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The Institutionalization of Propaganda in the Fascist Era: The Cases of Germany, Portugal, and Italy

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10848770.2012.699300

1470-1316

Goffredo Adinolfi,

Italian Fascism and Post-war Society

Abstract Almost a century after the emergence of right-wing dictatorships in twentieth-century Europe, a consensual regime paradigm has yet to be found. The debate always gets bogged down by ongoing attempts to find the definitive and complete definition of the two most common regime types: fascism or generic fascism, and totalitarianism/authoritarianism. This article claims that, although definitive nomenclatures are unlikely to be found, it is more useful to think of regimes as more or less approximating their ideal type than to posit their typologies in abstract terms. It therefore analyzes a key aspect of three dictatorial regimes: the functioning of the consensus-building institutions in Nazi Germany, in Fascist Italy, and in Salazarist Portugal. Propaganda is central to an understanding of these regimes, because it constitutes their ideological footprint—revealing what it aims for (inputs) and its capacity to impose those goals or make them popular (output). The three regimes examined here were very different from each other, and these differences can help us verify the degree to which each of them attained the standard of the totalitarian ideal type. Notes 1. “Italian Fascism and German National-Socialism were both attempts to create a charismatic leadership and “totalitarian tension” that was, in one form or another, also present in other dictatorships of the period. António Costa Pinto, “Elites, Single Parties and Political Decision-Making in Fascist-Era Dictatorships,” Contemporary European History 11.3 (2002): 429–54. 2. “The interaction between the single party, the government, the state apparatus and civil society appears fundamental if we are to achieve an understanding of the different ways in which the various dictatorships of the fascist era functioned.” António Costa Pinto, “Single Party, Cabinet and Political Decision-Making in Fascist Era Dictatorships: Comparative Perspectives,” in Ruling Elites and Decision-Making in Fascist Era Dictatorships, ed. António Costa Pinto (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 218. 3. Recent studies have highlighted that there was a much higher degree of intra-elite conflict within the Nazi regime than conveyed by earlier more monolithic views. See, for example, Aristotle Kallis, Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). However, for the purposes of this comparative study, it is the German case that shows the highest degree of regime and social “totalization.” 4. Emilio Gentile did not hesitate to consider Italian Fascism as an example of the totalitarian paradigm. In his opinion, “totalitarianism must be conceived as a revolutionary movement whose goals are to monopolize the control of politics, destroy the previous liberal regime and to establish a New State based on the dominion of the unique party.” Emilio Gentile, Fascismo, Storia e interpretazione (Bari: Laterza, 2002), 63–71 5. This study does not include the Spanish case because Spain was a relative latecomer to fascism and because of its demobilization following the Civil War. For an interesting analysis of this case, see Francisco Sevillano Calero, Propaganda y medios de comunicacion en el Franquismo (1936–1951) (Alicante: Universidade de Alicante, 2003), and Juan Linz, “Sistemas Totalitários e Regimes Autoritários,” Obras Escogidas 3 (Madrid: CEPC, 2009). 6. Although this may seem obvious, it is worth clarifying that generic fascism and totalitarianism are not synonymous. The first refers to right-wing single-party regimes, while the latter also includes the communist regimes, as Hannah Arendt suggests. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1962), 341–88. 7. Pinto reminds us that the “single party played a more modest role within the fascist regimes than it did within communist regimes. In the dictatorships associated with fascism the single party was not the regime's ‘ruling institution’—it was one of many.” Pinto, “Single Party, Cabinet and Political Decision-Making in Fascist Era Dictatorships,” 216–17. 8. The evolution of the concept of totalitarianism has contradictory aspects. Originating in Italy to define a state that occupies every area of organized life within its territory, Italian fascism is not considered by most specialists to be in that category today. My view is that we should return to the origins of the concept, which as Giovanni Gentile states in the Enciclopedia Italiana, means “all within the state, nothing without the state.” Giovanni Gentile, “Fascismo (dottrina del),” Enciclopedia Italiana (Roma: Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1932), vol. 14, 835–40.The key difference between totalitarianism and authoritarianism is not so much quantitative as qualitative: the two differ mainly in the level of ideological permeation of all state controlled bodies. My view is that Portugal, Germany, and Italy shared a comparable “totalitarian anxiety.” Thus Fernando Rosas has no problem in including the Estado Novo in the totalitarian paradigm. Fernando Rosas, “O salazarismo e o homem novo: ensaio sobre o Estado Novo e a questão do totalitarismo,” Analise Social 24. 