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South Africa: conceptualising a politics of human‐oriented development

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/02533950802078921

1940-7874

Adam Habib,

African cultural and philosophical studies

Abstract This article reflects on what needs to be done for a human‐oriented development agenda in South Africa? It investigates the broader structural political condition, especially the configuration of power, under which human‐oriented development occurs. It does this by first analysing the diverse academic literature on democracy and development with a view to drawing out the political lessons from comparative development experiences. These are then applied to South Africa through an engagement with its academic, policy and organisational literature so as to determine how best to establish the political condition for a human‐oriented development trajectory. Finally, the article concludes by both drawing together the various threads of the analysis and reflecting on the political implications of the succession dispute. Its overall conclusion is that not only is human‐oriented development a product of a political process, but it also requires an intricate mix of representative and participatory democratic elements. This mix of representative and participatory democratic elements is meant to create a substantive uncertainty, which is the political foundation that generates the accountability between elites and their citizens so necessary for realising a human‐oriented development agenda. The political programme recommended then challenges the perspectives of those who view participatory and representative democracy as distinct political systems. The perspective advanced here suggests that it is the intricate mix of participatory and representative elements that enhances the accountability of political elites to their citizens. Keywords: developmentpoliticspowercivil societyTripartite Alliance Acknowledgements I would like to record my appreciation to Bill Freund, David Everatt, Enver Motala, Garth le Pere, Geoffrey Modisha, Imraan Valodia, Lenny Markovitz, Michael MacDonald, Omano Edigheji, Steven Friedman, Raymond Suttner and Vishnu Padayachee for commenting on earlier drafts of this article. Notes 1. The structural adjustment literature of the World Bank, especially in the 1980s, was typical of this (see Nabudere 2006 Nabudere, D.W. . The development state, democracy and the glocal society in Africa. Presented to the Conference on Investment Choices for Education in Africa. September20. Faculty of Education, University of Witwatersrand. [Google Scholar], p. 3). Also typical of this in South Africa is the economic liberal school identified by Southall (2006 Southall, R. 2006. “Introduction: can South Africa be a developmental state”. In State of the nation: South Africa 2005–2006, Edited by: Buhlungu, S. xvii–xlv. Cape Town: HSRC Press. [Google Scholar], pp. xxii–xxiv). 2. Yet others like Wade suggest that these experiences are unlikely to be repeated because the very specific historical and industrial conditions under which they were originally implemented no longer exist (see Wade 1999 Wade, R. 1999. Governing the market: economic theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialization, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]). 3. This is particularly obvious in the case of Malaysia where the 1969 revolt laid the foundation for the New Economic Policy explicitly targeted at Malays with the objective of getting them out of poverty (see Chin and Jomo 2000 Chin, K.F. and Jomo, K.S. 2000. “Financial sector rents in Malaysia”. In Rents, rent seeking and economic development: theory and evidence in Asia, Edited by: Khan, M. and Jomo, K.S. 304–326. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar], Freund 2006 Freund, B. . State, capital and the emergence of a new power elite in South Africa: ‘black economic empowerment’ at national and local levels. Paper presented at the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust 10th Anniversary Colloquium. September22–232006, Cape Town. [Google Scholar]). 4. There are some scholars who are critical of this perspective. Raymond Suttner, for instance, in response to some of the democratisation literature on dominant parties, accuses ‘experts’ stressing the necessity of elite contestation, as being ‘dogmatic … deeply conservative … (and supporting) a specific version of democracy, that of formal, representative democracy without substantial social and economic transformation or significant popular involvement’ (see Suttner 2004 Suttner, R. 2004. Democratic transition and consolidation in South Africa: the advice of ‘the experts’. Current Sociology, 52(5): 755–773. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], pp. 756–757). The problem with this view of course is that it sets up a false divide between representative and participatory forms of democracy. 5. This is particularly worth noting given international political elites’ hostile reactions to current radical land reform initiatives. 6. For some of these scholars like O’Donnell, it was then the recent memory of authoritarian rule, which prompted them to recommend political caution, lest the transition be disrupted. This caution, however, led to a set of political dynamics that facilitated the rise of illiberal or delegative democracies (see Habib and Padayachee 2000 Habib, A. and Padayachee, V. 2000. Economic policy and power relations in South Africa’s transition to democracy. World Development, 28(2): 245–263. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 7. It is worthwhile noting that this perspective is similar to that articulated by the SACP. In part two of its controversial discussion document released by its Central Committee in May (2006), entitled ‘Class struggles and the post‐1994 state in South Africa’, the SACP argues that ‘if it is to have any prospect of addressing the dire legacy of colonial dispossession and apartheid oppression, a national democratic strategy has to be revolutionary, that is to say, it must systemically transform, class, racial and gendered power …’. This is not new. For instance, the slogan adopted by the SACP at its 1995 strategy conference, ‘Socialism is the future – build it now’ reflects similar sentiments. 