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Another Mars–Venus divide? Why Australia said ‘yes’ and Canada said ‘non’ to involvement in the 2003 Iraq War

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 64; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/10357718.2010.513368

1465-332X

Brendon O’Connor, Srdjan Vucetic,

Commonwealth, Australian Politics and Federalism

Abstract Why did Australia fight in Iraq, while Canada did not? In this paired comparison, we go beyond explanations centered on the role of leaders to consider three alternative factors—ruling party opinion, public opinion and strategic culture. We argue that in both countries the Iraq decision followed the dominant views within the ruling party as well as the dominant strategic culture among the elites. As for the public opinion, its impact was significant in Canada, especially concerning the province of Quebec, while in Australia its impact was mostly neutral. This type of explanation, we suggest, is not only more historically grounded, but it can also illuminate broader patterns of Australian and Canadian foreign policy behaviour. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Vanessa Newby and Katherine Delaney for research assistance with this article, and Joshua Kertzer for his written comments. We would also like to thank Kim Richard Nossal and Beatrice Maille for facilitating our research in Washington, DC and Ottawa. This project received funding from the Australian Research Council (Grant Number DP0666516). Notes 2. The expression was used by prominent Australian commentator Robert Manne (2003) in his comment: 'It is generally agreed that Iraq is John Howard's war'. Howard's war is also the title of Alison Broinowski's 2003 book. Also, in True Believer, Robert Garran's book on Howard and the US–Australia relationship, Garran (2004: 9) writes that 'essentially' Iraq 'was Howard's war'. See also Canberra Times (2003), Franklin (2007), and Grattan (2003). 3. An opposition foreign policy critic of Chrétien's foreign policy, Canadian Alliance Member of Parliament Jason Kenney, stated in Parliament that: 'the Prime Minister finally has a legacy. He is the first prime minister in Canadian history to abandon our British and American allies at a time of need, and has brought Canada–US relations to their lowest level in modern times' (Taber 2003; see also Wilson-Smith 2003). 4. To be sure, Chrétien's was hardly a resolute 'no'. A week into the invasion, when pressed on the question of whether Ottawa was 'with the US' on Iraq, Chrétien answered 'maybe' (Globe and Mail 2003). On Chrétien's dithering in the run-up to the war, see Harvey (2004) and Roussel and Massie (2005). 5. We are, of course, simplifying. For a sophisticated comparative account from the leadership perspective, see Doig et al. (2007). 6. In this article, we have no space to revisit the venerable agent–structure problem in international relations theory. For a comprehensive discussion, see Wight (2006). 7. According to Michelle Grattan (2006), Thawley 'lobbied a US Senate subcommittee not to investigate AWB [Australian Wheat Board] as part of a probe into kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's regime has increased the heat on the Howard Government'. See also Baker (2006), Courier-Mail (2006), Overington (2006), Sydney Morning Herald (2006), and Wilkinson et al. (2006). 8. For an antidote to Goldenberg's (2006) narrative, see Frank Harvey's (2004) Smoke and Mirrors. 9. The Conservatives in Canada have been organised in multiple parties in the past: the Progressive Conservatives (1867–2003), Canadian Alliance (2000–3), and, currently, the Conservative Party (2003–). 10. After half a century of analysis, there is little scholarly consensus about the impact of public opinion on foreign policy making. For overviews of this nuanced literature, including concepts such as 'rally around the flag' or 'casualty aversion', see Nincic (1992) as well as Shapiro and Jacobs (2000). What we take from this perspective, as per our general theoretical framework, is that public opinion is one of a variety of distinct factors that leaders weigh up when making foreign policy decisions. 11. Using second-hand surveys of public opinion, we hypothesise—following the extant literature—that committing troops to a major war would require support from at least 40 percent of the public. Conversely, the opposition of at least 60 percent makes a decision to go to war less likely (Schuster and Maier 2006). In other words, it is hard to imagine any democracy sending hundreds, let alone thousands, of troops into a 'warof choice' with anything less than 40-percent support from the public. 