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OBSERVING BEHAVIOR IN A COMPUTER GAME

1990; Wiley; Volume: 54; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1901/jeab.1990.54-185

1938-3711

David A. Case, Bertram O. Ploog, Edmund Fantino,

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Contingencies studied in lever‐pressing procedures were incorporated into a popular computer game, “Star Trek,” played by college students. One putative reinforcer, the opportunity to destroy Klingon invaders, was scheduled independently of responding according to a variable‐time schedule that alternated unpredictably with equal periods of Klingon unavailability (mixed variable time, extinction schedule of reinforcement). Two commands (“observing responses”) each produced stimuli that were either correlated or uncorrelated with the two components. In several variations of the basic game, an S‐, or bad news, was not as reinforcing as an S+, or good news. In addition, in other conditions for the same subjects observing responses were not maintained better by bad news than by an uninformative stimulus. In both choices, more observing tended to be maintained by an S— for response‐independent Klingons when its information could be (and was) used to advantage with respect to other types of reinforcement in the situation (Parts 1 and 2) than when the information could not be so used (Part 3). The findings favor the conditioned reinforcement hypothesis of observing behavior over the uncertainty‐reduction hypothesis. This extends research to a more natural setting and to multialternative concurrent schedules of events of seemingly intrinsic value.