The Persian Gulf and the Geopolitics of Oil
2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 48; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/00396330600594348
ISSN1468-2699
Autores Tópico(s)Socioeconomic Development in MENA
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Andrew F. Krepinevich, 'How to Win in Iraq', Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, September/October 2005, pp. 87–104. 2. Http://www.bakerinstitute.org/events_sept 26_transcript.pdf. 3. Geoffrey Kemp, 'Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Factor', United States Institute for Peace, Special Report No. 156, November 2005, available at http://www.usip.org. 4. Patrick Clawson and Simon Henderson, 'Reducing Vulnerability to Middle East Energy Shocks', The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 49, November 2005; Also Seminar Reports, Baker Institute, available at http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/PEC911Update_SeminarReport.pdf and http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/TrendsinMiddleEast_FactorsAffectSupplyOilMiddleEast.pdf. 5. According to a 2004 survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press: 'In the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, anger toward the United States remains pervasive, although the level of hatred has eased somewhat and support for the war on terrorism has inched up. Osama bin Laden, however, is viewed favorably by large percentages in Pakistan (65%), Jordan (55%) and Morocco (45%). Even in Turkey, where bin Laden is highly unpopular, as many as 31% say that suicide attacks against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. Majorities in all four Muslim nations surveyed doubt the sincerity of the war on terrorism. Instead, most say it is an effort to control Mideast oil and to dominate the world.' Report is available at http://people-press.org/. 6. Bin Laden audio message of December 2004 and November 2002 website message to the American people which asserted, 'You steal our wealth and oil at paltry prices. This theft is indeed the biggest theft ever witnessed by mankind in the history of the world.' Full text available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,845725,00.html. 7. Http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html. 8. Ian Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: America's Relentless Drive for Energy Security (London: I.B. Taurus, 2005), p. 8. 9. The Political, Economic, Social, Cultural and Religious Trends in the Middle East and the Gulf and Their Impact on Energy Supply, Security and Pricing', available at http://www.bakerinstitute.org; also Petroleum Intelligence Weekly covered these production increases in great detail in various issues from August 1990 to January 1991. 10. International Energy Agency, International Energy Outlook, 2005 (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2005), p. 26; idem., World Energy Outlook, 2004 (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2004). 11. Iran had aimed to reach 4m b/d, Libya 1.6m b/d and Iraq 4.5m b/d, but were constrained at 3.8, 1.4 and 1.2m b/d respectively. See 'Political, Economic, Social, Cultural, and Religious Trends in the Middle East and the Gulf and Their Impact on Energy Supply, Security and Pricing', available at http://www.bakerinstitute.org. 12. Amy Myers Jaffe, 'The Geopolitics of Energy', Encyclopedia of Energy, ed. Cutler Cleveland (San Diego, CA: Elsevier, 2004), pp. 843–57. 13. For discussion of the Gulf Arab pricing policies to keep pricing artificially low, see F. Gregory Gause, 'Iraq's Decision to Go to War', Middle East Journal, vol. 56, no. 1, Winter 2002, and Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) as well as The Washington Post, 15 January 1991, which described Iraq's dissatisfaction with the Gulf Arab policy of keeping oil prices low. Also, William Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution 1981). 14. Ariel Cohen and Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr, 'Achieving Economic Reform and Growth in Iraq', http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm236.cfm. 15. Dermot Gately, 'OPEC's Incentive for Faster Output Growth', The Energy Journal, vol. 25, no. 2, 2004, pp.75–96. 16. Presentation by Anthony Cordesmann and Nawaf Al-Abaid, available at www.csis.org, 22 April 2005, http://www.csis.org/features/050420SaudiOilCapacity.pdf. 17. Clawson and Henderson conclude in their policy focus: 'For decades, Saudi Arabia, with its spare capacity and enormous reserves, has been the solution to any energy supply crisis. For the foreseeable future, despite its stated policy of ensuring world oil demand is satisfied, Saudi Arabia may be unable to play this role because, given robust world demand, the kingdom may not have sufficient spare capacity to make up for lost production elsewhere. Moreover, the limited life expectancy of both the eighty-two year old King Abdullah and his designated successor, eighty-one year old Crown Prince Sultan, make for uncertain leadership at a time when the problems of Al-Qaeda terrorism, socioeconomic disparities, and huge youth unemployment persist in Saudi Arabia.' 18. Authors' interviews with Saudi Aramco officials. 19. Notes Rachel Bronson in 'Rethinking Religion: The Legacy of the U.S.–Saudi Relationship', Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no.4, Autumn 2005, pp. 121–37: 'Although Saudi Arabia appears to have turned the corner in its fight against violent jihadis, it was much easier to galvanize Saudi religious leaders for the battle against communism than it is against radical Islam' (p. 127). 20. Ellen Knickmeyer, 'U.S. Has End in Sight on Iraqi Rebuilding', The Washington Post, 2 January 2006, p. A1. 21. Emphasis added. 22. Text of constitution reported by the Associated Press, http://www.washngtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR2005101201450.html. 23. Peter Beaumont and Faisal Islam, 'Carve-up of Oil Riches Begins', The Observer, 3 November 2002, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,825103,00.html. 24. 'Oil Workers in Southern Iraq Demand Bigger Share of Income from Exports', International Oil Daily, 19 July 2005. 25. Marina Ottaway, 'Back from the Brink: A Strategy for Iraq', Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief, No. 43, November 2005. 26. Authors' estimates based on interviews with senior officials from Iraq's oil industry. 27. Working paper by Amy Myers Jaffe and Donald Hertzmark presented at the meeting of the US Association for Energy Economics, Denver, 20 September 2005. 