The Origins of the Fedeyeen in Nasser's Weltpolitik: Prelude to the Suez War
1979; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 42; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1540-6563.1979.tb00576.x
ISSN1540-6563
Autores Tópico(s)Middle East Politics and Society
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1. Middle Eastern Affairs, May 1954, 177‐78 (hereafter cited as MEA).2. MEA, October 1954, 334; Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir (Albany, N. Y., 1971), 174‐75; Mideast Mirror (Beirut), 4 September 1954 (hereafter cited as MM). On the differences between Naguib and Nasser and the latter's consolidation of power, see Enver Koury, The Pattern of Mass Movements in Arab‐Revolutionary Progressive States (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), 150‐60.3. Jean and Simone Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York, 1958), 194‐95. For excellent discussions, see also Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (New York, 1960), 47‐48; P.J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington, Ind., 1961), 84‐86; and Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: The Praetorian State (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974), chaps. 3,4, and 5. See also Earl Berger, The Covenant and the Sword (London, 1965), 176.4. From a typed, two‐part, undated memo in the Dulles Papers, Box 73, Princeton University (hereafter cited as Dulles Papers).5. Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New yorrk, 1965), 23.6. Dulles memo cited above in n.4. One month before the Dulles visit, Naguib, who was considered moderate, was saying that Israel was a “cancer endangering all Arab countries” and that the “Palestine cause belongs to all Arrabs.” Jewish Observer and Middle East Review (London), 24 April 1953 (hereafter cited as JOMER).7. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), 566‐67.8. Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents (New York, 1973), 37.9. Acheson, Present, 567.10. Text in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, 1956), 2: 308‐9.11. See Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship; Israel and the Sovied Bloc, 1947‐1953 (Chicago, 1947); Yaacov Roi, “Soviet‐Israeli Relations, 1947); Yaacov Roi, ”Soviet‐Israeli Relations, 1947‐1954,: in The U.S.S.R. in the Middle East, ed. Shimon Shamir and Michael Confino (Jerusalem: Halstead, 1973), 123‐41. See also Surendra Bhutami, Israeli Soviet Cold War (New Delhi: Parnassus, 1975), chap. 1. One reason for Soviet support for Israel during the 1948 war that the Arabs were being diplomatically, economically, and militarily supported by Britain. See John Zimmerman, “The Clayton Pact,” New Middle East, May 1972, 42‐43, and the ensuing exchange of letters in the June, September, and November issues.12. Novye Mir, cited in Yaacov Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement: The Soviet Union in the Middh East, 1945‐1973 (Jerusalem: Halsted, 1975), 111 n. 1. After Stalin's death, there was a revived interest in Oriental studies. See Walter Laquer, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London, 1956), 262, and Wayne S. Vucinich, “Soviet Studies on the Middle East,” in The Soviet Union in the Middle East, ed. Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institute, 1974), 180‐81.13. Uri Ra'anan, USSR Arms and the Third World (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 42, 69‐85.14. Heikal, Cairo Documents; Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir; Robert Stephens, Nasser: A Political Biography (New York, 1971); Anthony Nutting, Nasser (New York, 1972); Jean Lacouture,Nasser (New York, 1973); Facts on File, Egypt and Nasser, 1952‐1956, 3 vols.(New York, 1973), vol. 1; Shirley Graham Dubois, Gamal Abdel‐Nasser: Son of the Nile (New york, 1972).15. George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972); Yair Evron, The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and War (New York, 1973); Oles Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East under Khruscheu, 1955‐I964 (Lewisburg, Penna., 1974); Tarun Bose, Superpowers and the Middle East (New York, 1972); Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs (Baltimore, 1975); An Nahar Arab Report, The Dragon and the Bear (Beirut, 1973); P.J. Vatikiotis, “The Soviet Union and Egypt,” in Soviet Union, ed. Lederer and Vucinich, 121‐33.16. R.D. McLaurin writes that it is difficult to determine the immediate origins of the arms deal. He does cite Ra'anan in a note but makes no mention of his findings. McLaurin, The Middle East in Soviet Policy (Lexington, Mass., 1975). 