Religious Participation among Muslims: Iranian Exceptionalism

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10669920600997035

ISSN

1473-9666

Autores

Güneş Murat Tezcür, Taghi Azadarmaki, Mehri Bahar,

Tópico(s)

Religion, Spirituality, and Psychology

Resumo

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 38 Robert J. Barro & Rachel M. McCleary Barro, R. and McCleary, R. M. 2004. Which countries have state religions?. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(November): 1331–1370. [Google Scholar], ‘Which countries have state religions?,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (November 2004), pp. 1331–1370. 37 The methodologies underlying most literature on the impact of religious pluralism on religious participation are found wanting; see further David Voas et al. Voas, D., Crockett, A. and Olson, V. A. 2002. Religious pluralism and participation: why previous research is wrong. American Sociological Review, 67(April): 212–230. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Religious pluralism and participation: why previous research is wrong,’ American Sociological Review, 67 (April 2002), pp. 212–230. 36 According to Chaves Chaves, M. 1994. Secularization as declining religious authority. Social Forces, 72(March): 749–774. [Google Scholar], secularization can be thought of as the decline of religious authority rather than the decline or the marginalization of religious beliefs. His reconceptualization of secularism seems particularly relevant in the Iranian context. Mark Chaves, ‘Secularization as declining religious authority,’ Social Forces, 72 (March 1994), pp. 749–774. 35 After the amendments of 1989, the faqih no longer needs to be a marja-e taqlid. After the rationalist usuli school emerged victorious over the traditionalist akhbaris at the end of the eighteenth century, the position of the leading clergy—mujtahids—gained enormous importance. Shi'i believers were expected to follow the rulings of a mujtahid who commanded extensive knowledge of religious praxis and law. The marja-e taqlid are the leading Shi'i clergy who are emulated by their followers. See further Heinz Halm Halm, H. (2004), Shi'ism, J. Watson & M. Hill (Trans.), 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). [Google Scholar], Shi'ism, Janet Watson & Marian Hill (Trans.), 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 92–97. 34 For a rich discussion of the undemocratic process through which the constitution was written and approved in 1979, see Asghar Schirazi Schirazi, A. 1998. The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, New York: I.B. Tauris. , John O'Kane (Trans.) [Google Scholar], The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, John O'Kane (Trans.) (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 22–58. 33 Gary King et al. King, G., Honaker, J., Joseph, A. and Scheve, K. 2001. Analyzing incomplete political science data: an alternative algorithm for multiple imputation. American Political Science Review, 95(March): 49–69. [Google Scholar], ‘Analyzing incomplete political science data: an alternative algorithm for multiple imputation,’ American Political Science Review, 95 (March 2001), pp. 49–69. 32 This indicator is built by creating a composite variable based on the importance of the religion and piety questions. The Cronbach's alpha score for the variable is 0.84, which indicates that these two questions measure the same dimension of religiosity. 31 The current president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who was born in 1956, belongs to this generation. 30 Ideally, an exact comparison between the Tehran survey and the World Values Survey for Iran would provide a reliable picture of religious participation in Iran. While the Tehran survey inquires about respondents' participation in Friday congregations, the World Values Survey for Iran includes only a general question on participation in mosque prayers. Still, in both surveys, respondents who self-describe themselves as being religious are not necessarily those who attend Friday congregations and mosque prayers. 29 In an interview given to a reformist newspaper, Mohsen Do'agoo, the well-known Friday prayers leader of the Shemiranat district, a Tehran community located on the slopes of the Alborz Mountains, declared that ‘the so-called reformist movement is an anti-revolutionary current and must be annihilated.’ See Etemad, 22 October 2003. 28 The authors had the opportunity to participate in the well-known Friday prayers of the University of Tehran in January 2003. Despite the cold, a considerable number of people listened to the sermon by Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, Tehran's Friday prayers leader, who delivered the sermon in the open air. His sermon was interrupted occasionally by chants of ‘Death to America’ and ‘Death to Israel’ and lasted more then an hour, after which it was followed by the communal prayers. 27 The World Values Survey Iran was conducted in 2000 with a sample of 2532 individuals. Forty percent of the respondents reside in cities with a population of more than 100,000 and 27 percent in towns with fewer than 5000 inhabitants. Full information about this survey, including the questionnaire and raw data, is available at < www.worldvaluessurvey.org/services/index.html>. 