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A Friend Indeed? From Tobruk to El Alamein: The American Contribution to Victory in the Desert

2004; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09592290490448834

1557-301X

Andrew Buchanan,

African history and culture studies

Abstract The article offers a re-evaluation of American reinforcement for the Eighth Army following the fall of Tobruk in June 1942, arguing that American arms and air power made a decisive, if largely unrecognized, contribution to the victory at El Alamein. Both British and American leaders, for their own reasons, glossed over the critical American component of this most quintessentially British victory, and historians have echoed this downplaying of American aid. The article sets these political and military events in the context of expanding American interest in the Middle East. Acknowledgments This article grew out of a research paper for Prof. Warren Kimball of Rutgers University, Newark. I would like to thank him, together with professors Richard Langhorne (Rutgers University, Newark), and Kathleen Broome Williams (City University of New York) for their help and encouragement in preparing the article for publication. Notes 1. There is a voluminous literature on the events discussed in this paper. For background, the relevant sections of Gerhard Weinberg's A World At Arms (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994) is excellent. Matloff and Snell's Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1941 (Washington, GPO, 1953), offers a detailed and accurate chronology. Amongst more recent scholarship, Mark Stoler's Politics of the Second Front (Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1977) and Allies and Adversaries (Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 2000) stand out. 2. Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to the War Office, June 6, 1942, PREM 3/ 290/3. 3. While substantially British-led, the Eighth Army was composed of troops from British-ruled India and the Dominions of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa as well as from the United Kingdom. Tens of thousands of soldiers from Britain's African colonies provided logistical support. For brevity, the Eighth Army is referred to as “British” throughout this article, but this important qualification should be borne in mind. 4. Winston S Churchill, The Second World War Vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate: Boston. Houghton Mifflin 1950, (Henceforth Churchill Hinge of Fate) pp.343–344. 5. Alex Danchev, and Daniel Todman, (eds.) War Diaries 1939–1945 of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2001, p.269, (Henceforth Brooke, Diary.) General Sir Alan Brooke was Chief of the Imperial General Staff in November 1941. He was later promoted to Field Marshall (December 1943) and elevated to the peerage as Viscount Alanbrooke in August 1945. I have retained the usage General Alan Brooke, as the one contemporary with the events described. 6. Churchill, Hinge of Fate p.344. 7. For a review of accounts by participants in this meeting, see J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. III, Part II, London, HMSO, 1964, p.628. For color of Churchill's cheeks, see Thomas Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall. New York, William Morrow 1989, p.286. 8. See The Eighth Army, London, Ministry of Information, 1944, esp. pp.42, 69. 9. See Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, London, Cassell & Co., 1999 (first published 1960), John Bierman and Colin Smith, The Battle of Alamein, Turning Point, World War II, New York, Viking, 2002, and Jon Latimer, Alamein, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002. 10. See Raymond A. Callahan, Churchill: Retreat From Empire, Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources, 1984, esp. pp.102, 139. 11. Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp.1498, 1511. 12. See Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980 esp. pp.6, 34 ff. 13. Stoff, p.71. 14. Stoff, pp.39, 40. See also Phillip J. Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East 1919–1945, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978, pp.205, 206. 15. Telegram, Kirk (Minister in Egypt) to Secretary of State, February 1, 1942, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, IV (henceforth FRUS 1942 IV), pp.64–65. 16. Memorandum, Wallace Murray to Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, February 5 1942. FRUS 1942, IV, p.69. Welles rejected Murray's proposal that Kirk intercede with the British to get them to moderate their actions and concentrate on fighting the Germans, fearing to rupture Anglo-American relations. But the point was well taken. See Welles to Murray, February 5, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, pp.70–71. 17. Memorandum by Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations, July 10, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.25. 18. See FRUS 1942, IV, pp.63–71. On Kirk's career and outlook, see Baram, p.73. 19. See Matthew F. Holland, America and Egypt, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1996. 20. Bryson, pp.130–131; Baram, pp.190–191. 21. See Robert Vitalis, “The ‘New Deal’ in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 20 No. 2 (Spring 1996.) 22. On the Middle East Supply Center see Bryson, Chapter 11 and Baram, Chapter 8. 23. Baram, p.160. 24. Ibid. 25. Memorandum, Frederick Winant, Division of Exports and Defense Aid to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, April 17, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.11. For a discussion on Frederick Winant's views on MESC, see Baram, p.160. 26. Bryson, p.167. 27. Ironically, due to insecure signals Colonel Bonner Fellers’ reports from Cairo were also an important source of information for the Axis forces in North Africa. See Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, New York, Norton, 1990, p.65. 28. Kirk to Secretary of State, April 17, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.75. 29. Kirk to Secretary of State, June 19, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.78. 30. Major General Maxwell (Cairo) to War Department, #389, July 24, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (henceforth FDRL,) Map Room, Box 92. 31. Col. Szymanski (Teheran) to War Department, June 4, 1942, FDRL, Map Room Box 92. 32. Ondrick (Teheran) to War Department, #87, July 14, 1942, FDRL, Map Room, Box 92. 33. Ondrick (Teheran) to War Department, #94, July 25, 1942, FDRL, Map Room, Box 92. 34. Memorandum, William Donovan to Roosevelt, #125, January 3, 1942, FDRL, PSF, Subject File, OSS, Box 147. 35. Memorandum, Donovan to Roosevelt, #224, February 8, 1942, FDRL, PSF, Subject File, OSS, Box 147. 36. See David Stafford, Roosevelt and Churchill, Men of Secrets, New York, Overlook Press, 1999, p.213. 37. Memorandum, Bullit to Roosevelt, January 2, 1942, FDRL, PSF, Safe File, Box 2, Bullit. 38. Memorandum, Hopkins to Roosevelt, January 2, 1942, FDRL, PSF, Safe Files, Box 2, Bullit. 39. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, p.36. 40. See Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences, Lexington, VA, George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991, p.413. 41. See, for example, Memorandum Marshall to Roosevelt, December 26, 1941, FDRL, PSF, Safe Files, Marshall, and also Churchill, The Grand Alliance, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1950, pp.489, 576. 42. CCS Memorandum for Information, June 19, 1942, FRUS 1942, Washington Conferences, p.427. 43. Minutes of CCS, June 20, 1942, FRUS 1942, Washington Conferences p.430 Also see Brooke, Diary, Entry for June 21, 1942, p.269. 44. Churchill was under no contemporary confusion on this point. He wired Auchinleck June 21 to inform him to expect the arrival of U.S. Second Armored Division in August. See telegram Churchill to Auchinleck, June 21, 1942 PREM/3/284/7/240–241. 45. Brooke, diary entry June 20, 1942, Diary, pp.267–268. 46. Brooke, diary entry June 21, 1942, Diary, p.268. 47. See FRUS 1942, Washington Conferences, p.434. The quotation is taken from the diary of Secretary of War Henry Stimson. There is no formal record of the meeting other than a brief memorandum drafted by General Ismay, Churchill's personal Chief of Staff. 