20. Similarly, Robert Freedman cites Ra'anan in a note but evades the origins of the arms deal. Freedman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970 (New York, 1975), 10.17. On the other hand, Arnold Horelick argues that “for a broad understanding of Soviet policy” it is not important to know when the deal was concluded. Horelick, “Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” in Political Dynamics in the Middle East, ed. Paul Hammond and Sidney Alexander (New York, 1972), 567. But the wider implications concern Egyptian, not Soviet, policy, and the implications concerning the strains in American‐Egyptian relations aresignificant indeed. SeeRa'anan, USSR Arms, 54‐57, 132‐37.18. New Statesman and Nation, 22 January 1955, 95. Crossman was impressed with Nasser. In fact, he was “certain” that “Egypt will remain a factor for peace and social development.” Ibid., 96.19. Eliezer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York Praeger, 1970), 93. The same warning was given by the Voice of the Arabs on August 1, 1954.20. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Renumbers (Boston, 1970). 433.21. However, Acheson, as will be recalled, wrote that Naguib had approached the American embassy whereas Khrushchev cites “Nasser's representatives.” At the time, Naguib and Nasser shared power, and this may give an insight as to which superpower each favored. In the absence of any further evidence (there have been no documents concerning these contacts published by Egypt or the Soviet Union), it is difficult to assess whether any significance can be attached to this.22. Ro'i, Encroachment to Involvenient, Ill; David Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin (New York, 1961). 389. Ro'i writes (144) that the arms deal “was almost certainly concluded by mid‐February 1955.”23. Faiz Abu Jaber, “Origins of Soviet‐Arab Cooperation,” Mizan (London), Juiy/August 1969, 217. See also, Mizan, November/December 1968, 212.24. Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt, 228. In July 1953, the Egyptian minister of war wrote that in two years Egypt would be able to export arms and ammunition and in three years it would be exporting warplanes in the Middle East. Al Ahram (Cairo), cited in JOMER, 24 July 1953. Egypt received its first arms from the February 1955 deal in July 1955. Ra'anan, USSR Arms, 33; D.A. Farnie, East and West of Suez (Oxford, Eng., 1969). 713.25. Menahem Mansoor, Political and Diplomatic Histoty of the Arab World: A Chronological Study, 1900‐1967 (Madison, Wisconsin, 1972). vol. 3. References in this compilation appear in chronological order, and pagination is omitted.26. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy, 389. On East German‐Egyptian commercial relations in 1954, see Walter Laquer, The Soviet union and the Middle East (New York, 1959),195‐96.27. Boris Guriel, “The Ideological Origins of the Soviet‐Egyptian Alliance,” New Middle East, February 1970, 21. In the fall of 1953, the Soviet press, in a volte face, asserted the peaceful nature of the Soviet Union's policy in the Arab world and its desire to improve relation with the Abrbs. Therewere also repeated assurances of good will in early 1954, and especially in September 1954. Oles Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East, 1947‐1957 (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1959). 117‐19, 197‐99. See also Ro'i, Encroachment to Involvement, 111‐14; and John Swanson, “The Soviet Union and the Arab World,” Western Political Quarterly, December 1974, 643‐44. On the other hand, the Soviet press could also be critical of the Egyptian regime. See Aryeh Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Misror (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973), 34‐39.28. It might be worth noting, though it is often forgotten, that Syria began receiving Soviet arms in 1954. Tabitha Petran, Syria (New York, 1972). 