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The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theory on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad

2015; Wiley; Volume: 8; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1002/poi3.101

1944-2866

Elizabeth Pearson,

Social Media and Politics

Policy & InternetVolume 8, Issue 1 p. 5-33 ArticleOpen Access The Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theory on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad Elizabeth Pearson, Elizabeth PearsonSearch for more papers by this author Elizabeth Pearson, Elizabeth PearsonSearch for more papers by this author First published: 29 September 2015 https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.101Citations: 26AboutSectionsPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract As dozens of British women and girls travel to join Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, there are increasing concerns over female radicalization online. These fears are heightened by the case of Roshonara Choudhry, the first and only British woman convicted of a violent Islamist attack. The university student in 2010 stabbed her Member of Parliament, after watching YouTube videos of the radical cleric Anwar Al Awlaki. Current radicalization theories portray Choudhry as a "pure lone wolf," a victim of Internet indoctrination, without agency. This article explores how gender factors in her radicalization, to present an alternative to existing theoretical explanations. An engagement with gender reveals its role in Choudhry's radicalization, first, in precluding her from a real-world engagement with Islamism on her terms, pushing her to the Internet; then in increasing her susceptibility to online extremist messages; finally, in fomenting an eventually intolerable dissonance between her online and multiple "real" gendered identities, resulting in violence. The article emphasizes the transgressive nature of this act of female violence in Salafi-Jihadi ideology; also, the importance of this gendered ideology as the foundation of ISIS recruitment online. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the operation of gender in the Jihad's production of violence, and roles for men and women alike. Introduction The issue of women, terrorism, and radicalization is firmly on the European policy agenda. A central concern is the adherence of increasing numbers of women to the ideology of the Islamic State (ISIS), which emerged in 2013 from Al Qaeda in Iraq, with a Caliphate declared a year later (al-Tamimi, 2014). British counterterrorism officials estimate that by March 1, 2015, 60 women and girls had traveled from the United Kingdom to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Peachey, 2015). Many appear to have been radicalized through the Internet, and there are consequently warnings from analysts and academics alike of violence in the West (Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, 2015; Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2015; Peresin & Cervone, 2015; Sekulow, Sekulow, Ash, & French, 2014). There is, to date, however only one case of violent female Islamist radicalization in the United Kingdom, that of British university student Roshonara Choudhry. On May 14, 2010, she stabbed her local Member of Parliament (MP), Stephen Timms, in his constituency office, later telling police this was a "punishment" for his parliamentary vote in favor of the 2003 Iraq War (BBC News, 2010). While Choudhry failed to kill Timms, she did succeed in gaining notoriety as the first would-be assassin linked to Al Qaeda-inspired ideology in the United Kingdom (The Guardian, 2010c). The Internet appeared to function as an important factor in her radicalization, as the attack followed months spent watching extremist material online (Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed, & Muray, 2011). "Roshonara Choudhry" therefore quickly became a by-word for the possibility of violent "self-radicalization" on the Internet and a symbol of Muslim women as a new security threat (Brown & Saeed, 2015). Choudhry's actions problematize current mainstream conceptualizations of violent radicalization. First, she is a woman, in a world where Jihadi violence is monopolized by men (Bloom, 2011; Lahoud, 2014). Second, her attack on Timms appeared to be the result of a solitary online radicalization, contrasting with understandings of radicalization as a collective real-world phenomenon (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Sageman, 2004; The Guardian, 2010). The incident was therefore characterized in radicalization studies as a rare "pure lone-wolf" attack, the result of indoctrination by the online preacher Anwar Al Awlaki, whose video sermons she had watched online (Neumann, 2012; The Guardian, 2010c). It prompted waves of speculation in both academic and media discourses that other women would follow her to violent Islamist action. Yet neither the question of Choudhry's crime as a woman (sex), nor of her transgression