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Ambiguous Accommodation: Cape Muslims and Post-Apartheid Politics

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/03057070.2010.527639

1465-3893

Sindre Bangstad, Aslam Fataar,

Legal Issues in South Africa

Abstract This article explores how the elite among Muslim religious leaders in the Western Cape of South Africa, organised in the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), have positioned themselves with regard to political power in the post-apartheid era. We argue that the MJC's positioning may be characterised as premised on a ‘loyalist-accommodationist’ relation to power, in which the comforts and religious freedoms of a religious minority are seen as best ensured by accommodation with the party in power, the African National Congress (ANC). This strategy is closely linked to the interests of the middle-class elite, from which the elite among the ‘ulama’ is largely recruited. We demonstrate that this loyalist-accommodationist stance has survived the ideological and discursive shifts within the ANC over the course of the post-apartheid era, and attempt to explain why a politics of direct challenge to political power from the MJC is unlikely in the ‘new South Africa’, in spite of the ‘ulama's’ ambivalence with regard to societal secularisation.Footnote1 Notes 2 L. Samsodien, ‘Zille Elevates Herself, Says Zuma’, Cape Argus, 25 June 2008. 1 We base this article on material drawn from South African media and academic literature, as well as from long-standing personal engagement in empirical research on Cape Muslims. 3 I. Chipkin, Do South Africans Exist? Nationalism, Democracy, and the Identity of ‘the People’ (Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2007), p. 37. 4 S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence: Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986), p. 1. 5 S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence: Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986), p. 1 6 For recent illustrative examples of this genre, see C. Besteman, Transforming Cape Town (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008) and A. Mbembe, ‘Passages to Freedom: The Politics of Racial Reconciliation in South Africa’, Public Culture, 20, 1 (2008). 7 B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid (Johannesburg, Wits University Press, 2004), p. 1. 8 N. Alexander, An Ordinary Country: Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa (Scottsville, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2002). 9 For France, see J. Bowen, Why The French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State and Public Space (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 2007) and J. Bowen, Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State (Princeton, N.J. and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2010); for Great Britain, see P. Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics, and Identity among British Muslims (London, I.B. Tauris, 2002); for India see S. Tejani, Indian Secularism: A Social and Intellectual History 1890–1950 (Bloomington and Indianapolis, I.N., Indiana University Press, 2008). For a general overview of attitudes to democracy and political participation among Muslims in various post-colonial African states, which indicates that Muslims are as likely as non-Muslims to be supportive of democracy and pluralism, see M. Batton, ‘Briefing: Islam, Democracy and Public Opinion in Africa’, African Affairs, 102 (2003), pp. 493–501. 10 See M. Hendricks, ‘Strategies Underlying the Muslim Judicial Council's Approach to Political Engagement in South Africa’, Presentation at Public Workshop hosted by the Institute for the Study of Current Islam, Athlone, Cape Town, 21 September 2008. 