26 Gunes Murat Tezcur Tezcur, G. M. (2004) Religious values and political attitudes in Iran. Paper presented at the Middle East Association Annual Meeting; San Francisco (November). [Google Scholar], ‘Religious values and political attitudes in Iran,’ paper presented at the Middle East Association Annual Meeting; San Francisco (November 2004). 25 Some leading and high-ranking clerics deeply resent the ascendancy to the position of faqih of Ali Khamenehi whom they perceive as their inferior; see Olivier Roy Roy, O. 1999. The crisis of religious legitimacy in Iran. Middle East Journal, 53(Spring): 201–216. [Google Scholar], ‘The crisis of religious legitimacy in Iran,’ Middle East Journal, 53 (Spring 1999), pp. 201–216. 24 Under different historical circumstances, religion may be a source of rebellion against political authority or may serve to legitimize existing political inequalities. See further Dwight B. Billings & Shaunna L. Scott Billings, D. B. and Scott, S. L. 1994. Religion and political legitimation. Annual Review of Sociology, 20: 173–202. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], ‘Religion and political legitimation,’ Annual Review of Sociology, 20 (1994), pp. 173–202. 23 Mansoor Moaddel Moaddel, M. 1992. Ideology as episodic discourse: the case of the Iranian Revolution. American Sociological Review, 57(June): 353–379. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Ideology as episodic discourse: the case of the Iranian Revolution,’ American Sociological Review, 57 (June 1992), pp. 353–379. 22 Shahrough Akhavi Akhavi, S. 1983. The ideology and praxis of Shi'ism in the Iranian Revolution. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 25(April): 195–211. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘The ideology and praxis of Shi'ism in the Iranian Revolution,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 25 (April 1983), pp. 195–211. 21 Charles Kurzman Kurzman, C. 2004. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 50–76. 20 A survey was conducted in Iraq under the auspices of the World Values Surveys in 2004. While it provides valuable information on religious beliefs, cultural values, and political attitudes among Iraqis in the post-Saddam period, it does not have any questions on sectarian affiliations (i.e. Shiites, Arab Sunnis, Kurdish Sunnis, etc.). For more information on the survey, see Mark Tessler & Eleanor Gao Tessler, M. and Gao, E. 2005. Gauging Arab support for democracy. Journal of Democracy, 16(July): 83–97. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Gauing Arab support for democracy,’ Journal of Democracy, 16 (July 2005), pp. 83–97. 19 One of the best descriptions of Shi'i beliefs and practices in English is Moojan Momen Momen, M. 1985. An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. [Google Scholar], An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985); on religious obligations, see p. 298. 18 Abdolmohammad Kazemipur and Ali Rezaei Kazemipur, A. and Rezaei, A. 2003. Religious life under theocracy: the case of Iran. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42(September): 347–361. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Religious life under theocracy: the case of Iran,’ Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42 (September 2003), pp. 347–361. 17 For an explanation of the violence committed against civilians during the war, see Stathis N. Kalyvas Kalyvas, S. N. 1999. Wanton and senseless? The logic of massacres in Algeria. Rationality and Society, 11(August): 243–285. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Wanton and senseless? The logic of massacres in Algeria,’ Rationality and Society, 11 (August 1999), pp. 243–285. 16 Pipa Norris & Ronald Inglehart Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, New York: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 85. 15 The activities of Islamic political movements in urban peripheries are well documented. For Turkey, see Jenny White White, J. 2003. Islamist Mobilization in Turkey, Seattle: University of Washington Press. [Google Scholar], Islamist Mobilization in Turkey (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); for Egypt, see Carrie W. Rosefsky Rosefsky, C. W. 2002. Mobilizing Islam, New York: Columbia University Press. [Google Scholar], Mobilizing Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 14 Gilles Kepel Kepel, G. 2002. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 61–105. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Google Scholar] explains the rise of political Islamic movements as an intended consequence of the sponsorship by authoritarian states and oil-rich Persian Gulf kingdoms; these movements ultimately developed unanticipated radical platforms that threatened the interests of their sponsors. See Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 61–105. 13 The Islamic political movements that mobilize public support through extensive social services include Hamas in Palestine, Hizbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Da'wa and SCIRI in Iraq, and the now-defunct Refah Party in Turkey. 