4 (1994): 871–87. As underlined by Ian Kershaw, the paradox is that an overly restrictive definition would exclude even the Nazi regime. Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London: Edward Arnold, 1993). I am not persuaded by the idea that the difference between authoritarianism and totalitarianism resides in the latter's capacity to ignore the division between public and private life. Whether this line is blurred or not is a matter of political opportunity rather than of regime type. 9. I agree with Norberto Bobbio's contention that what fundamentally characterized fascist ideology was its “anti” stance, particularly its anti-parliamentarism. Norberto Bobbio, Dal fascismo alla democrazia, I regimi, le ideologie, le figure e le culture politiche (Milan: BCD Editore, 2008). 10. The totalitarian ideal type can not only be seen in dichotomous terms (a regime is either totalitarian or not). But as Charles Tilly explains, defining a political regime is also a matter of establishing the degree of its correspondence with the model. Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43. As stated by Max Weber, “ideal types” are fictional, and it is “a methodological utopia [which] cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.” Its validity can be ascertained only in terms of adequacy. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1949), 90. 11. The organic state and the liberal state are on opposite ends of the political spectrum. The first is based on the elimination of any kind of conflict and difference: the aim is a homogenous State; the latter works to mediate conflicts and conciliate differences. 12. “The active complicity or even passive consensus of the audience cannot be taken for granted, even in putatively ‘totalitarian’ systems where individual issues become related to a one-dimensional world-view. This is because, even in a revolutionary situation of a break with the past, the replacement of traditional values with attitudes derived from a ‘revolutionary’ ideology requires a long-term process of careful, step by step cultivation,” Aristotle Kallis, Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 4. 13. Bobbio explains extremely well the judicial and ideological foundations of the authoritarian regimes. His key point is precisely the organic character of these regimes: with their single-party driven anti-parliamentarism and anti-pluralism they constitute a modern reaction to liberalism. Bobbio, Dal fascismo alla democrazia, 45–48. 14. As Sartori notes, even when propaganda is ineffective, the repression of contradictory messages by censorship provokes apathy among the general public—people do not believe the message and lose interest in it. Propaganda thus takes a hold because in the state of apathy or what Sartori calls a “petrified or paralysed opinion,” no alternative or contradictory views are put forward. Sartori, Elementi di teoria politica, 177–216. 15. Jürgen Habermas, Storia e critica dell’opinione pubblica (Bari: Laterza, 1984). 16. It is evident that we are describing an ideal type because in reality the “single party was never trasformed into a dominant institution within the new regimes—not even in Nazi Germany.” Pinto, “Single Party, Cabinet and Political Decision-Making in Fascist Era Dictatorships: Comparative Perspectives,” 245. 17. It is interesting to note how already in 1935, at a seminar organized in Milan, Oreste Ranelletti spoke of the “single party's political regime.” Oreste Ranelletti, Gli Stati europei a partito politico unico (Milan: Panorama, 1936). 18. I am aware of the growing number of studies showing that power inside the Nazi regime was not as totalitarian as initially assumed. This is why I prefer “totalitarian tendencies” to “totalitarianism” tout court, and why it is important to see the degree to which real cases approximate the ideal type. However, Germany did come closer to being a totalitarian state compared to Portugal. 19. I would like to underline the heated debate between Tranfaglia and de Felice on the existence or not of a citizens’consensus under Mussolini. Nicola Tranfaglia, Labirinto italiano, fascismo, antifascism e gli storici (Milan: La Nuova Italia, 1989), and Renzo de Felice, Intervista sul fascismo (Bari: Laterza, 2008). 20. Manuel Braga da Cruz, O Partido e o Estado no Salazarismo (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1988). 21. Adinolfi, Ai confini del Fascismo, 41–45. 22. I may seem paradoxical that a dictatorial regime should obsessively respect the electoral calendar, yet “plebiscitarism” is insufficient to explain this. Elections under the Estado Novo also served to verify consensus in favor of the regime. See Philippe Schmitter, Portugal:do autoritarismo à democracia (Lisbon: ICS, 1999). 23. Adinolfi, Ai confini del Fascismo, 47–51. 24. “Our crusade in favour of Portuguese artists has begun to reap its first results … . In Portugal, all citizens will find their place in society. Even artists will find their due place.” Diário da Manhã, 15 March 1933. 25. David Welch, The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda (London: Routledge, 1993). 26. Among the various works on the relation between Italian fascism and propaganda, Cannistraro's is particularly worth noting. Philip Cannistraro, La fabbrica del consenso (Bari: Laterza, 1975). 