The Distinction between the Economy and Politics in Aristotle's Thought and the Rise of the Social
2014; Wiley; Volume: 23; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/1467-8675.12128
ISSN1467-8675
Autores Tópico(s)Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought
ResumoAt the outset of the Politics1 and of the Nicomachean Ethics,2 Aristotle declares that both texts are composed with the aim of establishing that the polis is the community in which man, as a communal creature (zoon koinonikon),3 may live happily. Aristotle not only declares that the polis is the “most supreme” of all communities because it is the community in which man, qua communal creature, may pursue the best mode of life, a pursuit which is “the aim of politics”; in the second book of the Politics he also argues zealously against Plato's call to eradicate the distinction between the communities of the polis and the oikos by sharing all possessions among citizens of the polis, as if it were a gigantic oikos. How does Aristotle convince us that this distinction must be preserved, and that, moreover, the polis, and not the oikos, is the community that facilitates the good life? A satisfactory theoretical answer to these questions cannot be found in the literature that studies the conduct of the ancient oikos,4 as compared with that of the polis. The oikos/polis literature makes frequent use of Hannah Arendt's reading of Aristotle as a reference point. In her work,5 Arendt relies on Aristotle's distinction between the economic community that, as he defines it, comes about in the course of nature for everyday purposes,”6 and the political community that, although it “comes into existence for the sake of life,” exists “for the good life,”7 namely the kind of life that enables citizens to “pursue the best mode of life.”8 Arendt's description of the economy, that is, the conduct of the oikos,9 has been criticized, however. Even though most scholars accept her description of the oikos as the sphere for managing the necessities of life, a sphere that was meant to sustain the polis, they present a much more complicated, less polarized relation between the oikos and the polis. In addition, contemporary literature persuasively presents the oikos as a diversified domain in which there exist all kinds of human relations besides despotic ones. They stress the friendship between husband and wife, it being for the sake of happiness and not just as a means to support the polis, the role of education of children within the household, the different kinds of slaves, the use of other means of government beside violence, and the household's existence in and for itself. In this depiction, not only the master, but many participants in the household can demonstrate virtue, doing so within its bounds. It ought to be stressed that what Aristotle and his contemporaries called the economy (oikonomia), the management (nemein) of the oikos, must not be mistaken with what we, moderns, call the economy — that is, market relations. Moreover, Aristotle himself regarded market transactions — “the other form of the art of supply (χρηματιστικῆς)”10 — as standing in stark contrast to economics. Another crucial distinction between ancient and modern economics has to do with ethics. While modern economics “involves inter alia a firm rejection of the “ethics-related” view,”11 the ancient Greeks held that the “economy is intelligible only as an ethical domain.”12 Furthermore, the reason why Aristotle made sure to distinguish between the economy and the market is ethical. As discussed in some details in Part 2.3.2, he held that the market arouses the vice of wantonness — the negation of the economic virtue of soundness of mind — and as such undermines the ability to live a happy communal life in both oikos and polis.13 But while contemporary scholars14 have provided us with vivid portraits of the oikos as a self-sufficient sphere in which many of its members could demonstrate virtue and live a relatively happy life,15 they have not discussed in purely theoretical terms their claim that the economic community was indeed happy, self-sufficient, governed by perfect virtue and manifesting human multiplicity. Moreover, they have not sufficiently accounted for the reasons that make the polis supreme in all human communities. The more complex picture drawn by contemporary literature repeatedly appears in the context of examining each of Aristotle's three criteria for upholding the distinction between the oikos and the polis:16 the community's self-sufficiency and completeness; the multiplicity that appears in it; and its conformity with virtue. But as I argue in this article, though the economy appears at times to withstand the test of these criteria, emerging as no less self-sufficient than the polis, as exhibiting a greater level of multiplicity and as governed by a perfect virtue equal in rank to the virtue demonstrated in politics, the supremacy of the political community over the economic is nonetheless well established by Aristotle. The correspondence between happiness and acting virtuously is put forward by Aristotle in his discussion of the nature of happiness, where he argues that “happiness is a certain activity of soul in conformity with perfect virtue.”17 Aristotle adds two further criteria for the appearance of the happy life in politics: “If, therefore, the more self-sufficing a community is, the more desirable is its condition, then a lesser degree of unity is more desirable than a greater.”18 Thus, according to Aristotle, in order to decide which of all human communities is the one in which humans can indeed live happily, one must examine their function according to the three above-mentioned criteria, that is, the virtue according to which it is managed, its self-sufficiency and the multiplicity revealed in it. In the three following sections, I will try to show how Aristotle uses these criteria to substantiate his claim that the political community is indeed the “supreme of