of Al Qaeda's ideology (gender), was engaged with in academic analysis, beyond the passing observation that the majority of lone-wolf perpetrators are men (Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014). This article addresses this gap, exploring the question, how does gender function in Choudhry's online radicalization, and in online Jihadi recruitment methods? The analysis is guided by feminist methodologies which use the marginal presence of women in male-dominated institutions to better analyze those institutions, revealing their otherwise unseen gender structures (Kronsell, 2005). An engagement with the incongruity of Choudhry's sex (a woman) in Al Qaeda-related violence permits gender (as constructed by them) to be revealed in the structures of violent Jihad and the Salafi ideology underpinning them, which both promote and limit women's agency in specific ways. This was alluded to by Choudhry herself, who noted the role of Al Qaeda scholar Abdullah Azzam in liberating her from the prohibitions for women in violent Jihad advanced by Awlaki, to the fulfillment of a violent agency. "Gender" is a social process of identity construction according to power hierarchies in which certain notions of masculinity or femininity have status (Butler, 2006; Connell, 1987; Murphy, 2009; Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013). It is causally related to violence, and gender theorists point to the inability to analyze security holistically when gender is not considered (Enloe, 2001; Goldstein, 2003; Hutchings, 2007; Sjoberg, 2013). This article argues that a gendered appreciation of Choudhry's radicalization not only better explains the mechanisms that make her case unusual, it is key to making intelligible the Jihad's production and control of violence, through the creation of masculinities and femininities and distinct roles for women and men. A gendered approach, therefore, has the potential to reinvigorate radicalization theory, at a time when it is suffering from what Sageman (2014) has termed "stagnation." The purpose of this article is not to document every detail of Choudhry's individual radicalization, the opinions of Choudhry herself, or those who know her. Nor does it engage in-depth with specific aspects of her case such as university radicalization, which warrants separate study. The key aim is to use a gendered account of Choudhry's online radicalization, and current ISIS recruitment practices, to suggest wider implications for radicalization theory and the Government policy based upon it. Methodologically, this is a primarily theoretical exploration of the issues revealed when a gendered lens is applied to academic literature and media reports of Choudhry's case, acknowledging that the latter reflect the biases of reporters, organizations, and the dominant discourses about Muslim women and terrorism (Jackson, 2007). The article makes a number of assertions based on research on British Muslim identity politics, and practices; this is not to suggest such assertions apply uniformly to all British Muslims. British Islam is diverse. The analysis is founded in concepts of ontological security as a state of stability and continuity of identity, and a political process involving the naming of threats and exclusionary practices (Rumelili, 2015; Steele, 2007). It engages with radicalization theory as a part of a security framework centered on the production of state security (Croft, 2012). However, it asserts that state security has the potential to include, not exclude, minority populations previously securitized, such as British Muslims (Brown, 2011). The article's critical perspective derives from the argument that gender is absent from radicalization theory, and that this is an omission. First, the known circumstances of the attack are outlined,1 followed by their representation in the dominant radicalization discourses, which deny Choudhry agency and present her in gendered ways. In the second section, Choudhry's emphasis on the role of Azzam in her crime functions as the starting point for an exploration of the gendered structures and ideologies underpinning the earlier stages of her radicalization. This suggests masculine gender structures may have limited her in the offline world and directed her to a radicalization online. The third section considers the role of gender in online messaging and communities, and ISIS recruitment strategies, which cast women in nonviolent roles. It argues that Choudhry's actions resulted from the Internet's ability to unify her increasingly multiple identities into one radical persona, through her interpretation of an edict by Azzam. Finally, directions are suggested for future research on the risks of violent radicalization posed by and to women, and the links between online radicalization, recruitment, and gender. There are a number of terms that require brief definition. First, "radicalization"—like "terrorism"—is a contested term in the literature (Neumann, 2013). It is also rejected by some as a justification