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Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 19; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636411003796002

1556-1852

Emanuel Adler,

Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

Abstract This article seeks to initiate a new round of strategic intellectual innovation in an era when threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations and their state supporters do not resemble Cold War threats. Based on an interpretative sociological reading of the concepts of power, security, and rationality, it argues that a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" dilemma is to the post-Cold War era what the danger of surprise attack or unintended nuclear war was to the Cold War: the defining structural threat of international politics. The dilemma leaves states confronting asymmetrical warfare with the choice of reacting with force to a terrorist act or practicing appeasement. Neither approach, however, can achieve the goal of putting an end to terrorism. Deterrence sustains the dilemma by providing a rationale for why force should be used and why self-restraint is irrational. This article proposes a third option, defusing, which may be accomplished by denial (preventing provocateurs from dragging states into the use of force) and restructuration (transforming the structure and rules of the situation). Defusing relies on "performative power"—the capacity to project a dramatic and credible performance on the world stage and to decouple social actors, their audiences, and their most deeply held strategic beliefs. The force of the argument is illustrated by examples from the global "war on terror," the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008–09 operation "Cast Lead" in Gaza, and the Iranian nuclear crisis. Emanuel Adler is the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Chair in Israeli Studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto and editor of International Organization. Previously, he was professor of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His publications include Security Communities, Communitarian International Relations, Convergence of Civilizations, and "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics." His current work includes projects on the turn to practice in International Relations, a constructivist reconsideration of strategic logic including deterrence, European cooperative security and pluralistic integration, European civilization as a community of practice, and rationality and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For their comments and feedback, I thank the participants of the Research Group in International Security at McGill University and participants at seminars at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; the Institute for National Security Education and Research, University of Washington; the Institute of National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University; the Political Science Department, Concordia University; and the twenty-fifth annual meeting of the Association for Israel Studies. For their useful critical comments, I also thank Michael Barnett, Timothy Crawford, Stefano Guzzini, Stephen Hamberg, Patrick James, Robert O. Keohane, Jeffrey W. Knopf, Emily Landau, Oded Löwenheim, Amir Lupovici, Jon Mercer, Sophie Meunier, Helen Milner, Jennifer Mitzen, Patrick Morgan, T.V. Paul, Louis Pauly, Vincent Pouliot, James Ron, Thomas Schelling, Janice Stein, Shibley Telhami, James Wirtz, the editors of Security Studies, and four anonymous reviewers. I especially thank Robert Brym and my outstanding research assistant Patricia Greve for their invaluable help in improving this article. Notes 1Throughout, I refer to "terrorist" organizations because of lack of a better term and the frequency with which the groups in question engage in terrorist acts. I believe, however, that the concept of terrorism is decreasingly useful. First, analytically, there is the danger of artificially reducing these organizations to one dimension whereas they often are complex political and social movements whose appeal has many different roots. Second, practically, the goal of socially constructing enemy militant organizations as terrorists has backfired. Regarding Hezbollah, Israel believed in its own construction that Hezbollah is a terrorist group, thus, it was militarily unprepared to deal with Hezbollah. While keeping these problems in mind, using the term "terrorist" organization seems analytically warranted in the context of this article: the key strategic dilemma of our time—"damned if you do, damned if you don't"—is illuminated here by looking at the practice of terrorism. 2Radical revisionist states express dissatisfaction with the status quo and thus would like to change it, if necessary, by disregarding the international system's regulative and constitutive norms. 3Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Performance and Power" (working paper, Center for Cultural Sociology, Yale University, New Haven, 2005), http://research.yale.edu/ccs/documents/public/alex_perfrmPower.pdf (accessed 13 July 2008); Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, and Jason L. Mast, eds., Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On the notion that terrorists acquire some of their power through performances to an audience, see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 3rd ed., rev. ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003); Mark Juergensmeyer, "Understanding the New Terrorism," Current History 99, no. 636 (April 2000): 158–63; Mark Juergensmeyer, "Terror as Deadly Theater," MIPT Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism Bulletin (First Quarter 2002): 2–3. Juergensmeyer's primary focus, however, is less on terrorism as a strategy to elicit a violent response than on the theatrical side of terrorism intended to impress for terrorism's symbolic significance. My article, thus, adds the strategic aspect to Juergensmeyer's thoughtful and important work. 4The argument that terrorism seeks to provoke target states is not entirely new. See, for example, David A. Lake, "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century," Dialogue-IO 1, no. 1 (2002): 15–29; David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73. 5For the classic argument that reputation for resolve is worth fighting for, see Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). For a critical view, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 6Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 124–28, 135–66; Lake, "Rational Extremism." Lake argues that provocation weakens the target country, ultimately making the country willing to negotiate on more favorable terms for the terrorists. Ivan Arreguín-Toft makes a similar argument without, however, referring to social power. See Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 224–25. 