Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy Toward China (1949–50)

2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636410701740890

1556-1852

Wooseon Choi,

Chinese history and philosophy

Abstract American policy toward China during the early Cold War has long been considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory. Many realists have argued that domestic forces caused a confrontational policy, overriding structural imperative to accommodate China to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. Refuting the domestic explanation, I argue that balance of power consideration primarily determined the U.S. policy. Under the powerful pressure of bipolar competition, the Truman administration persistently pursued a realist policy of forming an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralizing it, through accommodation in order to balance the Soviet Union in Asia. This policy was based on the assessment of Soviet superiority in Asia. However, my analysis of the power structure shows that there was little structural incentive for China to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union because the latter was in a somewhat disadvantageous position globally and had limited offensive capabilities in Asia. Further, Chinese leaders perceived the United States as the superior power in bipolarity. Consequently, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to check the United States according to its own balance of power logic. Wooseon Choi is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of New Orleans. I thank John Mearsheimer, Robert Pape, Stephen Walt, Dali Yang, and anonymous reviewers for Security Studies for their helpful comments. Notes 1For the most prominent works, see Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1952); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), chap. 7; and Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Also see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977). 2 Balance of power theorists agree that alliance formations are defensive actions of weaker states to check the dominance of the greatest power. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1973), 167–97; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addition-Wesley, 1979), 118–27; and John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), chap. 6, 8. 3Morgenthau argues that this U.S. policy was the result of domestic pressures from the China bloc and anticommunist Republicans. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest, 205–6, 324–35; “The United States and China,” in China in Crisis, vol. 2, ed., Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 101. Snyder maintains that the confrontational policy mainly resulted from the coalition logrolling of the Truman administration with Republican internationalists and Asia-first anticommunists to ensure congressional support for crucial European programs. Snyder, Myths of Empire, 258–62. 4 Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 5. 5 Ibid. As a strategic gain for the United States, Christensen notes that the military tensions on the Sino-Soviet border after the early 1970s pinned down a larger number of Soviet forces than the central European theater. He also opines that in the early Cold War period, the outcome of the realist policy of the United States would have been a working relationship with China, which could have weakened the Sino-Soviet alliance and helped avoid the escalation of the Korean War. See ibid., 138–40. 6 Ibid., 4. 7 Ibid., 69–76. 8 Ibid., 59–61, 66. 9 Ibid., 61–65. 10 Ibid., 94–95. 11 Ibid., 84–85, 88. 12 Ibid., 100–4. 13 Marshall stated in February 1947 that “the view of the Department, my own view and I believe the President's view, is that at the appropriate time we should endeavor to arrange to give them some financial assistance, but when that time comes is another matter.” Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions (Historical Series), vol. I, 81st Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1976, 2. Also see Statement by the President, 18 December 1946, Official Files 150 (1945–46), box 757, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL). 14See Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent), 26 May 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1947, Vol. 7, 833–34; Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 2 July 1947, ibid., 635. 15 Outline of Criticism of China Policy, 6 July 1949, RG 59, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs (ROCA), C0012, reel 12, National Archives (NA); Memorandum from Charles C. Stelle to Butterworth, 17 October 1947, RG 59, State Department Central Files (SDCF), LM 185, reel 4, NA. 16 Marshall testified that “we have to have a concrete proposal for you and we have been trying to draw one since last May.” See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Interim Aid for Europe, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 45. 17 Memorandum on Economic Aid Program for China by Assistant Chief of the Division of Investment and Economic Development (Melville H. Walker), 28 November 1947, FRUS 1948, Vol. 8, 442; Memorandum on China Aid to the Secretary of State by Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) (Clinton T. Wood), 30 December 1947, ibid., 442; and Butterworth Memo to the Secretary of State, 24 January 1948, RG 59, SDCF, LM 185, reel 4, NA. 18 See House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on Emergency Foreign Aid, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, 7, 14; Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 465. 