8. COSATU is in favour of the general recommendation, although it suggests that the proportion between constituency and party list be 65% and 35%, respectively (COSATU 2003 COSATU. . Resolutions of the COSATU 8th National Congress. Electoral System, Part 5 [Google Scholar], p. 7). 9. Its support is just shy of 70%, up between 66.36% and 62.65% in 1999 and 1964, respectively. Although critics sometimes qualify this point by noting that voter turnout in national elections has declined to 76%, down from 88% in 1999, this should not detract from the fact that the party has increasingly consolidated its electoral support in the country (HSRC 2006 HSRC. 2006. “Survey on South African voter participation in elections”. South Africa Prepared for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) [Google Scholar], p. 9). 10. This is the peculiar logic that has become common in this debate. See Southall and Wood (2003 Southall, R. and Wood, G. 2003. COSATU, the ANC and the election: wither the alliance?. Transformation, : 68–83. [Google Scholar]), COSATU (2003 COSATU. . Resolutions of the COSATU 8th National Congress. Electoral System, Part 5 [Google Scholar]), and a number of the chapters in Buhlungu (2006 Buhlungu, S. 2006. Trade unions and politics: COSATU workers after 10 years of democracy, Cape Town: HSRC Press. [Google Scholar]). 11. Ultimately, Jeremy Cronin, Deputy General‐Secretary of the SACP and Chairperson of the Transport portfolio in the national legislature, is probably correct to recognise that were the alliance to break, it would not do so neatly, but will probably fracture almost all of the constituent units (Cronin 2002 Cronin, J. 2002. An interview with Helena Sheehan Available from: http//www.comms.deu.ie/sheehanh/za/cronin02.htm [Accessed 17 November 2005] [Google Scholar]. See also Southall 2003 Southall, R. 2003. “State of the political parties”. In State of the nation: South Africa 2003–2004, Edited by: Daniel, J., Habib, A. and Southall, R. 53–77. Cape Town: HSRC Press. [Google Scholar], Suttner 2006 Suttner, R. . African National Congress as dominant organisation: impact of the attainment of power and phases of post liberation development and crisis. Delivered to the Wits Interdisciplinary Research Seminar. October2, Johannesburg. [Google Scholar], Butler 2007 Butler, A. 2007. “The state of the African National Congress”. In State of the nation: South Africa 2007, Edited by: Buhlungu, S. 35–52. Cape Town: HSRC Press. [Google Scholar]). But then political and social advance is often a messy affair, and it is precisely the acrimony and broken relationships that give rise to the substantive uncertainty of elites, which is so necessary for a policy agenda that is responsive to the interests of working and poor communities. Is this likely to happen? Almost certainly, not in the short term. As indicated earlier, the political will among both the leadership and its supporters just does not currently exist for such a radical course of action. It may, however, in the future. The problem is whether COSATU and the SACP will at that point be sufficiently viable so as to constitute an alternative political pole of attraction. 12. COSATU has itself begun to reflect on the organisational lessons of its practice of the 1980s, although it is careful to acknowledge that this experience must not be romanticised (see COSATU 2006 COSATU. . COSATU political discussion document: possibilities for fundamental change. Prepared for the 9th National Congress. September18–21. [Google Scholar]). 13. He suggested this at a seminar, hosted by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) of the University of Cape Town on 18 October 2006, where he served as a discussant to a presentation I made on our co‐edited book on social movements, Voices of Protest. 14. Note, for instance, how China has used population and therefore market size as a leverage to attract foreign investment. 15. Note, for instance, the coincidence of interests on agricultural subsidies that prevailed for so long between the USA and Europe in the World Trade negotiations. 16. There are of course scholars who dislike the term ‘hegemon’, preferring instead to describe South Africa as a pivotal state (see le Pere 1998 le Pere, G. 1998. South Africa: an emerging power. Global Dialogue, 3(1): 1–2. [Google Scholar], Adebajo and Landsberg 2003 Adebajo, A. and Landsberg, C. 2003. “South Africa and Nigeria as regional hegemons”. In From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s evolving security challenges, Edited by: Baregu, M. and Landsberg, C. 171–203. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. [Google Scholar]). 17. The negotiations ended in stalemate and generated enormous criticism of both the USA and Europe and increased pressure on them from domestic stakeholders to reconsider their positions. 18. Panel discussion on the theme, ‘The Presidential Succession and the Tripartite Alliance’, hosted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, 14 September 2006. 19. This contradiction has most recently reflected itself in a debate between Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) officials on the recommendations advanced by scholars and in particular Dani Rodrik, associated with Harvard University’s Center for International Development, which was commissioned to investigate the constraints on South Africa’s growth prospects. Rodrik’s focus is on employment which he recommends be addressed through an expansion of the export‐oriented tradable sector which often employs low skilled workers. This is to be done in part through the creation of a competitive exchange rate, which means that the Reserve Bank needs to go beyond its narrow inflation‐targeting regime to incorporate tradable output and employment as criteria for its decision‐making. This recommendation, it is reported, is heavily supported by DTI officials, and is simultaneously strongly opposed by the National Treasury, which insists on addressing the problems through a continued reliance on market measures such as a competitions policy (see Roderik 2006 Roderik, D. 2006. “Understanding South Africa’s economic puzzles”. Centre for International Development, Harvard University. Working Paper No. 130[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]).