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Words that Burn: Why did the Buddha say what he did?

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 7; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14639940600877853

1476-7953

Jonardon Ganeri,

Indian and Buddhist Studies

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgements I am grateful to Paul Williams, Rupert Gethin, Steve Palmer, John Peakcock, and both of the audiences for very helpful comments. I am also grateful to Michael McGhee and Clare Carlisle for their comments. Notes 40. Early versions of this paper were presented at Sharpham College Devon, June 2004, and the Centre for Buddhist and Tibetan Studies at the University of Bristol, March 2005. 1. Heidegger is referring to Plato's allegory of the cave (Heidegger 1998 Heidegger, M. 1998. “Plato's doctrine of truth”. In Pathmarks, Edited by: McNeill, William. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 8). 2. Dīgha Nikāya i 189; Walshe (1995 Walshe, M. 1995. The Long Discourses of the Buddha, Boston: Wisdom Books. (trans). [Google Scholar], 164). 3. Majjhima Nikāya i 489; The Middle Length Discourses, p. 594. 4. Milinda-pañhā 4.2.2; Horner (1996 Horner, I. B. 1996. Milinda's Questions, Oxford: The Pali Text Society, reprint. (trans), [Google Scholar], 204). 5. Compare Cicero De Officiis 3.50–5: deliberately leading someone into error, even by telling them the truth, is worse than failing to show them the right path. It is better, in that circumstance, to remain silent. 6. See Vasubandhu (1973) Adhidharmakośa and Bhā[sdot]ya of Vasubandhu, critically edited by Dwarkidas Shastri, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, pp. 1209–12; trans. James Duerlinger (2003) Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons: Vasubandhu's ‘Refutation of the Theory of a Self’, London: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 89–93. 7. For a thorough discussion of the four sorts of answer, see Jayatilleke (1963 Jayatilleke, K. N. 1963. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, London: Allen & Unwin. [Google Scholar], 281–93, 470–6); a useful chart of the possibility reasons for ‘setting aside’ a question by remaining silent is given on p. 472. The one possibility we have not considered here is that the answer is not merely unknown, but unknowable; that it lies beyond the limits of possible knowledge. Jayatilleke suggests that the Pāli Nikāya so regards the problem of the origin, duration and extent of the cosmos. See also Bekh (1919 Bekh, H. 1919. Buddhismus, vol. 1, Berlin and Leipzig: Sammlung Göschen. [Google Scholar], 120) and Nagao (1991 Nagao, G. M. 1991. “The silence of the Buddha”. In Mādhyamika and Yogācāra, 35–50. Albany: State University of New York Press. [Google Scholar]). 8. The problem is addressed, for instance, in a text for which we have a third-century CE manuscript (Eli 2004 ELI, F., ed. 2004. The Spitzer Manuscript: The Oldest Philosophical Manuscript in Sanskrit, Wien: Verlag der Östereichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. [Google Scholar]). 9. Ratnāvalī 2, 35: ‘What is not deceitful is the truth; it is not an intentional fabrication. What is solely helpful to others is the truth. The opposite is falsehood since it does not help’ (Hopkins 1998 Hopkins, J. 1998. Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland, Ithaca: Snow Lion. [Google Scholar]). The term ‘true’ might be used to denote any normative standard of appraisal against which statements are held accountable. Two candidates are ‘correspondence with the facts’ and ‘beneficial utility’. Thus, to say in this sense that a useful statement is true, is only to say that it meets, rather than fails to meet, the standard of appraisal against which it is being judged—here ‘helpfulness’. A commentator on Āryadeva suggests a different solution: that ‘true’ is a predicate like ‘big’ or ‘small’, conventional statements being true for ordinary people but not for enlightened ones: ‘A greenage is bigger than a date, but smaller than a cucumber. These two affirmations are both true. But if we say of the date that it is small and of the cucumber that it is big, this would be false.’ (Tucci 1929 Tucci, G. 1929. Pre-Di[ndot]nāga Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda: Gaekwad Oriental Series. no. 49 [Google Scholar], 88). That may exonerate the use of ordinary speech by ordinary people, but what of the Buddha's use of ordinary speech? 10. The Lotus Sūtra (Watson 1993 Watson, B. (trans). 1993. The Lotus Sūtra, 56–62. New York: Columbia University Press. chapter 3. [Google Scholar]). 