all” human communities. In Part 2.1 I will discuss self-sufficiency, in Part 2.2, the multiplicity that corresponds to the level of self-sufficiency of a community and in Part 2.3 the virtue that commands the economy — soundness of mind (σωϕροσύνη). I will also show how each of the three is accompanied by what may be termed a “generative paradox.” The three paradoxes are: that the existence of the self-sufficient, defined as that which is not subjected to anything, depends on subjecting its surroundings; that the highest level of multiplicity is revealed in a community that is governed by uniformity and equality; and that excelling in soundness of mind is a precondition for the performance of fortitude. Another issue that is almost entirely missing from the critique of Arendt's depiction of the oikos and its distinction from the polis (with the exception of Booth19), is a reexamination of her understanding of the modern human condition. The concluding part of this article is dedicated to that question. In it, I will examine how the description of the virtue of soundness of mind as the governing virtue of the economic community may shed new light on Arendt's description of the “rise of the social” in the modern age. In addition, seeing soundness of mind as the governing virtue of the economic community may redefine the task now facing contemporary political philosophers who wish to reconstitute the distinction between politics and the economy. Again, the object for which a thing exists, its end, is its chief good; and self-sufficiency is an end, and a chief good;20 [. . .] In speaking of degrees of completeness, we mean that a thing pursued as an end in itself is more complete than one pursued as a means to something else, and that a thing never chosen as a means to anything else is more complete than things chosen both as ends in themselves and as means to that thing; and accordingly a thing chosen always as an end and never as a means we call absolutely complete. Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely complete in this sense whereas the Supreme Good seems to be something complete [. . .] The same conclusion also appears to follow from a consideration of the self-sufficiency of happiness — for it is felt that the complete good must be a thing sufficient in itself.[. . .] we take a self-sufficient thing to mean a thing which merely standing by itself alone renders life desirable lacking in nothing, and such a thing we deem happiness to be.21 The level of self-sufficiency and the completeness attached to it positions all things on the Aristotelian scale of the good life, at whose head stands happiness. Its status at the top of the ladder as the “end all actions aim at” is justified by its being self-sufficient. Aristotle enumerated two criteria to measure the level of self-sufficiency.22 First, in order to be considered self-sufficient one has to be complete, meaning one should not serve as means for the attainment of another goal. Aristotle enumerates three degrees of completeness: as a means to a higher end; as an end in itself and as a means to a higher end; and as an end in itself. Second, for a thing to be considered self-sufficient, it must be able to command the means to sustain itself: it is “having all things and needing nothing,23” showing a lack of dependence on things found outside itself. The slave is a part of the master — he is, as it were, a part of the body, alive but yet separated from it.24 A slave is a living tool, just as a tool is an inanimate slave.25 No one allows a slave any measure of happiness.26 The relation of master to slaves is also tyrannical, since in it the master's interest is aimed at. The autocracy of a master appears to be right.27 [E]ven the most highly esteemed of the faculties, such as strategy, economics (οἰκονομικήν), oratory, are subordinate to the political art [. . .] the Good of man must be the end of the art of Politics.28 [. . .] the end of the art of [. . .] economy [is] wealth.29 The other sources of pleasure are not necessary, but are desirable in themselves: I mean for example [. . .] wealth.30 And wealth is a collection of tools for the economist (οἰκονομικῶν) and the politician (πολιτικῶν)31[. . .] As we choose some of them — for instance wealth, or flutes, and instruments generally — as a means to something else, it is clear that not all of them are complete ends.32 Clearly wealth is not the Good we are in search of, for it is only good as being useful, a means to something else. On this score indeed one might conceive the ends before mentioned [pleasure and honor] to have a better claim, for they are approved for their own sakes. But even they do not really seem to be the Supreme Good.33 As we just saw, the economy (together with strategy and oratory) is situated right below politics on the scale of self-sufficiency; it is one of the most highly esteemed faculties. The position the economy holds in relation to politics is equivalent to that held by the virtues in relation to happiness. Like the other esteemed arts it has sub-arts and subordinate activities, whose only criterion is the services they render to it. Thus, the economy is not only the handmaid of politics; it is also an end in itself that commands arts of its own. Moreover, as will be set out in some detail, choosing the “right economy” is a choice that stands on its own, just as the choice to act virtuously stands on its own, regardless of the contribution it makes to the attainment of happiness; in the same manner that virtues serve happiness, so does the economy serve politics. And like the virtues, the economy is sufficient in itself. [. . .] So that the Absolute Good would be this — the End of the goods practicable for man. And this is what comes under the art that master all the practical arts, which is politics and economy and prudence;34 for these habitudes differ from the others.35 As if to complicate things even more, there is yet a third discussion of the economy's position on the Aristotelian