for state securitization practices (Jackson, 2007; Kundnani, 2012). This article however accepts "radicalization" as a description of Choudhry's violent transformation from student to Al Qaeda-inspired attacker, while recognizing that there is no one clear understanding of what "radicalization" is, or whether it can be understood as a "process" at all (Mandel, 2009). Choudhry's attempted assassination of Timms was additionally an act of violent radicalization, to be distinguished from nonviolent radicalization (Bartlett & Miller, 2012; Neumann, 2013). The two are often conflated, but this is a crucial distinction, and one that so far separates Choudhry from the majority of women who have joined Islamic State. This article aims to demonstrate the role of gender in understanding distinctions between the two. This analysis understands "Jihad" as the violent struggle for Islam, equivalent to understandings of the "lesser Jihad" within Islam, the "greater Jihad" the personal internal struggle to follow God's will (Sageman, 2004, pp. 1–2). It is a key concept in Islamism, the "literalist practice of Islam with a revolutionary political ideology" (Rogers & Neumann, 2007, p. 12). Pure Lone Wolf: Creation of the Dominant Narrative Timeline of the Attack At the beginning of 2010, Roshonara Choudhry was a 20-year-old student at King's College London, expecting to attain a first class award in her degree in English and Communications (Mail Online, 2010). By the end of that year, she was serving a life sentence for the attempted murder of her local MP Stephen Timms (The Guardian, 2010d). Much of what is known about the events leading up to her crime and incarceration derives from open source excerpts of Choudhry's police interviews, in which she herself emphasizes her solitary exploration of Al Qaeda-related ideology (The Guardian, 2010b). These interviews suggest the attack on Timms in May 2010 took place some 6 months after her initial exposure to radical material, with no signs of interest in Islamism prior to late 2009. A police examination of her computer showed it was around this time that she began to download Internet sermons of the extremist preacher Anwar Al Awlaki from YouTube (The Guardian, 2010a). Awlaki was an American of Yemeni heritage, a radical propagandist, linked to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and a key disseminator of extremism online. His sermons, delivered in English, enabled him to attract many Western followers (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2011). The impact of Awlaki's video sermons on Choudhry seems to have been profound, as police reported no evidence of personal online contact with Al Qaeda operatives, other Jihadists, or other real-world links at all. She had not attended extremist meetings, nor did she possess any extremist literature (The Guardian, 2010a). Choudhry told police she had "stumbled" upon Awlaki's Internet sermons, downloading and watching more than 100 hours of them, sometimes between lectures. She also visited the extremist forum site, RevolutionMuslim. Although this, now banned, site hosted extremist discussion, Choudhry did not post or communicate with others. Instead she used the site to watch online footage of resistance fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan (The Guardian, 2010b). On April 27, 2010, just months from completing her degree, Choudhry dropped out of her studies (Mail Online, 2010). Her police interviews provide some evidence that she regarded King's College London as anti-Muslim, telling police she abandoned her course because "… they gave an award to Shimon Peres [Israeli politician] and they also have a department for tackling radicalisation … So I just didn't wanna go there anymore … 'cos it would be against my religion" (The Guardian, 2010b). Around this time, she also began to plan the attack, a decision she linked to YouTube videos not of Awlaki, but of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, whom she understood to decree that "even women" had a duty to fight. Before this, she told police, she believed only men were obligated to violent Jihad (The Guardian, 2010b). She selected as her target her local MP Stephen Timms, claiming she found him via the site www.theyworkforyou.com. He had voted in support of the war in Iraq, and stabbing him was to be his "punishment" (The Guardian, 2010b). Within 3 weeks Choudhry had bought two kitchen knives, and made an appointment to meet Timms at his local East London surgery. Once there, she waited patiently to see him, then as he greeted her, stabbed him twice in the stomach, before being restrained (Metropolitan Police, 2010). The attack was meticulously planned, to the extent that Choudhry paid off her student loans beforehand, to protect her family from any adverse financial consequences of her arrest (The Guardian, 2010a). She claimed she told no one of her plans and that no one directly instructed her in her actions. She was deemed mentally fit to stand trial, but offered no defense, saying she did