19See the telegrams from China posts in FRUS 1947, Vol. 7. By the end of 1947, the KMT had the numerical advantage over the Communists by 2,700,000 to 1,150,000. 20Marshall remarked in a Senate hearing that “they might be able to stay the Communist march to the north of the Yangtze River and hold themselves certain point there; they might in Manchuria be able to, say, establish in effect a point of resistance with Mukden as the outlying post and going back to the ports …. They have not lost Peiping, they have not lost Tientsin.” See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948, Held in Executive Session, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1973, 356–57. 21 See Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 June 1947, FRUS 1947, Vol. 7, 842–45; and NSC 6, “The Position of the United States Regarding Short-Term Assistance to China,” 26 March 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. 8, 45–46. 22Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 64–65. 23 See Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 246–47, 252; and Princeton Seminar, 22–23 July 1953, Acheson Papers, box 89, HSTL, 573. Also see Monthly Survey, RG 59, Records of Public Opinion Studies (Foster Papers), box 11, NA. 24 In a February 1947 NORC survey, 43 percent supported a large-scale loan to the National Government and 43 percent opposed it. See Monthly Survey, March 1947, ibid. 25Public opinion did not impose strong constraints on the administration's choices. In fact, public opinion regarding aid to China closely followed the position taken by the administration. A majority of 50–70 percent supported the ERP since July 1947. See Monthly Survey, Foster Papers, box 11, NA; Special Report of American Opinions, Foster Papers, box 33; U.S. Opinion on European Reconstruction, Foster Papers, box 50. 26 During this period, the only active members of the China bloc were Senator Styles Bridges and Representatives Walter Judd and John Vorys. 27 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was filled with internationalists. Taft also deferred to the leadership of Vandenberg in foreign affairs. See David Kepley, The Collapse of the Middle Way: Senate Republicans and Bipartisan Foreign Policy, 1948–1953 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 7, 12; and David Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 29, 33. 28 Republicans, mostly conservatives, were in the majority (13–11) in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 29 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948, 351. 30 NSC 22, “Possible Courses of Action for the U.S. with regard to the Critical Situation in China,” 26 July 1948, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), box 13, NA; NSC 22/1, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 5 August 1948, FRUS 1948, Vol. 8, 133–35. 31Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward China, 2 November 1948, ibid., 185–87. 32 See Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Acting Secretary of State, 3 November 1948, ibid., 187–89. 33 NSC 34/1, “United States Policy toward China,” 11 January 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 475. 34 NSC 34/2, “U.S. Policy toward China,” 28 February 1949, ibid., 494–95. 35 NSC 41, “United States Policy Regarding Trade with China,” 28 February 1949, ibid., 826–34. 36Truman, especially, did not make up his mind on the Titoist policy to draw Communist China away from the Soviet Union until November 1949, although he approved NSC 41 because an immediate decision on trade policy toward the Communist areas was needed. 37 Monthly Survey, March 1949, Foster Papers, box 12, NA. 38 See The Military Situation in the Far East, 1909. In the 81st Congress, Democrats were the majority in the Senate (54–42). In the SFRC, Democrats maintained the maximum majority of 8–5. 39See Monthly Survey, May 1949, Foster Papers, box 12, NA; Special Report on American Opinion, 28 June 1949 and 12 September 1949, box 33, ibid. 40 In the 81st Congress, Democrats became the majority (262–172) in the House. In the HFAC, the democrats were also the majority (15–11). 41About 50 percent of the public supported the MAP from March to August 1949. See Special Report on American Opinion, 20 June 1949, 21 July 1949, and 29 March 1950, Foster Papers, box 33, NA. 42 In a 30 August subcommittee meeting, Tydings suggested to make a concession to Knowland for the maximum support of the Military Assistance Program, but under the leadership of Connally and Vandenberg, they decided to fight it out with Knowland. See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Assistant Program: 1949, Held in Executive Session, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1974, 476. 43For the plan of an independent Taiwan government, see footnote 53. 44About 70 percent of the public supported the extension of the ERP. See Special Report on American Opinion, Foster Papers, box 33, NA. The Congress authorized the exact amount requested by the administration. 45The Secretary of the State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart), 24 March 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 304. 