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Sovereign Debt and Private Creditors: New Legal Sanction or the Enduring Power of States?

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13563460600990855

1469-9923

Helen Thompson, David Runciman,

Fiscal Policies and Political Economy

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. David Hume, Political Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 167 and 176–7. 2. Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, ‘Serial Default and the Paradox of Rich to Poor Capital Flows’, American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 2 (2004), pp. 53–9. 3. Jeremy Bulow, ‘First World Governments and Third World Debt’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2002, No. 1 (2002), pp. 229–55. 4. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, ‘A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, No. 1 (1989), pp. 155–78. 5. Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, ‘Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter’, American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 3 (2000), pp. 621–39; Barry Eichengreen & Peter Lindert (eds), The International Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective (MIT Press, 1989); Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, ‘Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1981), pp. 289–309. 6. Peru's debt in September 2001 was 35 per cent of gross domestic product, following a steady reduction of its foreign debt burden since 1993; Argentina's at the same time was around 65 per cent, reflecting the fact that Argentina has been able to borrow more at lower rates of interest during the 1990s because of its size and the fierce anti-inflationary policies it had pursued over that period. In this respect, Peru's experience as a debtor was more typical of that of other Latin American states than that of Argentina. 7. James MacDonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt: the Financial Roots of Democracy (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), ch. 8. 8. James Conklin, ‘The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain under Philip II’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 3 (1998), pp. 483–513. 9. Christian Suter & Hanspeter Stamm, ‘Coping with Global Debt Crises: A Comparative Analysis of Debt Settlements, 1820–1986’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1992), pp. 645–78; Kris James Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment, NBER Working Paper 11472 (2005); Charles Lispon, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the 19th and 20th Century (University of California Press, 2005). 10. Suter & Stamm, ‘Coping with Global Debt Crises’, p. 655. 11. Ibid.; Cyrus Veeser, ‘Inventing Dollar Diplomacy: The Gilded-Age Origins of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2003), pp. 301–26; Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900–1921 (Princeton University Press, 1964); Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999), ch. 5. 12. Mitchener & Weidenmier, Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment, p. 2. 13. Suter & Stamm, ‘Coping with Global Debt Crisis’, p. 657. 14. Barry Eichengreen, ‘The US Capital Market and Foreign Lending, 1920–1955’, in Jeffrey D. Sachs (ed.), Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance: Vol. 1: The International Financial System (University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 107–58; United Nations, Public Debt 1914–46 (United Nations, 1948). 15. Jeffrey D. Sachs, ‘Conditionality, Debt Relief and the Developing Country Debt Crisis’, in Sachs (ed.), Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, pp. 255–95. 16. Suter & Stamm, ‘Coping with Global Debt Crises’, p. 664. 17. Jill Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, ‘Vultures of Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring’, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 1043 (2004), p. 1085. 18. Ibid., p. 1082. 19. Supreme Court, 'Republic of Argentina et al. v Weltover Inc. et al. 504 US 607 (1992). 20. Southern District New York Court, Elliot Assocs LP v Banco de la Nacion, No. 96 Civ 7916 (RSW), 2000 WL 1449862 (SDNY, 29 September 2000). 21. Conklin, ‘The Theory of Sovereign Debt and Spain under Philip II’. 22. Anna Gelpern, ‘What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina’, International Financial Law Review, April 2005, pp. 19–24. 23. ‘A default to order’, The Economist, 30 September 1999. 24. See Anne Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (International Monetary Fund, 2002). 25. Federico Weinschelbaum & José Wynne, ‘Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets’, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 67, No. 1 (2005), pp. 47–72; Barry Eichengreen, Kenneth Kletzer & Ashoka Mody, ‘Crisis Resolution: Next Steps’, NBER Working Paper, 10095 (2003). 26. ‘The insouciant debtor’, The Economist, 3 June 2004; Weinschelbaum & Wyne, ‘Renegotiation, Collective Action Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets’, p. 68. 27. ‘Köhler blinks before Kirchner’, The Economist, 11 September 2003. 28. ‘The end of the affair?’, The Economist, 20 February 2004. 29. Anna Gelpern, ‘After Argentina’, Institute for International Economics: Policy Briefs, No. PB05-2 (2005), p. 4. 30. Gelpern ‘What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina’. 31. IMF Press Release, 17 September 2004, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pro4196.htm (accessed 20 February 2006). 32. ‘Short back and sides all round’, The Economist, 4 November 2004. 33. Gelpern, ‘After Argentina’, p. 4. 34. ‘Screeching to the precipice’, The Economist, 28 February 2005. 35. Gelpern, ‘What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina’. 36. Ibid., p. 23. 37. ‘Argentina and the IMF’, The Economist, 11 September 2003; Paul Blustein, And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of Argentina (Public Affairs, 2005). 38. Eric Helleiner, ‘The Strange Story of Bush and the Argentine Debt Crisis’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 6 (2005), pp. 951–69.