48. Quoted in Butler, Grand Strategy, p.28. 49. The decision to send 300 Sherman tanks and 100 guns accompanied only by support personnel instead of the U.S. Second Armored Division was taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff June 25. See CCS 84, June 25, 1942 in FRUS 1942, Washington Conferences, pp.446–447 and note on Marshall, Dill, Brooke luncheon June 25, 1942, Ibid. 50. FRUS 1942 Washington Conferences, p.436. 51. Pogue, George C. Marshall, p.334. 52. Henry Stimson quoted in FRUS, 1942, Washington Conferences, p438. Stimson was relieved that Churchill's rejection of the president's offer saved him from having to counter it himself. 53. Memorandum, Marshall to Roosevelt, June 23, 1942, FDRL, Map Room, Box 167, Naval Aide's File, A16–3 (Middle East). 54. See Pogue, George C. Marshall, p.336 and note 476, also Sherman, p.598. 55. Note from Marshall attached to memorandum, Marshall to Roosevelt, June 23, 1942, Op. Cit. 56. Churchill to Auchinleck June 25, 1942, PREM 3/284/7/238. See also Carlo D’Este, Patton, A Genius for War New York, Harper Collins, 1995, pp.415, 416. 57. Brooke, notes to diary entry June 21, 1942, Diary. p.269. 58. Brooke, diary entry June 23, 1942, Diary. p.271. 59. For Marshall's thinking on this question, see Minutes of CCS, June 20, 1942, FRUS 1942, Washington Conferences, p.430. 60. See Forrest C Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, New York, Viking Press, 1965 p.333. 61. Memorandum, Kirk to Cordell Hull, February 16, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.73. 62. Auchinlek to Air Ministry, June 25, 1942, PREM 3/290/3/25. Copied as Memorandum Stimson to Roosevelt, June 20, 1942, FDRL, Map Room, Naval Aide's Files, A16–3 (Middle East). 63. New York Times, June 24, 1942. 64. Daily Summary of Operational Decisions and Actions, July 1 1942, FDRL Map Room, Box 54. 65. See FRUS, 1942, IV, pp.80–85. 66. Memo, Marshall to Roosevelt, July 30, 1942, FDRL, PSF, Safe Files, Marshall. 67. On the military significance of the Grant tanks, see John Bierman and Colin Smith, The Battle of Alamein, pp.152–153. 68. Churchill to First Sea Lord, August 21, 1942, PREM3/284/7/194. When one tank-transporter was sunk en route, Marshall quickly dispatched a replacement, see memorandum Marshall to Roosevelt, August 31, 1942, FDRL, PSF, Safe File, Marshall. 69. Churchill to Brooke, July 9, 1942, PREM 3/284/7/222. Churchill exploded again in October when he found that 81 tanks were in workshops after being “assured that the Shermans would be given to the fighting formations.” Churchill to Brooke, October 20, 1942, PREM 3/248/7/178. 70. Memorandum, Brooke to Churchill, October 20, 1942, PREM 3/284/7. 71. See weekly tank returns from Eighth Army, PREM 3/284/9. 72. See Report prepared by the Secretary of State for the Dominions, June 2, 1942, PREM 3/284/12, and Memorandum, Office of War Cabinet to Churchill, July 15, 1942, PREM 3/ 284/12. 73. Unlike the M3 Grant, which mounted its main gun in a “sponson” on the side of the hull, the M4 Sherman mounted its 75mm gun in a turret, allowing the tank to engage the enemy from a “hull-down” position with its body under cover. See Bierman and Smith, Alamein, p.153. 74. Memorandum, General Alexander to Churchill and Brooke, October 30, 1942, PREM 3/284/7. 75. Churchill to Averell Harriman, October 31, 1942, PREM 3/248/7/161. 76. White House press statement, November 9, 1942. FDRL, Official File, Box 283. 77. See Memorandum, Bullit to Roosevelt, March 13, 1942, and Memorandum, George Marshall to Roosevelt, March 18, 1942, FDRL, Presidents’ Safe File, West Africa. 78. These moves were discussed on June 23, and Marshall summarized the proposals in memoranda to Churchill and to the President. See FRUS 1942 Washington Conferences, p.443; Marshall to Churchill June 23 1942, ibid. 447; Marshall to Roosevelt, June 26, 1942, PREM 3/281/4. 79. Richard Leighton, and Robert W Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940–43 Washington DC: US War Dept., p.366. 