Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia
2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/08929882.2013.798984
ISSN1547-7800
AutoresAnthony M. Barrett, Seth D. Baum, Kelly Hostetler,
Tópico(s)International Relations and Foreign Policy
ResumoAbstract This article develops a mathematical modeling framework using fault trees and Poisson processes for analyzing the risks of inadvertent nuclear war from U.S. or Russian misinterpretation of false alarms in early warning systems, and for assessing the potential value of options to reduce the risks of inadvertent nuclear war. The model also uses publicly available information on early warning systems, near-miss incidents, and other factors to estimate probabilities of a U.S.–Russia crisis, the rates of false alarms, and the probabilities that leaders will launch missiles in response to a false alarm. The article discusses results, uncertainties, limitations, and policy implications. Supplemental materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Science & Global Security to view the free online appendix with additional tables and figures. Acknowledgments Primary financial support for this work came from Saving Humanity from Homo Sapiens and from Jaan Tallinn. The authors are grateful for comments from Martin Hellman, James Scouras, Ross Snare, Trevor Pyle, Matthew Fargo, Nathan Donohue, R. Scott Kemp, Evan Saltzman, Henry Willis, Vicki Bier, Daniel Gonzales, the journal editors, two anonymous reviewers, and discussion with others that helpfully informed this analysis in many ways. However, any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of others.
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