12 On the plurality of Islamic politics, see Dale F. Eickelman & James Piscatori Eickelman, D. and Piscatori, J. 1996. Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Robert W. Hefner Hefner, R. W. 1998. Multiple modernities: Christianity Islam, and Hinduism in a globalizing age. Annual Review of Anthropology, 27: 83–104. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], ‘Multiple modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a globalizing age,’ Annual Review of Anthropology, 27 (1998), pp. 83–104. 11 Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler Fox, J. and Sandler, S. 2005. Separation of religion and state in the twenty-first century. Comparative Politics, 37(April): 317–335. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Separation of religion and state in the twenty-first century,’ Comparative Politics, 37 (April 2005), pp. 317–335. 10 Mark Chaves et al. Chaves, M., Schraeder, P. and Sprindys, M. 1994. State regulation of religion and Muslim religious vitality in the industrialized West. Journal of Politics, 56(November): 1087–1097. [Google Scholar], ‘State regulation of religion and Muslim religious vitality in the industrialized West,’ Journal of Politics, 56 (November 1994), pp. 1087–1097. 9 Anthony J. Gill Gill, A. J. 1994. Rendering unto Caesar? Religious competition and Catholic political strategy in Latin America, 1962–1979. American Journal of Political Science, 38(May): 403–425. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Rendering unto Caesar? Religious competition and Catholic political strategy in Latin America, 1962–1979,’ American Journal of Political Science, 38 (May 1994), pp. 403–425. 8 There are some exceptions to this pattern in Western Europe: predominantly Catholic Ireland has very high levels of religiosity, while religious pluralism in Germany does not translate into a vibrant life. Jose Casanova Casanova, J. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar] attempts to go beyond this sharp distinction between Western Europe and the United States by providing an innovative conceptualization of religion in the modern age; see Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 7 This view is well summarized in Roger Finke & Rodney Stark Finke, R. and Stark, R. 1998. Religious choice and competition. American Sociological Review, 63(October): 761–766. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Religious choice and competition,’ American Sociological Review, 63 (October 1998), pp. 761–766. 6 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966). 5 The ‘differentiation thesis’ was first elaborated by Max Weber Weber, M. 1958. “Religious rejections of the world and their characteristics”. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Edited by: Gerth, H. and Mills, C. W. 323–362. New York: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]. See his ‘Religious rejections of the world and their characteristics,’ in: H. Gerth & C. W. Mills (Eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 323–362. 4 For an overview of recent developments in the scholarship on religion, see Darren E. Sherkat & Christopher G. Ellison Sherkat, D. E. and Ellison, C. G. 1999. Recent developments and current controversies in the sociology of religion. Annual Review of Sociology, 25: 363–394. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], ‘Recent developments and current controversies in the sociology of religion,’ Annual Review of Sociology, 25 (August 1999), pp. 363–394. 3 For a forceful view that argues for the flaws of the secularization paradigm, see Rodney Stark Stark, R. 1999. ‘Secularization, R.I.P.’. Sociology of Religion, 60(Fall): 249–273. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘Secularization, R.I.P.,’ Sociology of Religion, 60 (Fall 1999), pp. 249–273. 2 See, for example, Bernard Lewis Lewis, B. 2003. What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East, New York: Perennial. [Google Scholar], What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Perennial, 2003); Steven Fish Fish, S. 2002. Islam and authoritarianism. World Politics, 55(October): 4–37. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], ‘Islam and authoritarianism,’ World Politics, 55 (October 2002), pp. 4–37; and Alfred C. Stepan & Graeme B. Robertson Stepan, A. C. and Robertson, G. B. 2003. An ‘Arab’ more than a ‘Muslim’ democracy gap'. Journal of Democracy, 14(July): 30–44. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], ‘An “Arab” more than a “Muslim” democracy gap,’ Journal of Democracy, 14 (July 2003), pp. 30–44. 1 All four waves of the World Values Surveys European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association (2006) European and World Values Surveys Four-wave Integrated Data File, 1981–2004. v.20060423, available at < www.worldvaluessurvey.org/services/index.html > (Accessed November 20 2005). [Google Scholar] are available at < www.worldvaluessurvey.org/services/index.html>. Additional informationNotes on contributorsTaghi AzadarmakiTaghi Azadarmaki, Social Science Faculty, University of Tehran, Iran; tazad@ut.ac.ir.Mehri BaharMehri Bahar, Social Science Faculty, University of Tehran, Iran; Baharan12345@yahoo.com.

Referência(s)