80. See Stoler, Allies and Adversaries p.81, and Robert Sherman, Roosevelt and Hopkins, New York, Harper Bros. 1948, 598. 81. See correspondence in PREM 3/281/4. including Churchill's instruction that the A-20 aircraft should be referred to as “Bostons”. 82. Analysis of Eighth Army order of battle, October 23, 1942, in Jon Latimer, Alamein, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 2002, pp.335–338. 83. See Deborah Wing Ray, “The Takoradi Route: Roosevelt's Prewar Venture beyond the Western Hemisphere.” Journal of American History Volume 62, Issue 2, September 1975. 84. For operations of ‘Halpro’ against Ploesti, see Daily Summary — Operational Decisions and Actions, FDRL, Map Room, Box 54, esp. reports 186, 187, 188. On diplomatic repercussions see file on ‘Halverson Mission’ FDRL, Map Room, Box 136. For reports from Ambassador Steinhardt see FRUS 1942, IV, esp. 793. This bold operation, a precursor to the “Tidalwave” raid of August 1943, was mounted June 11–12 with near disastrous consequences. After attacking oilfield facilities, the bombers scattered across the Middle East landing in Turkey, Syria and, as planned, in Iraq. Recovering the craft and their crews from neutral Turkey, where they had landed without destroying sensitive codebooks and bombsights, was a diplomatic challenge. They were released after the Germans indicated that they had no objection, perhaps, the Turks noted warily, anticipating reciprocal arrangements for their own fliers. 85. Daily Operational Summary, June 20, 1942, FDRL, Map Room, Box 54. 86. Clayton R. Newell, Egypt–Libya U.S. Army Center of Military History, p.10. 87. The Daily Operations Summaries prepared by the War Department for the White House offer a vivid outline of the actions of Halpro and later of USAMEAF on a daily basis. See FDRL, Daily Operations Summary, esp. #s 181–320, June 9–October 25, 1942. 88. Memorandum, Churchill to Roosevelt, July 4, 1942, PREM 3/470. 89. Churchill to General Corbett, July 12, 1942, PREM 3/290/3/124. 90. Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill's Chief Staff Officer (Ismay), June 21, 1942, FRUS, 1942, Washington Conferences, p.435. 91. White House Press Release, June 27, 1942, FRUS 1942 Washington Conferences, p.483. 92. Henry Stimson, Diary entry June 21, 1942, quoted FRUS Washington Conferences, p.434. 93. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries. 83. 94. Memorandum, Roosevelt to Hopkins, Marshall and King, July 16, 1942, FDRL, PSF, Safe Files, Marshall. 95. Telegram, Churchill to Alexander, November 4, 1942, quoted in Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p.537. 96. Memorandum of Conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Berle and A. K. Helm, Counselor of the British Embassy, Washington, April 16, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.19. 97. Memorandum, Henry Stimson (War Dept.) to Roosevelt, April 4, 1942, FDRL, PSF, Safe File, Box 6. 98. Aide-Memoire, Department of State to British Embassy, Washington, May 27, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.22. 99. Memorandum Paul Alling (NEA) to Cordell Hull, May 8 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, pp.76–77. 100. See note, FRUS 1942, IV, p.76. 101. Telegram Hull to Winant (London), August 27 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.27. 102. Telegram Hull to Winant (London), August 27 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.27. On choice of Hoskins, see Baram, p.75. 103. Memorandum Eden to War Cabinet, September 14, 1942, PREM 3/312/1. Eden's comments are amplified in the official British diplomatic history of the war, which claims that “the Americans generally knew little about British policy towards the Arab countries, and readily accepted the view that this policy (which in fact had accomplished more than any other Power for Arab liberation and advancement) had been merely one of exploitation” Woodward, Sir Llewellyn, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, London, HMSO, 1962, p.385. 104. Memorandum Welles to Leahy, October 20, 1942, FRUS 1942, IV, p.34. 105. For assessments of the Hoskins Mission see Baram, p.189, and Bryson, p.172.