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The Dynamics of Warfare in Civil War

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 12; Issue: 1-2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13698249.2010.484906

1743-968X

Adam Lockyer,

Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East

Abstract This article explains theoretically, and demonstrates empirically, the instrumental role of the balance of capabilities in shaping the form of warfare that develops in civil wars. It contends that the current common practice of labelling civil wars as either 'guerrilla' or 'conventional' (which is usually meant to accurately characterise the type of warfare throughout an entire civil war) is unable to fully encapsulate the dynamic nature of warfare in civil war. It is instead argued that the form of warfare frequently varies significantly across time and space in a single conflict. This article is divided into three sections. Section one examines recent advances in the understanding of warfare in civil wars. It identifies three categories of warfare in civil war: conventional, guerrilla and irregular. Section two builds on previous studies to develop the concept of the balance of capabilities. Finally, the article illustrates these theoretical insights through a discussion of the American and Somali Civil Wars. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Gil Merom, Anastasios Panagiotelis, Doreen Tan Fong Chen and the two anonymous reviewers for their astute comments on earlier versions this paper. Notes 1. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press 2006); Laia Balcells, Rivalry and Revenge: Making Sense of Violence Against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars, HiCN Working Paper 51 (Brighton: Households in Conflict Network 2008). 2. Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'Warfare in Civil Wars' in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom (eds) Rethinking the Nature of War (Abingdon: Frank Cass 2005) pp.88–104. 3. See Lawrence Freedman (ed.) Military Intervention in European Conflicts (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1994) p.9; James D. Fearon, 'Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?', Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) pp.275–301; T. David Mason, Joseph P. Weingarten, Jr. and Patrick J. Fett, 'Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars', Political Research Quarterly 52/2 (1999) pp.239–68; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom, 'On the Duration of Civil War', Journal of Peace Research 41/3 (2004) p.268; Patrick M. Regan, 'Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts', Journal of Conflict Resolution 46/1 (2002) pp.55–73. 4. For a clear example of confusing war with warfare, see Table 1 (p.21) in M.L.R. Smith, 'Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare', Review of International Studies 29/1 (2003) pp.19–37. 5. Mark Charles Fissel, The Bishops' Wars: Charles I's Campaigns Against Scotland, 1638–1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994) pp.174–95. 6. The warfare in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo are discussed in William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (London: Lynne Rienner 1998). 7. Mark Duffield, 'Post-Modern Conflicts: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection', Civil Wars 1/1 (1998) pp.65–102. 8. Edward E. Rice, Wars of a Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1988). 9. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999); Donald M. Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1996); Mats Berdal, 'How "New" are "New Wars"? Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil War', Global Governance 9/4 (2003) pp.477–502. 10. Stathis N. Kalyvas, '"New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?', World Politics 54/1 (2001) pp.99–118. 11. For a comprehensive list of all the elements that influence strategy, see, Williamson Murray, Alvin Bernstein and MacGregor Knox, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996). 12. Also, see Marika Landau-Wells, Capital Cities in Civil Wars: The Locational Dimension of Sovereign Authority, Crisis States Occasional Paper 6 (London: London School of Economics 2008). My motivation for employing the criteria is purely analytical and, unlike Landau-Wells, I make no normative claim that domestic and international actors necessarily perceive the belligerent in control over the capital as the legitimate sovereign of the entire state. Although, in sympathy with Landau-Wells' claim, I have found that historically there has been some correlation between the actor in possession of the capital and the side considered to be the 'legitimate government'. In the 1834 Spanish Civil War, for example, although France, England and Portugal were supporting the Cristina government, in September 1837, they agreed 'to recognize Carlos if he took Madrid, and by secret and joint instructions empowered their ambassadors in Paris to take this momentous step as soon as Carlos was in possession of his capital city'. Philip E. Mosely, 'Intervention and Nonintervention in Spain, 1838–39', Journal of Modern History 13/2 (1941) p.204. 