On the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers
1989; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 32; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/467175
ISSN1537-5285
AutoresGary M. Anderson, William F. Shughart, Robert D. Tollison,
Tópico(s)Judicial and Constitutional Studies
ResumoPrevious articleNext article No AccessOn the Incentives of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth TransfersGary M. Anderson, William F. Shughart II, and Robert D. TollisonGary M. Anderson Search for more articles by this author , William F. Shughart II Search for more articles by this author , and Robert D. Tollison Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 32, Number 1Apr., 1989 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467175 Views: 8Total views on this site Citations: 42Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1989 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Bryan P. 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