110; Arslan Humbaraci, Middle East Indictment (London, 1958), 201; Laquer, Soviet Union andtheMidd & East, 214. Syria had hinted at rapprochement with the Soviets as early as 1950. Ro'i, Encroachment to Involvement, 79‐81.29. Terence Robertson, Crisis: The Inside Story of the Sum Conspiracy (New York, 1965),42.30. Mansoor, Vol. 3, 3 September 1956. See Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt, 241.31. Robert St. John, The Boss: The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser (New York, 1960), 205.32. Israel received no American arms until after the June 1967 war.33. Ra'anan, USSR Ams, 45‐50; see also Geoffrey Kemp, “Srategy and Ams Levels,” in Soviet‐American Rivalry in the Middle East, ed. J.C. Hurewitz (New York, 1969), 24.34. Jon Kimche, The Second Arab Awakening (New York, 1970). 89. See also Ra'anan, USSR Arms, 50; and Humbaraci, Middle East, 233. Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson (New York, 1967), 148.35. See below, pp. 108‐10. Iraq was the only Arab country to join the pact.36. See MM, 12, 19, and 26 June and 3 and 10 July 1954.37. MM, 24 July and 28 August 1954; British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, part 4, 1954, no. 487, p. 41 (hereafter cited as SWB).38. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958‐1967 (London, 1967). 2; Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York, 1969), 130‐31.39. St. John, The Boss, 188‐89.40. Al Hayat (Beirut), quoted in JOMER, 11 June 1954, 3.41. See Be'eri, Army Officers, 383; Copeland, Game, 196. See also Albert Hourani, “The Middle East Crisis of 1956,” St. Anthony's Papers, no. 4 (London, 1958). 24‐25, explaining Nasser's pan‐Arabism and his advocacy of the Palestine question in terms of the Suez agreement freeing Egypt to do as it pleased.42. JOMER, 9 July 1954,4. See also Berger, Covenant, 176.43. Voice of the Arabs, 28 July 1954. All references to radio broadcasts are taken from SWB otherwise indicated.44. The term means self‐sacrificers.45. However, this broadcast referred to the fedeyeen as Egyptian commandos. Announcements on the organizing of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in 1954 referred to Palestinian commandos. See below, pp. 111‐12.46. Laquer, Soviet Union and the Middle East, 214; M.A. Fitzsimmons, Empire by Treaty (Notre Dame, Ind., 1964). 138; Howard Sachar, A Hirtory of Israel (New York, 1976), 475, 481; Yigal Allon, 'The Soviet Involvement in the Arab‐Israel Conflict, in USSR, ed. Shamir and Confino, 149; Herman Finer, Dulles over Suez (Chicago, 1964). 27; Berger, Covenant, 172, 179. Berger, however, gives more background on this period.47. Lacouture, Nasser, 275.48. Middle East Journal, 1954, 334 (hereafter cited as MEJ); JOMER, 7 May 1954, 4. The MAC was composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli representatives with the chairman, a UN appointee, holding the tie‐breaking vote. Its purpose was to deal with complaints of border violations.49. MEA, August‐September 1954, 302; MEJ, 1954, 456.50. Text in SWB, no. 487, 40‐43.51. The Voice of the Arabs was established in July 1953. Its specific function was to promote pan‐Arabism, Nasser, and anti‐Western sentiment. It became notorious for its anti‐lsraeli tirades. Later it began calling for the overthrow of pro‐Western Arab governments. For more on radio broadcasts, see John Zimmerman, “Radio Broadcasts in the Arab‐Israeli War, 1948,” Wiener Library Bulletin (London), 1973/74,2‐8; A. Loya. “Radio Propaganda of the United Arab Republic—An Analysis,” MEA, April 1962,98‐110; and New York Times, 22 August 1977.52. SWB, no. 541, 8 February 1955, appendix.53. The armistice agreement allowed only regular army forces to 52 SwB, no. 489, 33.54. MM, 24 July 1954.55. Voice of the Arabs, 19 July 1954.56. MM. 21 and 28 August and 11 September 1954.57. MEA, October 1954, 340; Report of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in UN document S/3319, 11 November 1954.58. Egypt had illegally prevented Israeli and Israel‐bound shipping from passing through the canal in contravention of a 1951 Security Council resolution. See Simcha Dinitz, “Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Blockade of the Suez Canal,” Georgetown Law Journul 45, no. 2: 166‐99; Leo Gross, “Passage through the Suez Canal of Israel Ships,”American Journal of International Law, July 1957, 530‐68. For‐Arab‐inclined views, see T.F. Huang, “Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question,” ibzd., April 1957, 277‐307; and Majid Khadduri, “Closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli Shipping,” in The Middle