7Lake argues, "Extremists, on the other hand, seek to use terror to provoke the target into a disproportionate response that radicalizes moderates and drives them into the arms of the terrorists, expanding their supporters and allies," Lake, "Rational Extremism," 16. See also Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 49–80. 8On restructuration at the end of the Cold War, see Karin M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998). 9Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). 10John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006). 11See, for example, Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars; Andrew J.R. Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 175–200; Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 12Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. 13Background knowledge makes strategic games possible in the first place. Strategic games depend on the mutual ascription of "game worthiness" by the actors—that is, assuming the other's predisposition toward rational, self-interested, unemotional decision making. See Erving Goffman, Strategic Interaction (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), 96. 14Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, "The Practice Turn in International Relations" (draft manuscript, 2009). 15Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict. 16On diffusion of meanings, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. On communicative action, see Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in World Politics," International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1–39. On speech acts, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions. On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). On the socialization of actors, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," International Organization 59, no. 4 (2005): 801–26. On learning, see Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 17The work by Karin Fierke and Barry O'Neill points into this direction. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies; Barry O'Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). 18From time to time, security studies scholars have acknowledged that non-material elements of power play a role. Kenneth Waltz includes "political stability and competence" as elements of power. These, however, remain largely inconsequential for his theory. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 131. 19David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World-Politics. New Trends Versus Old Tendencies," World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 161–94; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 20On agential and structural power, see Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds., Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stefano Guzzini, "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis," International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 443–78. 21On the pursuit of instrumental goals, see Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). On the pursuit of common understanding, see Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). 22On knowledge represented as valid or true, see Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 20–21. 23Alexander, "Performance and Power;" Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God. 24Jeffrey C. Alexander, "From the Depths of Despair: Performance, Counterperformance, and 'September 11,'" Sociological Theory 22, no. 1 (2004): 90–91. 25Ibid., 92. 26Jeffrey C. Alexander, "Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy," Sociological Theory 22, no. 4 (2004): 529. 27On the expansion of security threats, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991): 211–39; Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?," International Security 26, no. 2 (2001): 87–102. On the role of identity, norms, and community in shaping security, see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Karl. W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 28Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); Lawrence Freedman, "Deterrence: A Reply," Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 5 (2005): 798–801; Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Patrick M. Morgan, "Taking the Long View of Deterrence," Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 5 (2005): 751–63. 29Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Michael C. Williams, "Identity and the Politics of Security," European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 2 (1998): 204–25; Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 341–70. 30Duncan Snidal, "Rational Choice and International Relations," in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (New York: Sage, 2002), 74 (emphasis in the original). 31For a better understanding of rationality along these lines, see John R. Searle, Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (New York: Basic Books, 1998). 32For an elaboration of the structural changes underlying this development, see Emanuel Adler, "Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era," in Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, ed. T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 85–108. This article illuminates the dilemma by looking at one of the most policy-relevant situations in which it arises, namely states confronting threats and attacks from terrorist organizations. 33Adler, "Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era." 34Of course, preexisting intersubjective perceptions of victory and defeat (and broader norms) also determine, in part, which performances are accepted as compelling. Killing civilians or blowing up oneself is not a compelling performance in Western states. 35Mueller, Overblown; James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States (London: Routledge, 2007). 36Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, 135. 37On audience costs, see James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–92. 38The predominant empirical pattern is that terrorist leaders set the dilemma and Western leaders fall for it, but the dilemma's logic may also work the other way around. This would require Western leaders provoking terrorist groups to strike back, expecting to benefit from the response. The predominant empirical pattern, however, is explained by the structural and process conditions outlined in this section and is perhaps also (in some cases) due to normative reasons. 