The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
1981; American Association for the Advancement of Science; Volume: 211; Issue: 4481 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1126/science.7455683
ISSN1095-9203
AutoresAmos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman,
Tópico(s)Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
ResumoThe psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
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