11. Richard Gombrich (1996 Gombrich, R. 1996. How Buddhism Began, London: Athlone. [Google Scholar], 69) comments that ‘I believe that the application of the concept “skill in means” to saying something untrue, albeit with the noblest motives, is an innovation’. Compare the case, made famous by Kant, of the assassins at one's door. 12. Long (2002 Long, A. A. 2002. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 54). S. R. Slings states that ‘a text may be called protreptic if its design is to cause a change in the behaviour of those for whom it is destined’ (Slings 1999 Slings, S. R. 1999. Plato: Clitophon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar], 59). 13. Schenkeveld (1997 Schenkeveld, D. 1997. “Philosophical prose”. In Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 BC–AD 400, Edited by: Porter, Stanley. 195–264. Brill: Leiden. [Google Scholar]) distinguishes in the Hellenistic period: protreptic, dialogue, diatribe, ego-documents and technical writings. Compare Sweeney (2002 Sweeney, E. 2002. “Literary forms in mediaeval philosophy”. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Google Scholar]), who distinguishes in the mediaeval period: allegory, axiom, commentary, dialogue, disputation, meditation and soliloquoy, sentences, sophismata and summa. See also Jordan (1986 Jordan, M. 1986. Ancient philosophic protreptic and the problem of persuasive genres. Rhetorica, 4: 309–33. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) on the cross-classification of protreptic. 14. Quoted by Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā (B 248–9); ‘B’ refers to the pagination in Poussin's (1903 de la Vallée Poussin, L., ed. 1903–13. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, St Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences. [Google Scholar]–13) edition. The text is in Vaidya (1987 Vaidya, P. L., ed. 1987. Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna with the Commentary Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti, 2nd edn, Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute. [Google Scholar]). In place of the first reference to incurability (von Staūl-Holstein 1926), reads ‘Kāśyapa, emptiness is the halting of the view that there are persons (pudgala, distinct from streams of experiences); by what, Kāśyapa, shall emptiness as a view be halted?’ 15. Quoted by Porphyry; see Long and Sedley (1987 Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar], 155). Other fragments suggest that Epicurus saw the medical analogy not as implying that philosophy is a cure for an illness, but as having a role to play in sustaining a healthy life; thus Long and Sedley (1987 Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar], 156): ‘The medical analogy, then, should perhaps be read as making philosophical study comparable less to surgery or to drinking medicine than to lifelong healthy activity’. In his willingness to allow the philosophical life to be pleasurable, as long as that pleasure does not become the reason for its being valuable, Ari[tdot][tdot]ha is perhaps more Epicurean than other Buddhists. 16. In this, they may anticipate Quentin Skinner's contextualist method for the history of philosophy. See Skinner (2002 Skinner, Q. 2002. Visions of Politics, vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]). I discuss the application of Skinner's methods to India in my ‘Context and content: theory and method in the study of Indian philosophical cultures’ in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (in press). 17. V. Bhattacharya (ed) (1974) The Catu[hdot]śataka of Āryadeva, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts with Copious Extracts from the Commentary of Candrakīrti, Calcutta: Visva-Bharati; trans, Karen Lang (1986) Āryadeva's Catu[hdot]śataka: On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, modified. 18. This is not to deny that dialectic can also be used protreptically, as is illustrated by the two protreptic arguments in Plato's Euthydemus. Dialectic, in such cases, is a exercise in collaborative learning; see Gill (2000 Gill, C. 2000. “Protreptic and dialectic in Plato's Euthydemus”. In Plato: Euthydemus, Lysis and Charmides: Proceedings of the Vth Symposium Platonicum, Edited by: Robinson, Thomas M. and Brisson, Luc. 133–43. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. [Google Scholar]). 19. ‘Why truth? The Snake Sūtra’ (2002 Why truth? The Snake Sūtra. 2002. Contemporary Buddhism, 3(2): 127–39. [Google Scholar]). 20. CŚ 8.19. This translation follows a rendering of the idiomatic Tibetan by Huntington and Wangchen (1989, 235, n. 54). 