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Who "Won" Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy

2005; The MIT Press; Volume: 30; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1162/016228805775969582

1531-4804

Bruce W. Jentleson, Christopher A. Whytock,

Global Peace and Security Dynamics

Having promoted global radicalism and regional rejectionism, engaged in terrorism, and pursued weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for years, Libya has shifted away from its "rogue state" policies, most especially by settling the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie terrorism case and by abandoning its programs for the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 1 The key policy changes started in 1999, when Libya surrendered two Lockerbie suspects for trial in The Hague, and culminated in 2003 with the settlement of the Lockerbie case that August and particularly Libya's December 19 announcement that it had agreed to abandon its WMD programs and allow international inspections.The debate over who deserves credit for these important changes in Libyan policy is a lively one politically and a challenging one analytically. 2Among the questions that analysts have sought to answer are: To what extent was Libyan leader Muammar Qaddaª intimidated by the George W. Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq and the broader Bush doctrine of preemptive force?How important was diplomacy, especially the secret talks between Libya and the United States that started late in Bill Clinton's administration and continued into the Bush administration, with the British playing a signiªcant role?What other factors, including Libya's internal politics and economy, came into play?And what are the lessons for dealing with other terrorism-supporting, WMD-seeking, and otherwise aggressive states?Positions in this debate have been sharply staked out."I hope to never haveWho "Won" Libya?3.