28. Ishita Ayan Dutt and Chris Flood, 'Tensions over Iran Put the Heat on Oil Prices', Financial Times, 13 January 2006, p. 45 29. Robert Tait, 'Iran Issues Stark Warning on Oil Prices: War of Words over Trade Sanctions', The Guardian, 16 January 2006, p. 1 30. BBC website, BBC Timeline, Abu Dhabi; Also, Hassan Hamdan Al-Alkim, 'The Arabian Gulf at the New Millennium: Security Challenges', in Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Arab States, ed. Joseph Kechichian (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 31. Http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/3876_4086.html. 32. Http://www.converger.com/eiacab/chron.htm. 33. Http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/3876_4086.html. 34. Http://www.eia.doe/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html. 35. 'Iran Accuses Qatar of Overproducing Gas', Oil Daily International, Energy Intelligence Group, 24 April 2004, p. A1. 36. Dagobert Brito and Amy Myers Jaffe, 'Reducing Vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz', in Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2005) 37. In the autumn of 1984, as an oil price war was looming, influential speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hojjatolislam Hashmi Rafsanjani indicated in a sermon that Iran might attempt to block the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf if oil prices continued to fall, warning if Iran 'was one day pressured in a price-cutting war, it will create such a crisis in the region that it will be similar to the days of the revolution and oil would not flow to the other side'. Iran's minister of oil announced the country would like to see $25 oil remain OPEC's minimum price in the aftermath of the Gulf War and was able to orchestrate a high-level political agreement with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to boost prices above the traditional $18 a barrel target price starting in 1999. In recent years, Iran has lobbied within OPEC to keep prices high by pressing the producer cartel to maintain a pattern of pivotal oil production cuts. It has used its leadership position inside OPEC to try to thwart attempts within the producer group to raise production during times of market disruptions. 38. The remarks of Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick in December 2005 at the conclusion of the Second US–China Senior Dialogue lists an extraordinary range of issues – terrorism, proliferation, pandemic disease and, notably, energy security – where the Bush administration seeks closer cooperation with Beijing. The remarks are available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/57822.htm. 39. David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, 'China's Global Hunt for Energy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, September/October 2005, pp. 25–38. 40. For an overview of this literature, see Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev, 'Putin's Eastern Dilemma: Kung Fu or Karate, Survival, vol. 48, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 163–178 (this issue) and Amy Myers Jaffe and Steven W. Lewis, 'China's Oil Diplomacy', Survival, vol. 44, no. 1, Spring 2002,. pp. 115–34. 41. China has been active in Iran's oil and gas sectors. Sinopec signed an MOU in late 2004 with the National Iranian Oil Company's gas division, NIGEC, to purchase liquefied natural gas (LNG) in return for an equity stake in the 300,000 b/d Yadavaran oil field. CNPC also pursued an exploration and development license for the Kuhdasht block and has expressed interest in taking a stake in the Pars LNG project. Sinopec also contracted with Iran for upgrading work at Iran's refineries at Tehran and Tabriz and for the construction of the oil terminal of Neka on the Caspian Sea. China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) has a contract to drill 19 gas wells in southern Iran. Sinopec was also awarded a contract for the Zavaareh–Kashan exploration block in central Iran where it made a discovery in 2005. CNPC has several contracts in Iran including operatorship of the Mesjed-I-Suleyman field development project while Chinese firms have drilling contracts in the Tabnak gas fields. 42. Joe Barnes, 'Slaying the China Dragon: The New China Threat School', Baker Institute Working Paper, Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, April 1999, p. 17. 43. See Zweig and Jianhai, 'China's Global Hunt'. 44. Douglas R. Bohi and Michael A. Toman, The Economics of Energy Security (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic, 1996). 45. Edward L. Morse and Amy Myers Jaffe, 'OPEC in Confrontation with Globalization', Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, ed. Jan H. Kalicki and David L.Goldwyn (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 65–96. 46. The costs and options for doing so have been studied in detail by the James A. Baker III Institute and the Center for Naval Analysis. For a detailed study of this subject, which is the basis for this section of this essay, see M. Webster Ewell, Jr, Dagobert Brito and John Noer, 'An Alternative Pipeline Strategy in the Persian Gulf', available at http://www.rice.edu/energy under 'Research/Other Publications and Presentations'. A classified version of the study also exists that should be revisited by policymakers, given the risks to Persian Gulf facilities described in this essay (M. Webster Ewell, Dagobert L. Brito and John Noer, 'Drag Reduction Agents: An Energy Security Bargain', Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 99-87.09, 1999). 47. Because of weak markets in mid-1990, Saudi Arabia and Iran held tens of millions of barrels of oil afloat unsold that served as a cushion to the sudden loss of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil production. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Saudi Arabia maintained a policy of storing oil abroad in the Caribbean and northwest Europe to make sure it could respond to any sudden disruption in oil markets. See Ronald Soligo, Amy Myers Jaffe and Peter Mieszkowski, 'The Political, Economic, Social, Cultural and Religious Trends in the Middle East and the Gulf and Their Impact on Energy Supply, Security and Pricing', working paper, 1996, available at http://www.rice.edu/energy. 48. Douglas E. Streusand, 'Managing the Iranian Threat to Sea Commerce Diplomatically', in Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJoe BarnesJoe Barnes is the Bonner Means Research Fellow for International Economics at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.Amy Myers JaffeAmy Myers Jaffe is the Wallace Wilson Fellow for Energy Studies at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.
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