21. Āryadeva, Śataśāstra [ŚŚ] 10.22–7: ‘In order to refute these false conceptions, we expound “the refutation,” but really there is nothing to be refuted’. The text is extant only in Chinese translation, and has been rendered into English by Tucci (1929 Tucci, G. 1929. Pre-Di[ndot]nāga Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda: Gaekwad Oriental Series. no. 49 [Google Scholar], 87–8). 22. Vigrahavyāvartanī [V] 23, 27; Johnston and Kunxt (1986 Johnston, E. H. and Kunst, A. 1986. The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (critical eds) [Google Scholar]). On the metaphor of the ‘magician’, see further Ganeri (2001 Ganeri, J. 2001. Philosophy in Classical India: The Proper Work of Reason, 66–8. London: Routledge. [Google Scholar]). The metaphor might remind one of Kierkegaard's description of his own indirect method of Socratic deceit: ‘Do not be deceived by the word deception. One can deceive a person out of what is true, and—to recall old Socrates—one can deceive a person into what is true. Yes, in only this way can a deluded person actually be brought into what is true—by deceiving him’ (Kierkegaard 1998 Kierkegaard, S. 1998. The Point of View for My Work as an Author, A Report to History, and Related Writings, Edited by: Hong, Howard V. and Hong, Edna H. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (eds and trans), [Google Scholar], 53). Vlastos takes issue with this remark, arguing that the purpose of Socratic irony is to ‘taunt’ and not to deceive; see Vlastos (1994 Vlastos. 1994. “Socrates' disavowel of knowledge'”. In Socratic Studies, 64–5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]). 23. The distinction between definitive and non-definitive statements is traceable back to the Nikāya; for example, A[ndot]guttara Nikāya i 60: ‘There are these two who misrepresent the Tathāgata. Which two? The one who represents a Sutta of definitive meaning as a Sutta of non-definitive meaning, and the one who represents a Sutta of non-definitive meaning as a Sutta of definitive meaning’. 24. Madhyamakāvatāra; available only in Tibetan translation (de la Vallée 1907 de la Vallée, L., ed. 1907–12. Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, St Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences. [Google Scholar]–12). Several translations of chapter 6 (on the self) are available: de la Vallée Louis de la Vallée Poussin, in Muséon 12 (1912, 235–328) (French); Huntington and Wangchen (1989 Huntington, C. W. Jr and Wangchen, G. N. 1989. The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]); Rabten (1983 Rabten, G. 1983. Echoes of Voidness, Edited by: Batchelor, Stephen. London: Wisdom Publication. (ed and trans), [Google Scholar]); and Blanleder and Fletcher (2002). 25. Candrakīrti: ‘[I]t is therefore the case that this Madhyamakaśāstra has been composed by the master [Nāgārjuna] in order to demonstrate the distinction between a canonical text of provisional meaning and one of definitive meaning (neyanītārthasūtrāntavibhāgopadarśana)’ (PP B41); trans, D. S. Ruegg (2002) Two Prolegomena to Buddhist Philosophy, Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 78. 26. ‘Why truth? The Snake Sūtra’ (2002). 27. Quoted by Candrakīrti, at PP B359. Hopkins (1998 Hopkins, J. 1998. Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Nāgārjuna's Precious Garland, Ithaca: Snow Lion. [Google Scholar], 147) translates slightly differently from the Tibetan. 28. Ruegg (1985 Ruegg, D. S. 1985. Purport, implicature and presupposition: Sanskrit abhiprāya and Tibetan dgo[ndot]s pa / dgo[ndot]s gži as hermeneutical concepts. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 13: 309–25. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 316–8). 29. See Davidson (1984 Davidson, D. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], essays 9, 10 and 11). Candrakīrti's willingness to entertain the possibility that the true intentions of the Buddha can be recovered in a process of textual analysis reveals that there is a considerable difference between him and the postmodernists such as Derrida. Derrida thinks that we can infer nothing about, for example, Nietzsche's intentions from the discovery of the written text ‘I have forgotten my umbrella’, although we do, of course, know what the words mean. See Derrida (1979 Derrida, J. 1979. Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles 123–31. Chicago, IL [Google Scholar]). The Mādhyamika method is, as mentioned earlier, more in keeping with Skinner's contextualism. 