13. Defining the incumbent in such a manner has several precedents in the empirical literature. Ngoga, for example, assumed that the capture of the Ugandan capital city instantly resulted in a transfer of governmental power. Pascal Ngoga, 'Uganda: The National Resistance Army' in Christopher Clapham (ed.), African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Currey 1998) pp.91–106. 14. The case of the Rabbani government in Afghanistan provides an excellent example of a 'besieged government'. In addition, Maley argued that much of the fighting over Kabul during the Afghan Civil War was for its 'symbolic' importance. See chapter 8 and William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (New York: Palgrave 2002) p.201. 15. This was exactly the case of the Former Government of Rwanda (FGOR) which after losing control of Kigali, withdrew to Zaire and began aggressive guerrilla operations against the new Rwandan government. For more detail see, Wm Cyrus Reed, 'Guerrillas in the Midst' in Christopher Clapham (ed.) African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Currey 1998) pp.134–54. 16. See Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica: RAND 2001) pp.4–5; On the aims of terrorism and the methods see, Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press 1989), in particular see, pp.34–58; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press 1999). Some scholars do not, however, view the differences between civil war and communal conflicts as being fundamentally different, but rather a similar phenomenon at a different level of violence. See, for example, Sarah Kenyon Lischer, 'Causes of Communal Warfare: Fear and Feasibility', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22/4 (1999) pp.331–55. 17. Andrew C. Janos, 'Authority and Violence: The Political Framework of Internal War' in Harry Eckstein (ed.) Internal War: Problems and Approaches (London: The Free Press 1964) p.644. 18. Alice Hills, 'Warlords, Militias and Conflict in Contemporary Africa: A Re-examination of Terms', Small Wars and Insurgencies 8/1 (1997) p.35; Duffield (note 7) pp.66–102. 19. David J. Francis (ed.) Civil Militias: Africa's Intractable Security Menace? (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005) p.2. 20. Herbert Howe, 'Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping', International Security 21/3 (1996) pp.145–76; Stephen Ellis, 'Liberia 1989–1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence', African Affairs 94/375 (1995) pp.165–97. Conversely, the collapse of any belligerent would result in more open territory, available recruits and weapons for the remaining belligerents to integrate. Under these circumstances, the surviving belligerents' military capabilities would be expected to increase, although, unevenly. 21. See, for instance, Noel C. Fisher, War at Every Door: Partisan Politics and Guerrilla Violence in East Tennessee, 1860–1869 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 1997) p.3. 22. Robert W. McColl, 'The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution', Annals of the Association of American Geographers 59/4 (1969) p.622. 23. See Amikam Nachmani, 'Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946–49', Journal of Contemporary History 25/4 (1990) p.512. 24. Phillippe Devillers, Histoire du Viet-Nam de 1940 à 1952 (Paris: Editions de Seuil 1952) p.166 in Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham Publishing 1970) p.59. 25. See, for example, J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey, 'Capability Distribution, Uncertainty and Major Power War, 1820–1965' in Bruce M. Russett (ed.) Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1972) pp.19–48; Frank W. Wayman, J. David Singer and Gary Goertz, 'Capabilities, Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes and Wars, 1816–1976', International Studies Quarterly 27/4 (1983) pp.497–515; Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, 'Measuring Military Allocations: A Comparison of Different Approaches', The Journal of Conflict Resolution 30/3 (1986) pp.553–81. 26. Smith (note 4) p.21. 27. David Tarr, 'Defense as Strategy: A Conceptual Analysis' in Stephen. J. Cimbala (ed.) National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits (New York: Praeger 1983) pp.217–35. 28. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1963). 29. Andrew C. Janos, 'Unconventional Warfare: Framework and Analysis', World Politics 15/4 (1963) p.643. See also, V. K. Anand, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: A Study of Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications 1985) pp.17–18. 30. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (London: Souvenir Press 1998) p.15. 31. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Everyman's Library 1993) p.580. 32. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee (New York: Praeger 1964) p.63. 33. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003); Gil Merom, 'Strong Powers in Small Wars: The Unnoticed Foundations of Success', Small Wars and Insurgencies 9/2 (1998) pp.38–63. 34. Michael Roddy, 'Liberian Rebels Attack Central Monrovia', Reuters 27 Jul. 1990. 35. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (New York: Palgrave 2005) p.84. 36. Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow Books 2004) p.277. 37. Ellen Kinckmeyer, 'Battle Lines Leave some Liberians locked in Hunger/Fighting Persists Outside Capital', Associated Press 9 Aug. 2003. 38. Ulysses S. Grant III, 'Military Strategy of the Civil War', Military Affairs 22/1 (1958) p.21. 39. Fisher (note 21) p.3. 