46 NSC 22/3, “The Current Position of the United States Respecting Aid to China,” 2 February 1949, ibid., 479–80; and Memorandum of the 33rd NSC Meeting, 4 February 1949, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), box 220, HSTL. 47Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952), 530–31. 48 “United States Policy Toward Formosa,” 5 January 1950, The Department of State Bulletin (DSB) 22, no. 550: 79. The last shipment of a small amount of the already contracted materials ($6 million) was technically permitted. 49Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949–50, Held in Executive Session, 81st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., 1974, 224. 50The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 753. 51 Memorandum of Conversation between Zhou and Henry Kissinger (Taiwan), 7 July 1971, Nixon Presidential Material Project (NPMP), NSC [files], FILE [for the President-China Materials], box 1032, 2, NA; and Remin Ribao, 29 June 1950, cited in Tsou, America's Failure in China, 561. 52 NSC 37, “The Strategic Importance of Formosa,” 1 December 1948, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 261–62. 53 NSC 37/1, “The Position of the United States with Regard to Formosa,” ibid., 270–75. See also NSC 37/5, “Supplementary Measures with Respect to Formosa,” 1 March 1949, FRUS, ibid., 290–92. 54 Consul at Taipei (Edgar) to the Secretary of State, 4 May 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 326–27. 55Statement by the Secretary of State at the 35th Meeting of the NSC, 3 March 1949, RG 59, PPS, box 13, NA. 56 NSC 37/8, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” 6 October 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 392–97. 57 NSC 41, “United States Policy Regarding Trade with China.” In contrast, the United States restricted extensive 1-B items as well as 1-A items in trade with the Soviet Union and its satellite states. 58Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” 5 March 1949, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (SWM) 4 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969), 371. 59The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to Secretary of State, 30 April 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 976–77; The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to Secretary of State, 14 May 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 8, 745–47; and Memorandum by General Chen Ming-shu, Chairman of the Shanghai Board of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, 10 July 1949, ibid., 771–79. 60For contacts with Chinese leaders through other channels, see The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, 13 June 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 8, 756–57; Memorandum by General Chen Ming-shu, ibid.; The Consul General at Shanghai (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State, 21 January 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, 289–93; and The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Peiping, 22 March 1950, ibid., 321-22. 61The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to Secretary of State, 8 June 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 8, 752–53; The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to Secretary of State, 26 July 1949, ibid., 801–2. 62 The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, 12 July 1949, ibid., 424; Memorandum by General Chen Ming-shu, ibid. 63 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 17 September 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 84; Memorandum by Charlton Ogburn, Jr. of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, 2 November 1949, ibid., 161. 64The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State, 16 July 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 8, 436–39; The Counselor of Embassy in China (Jones) to the Secretary of State, 3 September 1949, ibid., 519–21; and The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State, 8 October 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 112–15. Also see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 50–56. 65 Report by Charles W. Yost, Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), 16 September 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 7, 1204–8. 66Transcript, Round Table Discussion on American Policy toward China, 6–8 October 1949, Department of State. 67Memorandum by Charlton Ogburn, Jr., 160–61. 68 Outline of Far Eastern and Asian Policy for Review with the President, 14 November 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 7, 1210–14. 69Memorandum for the President, 19 November 1949, RG 59, SDCF, LM 185, reel 5, NA. 70 Regarding the meeting, Truman said that “he had gotten a new insight into the reasons for the Communist success in China, a better understanding of the whole situation, and found himself thinking about it in a quite new way.” Conversation with the President, 17 November 1949, Acheson Papers, box 65, HSTL. 71 Ibid. 72See Robert Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origin of American Containment Policy in East Asia (New York: W.W. orton, 1982), 169–71. 73 NSC 48/2, “The Position of the United States with Respect of Asia,” 30 December 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 7, 1215–20. 