30. It is interesting to compare these conceptions of wisdom with the Greek philos, such knowledge as leads to perfect happiness or well-being. 31. Quoted by Candrakīrti (PP, B 358). 32. And the doors of a city are as much a part of its infrastructure as are the walls and the floors: the truth is not merely instrumental. For text and translation, see Tillemans (1990 Tillemans, T. 1990. Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti, Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien. vols I and II. [Google Scholar]). 33. These statements are collated by Candrakīrti at PP, B 41; trans. Ruegg (2002, 80) (see note 5). The last abridges the A[sdot][tdot]ādaśasāharikā 74: ‘Material is like a mass of foam, it has no solidity, it is full of cracks and holes, and it has no substantial inner core. Feeling is like a bubble, which swiftly rises and swiftly disappears, and it has no durable subsistence. Perception is like a mirage. As in a mirage pool absolutely no water at all can be found. Impulses are like the trunk of a plantain tree: when you strip off one leaf-sheath after another nothing remains, and you cannot lay hand on a core within. Consciousness is like a mock show, as when magically created soldiers, conjured up by a magician, are seen marching through the streets’; trans, Edward Conze (1978) Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom, Boulder: Prajna Press, 96. 34. Here I follow Tucci. Hopkins' translation is flatter: ‘That which is secret for a common being is the profound doctrine, the world is like an illusion, the ambrosia of the Buddhas ‘teaching'. 35. Satkari Mookerjee: ‘The Vedāntist would shake hands in friendship with the followers of Nāgārjuna if they affirm the reality of a spiritual Absolute as the background behind the enigmatic appearance of the world of plurality’. See Mookerjee (1957 Mookerjee, S. 1957. The absolutist's standpoint in logic. Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara Research Publication, 1: 1–175. [Google Scholar], 147). 36. Śāntideva (1960 Śāntideva. 1960. Bodhicaryāvatāra, Edited by: Vaidya, P. L. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series 12. [Google Scholar]). For a complete translation, see Crosby and Skilton (1995 Crosby, K. and Skilton, A. 1995. Bodhicaryāvatāra, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oxford World Classics, [Google Scholar]). 37. Śāntideva's interpreter Prajñākaramati is clear on this point, distinguishing carefully between the ‘inter-subjective’ and the merely illusory. The two ‘truths’ are not two levels of reality, but two ways of thinking about a single reality (one much better than the other). Phillis Granoff observes that Śrīhar[sdot]a understands the matter the same way (Granoff 1978 Granoff, P. 1978. Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta: Śrīhar[sdot]a's Kha[ndot][ddot]anakha[ndot][ddot]akhādya, 84–5. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 38. For reviews of western interpretations of Madhyamaka, see Tuck (1990 Tuck, A. P. 1990. Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna, New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]) and Burton (1999 Burton, D. 1999. Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy, London: RoutledgeCurzon. [Google Scholar]). The interpretation I am advancing here has points of commonality with the reading C. W. Huntington (1983 Huntington, C. W. 1983. The system of the two truths in the Prasannapadā and the Madhyamakāvatāra: a study in Mādhyamika soteriology’. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 11: 77–106. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) offers. Huntington concludes: ‘Unlike either a strictly rational philosophy or a metaphysical system, the Mādhyamika does not seem to be preoccupied with sophisticated epistemological or ontological explanations of reality. On the contrary, the dialectic is apparently designed to expose the meaninglessness of any such attempts at explanation, and in doing so, to “make propaganda” for a style of thinking that should lead to a conception of ultimate truth as du[hdot]kha-nirodha, or the cessation of suffering, by altering one's attitude towards everyday experience in this world’. 39. ‘Internal exile’ is a phrase used to describe the state of those who choose to remain in an occupied country rather than flee, but live there as if in exile. The poet Erich Kaumistner described himself as living in internal exile in Nazi Germany, refusing to say or do anything that implied approval of the Third Reich. Other dissidents wondered to what extent it is possible not to compromise one's authenticity in such a state.