40. In 1863, the Union army numbered some 2,128,948 men compared to the Confederacy's 1,082,119 soldiers. See Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000 (Jefferson: McFarland and Co. 2002) p.305. 41. In 1863, the Union army numbered some 2,128,948 men compared to the Confederacy's 1,082,119 soldiers. See Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000 (Jefferson: McFarland and Co. 2002) pp.306–14. A study of some 60 battles discovered that, on average, the Union had a 37 per cent numerical advantage over the Confederacy. See Peter Maslowski, 'To the Edge of Greatness: The United States, 1783–1865' in Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds) The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994) p.236. 42. Mark Grimsley, 'Surviving Military Revolution: The U.S. Civil War' in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds) The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) p.76. 43. Grant (note 38) p.24. He later revised his stated plan to 'fight it out on this line if it takes all summer'. See Grimsley (note 42) p.83. 44. Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1961-1865 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 2000) p.33. 45. Redoubts were earthen defensive works, generally 'rectangular and usually with two or more artillery emplacements or bations at the corners. A ditch or moat surrounded walls carefully sloped to provide maximum deflection of shots fired into them.' John F. Bradbury, Fort No.5: A Civil War Field Fortification in Springfield, Greene County, Missouri, Unpublished manuscript: available through 'State Historical Society of Missouri Civil War Collection' (1984) p.10. Rifle pits consisted of a timber or stone reinforced trench and an earthen parapet. Rifle pits were frequently, but not exclusively, used in conjunction with redoubts. 46. Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press 1989) p.23. Also see Kenneth W. Noe, 'Exterminating Savages: The Union Army and Mountain Guerrillas in Southern West Virginia, 1861–1862', in Kenneth W. Noe and Shannon H. Wilson (eds) The Civil War in Appalachia: Collected Essays (Knoxville, TS: The University of Tennessee Press 1997) pp.104–30. 47. Dale E. Davis, Guerrilla Operations in the Civil War: Assessing Compound Warfare During Price's Raid (Fort Leavenworth: General Staff College 2004) p.26. 48. Don R. Bowen, 'Quantrill, James, Younger, et al.: Leadership in a Guerrilla Movement, Missouri, 1861–1865', Military Affairs 41/1 (1977) p.42. Elsewhere, Bowen had rounded the number down to 200 guerrillas, see Don R. Bowen, 'Guerrilla War in Western Missouri, 1862–1865: Historical Extensions of the Relative Deprivation Hypothesis', Comparative Studies in Society and History 19/1 (1977) p.30. Davis had estimated that 450 guerrillas participated in the August 1863 raid on Lawrence, Kansas, which is commonly reported to have been the largest of its kind and involved every available Missouri guerrilla fighter. See, Davis (note 47) p.2. 49. Richard S. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861–1865 (Richmond, VA: Louisiana State University Press 1958) p.24. 50. Richard S. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861–1865 (Richmond, VA: Louisiana State University Press 1958) p.24. 51. Albert Castel, 'Quantrill's Bushwackers: A Case Study in Partisan Warfare' in John T. Hubbell (ed.) Battles Lost and Won: Essays from Civil War History (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press 1975) p.180. 52. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Serial 1, Vol. 22, Part 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1880–1901) p.428 as reproduced in Davis (note 47) p.23. 53. Albert Castel, 'Order No. 11 and the Civil War on the Border', Missouri Historical Review 57/4 (1963) pp.357–68; Thomas Goodrich, Black Flag: Guerrilla Warfare on the Western Border, 1861–1865 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1995) pp.96–105. General Order No. 11 was used in conjunction with the Union's 'assessment' policy. Essentially, 'assessments' were aimed at forcing suspected Confederate sympathisers to financially compensate loyal Unionists for damages done by guerrillas. At first, the policy met with some success, however, it was open to fraud and other abuses, which, over time, diminished its effectiveness. See, W. Wayne Smith, 'An Experiment in Counterinsurgency: The Assessment of Confederate Sympathizers in Missouri', The Journal of Southern History 35/3 (1969) pp.361–80. 54. Bowen, 'Guerrilla War in Western Missouri' (note 48), p.30. 55. Hussein M. Adam, 'Somalia: Militarism, Warlordism or Democracy?' Review of African Political Economy 19/54 (1992) p.20. 56. By 1985, however, it is likely that the SAF numbered half this figure, with the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Economist Intelligence Unit both placing the size of the SAF at 62,550. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti (London: EIU 1986) p.31. 57. Paul B. Rich, 'Warlords, State Fragmentation and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention', Small Wars and Insurgencies 10/1 (1999) p.82. 58. IISS, The Military Balance, 1981–1982 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1981) p.64. 59. Said S. Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil (London: The Minority Rights Group 1991) p.19. 