scale besides that which situates it as a mere servant of politics and as one of the esteemed faculties; in this discussion, it is presented as equal only to politics and prudence, and as such it masters all other arts. It is equal to politics in the disposition of prudence;36 mastership as practiced in politics and in the economy share the same quality,37 “For man is not only a political but also an economic creature.”38 By presenting prudence, the economy and politics as different forms of acting prudently, the following distinction is made: a person acts in three different spheres of existence simultaneously: between individuals and themselves, as a master in the oikos, and as a citizen in the polis; in the soul, in the economy, and in politics, respectively. In each of these spheres, which is examined on its own terms (while suspending the hierarchy between them), he ought to excel by demonstrating virtues in accordance with the sphere's distinguishing characteristics. Moreover, what distinguishes man from other political creatures is “that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes an oikia and a polis.”39 commonly understood to mean especially that kind of wisdom which is concerned with oneself, the individual; and this is given the name, prudence, which really belongs to all the kinds, while the others are distinguished as economic art, legislature, and political art.43 Prudence alone is a virtue proper to the ruler. For all the other virtues would seem necessarily to belong in common to ruler and ruled, but there is no virtue of prudence in the case of someone who is being ruled; he has right opinion instead.44 There is a lack of consistency in the position of the economy on the Aristotelian scale — it appears in all three degrees of completeness — at one and the same time serving as a means to an higher end; as an end in itself and as means to a higher end (second only to politics itself); and as an end in itself equal to politics in its mastership. This variation may be attributed to the point of view from which Aristotle examined the status of the economy. In the first case, the economy appears as politics’ handmaid because the oikos is neither self-sufficient nor multiple like the polis. In the second case, it is one of the faculties that contribute most to the existence of the polis, and therefore it is highly esteemed. When adopting the third point of view, Aristotle suspended his judgment of the different positions that man's spheres of existence (the soul, the oikos and the polis) occupy on his scale, and examined each sphere in itself; prudence, which may be found on the personal level, the economy on the level of the oikos, and politics on the level of the polis are all deemed to be equal in value. Common to them all is that man acquires prudence as a ruling habitude when governing them. Put differently, the economy is the “art which is preeminently a master-craft” in the economic community, just as politics is the “art which is preeminently a master-craft” in the political community, and just as prudence is in man's soul. All three are preeminent and master crafts that are to be distinguished by the sphere of existence in which they are implemented, not by the habitude acquired. It is here that we learn how the economy is distinguished from all the other subordinated arts; all other arts can be used (or not) according to circumstances, while the economy is the master and preeminent art of the human community whose existence is by necessity.45 Such an interpretation is supported by the fact that, as shown by Robert Mayhew, Aristotle distinguished between two kinds of self-sufficiency “The first is self-sufficiency with regard to life or living [. . .] Also described as self-sufficiency with regard to necessary things [. . .] the second kind of self sufficiency in cities is self sufficiency with regard to the good life or living well.”46 I refer to the best of the fullest possible unity of the entire Polis, which Socrates takes as his fundamental principle. Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a certain point, the Polis will not be a Polis at all for a Polis essentially consists of a multiplicity of persons, and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, Polis will be reduced to oikia and oikia to individual, for we should pronounce the oikia to be a more complete unity than the Polis, and the single person than the oikia; [. . .] And not only does a Polis consist of a multitude of human beings, it consists of human beings differing in kind. A collection of persons all alike does not constitute a Polis. [. . .] whereas components which are to make up a unity must differ in kind and it is by this characteristic that a polis will also surpass a tribe.47 At first sight, Aristotle's claim that the political community is more diverse than the economic community strikes the reader as puzzling. If we consider the points of view from which one can examine human communities, their forms of government and justice and the participants in each form, we will find out that opposite seems true. The political community is to be seen from only one point of view, as it is in itself, while the economic community cannot be described from a single point of view. It has to be viewed from three perspectives at the same time: as sufficient in itself, as mere handmaid to politics, and as subjected and subjecting at the same time. In the economic community we witness a greater multiplicity of forms of government. The polis is ruled by only one form of government at a time, be it monarchy, aristocracy, or the political form (πολιτειῶν).48 The economy, on the other hand, is ruled by multiple forms of government at the same time: the monarchical, aristocratic/political, and despotic.49 Moreover, Aristotle held the opinion that “one may find likenesses and so to speak paradigms (παραδείγματα) of these various forms of constitution in the oikiai”50 appearing one at a time in the political community. 