11 Note for instance here sheikh Shahed Esau, a former MJC Deputy President and a member of the provincial legislature for the national opposition party the DA. Esau was recently elected speaker of the Western Cape Parliament. Together with Imam Abdulmoutie Saban, the Head of the MJC's welfare section and Mr. Yagyah Adams, Esau became a member of the DA's precursor, the DP, ahead of the Local Government Elections in 2000. He remained a member of the MJC. These events caused a division within the MJC, as dominant voices within the MJC at the time, such as sheikhs Nazeem Mohamed, Ebrahim Gabriels and Achmat Sedick, were aligned with the ANC. See H. Matthee, Muslim Identities and Political Strategies: A Case Study of Muslims in the Greater Cape Town Area of South Africa, 1994–2000 (Kassel, Kassel University Press, 2008), pp. 257–8. 12 A. Tayob, ‘Muslims’ Discourse on Alliance Against Apartheid’, Journal for the Study of Religion, 3, 2 (1990), p. 31. 13 R. Hefner, ‘Introduction’, in R. Hefner and P. Horvatich (eds), Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu, University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), p. 26. 14 F. Esack, ‘Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice’, Third World Quarterly, 10, 2 (1988), pp. 473–98; S. Jeppie, ‘Amandla and Allahu Akhbar: Muslims and Resistance in South Africa, c. 1970–1987’, Journal for the Study of Religion, 4, 1 (1991), pp. 3–19. 15 B.F. Soares and R. Otayek, ‘Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa’, in B.F. Soares and R. Otayek (eds), Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa (New York and Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 17. 16 M. Mamdani, ‘Reconciliation without Justice’, H. De Vries and S. Weber (eds), Religion and Media (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 380. 17 Esack, ‘Three Islamic Strands’. 18 J. Seekings, The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front 1983–1991 (Cape Town, David Philip, 2000), pp. 260–77. 19 The paradox inherent in this is of course that the main architect of the shift from non-racialism towards Africanism within the ANC in the 1990s had been President Thabo Mbeki, with whom Rasool was aligned. After Rasool's ouster, Ngculu was part of a faction which opposed Skwatsha's appointment as Chair of the Western Cape ANC in September 2008. In the shifting terrain of political alliances in post-apartheid South Africa, ideological and political affinities do not necessarily correspond, and the epithet ‘Africanist’ may in fact have been something of a misnomer in the case of Rasool's opponents within the Western Cape ANC. 20 See ‘It's a Relief, Says Rasool’, Cape Argus, 23 July 2008. 21 See ‘Don't Axe Rasool, says MJC’, Cape Argus, 17 July 2008. 22 See F. Esack, ‘Introduction’, in A. Fataar and F. Esack (eds), After the Honeymoon: Muslim Religious Leadership and Political Engagement in a Post-Apartheid South Africa (Cape Town, Centre for the Study of Progressive Islam, 2009), p. 4. 23 The president of the UUC is, at the time of writing, sheikh Ebrahim Gabriels, the MJC President from 2000 to 2006. Sheikh Gabriels has family connections to the Muslim businessman Tahir Salie, Rasool's advisor on international relations when Rasool was Premier. 24 ‘It's a Relief, says Rasool’. 25 See W.M. Gumede, ‘Modernising the African National Congress: The Legacy of President Thabo Mbeki’, in P. Kagwanja and K. Kondlo (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2008 (Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2009), pp. 35–57. 26 ‘Rasool to Advise Mothlante’, Mail & Guardian, 20 August 2008. 27 W. Meyer, ‘US Set to Welcome Rasool’, Cape Argus, 3 July 2010. 28 F. Esack, ‘Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice’, Third World Quarterly, 10, 2 (1988), pp. 473–98. 29 The notion of ‘Islamic contextualism’ was developed with reference to developments within the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) in South Africa from 1986 onwards by Abdulkader Tayob. See A. Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa: The Muslim Youth Movement (Cape Town, University of Cape Town Press, 1995), pp. 161–87. 30 Esack, ‘Three Islamic Strands’, pp. 479–82. 31 See ‘Cassiem Vows to Keep PAC Image Clean’, Cape Times, 5 October 2005. 32 Esack, ‘Three Islamic Strands’, p. 488. 