Artigo Acesso aberto Revisado por pares

Natural Kinds and Naturalised Kantianism

2012; Wiley; Volume: 48; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00862.x

ISSN

1468-0068

Autores

Michela Massimi,

Tópico(s)

Philosophy, Science, and History

Resumo

NoûsVolume 48, Issue 3 p. 416-449 ARTICLE Natural Kinds and Naturalised Kantianism Michela Massimi, Michela Massimi University of EdinburghSearch for more papers by this author Michela Massimi, Michela Massimi University of EdinburghSearch for more papers by this author First published: 21 June 2012 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00862.xCitations: 9Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Bibliography Achinstein, P. (2002) 'Is there a valid experimental argument for scientific realism?'. 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