Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Italian bipolarism and the elections of 2006. End of the line or just a connecting stop?

2006; Routledge; Volume: 11; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13545710600979701

1469-9583

Adriano Pappalardo,

Abstract The recent Italian elections have taken place under a new proportional system, but have confirmed and even strengthened the main trends already at work since the beginning of Italy's political transition. The center-left coalition has won by the slightest margin, thus ensuring the third alternation in power since 1994. The system's extreme competitiveness underscores its full-fledged bipolar format, the eclipse of center parties, and the continuing electoral stagnation and political integration of extreme left and right. These trends coexist with a party system fragmentation whose level is within the standard of other European systems of moderate pluralism and this fragmentation is, moreover, kept at bay by the coordination ensured by the majority bonus seats provided through the electoral law. At the same time, the main parties show persistently low levels of structural consolidation, that tend to hinder the stability and effectiveness of coalition cabinets. This problem might paradoxically have been sharpened by systemic competitiveness through a negative impact on coalitional discipline and the maximization of destabilizing effects of the smallest changes in electoral and parliamentary behavior. Keywords: Italyelectionscompetitivenessbipolarismtransition Notes 1 According to a simulation done by Antonio Agosta and Nicola D'Amelio, published in La Repubblica, 15 April 2006. 2 The majority bonus is an extra set of seats awarded to the winning electoral coalition (and taken away from the losing coalition), in order always to ensure a parliamentary base that is sufficient to govern. This bonus, however, is calculated differently in the two chambers of the Italian parliament: while in the Chamber of Deputies the bonus is awarded to the coalition with the greatest number of votes on a national level, in the Italian Senate the bonus, or rather the bonuses, are awarded region by region. Given the difference among regions in demographic terms and in terms of seats, the center-right thus received a total of over 400,000 more votes than the center-left and 153 seats as against 148 seats (excluding Valle d'Aosta, Trentino/Alto-Adige, and the foreign constituency); but the figure would have risen to an absolute majority (ca.166) with a national bonus. 3 Attributing DE to the center-left may be a controversial decision, because its leader (Mario D'Antoni) ran for office in the Margherita component of the Ulivo, while the organization and the symbol of the party official went to the center-right UDC. Because DE was essentially a personal party, however, I have chosen to emphasize the choice of D'Antoni, rather than that of the organization, which is in any case largely imaginary. Moreover, I would point out that DE originated from the center-left and, more specifically, from the Partito Popolare in 2001: therefore, it strikes me as all the more accurate to attribute to that political sector its votes. 4 Like sovereignty of demand, sovereignty of supply originates from economic theory and, specifically, from the versions of economic theory that emphasize the monopolistic, or oligopolistic, structure of capitalist markets, deducing that the preferences of consumers are restricted, or 'shaped', or even created, by producers, thereby viewed as 'sovereigns'. In political terms, the same capacity is attributed to the parties with respect to the electors and their decisions. See Dunleavy (Citation1983). 5 Sartori (Citation1976: 329). The fallacy is avoided by Corbetta and Parisi (Citation1997: 18), who correctly emphasize the concomitant change of leaders and electors. 6 The literature on this subject is extensive. See, among others, Van der Eijk (Citation1993), Barnes (Citation1997), Dalton and Wattenberg (Citation2000), Karvonen and Kuhnle (Citation2001), Luther and Müller-Rommel (Citation2002). 7 Concerning these typologies of electors, see Sartori (Citation1976: ch. 10), Barisione (Citation2001), Campus (Citation2000). Which of these is most prevalent in the Italian electorate is a strictly empirical question that cannot be addressed in this context and which is in any case irrelevant to the subject under examination. 8 For confirmation, see Cartocci (Citation1996: Table 3), Pappalardo (Citation2001: Table 7). Below, however, we will see that the relative stability of the red regions did not prevent a collapse of the left in 2001. 9 In detail, the 0.9 per cent was obtained by calculating the center-right/center-left difference in accordance with the coalitions competing in 2006 and assigning DE to the center-left in 2001; if instead we ignore the coalitions of 2006 and, with a more distinctly sociological approach, we assign DE and the radicals to the center-right, we obtain the highest number (4 per cent); and 2.8, finally, is the result of assigning DE and Lista Di Pietro to the third bloc. 10 The weakness of the confessional component of the Margherita (the former Christian Democrat Partito Popolare) was already evident in 2001 (Pappalardo Citation2001), despite the success enjoyed in that election by the party as a whole. Moreover, beginning at least in 2004, analyses of data and estimates from the Istituto Cattaneo in relation to partial elections and the regional elections of 2005 showed the Margherita as a whole declining systematically with respect to the DS. Taking this into account, I have estimated the vote that it received in 2006 in the Chamber of Deputies on the basis of its share of the total Senate vote for DS and the Margherita. The result (11.9 per cent) represents a 2.5-per cent drop from 2001, which is perfectly compatible with the information mentioned. Therefore, I have used this estimate in Table 5 to put at 22.9 per cent the total vote of the center parties in 2006. 11 Not included in the 8.2 per cent total is the Partito Popolare, long ago 'vanished' into the Margherita; but, to judge from the information provided in the previous note, what has largely survived of the former Christian Democratic party are the candidates, more than the electors. 12 D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte (Citation2006). The reverse side of this position is that without a single-member constituency, there cannot be bipolar competition (Bartolini et al. Citation2002: 375): an even more glaring blunder, as pointed out by Sartori (Citation2001: 471 – 2). 13 A particularly eloquent media-based confirmation of this legitimization was the first television interview of the newly elected secretary of Rifondazione Comunista, Franco Giordano. Asked for his opinion of a candidacy of Fini for President of the Italian Republic, he replied: 'I would not vote for him, but I would accept him if he were elected'. 14 Concerning the 'proportionalization' of the majority share in the mixed system, see Di Virgilio (Citation1996) and Pappalardo (Citation2001). 15 As explained in note 10, blame for the loss is thought to go to the Margherita, rather than the DS; but the fact that in 2001 DS were down −5.8 per cent in the 'red zone' is certainly no sign of good health and, in any case, renders a significant recovery as highly unlikely. 16 With the reservations and qualifications set out in the second paragraph and in Pappalardo (Citation2001); and we should take into account, in any case, that the national results of 2006 (0.9 per cent) conceal a volatility that is sharply differentiated by zone: from the 2.7 per cent in the south, to the 2 per cent of the north and the 0.3 per cent in central Italy.