60. Robert Gersony, 'Why Somalis Flee: A Synthesis of Conflict Experience in Northern Somalia by Refugees, Displaced Persons and Others', International Journal of Refugee Law 2/1 (1990) pp.4–55; Samatar (note 59) p.19; Anonymous, Somalia: A Long-Term Human Rights Crisis (London: Amnesty International 1988) p.38. 61. Gersony (note 60) p.5. 62. Gerald Prunier, 'A Candid View of the Somali National Movement', Horn of Africa 13–14/3–4/1–2 (1990) p.107. Furthermore, Ogaden refugees fleeing Ethiopian counter-guerrilla operations were encouraged to move to northern Somalia. As Lewis explained: 'male Ogadeni refugees in northern Somalia, who have long been subject to illegal recruitment into Somalia's armed forces, have been conscripted as paramilitaries militias to fight the SNM and man checkpoints on the roads. Ogadeni refugees have been encouraged to take over the remains of Isaaq shops and houses in what are now ghost towns. Thus, those who were received as refugees guests have supplanted their Isaaq hosts, many of whom – in this bitterly ironic turn of fate – are now refugees in the Ogaden.' Ioan M. Lewis, 'The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism', African Affairs 88/353 (1989) p.577. 63. Samatar believed there to have been 5,000 SNM casualties in this offensive, see Samatar (note 59) p.19. Ethiopia had allowed the SNM use its territory and supplied some indirect military assistance to the guerrilla groups. According to one account, the 'Ethiopian "presence" is everywhere obvious (in the form of tinned food, various objects and so on), but Ethiopian military aid seems relative limited.' Prunier (note 62) p.115. 64. Robert Powell, 'Somali Rebels Seek Credibility as Force Independent of Ethiopia', Reuters 9 Jun. 1988. 65. Prunier (note 62) p.112. 66. Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1993) p.17. 67. Gerard Prunier, 'Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal, 1990–1995', Refugee Survey Quarterly 15/1 (1996) p.45. Also see, Richard H. Shultz, 'State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 541 (1995) pp.75–88. 68. Ioan M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press 1994) p.231. 69. A (incomplete) list of belligerents in 1991 would include: the SNM, the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), United Somali Congress (USC), United Somali Congress-Aydid (USC-Aydid), Somali People's Movement (SPM), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Front (SNF) and Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM), United Somali Front (USF), Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU), Somali African Muki Organisation (SAMO), and Somali National Union (SNU). 70. SAF weapons and equipment that were not pilfered, had long since fallen into disrepair. The SAF's aircraft, for instance, had 'all been grounded, one by one, as a result of poor maintenance rather than SNM fire'. Prunier (note 62) p.108. Also see IISS, The Military Balance, 1991–1992 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1991) p.119. 71. Jutta Bakonyi and Kirsti Stuvøy, 'Violence and Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia and Angola', Review of African Political Economy 32/104 (2005) pp.365–66. Also see Belachew Gebrewold, 'Civil Militias and Militarisation of Society in the Horn of Africa' in David J. Francis (ed.) Civil Militia: Africa's Intractable Security Menace? (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005) pp.187–212; Roland Marchal, 'Forms of Violence and Ways to Control it in an Urban War Zone: The Mooryaan in Mogadishu' in Hussien M. Adam and Richard Ford (eds) Mending Rips in the Sky (Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press 1997) pp.193–209. 72. Daniel Compagnon, 'Somali Armed Movements: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship and Clan-Based Factions' in Christopher Chapman (ed.) African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Curry 1998) p.77. 73. Bakonyi and Stuvøy (note 71) p.366; Ismail I. Ahmed and Reginald Herbold Green, 'The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Intervention and Reconstruction', Third World Quarterly 20/1 (1999) pp.113–27. 74. See John Sislin and Fredric S. Pearson, Arms and Ethnic Conflict (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield 2001) p.38. 75. Michael Hedge, 'Drug Gives Young Gunmen Courage', The Washington Post 9 Dec. 1992, p.2. 76. David D. Laitin, 'Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention' in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (eds) Civil War, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press 1999) p.148. 77. Donatella Lorch, 'As U.N. Girds to Leave Somalia, Renewed Fighting', The New York Times 27 Feb. 1995. 78. United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS), Study on Governance in Gedo Region (Nairobi: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1998) p.75. 79. This is an average over the five years of 4,500 per month. Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Interventions in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 2000) p.80. Bryden estimates that in fighting over Mogadishu alone in 1992 nearly 30,000 people were killed, see Matthiew Bryden, 'Somalia: The Wages of Failure', Current History 94/591 (1995) pp.146–47. 80. Bakonyi and Stuvøy (note 71) p.366. 81. Marshall V. Ecklund, 'Task Force Ranger vs. Urban Somali Guerrillas in Mogadishu', Small Wars and Insurgencies 15/3 (2004) p.56.