Principal‐Agent Problems in S&L Salvage
1990; Wiley; Volume: 45; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05104.x
ISSN1540-6261
Autores Tópico(s)Public-Private Partnership Projects
ResumoABSTRACT New legislation and traditional FDIC insolvency‐resolution procedures transform and intensify the principal‐agent problems most responsible for the FSLIC mess. These problems explain counterproductive constraints on the governance and operating policies of the agency responsible for rescuing and salvaging assets in insolvent thrifts: the RTC. The constraints slow insolvency resolution, increase interim financing costs, and undermine RTC recovery of asset value. Operationalizing its task as preserving evanescent and economically misconceived “franchise values,” the RTC allows insolvents to seek financing on an unconsolidated basis, initiates bidding for one institution at a time, holds back seriously troubled assets, and recruits an overly narrow range of bidders.
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