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Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification

2011; Wiley; Volume: 65; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01283.x

1746-8361

Helen De Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan De Smedt, Stefaan Blancke,

Philosophy and History of Science

DialecticaVolume 65, Issue 4 p. 517-535 Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification Helen DE CRUZ, Helen DE CRUZ Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, K. Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium and Somerville College, University of Oxford, Woodstock Road, OX2 6HD Oxford, United Kingdom; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorMaarten BOUDRY, Maarten BOUDRY Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorJohan DE SMEDT, Johan DE SMEDT Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium and Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, 16-17 St Ebbes Str, Oxford, United Kingdom; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorStefaan BLANCKE, Stefaan BLANCKE Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Helen DE CRUZ, Helen DE CRUZ Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, K. Mercierplein 2, 3000 Leuven, Belgium and Somerville College, University of Oxford, Woodstock Road, OX2 6HD Oxford, United Kingdom; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorMaarten BOUDRY, Maarten BOUDRY Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorJohan DE SMEDT, Johan DE SMEDT Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium and Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, 16-17 St Ebbes Str, Oxford, United Kingdom; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorStefaan BLANCKE, Stefaan BLANCKE Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium; Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 22 November 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01283.xCitations: 21Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification seem to be committed to the view that our sensory systems and belief-formation processes are at least approximately accurate. However, for that reason they are vulnerable to the charge of circularity, and their success seems to be limited to commonsense beliefs. This paper offers an extension of evolutionary arguments by considering the use of external media in human cognitive processes: we suggest that the way humans supplement their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an effective way to increase the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive biases. Citing Literature Volume65, Issue4Special Issue: Justification. Guest Editor: Anne MeylanDecember 2011Pages 517-535 RelatedInformation