51 Economic justice, as well, is more diverse than political justice. In the political community there is one law for all and all are equal. In the economic community there is a fundamental condition of inequality alongside a number of forms of justice conterminously appearing in it:52 the forms of justice between the master and his slaves, his children, and his wife are different from justice in the political sphere. The human multiplicity that appears in the economic community is far greater than that of the political community. The only people who have the right to participate in deliberative or judicial office are adult male, landowners of the same ethnic group. The members of the oikos, on the other hand, are men, women, children, Greeks and barbarians alike, animals, and things. Moreover, the idea of maintaining the level of multiplicity is used by Aristotle to dismiss the Platonic proposal, discussed in the second book of Politics, to manage human communal life by nullifying the distinction between the economic and political communities through collective ownership. The generative paradox that stands at the bottom of multiplicity can thus be articulated as follows: it is precisely out of the uniformity of conditions of appearance, under one law, one government, from one point of view, and between equals that the greater level of multiplicity takes place. How, then, does the economic community present a lesser degree of multiplicity that the political community? We can offer three solutions to the paradox: the first is supported by the different scales of self-sufficiency that appear in the three spheres of human existence: the soul, the oikos, and the polis. The supreme multiplicity of the polis is due to the simple fact that it already contains the oikoi that in turn contain the individuals. The whole must be more diverse than its components in the same manner as the body is more multiform than each of its organs.53 In other words, the political community is composed of a multiplicity of oikoi, and this is enough to render it more multiple than any single oikos. The second solution turns our attention towards the governed. The polis, as the only community in which man qua communal being can pursue the best mode of life, is the community in which human multiplicity, in its meaning as the multiplicity of forms of human speech and action, fully reveals itself. In the economic community the master, the wife, and the slaves are all required to act prudently according to a given set of rules in order to achieve a certain quantitative goal. As a result, human appearances in the economic community are limited to that of the master acting prudently in order to achieve just the right amount, the matron acting prudently to achieve more, and the slave who responds to the command of either the master or the matron. In the political community, the citizens are expected to pursue the best mode of life as each and every one of them deems it. Thus, the interval of human expression is much greater, and so is the subject matter deliberated and discussed in it. As Hannah Arendt puts it, only when a man acts freely can a true answer be given to the question of who he is, contrary to the question of what he is.54 Following Arendt, we may say that the answer to the question of who is man is equal to the number of the persons partaking in the political community, while the answer to the question what is man as he appears in the economic community is forever fixed: it is one who acts prudently in order to generate a surplus. This answer might explain Aristotle's insistence on the reciprocal distinction between the polis and the oikos; if this distinction were to be lost, there would be no sphere in which what Arendt termed human plurality could be fully revealed, and in which man could pursue the best mode of life. The third solution is supported by Arlene Saxonhouse's (1992: 207)55 reading of Aristotle. Such a solution points towards the multiplicity of governmental forms, and begins with yet another difference between the economy and politics: while the oikos is conducted according to nature, the polis is an artifact of the lawgiver. The boundaries set by law, in much the same was as the walls surrounding the polis56 form its boundaries and together manufacture a wholly human sphere that is as distinguished from nature.57 The artificiality of the political is that which generates the multiplicity of government. This is demonstrated in Aristotle's discussion of natural slavery.58 Aristotle does not rule out natural slavery (just as he does not rule out the distinction between old and young, and male and female), since it is generated by nature's hierarchy. The oikos, when conducted well, will function in accordance with multiplicity that is limited by nature; this is to be achieved when the natural despot rules over the natural slave by despotic rule, the father rules over his children by monarchic rule, and the husband rules over the wife by aristocratic/political rule.59 The aspiration to govern in accordance with nature's dictates, whose existence we have just seen in the economic community, does not exist in the political community. The chances that one who is naturally gifted will actually rule the polis are very slim. Even if such a man were to exist, there is no guarantee that he would be chosen as ruler. Given the unlikelihood that the naturally gifted ruler will indeed assume power, the law sets up an artificial mechanism that enables his best approximation to be found (that is to say, if not the best ruler, then the second best); this is done by ruling in turn (either by all citizens or by a certain minority group, the aristoi). Ruling in turns does not dictate equality of the forms of government nor of the governmental skills displayed by the different rulers, but only allows everyone in his turn to rule as well as he can, according to his singular qualities. The result is a multiplicity of rulership appearances in a unified form of