27. It should be remembered that the Press Office already existed when Mussolini was appointed to the premiership. What the dictator did was to broaden its role considerably, providing it with substantial additional financial resources. 28. On 6 September 1934, Decree No. 1434 was promulgated, establishing the Undersecretary of State for the Press and Propaganda linked to the Head of Government. Gaetano Montefusco, L’ordinamento, I compiti e le attribuzioni del Ministero per la Cultura Popolare (Roma: Unione Editoriale Romana, 1939), 11. 29. “In particular, the Corriere della Sera believed that fascism could be used to create a large middle-class union capable of opposing the new mass parties.” Valerio Castronovo, La stampa italiana dall’unità al fascismo (Bari: Laterza, 1995), 280–81. 30. “At least until the thirties, fascist propaganda relied almost exclusively on the press. This is not as effective a totalitarian instrument as radio or film. Further, the content of propaganda promoted mostly traditional or nationalistic sentiments that were already widespread among Italians, and did not therefore require more than reinforcement and shrewd drafting.” Cannistraro, La fabbrica del consenso, 72–73. 31. Basically the norms adopted by fascism tended to increase repression by prefects against the press, which became almost unlimited. See Castronovo, La stampa italiana dall’unità al fascismo, 301–18. 32. Welch, The Third Reich, 23–30. 33. As explained by Cannistraro, Italian fascism distinguishes between high and low culture. In the first years of the regime, Mussolini concentrated on enlisting the intellectuals to support the aims of the regime. See, Cannistraro, La fabbrica del consenso, 27–69. 34. “Freedom of expression and thought in all of its forms,” Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Lisbon, National Assembly, 1936, Article 8, paragraph 4. “Special laws will regulate the exercise of freedom of expression, preventively impeding and repressing the perversion of public opinion in its function as a social force, while safeguarding the moral integrity of citizens” (Article 20, paragraph 1). 35. “Public opinion is a fundamental element of the politics and administration of the country; it shall be the duty of the State to protect it against all those agencies which distort it contrary to truth, justice, good administration and the common welfare” (1933, Article 21). “The press exercises a function of a political nature, by virtue of which it may not refuse to insert official notices issued by the government in matters of national interest” (1936, Article 23). 36. Decree-Law no. 23054, 25 September 1933. For more details about the similarities between Fascist Italy and Salazarist Portugal, see Mario Ivani, “Il Portogallo di Salazar e l’Italia fascista: una comparazione,” Studi storici 46.2 (2005): 347–406; and Giulia Albanese, “Comparare i fascismi. Una analisi storiografica,” Storica 43–45 (2010): 313–43. 37. As Welch writes: “The communications media—the press, radio and film—had a circular interrelationship in that they supplied each other with themes in the manner prescribed by the State, and supported each other in their effect by a simultaneous and graduated release of information, which was circulated, controlled, and modulated by the State” (The Third Reich, 48, 103–10). 38. Welch: “In the first year of the war, propaganda had a relatively easy task capitalising on the Blitzkrieg victories … . War imposes considerable strains on political systems … . The history of Nazi propaganda during the war is one of declining effectiveness” (The Third Reich, 90–125). “At the same time that Goebbels counselled restraint with regard to the reporting of the military situation, Hitler and His press chief, Otto Dietrich, bypassed the RMVP and arranged the broadcast of twelve ‘special announcements’ over the radio in hourly intervals” (The Third Reich, 111). 39. Welch: “During the war, new stars complicated the power struggle even further … . The RMVP's Foreign Press section had remained a small office attached to the overall Press Division … . Claiming direct authorization from the Fuhrer, Ribbentrop presented to his opponent a decree that allowed the AA to engage propaganda activities and consolidate its institutional gains” (The Third Reich, 50). 40. Decree-law 20054 of 25 September 1933, Article 6. 41. Cannistraro, La fabbrica del consenso, 34–42. 42. Welch: “A plenty of administrative bodies were created to facilitate the government's control on cinema. Yet the striking fact remains that Italian cinema was basically autonomous and independent from the state” (The Third Reich, 321–22). 43. Colarizi, L’opinione degli italiani sotto il regime, 175–203. 44. I concur with António Costa Pinto when he says: “I readily confess that I do not know where the tendency for ‘short definitions’ of fascism comes from. Such definitions are obviously central to the functionality of an analysis: however, some are little more than sound-bites. There has, to my knowledge, been no similar obsession in the study of communism or democracy.” António Costa Pinto, “Back to European Fascism,” Contemporary European History 15.1 (2006): 104. 45. This is one of the central points of Arendt's thought, although it is hard to see what the difference between propaganda and inculcation might be. Inculcation requires propaganda, and when propaganda works in a single-party system we have a totalitarian regime. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 305–479.