Game Theory Models for Organizational/Public Conflict
1991; Jilin Academy of Agricultural Sciences; Volume: 16; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Francês
10.22230/cjc.1991v16n2a606
ISSN1499-6642
Autores Tópico(s)Business Strategy and Innovation
ResumoAbstract: This paper applies game theory to conflicts between organizations and publics. Non-cooperative games--the duel (Chernobyl), the game of tag (Ford Pinto), and the escalation game (A. H. Robins' Dalkon Shield)--are contrasted with a cooperative bargaining game between an organization and its publics (Procter & Gamble's Rely tampon recall). Resume: Cette etude applique la Theorie des jeux aux situations de conflits ou de crises entre des organisations et des parties du public. Modeles noncooperatifs--le duel (Chernobyl), le jeu de recherche et poursuite (Ford Pinto), et le jeu d'escalade (le Dalkon Shield de A. H. Robins)--sont contrastes avec un jeu cooperatif de negociation entre une organisation et sa clientele (le retrait du Rely tampon de Procter & Gamble).
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