12. Examples include the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer (2003), asserting in Parliament that the 'issue about Iraq' was 'about whether the world has any choice but other than to live in the constant fear of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons left in the hands of vicious dictators'. Connecting Iraq with the 'War on Terror', the Howard government declared on a number of occasions that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction had the potential to be passed on to terrorists. In Parliament on 4 February 2003, Howard (2003a) stated that 'Iraq's history of relationships with and support of terrorist organisations magnify our concerns. The rise of international terrorism adds a new and frightening dimension to the threat posed by the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons'. Connecting the dots at the National Press Club in March, Howard (2003b) suggested that the failure to deal with Iraq meant other 'rogue States will believe they can do the same', and this would 'multiply' the 'risk that they [weapons of mass destruction] may fall into the hands of terrorists'. This threat is linked to Australia with the statement that: 'if terrorists ever get their hands on weapons of mass destruction that will, in my very passionate belief and argument, constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat to Australia and its people, and that would be the ultimate nightmare not only for us but other peoples in other nations. That, more than anything else, is the reason why we have taken the stance we have'. 13. Note that opinion in the province of Alberta showed a majority in favour of a US-led assault (Léger, March 2003). 14. The longitudinal research on social values, such as that conducted under the auspices of the World Values Survey, German Marshall Fund/Chicago Council on Foreign Relations or the Pew Research Center, is less conclusive on this point, but judging by the dominant media reception of these findings, contemporary Canadians were indeed comfortable with the idea of 'North American divergence' (Maich 2005; cf. Adams et al. 2003; Brooks 2006; Resnick 2005). These attitudes should not be chalked up as simple-minded anti-Americanism, however. Canadian anti-Americanism is both 'unique', with the United States being central in many aspects of the Canadian body politic, as well as 'ultra-lite', meaning that it is highly contingent on particular American policies and administrations (Nossal 2007: 60; see also Granatstein and Hillmer 2001). 15. On more general foreign policy issues, the majority of Australians and Canadians reflect a global support for the US response to 'terrorism', but the same proportion also disagreed rather than agreed with American policies on 'global warming', 'nuclear proliferation', 'world poverty', and 'Israel and Palestine'. It is indicative that significant minorities of both Australians and Canadians said they 'don't know' whether they agree or disagree with American policies (O'Connor 2007a; O'Connor and Griffiths 2006). 16. In fact, while the Canadian numbers resemble those in Britain, the Australian respondents seem to share similar concerns to those in France. When asked, 'Do you think over time this country is becoming more like America or less like America?', 81 percent of Australians, as opposed to 52 percent of Canadians, answered 'more'. When asked, 'Do you think that the influence of American consumer products and entertainment in your country is too great?', 68 percent of Australians as opposed to 44 percent of Canadians answered 'too great'. It would appear that Australians are becoming increasingly Americanised but, generally speaking, 42 percent of Australians 'dislike' American television (a perusal of the prime-time television in Australia any given night would suggest a large number of Australian viewers are masochists). Only 21 percent of Canadians said they 'dislike' American television. Furthermore, 51 percent of Australians said they 'dislike' American food, as opposed to 32 percent of Canadians. Australians and Canadians are generally agreed on questions such as whether Australia/Canada is 'more cultured' or a 'better place to live' than America (O'Connor 2007a). 17. Our treatment of the concept brackets the philosophical and methodological debates on strategic culture, but see Bloomfield and Nossal (2007) and Haglund (2004). 18. There is no accepted definition on 'middle powers'—the concept has, in fact, fallen into considerable disrepute over the last decade—but the general intuition pegs them as also-rans in the cold war game of rising superpowers and declining great powers (Welsh 2004: 585–7; see also Stairs 1998: 271–9). Australia and Canada are often treated as ideal-typical middle powers, where the so-called form and scope of their middle-power behaviour varies, but their middle-power identity does not (Andrew 1993; Chapnick 2005; Cooper 1997; Michaud and Belanger 2000; Ravenhill 1998). Good international citizenship refers to foreign policies driven by internationalism, multilateralism and even cosmopolitanism (Lightfoot 2006). Additional informationNotes on contributorsBrendon O'Connor Brendon O'Connor is an Associate Professor in the US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney Srdjan Vucetic Srdjan Vucetic is an Assistant Professor in the Graduate School for Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, Canada