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France and the EU under Sarkozy: Between European Ambitions and National Objectives?

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 17; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09639480903251670

1469-9869

Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos, Anand Menon, Argyris Passas,

European Political History Analysis

Abstract The early phase of Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency proved highly proactive, particularly during the French presidency of the European Union (EU). However, little of practical import resulted. Moreover, there is much that connects Sarkozy's policies to those of his predecessors. Constrained both at home and abroad, he was sometimes unable to carry through his preferred policies. In addition, Sarkozy has done nothing to resolve a long-standing tension of French EU policy between enormous ambitions for the Union and reluctance to empower its institutions. Intergovernmental co-operation has been the theme linking all of Sarkozy's initiatives. The jury is, of necessity, still out on the long-term impact Sarkozy will have. Early indications are that, whilst there has been no shortage of initiatives, it is open to question whether these either diverge much from those of his predecessors, or will have much impact on the workings and effectiveness of the Union itself. Les premiers temps du mandat de Nicolas Sarkozy ont été marqués par de nombreuses initiatives, en particulier pendant la présidence de l'Union européenne. Cependant, peu de résultats concrets peuvent être mis à son actif. En outre, la politique de Sarkozy en matière européenne est largement liée à celle de ses prédécesseurs. Entravé sur le plan intérieur et étranger, il n'a parfois pas été en mesure de faire passer les politiques qu'il souhaitait mettre en œuvre. En outre, Sarkozy n'a pu résoudre la tension traditionelle au cœur de la politique européenne française, entre d'une part le projet ambitieux de la France pour l'Union et, d'autre part, la réticence française à doter les institutions communautaires de pouvoirs supplémentaires. Les initiatives de Sarkozy ont été frappées du sceau de la coopération intergouvernementale. Il est prématuré de se prononcer sur l'impact qu'aura à long terme la politique sarkozyste. En dépit d'un nombre important d'initiatives, la direction prise ne semble pas différer sensiblement de celle de ses prédécesseurs. On peut aussi s'interroger sur l'impact qu'une telle politique aura sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne. Notes [1] Jouyet is a technocrat with experience in the private sector who also held senior posts in the central French administration (including the directorship of then Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's cabinet) and Brussels (where he was director of Jacques Delors' cabinet). He gave up his post in December 2008 to take charge of the Autorité des marchés financiers. [2] The addition of the term 'European' to the formal title of the Quai d'Orsay can be seen as a symbol of the new French leadership's policy priorities. [3] If Sarkozy's support for Juncker could be interpreted as a desire to strengthen the position of the states of 'old Europe' at the helm of major policy areas like the euro, his support for the current Commission President was—on the surface—more surprising in the light of the latter's support for the war in Iraq and his role in the handling of the Bolkestein directive. [4] This latter claim was in keeping with his criticism of the énarques at the domestic level. [5] While Sarkozy had supported the idea of a reform treaty focusing on institutional reform, his main rival, Ségolène Royal, was in favour of a more substantial reform of the treaty followed by a referendum (Henderson & Sitter 2008 Henderson, K. and Sitter, N. 2008. Political developments in the EU member states. Journal of Common Market Studies, 46: 183–213. annual review [Google Scholar], p. 190). Moreover, it is important to note that this ratification has been facilitated by the abstention of most socialist MPs. [6] See Henderson and Sitter (2008 Henderson, K. and Sitter, N. 2008. Political developments in the EU member states. Journal of Common Market Studies, 46: 183–213. annual review [Google Scholar]) and Hoang-Ngoc in this special edition. [7] 'La guerre c'est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires.' [8] Although the idea that politicians would give instructions to the ECB was dismissed by the Commission President (The Economist, 23 October 2008), the crisis in the financial markets and its implications for the real economy will doubtless keep the issue on the political agenda. [9] Indeed, Sarkozy's potentially most controversial remarks related not to substance but to process, as he questioned the traditional presidential domaine réservé incorporating defence, arguing in favour of greater parliamentary involvement in the definition of defence policy (Sarkozy 2007e Sarkozy, N. 2007e. La politique de défense selon Nicolas Sarkozy: interview. Défense et Sécurité Internationale, 24: 40–42. Mar. [Google Scholar]; Major & Mölling 2007 Major, C. & Mölling, C. (2007) 'Sarkozy's brave new world: France's foreign security and defence policy', ISIS Europe: European Security Review no. 35. [Google Scholar]). [10] Which was all the more striking because the Helsinki document had in fact been superseded by the Headline Goal 2010, adopted at the European Council meeting on 17 June 2004, which focused on small, rapidly deployable units capable of high-intensity warfare. [11] He demanded that the EU be able, simultaneously, to carry out two important military stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with up to 10,000 men for a period of at least two years; two rapid reaction operations, using battle groups (around 1500 troops); an emergency evacuation of European nationals; a surveillance or maritime or air interdiction mission; a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 20 days; all along with 10 or so civilian missions (police/justice) of variable size, including a larger, longer one. [12] This shift in emphasis is symbolised by the change of name from President Sarkozy's preferred 'Mediterranean Union' to 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean', the formal title endorsed by the European Council in March 2008. [13] As Senator del Picchia (a member of the UMP) reported to the French Senate's Foreign Affairs Commission in March 2009, the process suffered due to political issues (such as Israel's invasion of Gaza in January 2009) and funding problems (Sénat 2009 Sénat (2009) 'Communication de M. Robert del Picchia sur la situation de l'Union pour la Méditerranée. Réunion de la commission des affaires européennes du mardi 31 mars 2009'. Available at: http://www.senat.fr/europe/r31032009.html#toc1 [Google Scholar]).