government. This multiplicity of political rulership appearances stands in contrast to economic rulership; the economy, in spite of its various forms of government (aristocratic/political, monarchic, and despotic) is one man's rulership since every house is governed by a single man.60 In other words, while in the political community the appearance of rulership will change when the ruling person is replaced, in the economic community the ruler is all ways one and the same master. In the political community, then, we witness a twofold greater multiplicity than in the economic one: a plurality of the governed who, live their lives pursuing the best mode of life, and a multiplicity of rulers, each of whom rules in turn according to his capabilities. [. . .] we take for our special consideration the study of the form of political community that is the best of all the forms for a people able to pursue the best mode of life.61 […] virtue in its various forms, we choose indeed for their own sakes since we should be glad to have each of them although no extraneous advantage resulted from it, but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, in the belief that they will be a means to our securing it.62 Soundness of mind is the third criterion to distinguish the political community from the economic community. So far, we have managed to establish by the analysis of the criteria of self-sufficiency and multiplicity that the economic community is located as an intermediate sphere of existence between the soul and the political community. According to this view, the polis is seen as the perfection of the oikos, emphasizing the resemblance between the two communities; self-sufficiency and multiplicity are perfected in the political community, but as demonstrated, a high level of both can be found in the economic community. Moreover, the difference does not strike us as crucial when taking into account the fact that at times the economy seems to encompass greater multiplicity. It does not seem sufficient to the purpose of the Politics to prove that there is an essential distinction between a large oikos and a small polis.63 If indeed, as stated by Aristotle at the beginning of the book, one would be mistaken in thinking “that the politician, the royal ruler, the economist and the despot64 are the same, [. . .] that the difference between these various forms [. . .] is one of greater and smaller number, not a difference in the kind”, 65 then Aristotle's discussion of self-sufficiency and multiplicity does not suffice. In order that “we shall better discern in relation to these different kinds of rulers what is the difference between them, and whether it is possible to obtain any scientific precision in regard to the various statements made above” 66 there is a need for yet another yardstick. Sophrosyne is so named because it keeps prudence unharmed.68 appears to be common to all living things, and of a vegetative nature: I refer to the part that causes nutrition and growth [. . .] the nutritive part of the soul [. . .] exhibits no specifically human virtue. [. . .] the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all.70 the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, [and] does in a sense participate in [the rational] principle, as being amenable and obedient to it [. . .] If (on) the other hand it be more correct to speak of the appetitive part of the soul also as rational, in that case it is the rational part which, as well as the whole soul, is divided into two, the one division having rational principle in the proper sense and in itself, the other obedient to it as a child to its father.71 The relationship between the different parts of the soul finds its way into the discussion of the virtues of the participants in the economic community that Aristotle conducted in the Politics. In it, Aristotle designates the master–slave relationship as analogous to the relationship between the different parts of the soul. Aristotle makes use of this analogy when arguing that each member of the oikos shares in virtue according to their nature. In the economic community, the master, who is a ruler by nature, should demonstrate the virtue of the rational part, while the slave, who is subjected by nature, must demonstrate the virtue of the irrational part; the master has to make prudent choices and the slave must comply. The human communities are presented as sharing a space that is identical to psychic space, subjected as it is to the conduct of the ethical virtues. This space, as described, lies between the purely rational and that which is purely animalistic, with the economy inhabiting its lower end, and politics inhabiting its higher end. Soundness of mind therefore has to do with the pleasures of the body. But not with all even of these [. . . It is] concerned with those pleasures which man shares with the lower animals, and which consequently appear slavish and bestial. These are the pleasures of touch and taste [. . .] this is done solely through the sense of touch, alike in eating and drinking and in what are called the pleasures of sex.72 By doing so he makes an analogy between the objects that are dealt with in the economy and those related to by soundness of mind. Eating, drinking, and sex are the activities that secure physical existence and the continuation of the species, the end towards which two of the communities (master–slave, husband–wife) that form the oikos are aimed.73 Common to the economy that is enacted in the interpersonal sphere and to soundness of mind, enacted in man's soul, is that both are assigned to the “lower” end of the space in which they are enacted. Both are enacted in the sphere where vegetative nature, nature that generates growth, needs to be managed rationally. Both are assigned the mission of forming a buffer zone that will delineate the border between the vegetative part that has no share in virtue and that is not subjected to the rational part and the purely human, that is, the rati
Referência(s)