East Crisis: Test of International Law, ed. John W. Halderman (New York, 1969).59. MM. 2 October 1954. For Israel's proposals, see MEJ, 1955, 63.60. Along with Egypt, Israel had also signed armistice agreements with Syria, Jordan, Lebanon.61. E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (London, 1962), 70‐71.62. UN document S/3319,15.63. Mansoor, vol. 3, 28 December 1954; MM, 1 January 1955; JOMER, 7 January 1955. Egypt interpreted these resolutions as meaning Israel's return to the boundaries of the 1947 partition plan and the repatriation of all Palestinian refugees to Israel.64. Ernest Stock, Israel on the road to Sinai (Ithaca, 1967), 71; UN document S/3373,17 March 1955, 36.65. UN document S/3319,Annex, 20‐28; S/3373, Annex 4, 71‐88.66. S/3374, 30 March 1955. For Burns's proposals, see p. 113.67. Egypt wanted the Negev in 1949 as a means of persuading the British to leave the Suez Canal Zone. Britain was ready to leave the zone providing it could have an alternate base in the Negev. Israel, however, was unwilling to cede any territory. C. Ernest Dawn, “Pan‐Arabism and the Failure of Israeli‐Jordanian Peace Negotiations,” in Islam and its Cultural Divergence, ed. Girdhari Tikku (Chicago, 1971). 30, 31, 40, 42. On Arab territorial desiderata in 1948, see Zimmerman, “Clayton Pact.”68. Dulles Papers, Box 73.69. Ironically. Israel was often accused by the Arabs of wanting to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates.70. Radio Cairo, 24 September 1954. See also Berger, Covenant, 172‐73.71. JOMER, 25 March and 1 April 1955; MEJ, 1955, 318. See also MM, 18 December 1954, 21.72. Text of speeches in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, 2: 395‐98, 413‐15.73. Letter dated 25 August 1955 in the Dulles Papers, Box 93. When Dulles came under fire for making a controversial statement about American Jews and the Republican Party, it was Katzen who, after meeting with the secretary, issued an explanation to the press. Text of statement issued on 29 June 1953 in Dulles Papers, Box 73.74. Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (London, 1966), 12‐15. Shorlty before Egypt announced the blockade of Aqaba, a publication of the Arab News Agency reported that Egypt was planning a land link to other Arab countries. However, the publication discussed only a project for a ferry which would link the Sharm el Sheikh with Aqaba and Jordan, MM, 13 August 1955.75. Moshe Brilliant, “Israel's Policy of Reprisals,” Harpers, March 1955, 68‐73; Michael Handel, Israel's Political‐Military Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 21.76. Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel (London, 1969), 85.77. Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven, 1972). 379‐91, and chapter 12 on the differences between the two men. See also Peter Medding, Mapai in Israel (Cambridge, 1972). 215‐16; Perlmutter, Military and Politics, 84; and Stock, Israel, 124‐26.78. Stock, Israel, 123. Sharett later said that had it not been for the Gaza raid, “Nasser might not have been forced into the Czech deal… .” Brecher, Foreign Policy System, 287.79. Humbaraci, Middle East, 198‐99. See also Berger, Covenant, 180‐81.80. This account is taken from Orbach's hitherto secret report to Sharett on the results of his contacts. It was published in New Outlook (Tel Aviv), October, November, and December 1974 and January 1975.81. Letter of 8 February 1955 in New Outlook, January 1975, 19‐20.82. The scandal known as the Lavon affair plagued Israel for ten years. See Michael Bar Zohar, Ben Gurion: The Armed Prophet (New Jersey, 1968), 177‐85.83. Stock, Israel, 126.84. Kennet Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War (New York, 1970), 48; Erskine Childers, The Road to Suez (London, 1962), 130; Maxime Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs (London, 1968), 69. Love and Childers are staunch Nasser‐supporters.85. Radio Cairo, 12 June 1956, quoted in Love, Suez, 122.86. Perlmutter writes that the years 1953‐55 saw great institutional changes in Israel's military “where crucial political decisions were taken, determining Israel's defense policies for a decade.” Military and Politics in Israel, 83.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJohn ZimmermanThe author is a research analyst in Middle Eastern affairs and a journalist.
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