not accept the court's jurisdiction. She is currently serving a minimum 15 years of a life sentence for attempted murder (The Guardian, 2010d). Brainwashed by Awlaki: The Dominant Discourse Choudhry's case has become important in radicalization theory because it is an "exception to the rule," deviating from conventional understandings of processes toward extremism in three salient regards. The first is her apparent lack of contacts, and apparently solitary radicalization. The second is its online location. The third is the fact of her sex, and her unique position as the first woman to carry out an act of Islamist violence in the United Kingdom. As a result, radicalization theorists have debated the case; yet they have only engaged in any depth with the first two anomalous characteristics of her radicalization. This section explores the resulting dominant account of her radicalization and its theoretical basis. Choudhry has been categorized as the archetypal "lone wolf," the exception to understandings of radicalization from social movement, social network theory, and empirical studies as a predominantly collective phenomenon (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Pantucci, 2011; Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The term "lone wolf" is a designation for single, undirected, attacks by individuals; however, its boundaries are blurred (Spaaij, 2010). Lone wolves exhibit varying degrees of autonomy, some having loose connections with group leaders or other actors. Choudhry, however, emerges as a rare case of what Pantucci (2011) terms a pure "Loner," lacking contact with a supra-organization, and with no external command or control. She is rarer still in being a female lone wolf, in a category which is already distinctive (Gill et al., 2014; Hussain & Saltman, 2014). Both Pantucci (2011) and Spaaij (2010) note the prevalence of mental disorder among lone wolves, contrasted with the general "terrorist" population, where psychological disturbance is rare (Silke, 1998). Choudhry was deemed fit to stand trial (The Guardian, 2010d), yet the benchmark is somewhat low, centering on an ability to understand the charges and enter a plea (Law Commission, 2005). Lone wolves also contradict majority understandings of radicalization as an essentially social process, first in invoking an ideological community, in this case, the global Muslim community or Ummah, and second in requiring social mechanisms to form the groups that carry out terrorist violence (Roy cited in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Radicalization theorists focusing on Salafi-Jihadi extremism regard these processes to begin with a threat to personal ontological security, then relocated to the Ummah as a secure global community. Roy (cited in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 800) describes how "a double sense of non-belonging" arises in second or third generation immigrants experiencing dislocation from their heritage culture, accompanied by a sense of exclusion from mainstream society. Wiktorowicz (2005) shares this conceptualization, highlighting the role of what he terms "grievances," anger over foreign policy, discrimination, or socioeconomic inequality in fomenting alienation and identity crisis in second or third generation immigrant Muslims to Britain. Several theorists echo these ideas, and they are instituted in the British counter-radicalization policy Prevent (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; King & Taylor, 2011; Prevent Strategy, 2011). No theory, however, can explain why, although many people experience such grievances, alienation, and discrimination, only a minority would proceed to adopt Al Qaeda-related ideology and extreme views (Sageman, 2014). The mechanisms of progression toward radical Islamism are also regarded as social. Sageman (2004) describes how what he terms a "bunch of guys" bond through friendship or kinship to discover and adopt extremism together. Many theorists regard this process as phased, with models such as Moghaddam's (2005) "staircase" to terrorism, or MacCauley and Moskalenko's pyramid model (2008) suggesting a starting point of neutrality (what Silber & Bhatt [2007] label "pre-radicalization"), to "self-identification," to Malthaner and Waldmann's (2014) "radical milieu," and ultimately to violence. It is the personal social connections inherent in such processes that appear absent in Choudhry's case. The second salient aspect of Choudhry's radicalization is the Internet, prompting theorists to speculate that online space now had the power to initiate lone wolf radicalization; the unpredictability inherent in this process attracting substantial fear and analysis (Bakker & Graaf, 2011; Weimann, 2012). McFarlane (2010, p. 17) noted "Roshonara Choudhry may represent the changing face of violent extremism in a younger generation that is increasingly looking toward the Internet for answers." Not only could the Internet create lone terrorists, it could even radicalize women, so far unrepresented in