74 In addition, the JCS proposed military aid and the dispatch of a survey mission to Taiwan in December. Truman and Acheson rejected the proposal. See Memorandum of Conversation, by Secretary of State, 29 December 1949, FRUS 1949, Vol. 9, 463–67. 75Truman stated that the Economic Cooperation Act (ECA) program of the CAA would be continued. The State Department, which had been preparing for its extension, accepted the Senate bill to extend the economic aid program (planning to use up to $10 million of the total $104 million in Taiwan) to 30 June. On 19 January, the House unexpectedly turned down the small Korea Aid Act (KAA) of $60 million by a vote of 192 to 191. House Republicans led by Vorys could then make a counterattack on Truman's 5 January statement by forming a coalition with Southern Democrats. In this situation, the administration decided to introduce the Senate bill to the House and attach it to the KAA. It passed the House. In May, according to the previous plan, the State Department again introduced the bill to extend the ECA fund until 30 June 1951 to use it in the general area of China. Different from the argument of Christensen, it was not the case that the administration was forced to reverse its China policy by overwhelming domestic forces linking it to the KAA. The extension of the small humanitarian ECA fund was the administration's established policy. In this case, the already decided extension bill was attached to the KAA as a sop to buy some more votes in the House. Indeed, the KAA was not important enough for the administration to reverse its China policy. 76 See Special Report on American Opinion, 13 February 1950, Foster Papers, box 33, NA. 77 “Crisis in Asia-An Examination of U.S. Policy,” 12 January 1950, DSB 22, no. 551: 115. 78 Memorandum on Secretary's Meeting on China Trade Policy, 12 April. 1950, RG 59, ROCA, C0012, reel 15, NA; and Memorandum of the 56th NSC Meeting, 5 May 1950, PSF, box 220, HSTL. 79See H. S. Foster Memo, 7 June 1950, Foster Papers, box 33, NA. 80 American diplomats withdrew until April to avoid further accidents that would ruin the prospect of recognition. 81 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Review of World Situation: 1949–50, Held in Executive Session, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1974, 95, 134, 271. 82 Foster Memo to Fisher (FE), 7 July 1949, Foster Papers, box 33, NA; Special Report on American Opinion, 13 January 1950, ibid. 83 The fall of Taiwan by the end of 1950 was explicitly anticipated. 84 Extract from a Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State, 30 May 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, 349–51. 85 Memorandum by the Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence (Howe) to W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 31 May 1950, ibid., 147–49. 86 On 12 June, after his meeting with Acheson, Dulles told Chinese Ambassador Wellington Koo that Acheson had persisted with his policy course and that the support of KMT would not be forthcoming. Cited in Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and America's China Policy 1949–79 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 33. 87 See “United States Policy Toward Asia,” 27 March 1950, DSB 22, no. 560: 459; CIA, Review of the World Situation, 273. 88 Progress Report on NSC 48/5, 25 September 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. 6, 82. 89 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 357–58; and P. Bairoch, “Europe's Gross, National Product, 1800–1975,”Journal of European Economic History 5 (1976): 292. 90 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 74. 91The United States had maintained its atomic monopoly until 1948 and an advantage of 9:1 in number of nuclear weapons in 1956. “U.S. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1945–1989: Numbers of Weapons,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientist (November 1987): 53. Also see David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983): 3–71. The United States possessed a large number of strategic bombers that could directly attack the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the Soviets began to introduce a small number of long-range bombers in the mid-1950s. See Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museum Program, 1996); Norman Polmar, ed., Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft, and Missiles (Annapolis: Nautical Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1979); Asher Lee, The Soviet Air Power (London: Ducksworth, 1950); and Asher Lee, ed., Soviet Air and Rocket Forces (New York: Praeger, 1959). 92 In 1948, Soviet manpower strength was 2,874,000 including ground forces in contrast to about 1,500,000 of U.S. manpower. See Matthew Evangelista, “Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised,” International Security 7, no. 3 (1982/83): 286–87 93 The Soviet Union deployed about 30 full strength divisions in eastern Europe backed by some 70 divisions in western Russia in the late 1940s. Ibid., 288, 300. 94 NIE 11-14-16, “Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1964–1970,” 10 December 1964, RG 263, [Records of the] CIA, Entry 19, NIE Concerning Soviet Military Power 1950–1984 (Second Set), box 16, NA; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1968–69 (London: IISS, 1968); Allen S. Whiting, Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 89–90; and Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict,” in Diplomacy of Power, ed. Stephen Kaplan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 287. 