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Pluralism about Well‐Being

2014; Wiley; Volume: 28; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/phpe.12038

1758-2245

Eden Lin,

Free Will and Agency

Philosophical PerspectivesVolume 28, Issue 1 p. 127-154 Original Article Pluralism about Well-Being Eden Lin, Eden Lin Rutgers University, NewarkSearch for more papers by this author Eden Lin, Eden Lin Rutgers University, NewarkSearch for more papers by this author First published: 22 December 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12038Citations: 18Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Bradley, Ben (2009). Well-Being and Death (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 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