home-grown violent radicals. Key to narratives of Choudhry's online radicalization was the figure of Anwar Al Awlaki, whose YouTube sermons constituted the main extremist content she consumed online, and who features as an explanatory factor in all academic work on her case (see e.g., McFarlane, 2010; Neumann, 2012; Pantucci, 2011). Frequently, he is understood as the direct cause. This is partly due to Choudhry's own admission of his influence, but also due to perceptions of Awlaki as perhaps the world's most dangerous online Islamist cleric, associated with other lone events, including the Fort Hood murders, and failed Christmas Day bombing (Pantucci, 2011).2 Awlaki is just one of a number of influential ideologues regarded by scholars such as Brachman (2008, p. 78) as "the backbone of the global Jihadist movement. Without them none of the violence or rhetoric could endure or make sense." British-Muslim Woman: A Gendered Radicalization Gendered Ideology Accounts of Choudhry's "lone wolf" radicalization, powered remotely by Awlaki have two central effects. First, the figure of Awlaki realigns Choudhry's lone wolf radicalization with the more familiar narrative of the "powerful ideologue." Headlines such as "The remote-controlled Al Qaeda assassin: How brilliant student was brainwashed into stabbing MP" became somewhat typical of broader narratives in the media and academic discourses (Mail Online, 2010). This focus on the radical preacher saw urgent ministerial calls for YouTube to remove his videos, and a greater scrutiny of his activities by U.S. intelligence (The Guardian, 2010e; The New York Times, 2013). This would lead to Awlaki's eventual death as the target of a U.S. drone attack in Yemen in 2011, although never himself accused of violence (BBC News, 2011; Conway, 2012; Daily Telegraph, 2010). The second effect is to deny Choudhry agency in her own crime, responsibility instead being situated with Awlaki. Radicalization theory, therefore, performs in gendered ways, consistent with feminist critiques of the discipline. These suggest not simply that a "gender-blind" security studies field has neglected gender, and failed to consider it, but that this exclusion has nonetheless resulted in the stereotyping of women in distinctly gendered roles (Brown, 2011; Satterthwaite, 2013; Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007). These critiques also hold that mainstream security studies scholars readily read women according to accepted discourses, as either "victims" or "monsters," who do not conform to dominant norms for women of passivity and peace (Cunningham, 2003; Henshaw, 2015; Rajan, 2012). Women's active political participation in violence is ignored (Chowdhury Fink, Barakat, & Shetret, 2013). This neglect fails to see their commitment to violent causes, whether as suicide bombers for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, fighters for the Irish Republican Army, or in nonviolent roles, as recruiters, propagandists, agents, or spies, sometimes in leadership roles (Henshaw, 2015; Mahan & Griset, 2013). Other scholars suggest stereotypical depictions of women in mainstream security studies and policy are also racialized. Thus, British counter-radicalization strategy can be read as engaging Muslim women as passive, peaceful, and apolitical, an orientalist approach that regard them as uniformly vulnerable to Muslim men, from whom they need rescue (Brown, 2013). In police interviews, however, Choudhry is explicit about her agency in the attack on Timms. Her account of her rationale draws attention to the relevance of gender in the Jihad, and in her radicalization. Awlaki did not support women in violent Jihad, advocating instead a supportive role (Awlaki cited in Lahoud, 2014, p. 9). Choudhry told police she accepted this gender separation, until watching a video of Abdullah Azzam. An edited version of the interview was carried by The Guardian newspaper (2010b), as follows: Q: OK, can you pinpoint the time when that changed or was it a gradual … was there one particular incident?A: Like, erm, after like listening to the lectures, I realised by obligation but I didn't wanna like fight myself and just thought other people should fight, like men, but then I found out that even women are supposed to fight as well so I thought I should join in.Q: Where did you find that out from?A: A YouTube video by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam.Q: And what was he saying? A: He was saying that when a Muslim land is attacked it becomes obligatory on every man, woman and child and even slave to go out and fight and defend the land. Azzam is in fact more broadly ambiguous on the issue of women's active participation in violent Jihad than Choudhry understood (Bloom, 2013; Lahoud, 2014). The significance is in Choudhry's personal interpretation of his message, which permitted her to transform her engagement from passive online activity (nonviolent), to active offline (violent). Choudhry's reference to Azzam makes manifest the Jihad's gendered