” New York Times, 15 January 2002. 78 It is worth clarifying that if U.S. diplomacy was not intensive but was only sporadic, and if it was not at the very highest levels (involving the president, secretary of state, and deputy secretary of state), then it was less likely to have influenced New Delhi. 79 “Bush Speaks To Leaders And Urges Negotiation,” New York Times, 14 January 2002. 80 Michael Gordon, “Kashmir Threat Eases, but U.S. Still Sees Dangers,” New York Times, 20 January 2002. 81 “Full Text of Statement Issued by the Ministry of External Affairs,” Times of India, 14 January 2002. 82 Nayak and Krepon, U.S. Crisis Management, 36. 83 “U.S. Envoy Spells Out to Pakistan Steps to Lower Tension,” New York Times, 7 June 2002. 84 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 226. 85 Celia W. Dugger with Thom Shanker,|“Indian Sees Hope As Pakistan Halts Kashmir Militants,” New York Times, 9 June 2002. “India Believes Pakistan Restrains Militants,” New York Times, 6 June 2002. 86 “Kashmiri Militants Angry at Being Blocked From India,” New York Times, 9 June 2002. 87 For example, India's external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, told Colin Powell that Musharraf's pledge was a “step forward and in the right direction.” Dugger,|“Indian Sees Hope.” See also “A Defining Moment in Islamabad: U.S.-Brokered ‘Yes’ Pulled India, Pakistan From Brink of War,” Washington Post, 22 June 2002. 88 “Musharraf Says Pakistan Was Ready to Wage Nuclear War,” Washington Post, 30 December 2002. A day later, Pakistan clarified that Musharraf was referring to irregular, not nuclear, war, but New Delhi and participants in the crisis interpreted such rhetoric as the latter. 89 Stephen Cohen, “South Asia,” in Strategic Asia 2002–03, ed. Richard Ellings and Aaron Friedgerg (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 292. 90 See Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan—A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network (Landau Network-Centro Volta, Como, Italy, 14 January 2002). 91 Pakistan moved its Hatf-1, Hatf-2, and M-11 missiles in December. In May, Pakistan moved Shaheen missiles close to the border. Bill Gertz, “India, Pakistan Prepare Nukes, Troops for War,” Washington Times, 31 December 2001; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Indian Missiles Put ‘in Position,’” Washington Post, 27 December 2001. See also Mayed Ali, “Pakistan, India Said Moved Tactical Nuclear Arms along Borders,” The News, 28 May 2002; “Pakistan Deploys Shaheen Missiles to Cope with Possible Indian Attack; U.S. Informed,” Nation, 20 May 2002. On Pakistan's three missile tests, President Musharraf noted that they “validated … the deterrence value of Pakistan's premier surface-to-surface missiles … [We] need to ensure that the three basic ingredients of the deterrence—capability, credibility, and resolve—never get compromised.” “Nation Proud of Missile Test Results, Says Musharraf,” The News, 18 June 2002. 92 Major General Ashok Mehta, “India Was on Brink of War Twice,” Rediff.com, 2 January 2003, http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jan/02ashok.htm. 93 For the evolution of th