95 See JIC 435/12, “Soviet Intentions and Capabilities 1949, 1956/57,” 16 December 1948, RG 218, JCS, 092 USSR (3-27-45), Sec. 33–39, NA; Harry Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korean War (Westwood: Greenwood Press, 1982), 190. 96 U.S. military leaders generally agreed on the air superiority of the United States in the Asian theater. See The Military Situation in the Far East, 7, 79, 1204, 1379, 1524. 97 In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union reached parity with the United States in overall military balance, especially in strategic balance. More importantly, the Soviets upset the regional balance to their advantage by building up their nuclear and conventional forces (from about 15 understrength divisions to 40 modernized divisions) on the border with China while U.S. power retreated from Asia. 98 China maintained a field army of 1,710,000 in 1950. Kissinger assessed that “[until] almost 1965–66, a rough military balance had existed along the Sino-Soviet border.” See Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 166–67. 99 See The Military Situation in the Far East, 1379. For a study of the contingency war plan with China, see CIA-SE 27, 29 May 1952, RG 263, CIA, NA; JCS 2118 series, RG 218, JCS, NA. 100 For Mao's estimations of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, see Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitude toward Nuclear Weapon: China and the United States during the Korean War (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), 16–17, 28–29, 181–182. Actually, China immediately backed down in the confrontations in 1953, 1954, and 1958 after the U.S.'s nuclear blackmails. See Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 168–73; and Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 220–24, 247–51. 101Mao Zedong, “Talks with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong,” SWM 4, 99–100. 102Cited in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 251. 103 Memorandum of Conversation between Zhou and Kissinger (Philosophy), 9 July 1971, NPMP, NSC, FILE, box 1032, 9, NA. Foreign Minister Chi also remarked in 1972 that in the post World War II period, due to the enormous expansion of American economic and nuclear strengths, “the US had ‘indisputable superiority in strategic strength.”’ However, he stated that the “President himself noted in the July 1971 Foreign Policy Report that the US was no longer in a position of ‘complete predominance.”’ Memorandum of Conversation between Rogers and Chi, 24 February1972, NPMP, NSC, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files-Far East, box 91, 2, NA. 104 See Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 97. 105 Jian Chen, China's Road to the Korean War: the Making of Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 9–10. 106 For ideological arguments, see Douglas Macdonald, “Communist Bloc Expansion in the early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism,”International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 152–88; Jian Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Michael Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Quansheng Zhao, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Also see “Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (1997): 71–115. 107See Sergei N. Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Litai Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and Communist China 1945–1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). Later, while expressing his appreciation for Soviet assistance in Manchuria after the surrender of Japan, Mao contended that the Soviets had pressed him to negotiate with the KMT even in the last phase of the civil war in order to maintain the status quo at the expense of the Chinese revolution. He also criticized Stalin's insistence on China's concession of certain sovereign rights during the treaty negotiation. Mao even said to the Soviet ambassador that “there had existed no such thing as brotherly relations among all the parties because [your leaders] merely paid lip service and never meant it: as a result, the relations between [the brotherly parties] can be described as between father and son or between cats and mice.” Minutes of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Ambassador Yudin, 20 July 1958, Cold War International History Project Bulletin (CWIHPB) 8/9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996/97): 155. 108 Chen, China's Road to the Korean War, 68. 109 Mao Zedong, “On the People's Democratic Dictatorship,” 1 July 1949, SWM 4, 411–24. 110 Cited in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 31. 111 “Report, Mao Zedong, At the Sixth Session of the Central People's Government Council,” 11 April 1950 in Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, eds. Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996), 148. In his speech to urge the ratification of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Mao emphasized the importance of the treaty in deterring U.S. power, stating that “if the imperialists are preparing to attack us, we already have help.” For internal discussions on the strategic importance of the treaty within the CCP, see Chen, China's Road to the Korean War, 85. Realist calculations continued to dominate the subsequent Sino-Soviet relations. The main causes of the ideological dispute between China and the Soviet Union since the mid-1950s were their diverging policies toward the U.S. and their increasing power competition. The ideological dispute turned to a military competition as the Soviets built up its military forces in Asia after China had developed nuclear weapons in 1964. For the Sino-Soviet dispute, see G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Sino-Soviet Dispute (London: The China Quarterly, 1961); William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964); and John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics 1963–1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) 112 Notably, on the basis of his balance of threat theory, Walt argues that ideologies largely determined the perceptions of Chinese and American leaders of others' intentions, causing their mutual antagonism. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 310–323. Also see Steven M. Goldstein, “Chinese Communist Policy toward the United States: Opportunities and Constraints, 1944–50,” in Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947–50, eds. Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (New York Columbia University Press, 1980). For the study of the impact of ideology on the China policy of the United States, see Jie Chen, Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy (New York: Praeger, 1992). 113For Mao's principles of alliance which actually reflect balance of power logic, see Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction,” SWM 1, 316, 327, 333. 114For the united front strategy of the Chinese Communists during the civil war, see J. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and United Front Doctrine (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977); and James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Power: The Origins of Chinese-Communist Foreign Policy, 1944–1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). 115 After signing the treaty, Zhou stated in a speech to cadres of foreign ministry that “the stronger the people's strength becomes, the less possible that a new war will take place. In the final analysis, the international struggle reflects the balance of strength…. The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance has placed the U.S. imperialists in a disadvantageous position.” Zhou Enlai, “On the International Situation and Our Diplomatic Affairs after the Signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” 20 March 1950 in Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, eds. Zhang and Chen, 114–45. 116Mao Zedong, “Report to the Second Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” 371. In a report to Stalin during his visit, Liu informed him that “they [Americans] are trying in every possible way to show that they seek rapprochement with the CCP and, simultaneously, are striving to lure the CCP onto the path of rapprochement with the imperialist state. We are clearly aware of these imperialist schemings, and we have sufficient experience in combating them.” Then, he stated, “If imperialist countries adopt a policy of granting recognition to the new government in China, we will be ready then to establish diplomatic relations with these countries.” “Liu Shaoqi's Report to the CPSU CC Politburo,” 4 July 1949, in Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Washington, D.C. and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 1998), 308, 310–11. For the Chinese notice of continuous approaches by Americans including Jessup, see “Memorandum of Conversation of V.M. Molotov and A.Y. Vyshinski with the Chairman of the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong,” 17 January 1950, CWIHPB 8/9: 233. 117 CIA, Review of the World Situation, 138. Also see Chang, Friends and Enemies, 40. 118 In a 29 March hearing before the SFRC, Acheson forcefully advocated the policy of alliance again. He stated, “[w]e think we have a great force operating with us … you get the advantage of the gravitation of the earth or the turning of the earth, whatever it is that is behind the force. That is, that the Chinese inevitably, we believe, will come into conflict with Moscow, because the very basic objectives of Moscow are hostile to the very basic objectives of China.” CIA, Review of the World Situation, 273. 119 U.S. policy makers agreed on this strategic reason at the Blair House meeting. See Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), 25 June 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. 7, 158. Also see Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), 334. 120Memorandum of Conversation by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup); The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China, 14 August 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, 438. Truman ordered MacArthur to withdraw his message to the Veterans of Foreign War advocating an irrevocable commitment to the KMT. He also opposed the JCS proposal for preemptive bombing of Communist concentrations by the KMT. 121 See United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, 5 December 1950, FRUS 1950, Vol. 7, 1402; NSC 48/5, “United States Objectives, Policies, and Courses of Action in Asia,” 17 May 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. 6, 33–39.