33 By ‘secular Muslim’ we do not mean to imply that the Muslims involved in the Call were non-religious. The ‘secular Muslim’ understanding in the context of apartheid South Africa was simply one that accepted that Muslims were a minority in South Africa, which drew inspiration from an eclectic range of sources, including non-Islamic sources (human rights discourse, the ecumenical movement, peace movements), and whose actions were premised on wide notions of inclusivity. This reflects what Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor refers to as ‘secularity 3’ in his seminal work A Secular Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap Press, 2007). 34 E. Moosa, ‘Muslim Conservatism in South Africa’, Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, 69 (December 1989), p. 78. 35 For the Majlisul ‘Ulama’ in Port Elizabeth, see M. Haron, ‘Maulana Ahmad Sadeq Desai and His Majlis: An Ultra-Conservative Voice in the Eastern Cape Wilderness’, Annual Review of Islam in South Africa, 6 (December 2003), pp. 55–9. 36 E. Moosa, ‘Worlds Apart: The Tablīgh Jamāt under Apartheid, 1963–1993’, Journal for Islamic Studies, 17 (1997), pp. 28–48 remains the classical reference on this. 37 Moosa, ‘Muslim Conservatism’, p. 80. 38 Moosa, ‘Muslim Conservatism’, p. 80, p. 75. 39 Esack, ‘Three Strands’, p. 490. 40 G. Lubbe, ‘The Muslim Judicial Council – A Descriptive and Analytical Investigation’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of South Africa). 41 Moosa, ‘Muslim Conservatism’, p. 75. 42 Esack, ‘Three Strands’, p. 493. 43 Esack, ‘Three Strands’, our emphasis. 44 N. Jennah, ‘Hajj: Only at this Sacred Time and Place’, ISIM Review, 16 (2008), pp. 50–1 provides some instructive examples in this regard. 45 G. Vahed and S. Jeppie, ‘Multiple Communities: Muslims in Post-Apartheid South Africa’, in J. Daniel, R. Southall and J. Luthman (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2004–2005 (Cape Town, Human Sciences Research Council, HSRC Press), pp. 253–4 notes that average per capita income for Western Cape Muslims in 2001 according to the population census was ZAR1,262 per month, that 55.76 per cent were not working, and that 24.17 per cent had grade 12 education, and a mere 2.07 per cent tertiary degrees. 46 I. Goldin, Making Race: The Politics And Economics of Coloured Identity in South Africa (London, Maskew Miller Longman, 1987) is the classical text on coloureds and the apartheid economy. 47 T. Lodge, ‘The African National Congress: There is No Party Like It: Ayikho Efana Nayo’, in J. Piombo and L. Nijzink (eds), Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade (Cape Town, Human Sciences Research Council, HSRC Press), pp. 125–7. 48 As recorded by the authors in interviews and conversations from the late 1990s onwards. 49 See ‘ANC President in Historic Meeting: Mandela Reassures Muslims’, Muslim Views, April 1992. 50 South African Law Commission (SALC), Islamic Marriages and Related Matters. Report (Pretoria, South African Law Commission, 2003). 51 See ‘Extensive Public Participation and Deep Divisions Delay Muslim Marriages Bill’, Muslim Views, June 2010. 52 The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) at Kempton Park was convened for December 1991. Cassiem was released from prison in February 1991. 53 S. Hamdulay, ‘Quoting from the Holy Constitution’, Muslim Views, March 1991. 54 A. Tayob, ‘The Function of Islam in the South African Political Process: Defining a Community in a Nation’, Journal for the Study of Religion, 11, 2 (1998), p. 26. 55 See ‘The Imam of the Flats’, Mail & Guardian, 16 August 1996. 56 S. Dangor, ‘The Call of the Imam’, Muslim Views, July 1999. 57 S. Bangstad, ‘Hydra's Heads: PAGAD and Responses to the PAGAD Phenomenon in a Cape Muslim Community’, JSAS, 31, 1 (2005), pp. 187–208. 58 Anon, ‘Muslims and Elections: MJC Urges Muslims to Vote’, Ad-Da'wah, 2, 2 (1991). 59 M. Eldridge and J. Seekings, ‘Mandela's Lost Province: The African National Congress and the Western Cape Electorate in the 1994 South African Elections’, JSAS, 22, 4 (1996), p. 529. 