structure as presented by Awlaki, which she perceived as a barrier to violent action as a woman. To Choudhry, Azzam presented an alternative, endorsing female agency in violence and a possible course of action not endorsed by Awlaki. While Choudhry admittedly relies on male authority figures for permission to act, she retains agency through her personal interpretations of their sermons, which she instrumentalized to execute what then becomes, for her, an act of legitimate female violence within the Jihad. The incongruity evident in Choudhry's femaleness in her performance of Al Qaeda-inspired violence, and her reference to Azzam, problematizes the notion of violent Jihad as a male domain, and reveals the previously obscured gender mechanisms in its institution. The centrality of gender structures in Salafi-Jihadi doctrine will be dealt with in more detail later in the article. Four concepts are useful to understand these mechanisms: gender identity, gender structure, gender norms, and gender ideology (Carpenter, 2002; Duerst-Lahti, 2008). Choudhry's gender identity encapsulates the beliefs she entertained regarding her individual role as a (British-Muslim) woman. She appears to have contrasted these beliefs with her understanding of the gender structure of Jihad, the ways in which men and women are positioned within the Jihad, as a social, religious, and political institution. Choudhry's testimony reveals a desire to accurately understand the "gender norms" of the Jihad, the values and beliefs of the Jihadi community. Central to all this is a gender ideology, a belief system with gender at its heart, which enables and underpins the Jihad's political ideology (Carpenter, 2002). Hirdman additionally suggests gender systems are maintained via two mechanisms: the maintenance of male attributes as the norm, and the separation of men and women's activities (Hirdman cited in Kronsell, 2005, p. 284). Analysis that focuses exclusively on Awlaki discounts Choudhry's agency, which is apparent in her engagement with the messaging of Azzam, and neglects these complex gender dynamics. It also effectively discounts influences on Choudhry outside of the Internet, which act to contextualize her engagement online. As Spaaij (2010, p. 866) underlines, lone wolves "do not radicalise in a vacuum." The first spark of radicalization is almost always located in the real world (Hussain & Saltman, 2014; Neumann & Stevens, 2009). The importance of lived experience is emphasized by feminist standpoint theorists, who point to the need for academic theory to consider women's everyday "embodied" realities, which have been consistently ignored, as equal in importance to abstract and theoretical perspectives. These scholars advocate the power of standpoint theorizing to reveal the function of gender at the heart of dominant structures, by concentrating on that which theory has historically neglected: the domestic, the private, the feminine (Smith, 1997; Hartsock in Welton, 1998). To seek these sparks, alongside an understanding of the early stages of Choudhry's radicalization as a British-Muslim woman, through a gendered lens, is the task of the next section, which goes on to suggest the importance of gender beyond her case. Gender Structures, Gender Interrupting Choudhry's background is consistent with Wiktorowicz's (2005) theorizing on connections between socioeconomic deprivation, ideology, and radicalization within British-Pakistani and Bangladeshi-Muslim communities. Choudhry was a second/third generation British-Bangladeshi, from a moderate Muslim family, which was not well-off (The Guardian, 2010a; The Telegraph, 2010). The family lived in the London Borough of Newham, one of the most deprived areas in the country, poverty disproportionately affecting its large Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities (Newham Local Economic Assessment, 2010). Newham had attracted the activities of extremist Islamist group Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the mid-1990s (Husain, 2007; Nawaz, 2013), although the extent to which Choudhry was aware of this is not clear. Dwyer (2000) describes how young British-Muslim women, like Choudhry, constantly and successfully renegotiate a variety of identities imposed on them both by their communities and by wider society. Frequently they are cast by the mainstream in essentialized roles as either victims, or civilizing influences (Brown, 2008). In the family context, gender structures, underpinned by both Islamic arguments and cultural traditions, position women and men differently, and patriarchal norms dominate in some British Muslim communities, although this is changing (The Change Institute, 2009). Brown (2006) suggests a shift in recent years to an articulation of women's rights from an Islamic context, with culture distinguished from religion. Gender ideology infuses Islamic texts, which present familial roles and obligations in gendered terms, the father as the provider and protector of female family members (Aayah No. 34, Surah An-Nisa', Ch