39"Damned if you do, damned if you don't," however, is not a goal; terrorists are moved by a variety of goals depending on historical, geographical, cultural, and political contexts. Juergensmeyer, on the other hand, hesitates to refer to past acts of terrorism as "aimed at an immediate, earthly, or strategic goal. Rather, they were dramatic events, intended to impress for their symbolic significance. As such, they could be analyzed as one would any other symbol, ritual, or sacred drama." Juergensmeyer, "Terror as Deadly Theater," 3. 40Bradley Burston, "The Racist Israeli Fascist in Me," Ha'aretz, 16 March 2009, www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1064578.html (accessed 16 March 2009). 41Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 7. 42Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 14–16. 43Jennifer Mitzen, personal communication with author, 29 October 2006. See also Amir Lupovici, Tel Aviv University, "Is it Possible to Ride Two Horses at Once? Physical Security, Ontological Security, and the Norm of Deterrence" (paper presented at the second annual conference for political science research students, University of Haifa, 26 December 2006). 44Freedman, Deterrence, 4–5. 45The social support on which terrorist groups rely cannot be taken as given; they have to use performative power in order to win these narratives. For a related argument, see Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars. 46On the difficult moral questions that asymmetric warfare raises for states that respond to provocations by terrorists who cannot be distinguished from non-combatants, see Neta C. Crawford, "Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 1 (2003): 5–25. 47Freedman, Deterrence, 122. The relationship between the levels of violent response and radicalization may not be linear, however. New polls seem to suggest that the support of terrorism among possible audiences in the Muslim world is actually declining, partly because of increasing casualties among Muslims and also because no practical solutions are being offered. See Scott Shane, "Rethinking Our Terrorist Fears," New York Times, 27 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/weekinreview/27shane.html?ref=weekinreview. Yet since Hamas and Hezbollah are complex social and political movements, as long as they successfully perform welfare functions, the support of their audience may be higher than in other areas, thus making the dilemma particularly severe for Israel. I thank Patricia Greve for helping me see this point more clearly. 48I thank Jennifer Mitzen for helping me sharpen this point. For the leadership role in decoupling terrorists' performances see John Mueller, "Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration" (prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1–4 September 2005). 49I thank Jennifer Mitzen and Patricia Greve for helping me see this point more clearly. 50From a different perspective, Schelling, in his celebrated conceptualization, posits that the goal of acting "irrationally" is to enhance deterrence, not social power. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 16–18. Compare also his discussion of "commitment" and leaving the "last clear chance" to "avert mutual damage" to the other party (ibid., 37–42). 51Doron Rosenblum, "The Rules," Ha'aretz, 14 July 2006, www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=738387 (accessed 14 July 2006). 52Zeev Maoz, "Evaluating Israel's Strategy of Low-Intensity Warfare, 1949–2006," Security Studies 16, no .3 (July-September 2007): 319–49. 53Ze'ev Schiff, "A Must-Win Situation," Ha'aretz, 27 July 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=743169&contrassID=1&subContrassID=5 (accessed 13 October 2008). 54Compare the role deterrence played in the dilemma Israel experienced and the role deterrence played between the superpowers during the Cold War. Note that Soviet missiles in Cuba did not create a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" dilemma for the United States. Not only did the Soviets not seek a violent response from the United States, but Soviets and Americans would have been more damned if they had used force because of the fear of mutual annihilation. Thus, they skillfully managed to prevent nuclear war. On the other hand, Hezbollah and other terrorist groups purposefully stage terrorist attacks to provoke Israel. They repeatedly succeed because Israeli political and security leaders believe in deterrence as a social fact and therefore claim that Israel's existence depends on its reputation to deter. Israeli leaders opt for using force for the sake of future deterrence, not only falling for the terrorists' trap but also turning deterrence theory and practice into a cause of their violent response. See also Lupovici, "Is it Possible to Ride Two Horses at Once?" 55See Israel Harel, "Hamas is Hoping for an IDF Ground Operation," Ha'aretz, 30 December 2008, www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1051024.html (accessed 26 March 2009). 56United Nations Human Rights Council, "Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories," Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights Council 12th Session, 15 September 2009, A/HRC/12/48. 57European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy" (Brussels, 12 December 2003), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed 12 November 2006). 58According to Arreguín-Toft, strong and particularly democratic states "will more often lose asymmetric conflicts that are protracted," if only because within these states, "there is a strong expectation that any war will be over quickly." Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 27–28. 59Lawrence Wright, "The Terrorist," The New Yorker, 19 June 2006, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/06/19/060619ta_talk_wright (accessed 13 October 2008). 60David Ignatius, "Mideast Lessons from 1973," The Washington Post, 2 August 2006. 61Ze'ev Schiff, "Israel's War with Iran," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6 (2006): 23–31. 62Ze'ev Schiff, "The Foresight Saga," Ha'aretz, 11 August 2006, www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo = 749268 (accessed 11 August 2006). 63Schiff, "The Foresight Saga"; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Spanish Lessons for Israel," New York Times, 23 July 2006, http://select.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/opinion/23kristof.html (accessed 23 July 2006). 64Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 65Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002): 240. 66Andrew Moravcsik, "How Europe Can Win without an Army," Financial Times, 3 April 2003, http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/FT_4–3-03.pdf (accessed 9 August 2008). 67 EU, "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World." 68Council of the European Union, "The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy" (Brussels, 30 November 2005), http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/05/st14/st14469-re04.en05.pdf (accessed 17 August 2008). On how responses to terrorism have changed the governance of the EU, see Geoffrey Edwards and Christoph O. Meyer, "Introduction: Charting a Contested Transformation," Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no. 1 (2008): 1–25. 69On NATO's cooperative-security strategies, see Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the "New Europe": The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 2 (June 2008): 195–230. 70Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities," 215, 217. 71Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," 71. 72Mueller, "Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration." 73Stuart J. Kaufman, "Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence," International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 45–86, 51. For the importance of emotional factors in international politics, see Jon Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," International Organization 64, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 1–31; Khaled Fattah and Karin M. Fierke, "A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East," European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 1 (2009): 67–93. 74William Josiger, "Fear Factor: the Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New York City, 15 February 2009). 75Oded Löwenheim and Gadi Heimann, "Revenge in International Politics," Security Studies 17 (2008): 685–724. 76On media coverage, see Mueller, "Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration." On government response to terrorism, see Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Media: Freedom of Information vs. Freedom From Intimidation," in Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, ed. Lawrence Howard (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1992), 95–118. 77Pippa Norris, Montague Ken, and Marion Just, Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public (London: Routledge, 2003). 78On socially constructing terrorists as "the other," see Karin M. Fierke, "The War on Terrorism: A Critical Perspective," Irish Studies in International Affairs 16 (2005): 51–64. Ontological insecurity refers to threats to the identities of individuals and states, thus, to an ability of finding one's bearings in the world. Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics." See also Lupovici, "Is It Possible to Ride Two Horses at Once?" 79One reason why deterrence became part of actors' identities is the Cold War legacy of superpowers trying to cope with the profound uncertainties of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which turned deterrence into a taken-for-granted reality. Today, a defusing strategy requires uncovering the almost mythical dimension of deterrence through performative power and changing the rules of the game. Mitzen, personal communication. 80Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics." 81Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences." 82Barry R. Posen, "We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran," New York Times, 27 February 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/opinion/27posen.html (accessed 28 October 2009). 83Freedman, "Deterrence: A Reply," 799. 84From an institutional perspective, this suggests that implementing a defusing strategy in liberal democratic societies may run into formidable difficulties. (I thank Alexandra Gheciu for this point.) On the other hand, the institutional obstacles may be partly overcome through strong leadership and appeals to liberal norms and self-images. President Obama's 2009 Cairo speech, which may have helped partly to de-demonize Muslims in American eyes, may help control domestic pressures to become trigger happy in case of terrorist provocations. Obama's appeal to U.S. commitment to multilateral solutions may have a similar effect. 85Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism." 86Fattah and Fierke, "A Clash of Emotions." 87Alexander, "From the Depths of Despair," 91. 88Mueller, "Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration," 2. 89Kydd and Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism." 90Mueller, "Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration," 34, 35. 91Ibid., 42, 44. 92Mueller, "Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration," 39. 93Successful strategic actors engage in "impression management," such as perceiving their own activity from the point of view of the observer, so as to exert control over the observer's impression. Goffman, Strategic Interaction, 13. 94Ibid., 12. 95Juergensmeyer, "Terrorism as Theater," 3. 96Adler, "Complex Deterrence in the Asymmetric-Warfare Era," 103–5. 97Defusing by denial without changing structural conditions has a potentially serious limitation to its success. Terrorists are likely to become aware of the strategy of raising the bar on terrorist violence and adapt by escalation. A spiral of reflexivity might lead to a spiral of violence. On the other hand, examples exist of successful defusing by denial. Mahatma Gandhi's strategy of non-violence forced both the South African government into negotiations before the First World War and the British to leave India after the Second World War. 98On manipulating the opponents' preferences, see Freedman, Deterrence, 59. 99Changing entrenched strategies, however, may be difficult because, as Arreguín-Toft argues, "The nature of threats can shift faster than an actor can shift strategies." Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 38. 100Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 58–79. See also G. John Ikenberry, After Victory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 101Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, "Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?" Policy Review, no. 129 (February/March 2005): 47–56. 102Barack Obama, video message, "Norouz Message to Iran," 19 March 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ks6yT6BIAJY (accessed 13 April 2009).