60 R. Mattes, H. Gilliomee and W. James, ‘The Election in the Western Cape’, in R.W. Johnson and L. Schlemmer (eds), Launching Democracy in South Africa: The First Open Election, April 1994 (New Haven, CT and London, Yale University Press, 1996), p. 149. 61 For one example, see M. Adhikari, Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South African Coloured Community (Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 2005), p. 177. 62 Z. Erasmus, ‘Race and Identity in the Nation’, in J. Daniel, R. Southall and J. Lutchman (eds), State of the Nation: South Africa 2004–2005 (Cape Town, Human Sciences Research Council Press, 2005), p. 25. 63 See Mattes, Gilliomee and James, ‘The Election in the Western Cape’; Eldridge and Seekings, ‘Mandela's Lost Province’. 64 Mattes, Gilliomee and James, ‘The Election in the Western Cape’, pp. 128–9. 65 See ‘Academics Slam ‘Derogatory’ Coconut Comment’, Cape Times, 18 October 2001. 66 R. Rive, Writing Black (Cape Town, David Philip, 1981), p. 7. 67 Anon, ‘Muslims and Elections’. 68 A new party, the Al-Jaama Party, established by Ganief Hendricks, a prominent former Islamic Unity Convention (IUC) member, participated in the 2009 national election together with the AMP. Their negligible performance indicates the lack of appeal of Islamic parties to the South African Muslim electorate more generally. 69 Chabaan had been involved in tendering irregularities, cultivated contacts with the Russian mafia in Cape Town, and had undeclared interests in the gambling sector. 70 See ‘Chabaan to Declare Interests as Muslim Rage Grows’, Voice of the Cape, 9 August 2006. 71 Vahed and Jeppie, ‘Multiple Communities’, p. 279. 72 Tayob, ‘The Function of Islam’, p. 27. 73 Tayob, ‘The Function of Islam’, p, 27, p. 31. 74 J. Casanova, ‘Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam’, Social Research, 68, 4 (Winter 2001), p. 1,059. 75 Moosa, ‘Muslim Conservatism’. 76 S. Jeppie, ‘Leadership and Loyalties: The Imams of Nineteenth Century Colonial Cape Town’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 26, 2 (May 1996), pp. 139–62. 77 A. Tayob, Islam in South Africa: Mosques, Imams and Sermons (Gainesville, Florida, University of Florida Press, 1999), p. 21. 78 G. Lubbe, ‘The Muslim Judicial Council: Custodian or Catalyst?’ Journal for Islamic Studies, 14 (1994), p. 42. 79 M. Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 55. 80 A. Tayob, ‘The Muslim Youth Movement: Challenging the ‘Ulama Hegemony’, Journal for Islamic Studies, 12 (1992), p. 102. 81 See T. Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 187. 82 See ‘Ulema Role Changing as Debates Increase’, Voice of the Cape, 8 August 2007. 83 The most famous of these cases related to a female Muslim social worker at a prison in Worcester north of Cape Town, Mrs Fairouz Adams, who had been suspended and later fired from her position in 2005 for refusing to take off her headscarf at work. After a series of interventions by the MJC, an agreement with the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) which meant that Adams returned to work was reached in 2006. See M. Karaan, ‘Fairuz Re-instated after being Fired for Wearing Scarf’, Al-Qalam, September 2006. 84 Certifying food and drink products as ‘halal’ is by far the most important source of revenue for the MJC and other ‘ulama’ organisations in South Africa. 85 The MJC has been centrally involved in organising demonstrations for Palestinian rights in Cape Town throughout the post-apartheid era. It has also been involved in organising boycotts of Israeli products. 86 See ‘Ulema Commend SA Govt on Mideast Position’, Voice of the Cape, 8 August 2006. 87 A. Tayob, ‘Islamic Politics in South Africa between Identity and Utopia’, South African Historical Journal, 60, 4 (2008). 88 Matthee, Muslim Identities and Political Strategies, p. 210. 89 Sedick was supposed to stand as a candidate for the ANC during the local elections in 2000, but resigned as a candidate after he received threats against his family, reportedly from PAGAD. Ibid., p. 211. 90 Interview with sheikh A. Sedick at the MJC's offices in Rylands, 16 May 2005.