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Africa's Informal Power-Sharing and the Prospects for Peace

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 15; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13698249.2013.781302

1743-968X

Ian S. Spears,

International Development and Aid

Abstract Power-sharing and inclusion continue to inform contemporary approaches to conflict resolution and post-conflict governance in Africa. But aside from power-sharing efforts in relatively well-institutionalized countries such as South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, most efforts at formal inclusion have been short-lived. Indeed, many high-profile experiences in power-sharing governments have been failures. African governments and opposition groups do engage in inclusion, but, owing to the non-institutionalized nature of African politics, it is almost always directed toward more limited short-term objectives such as regime survival or material reward that comes with participation in peace processes. Surveying Africa's experience with power-sharing, this article argues that inclusion continues to be a fragile basis on which to build peace. Acknowledgements My thanks to Sarah Atkinson, Elisabeth King, Dr. Belachew Gebrewold, Dauda Abubakar, Betty Anne and Hugh Anson-Cartwright, and two anonymous reviewers. Notes 1. See, for example, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Consociational Engagements (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004); Rupert Taylor (ed.), Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict (London, New York: Routledge 2009); Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa?: Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press 1991) and Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985). 2. See, for example, Donald Horowitz, ‘Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management’ in Joseph V. Montville (ed.) Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington 1990) and Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (eds), Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2003) p.143. 3. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, ‘Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis’, Journal of Modern African Studies 24/1 (1986) p.17. 4. Marina Ottaway and Bethany Lacina, ‘International Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s’, SAIS Review XXXIII/2 (Summer-Fall 2003) p.82. 5. Herbert M. Howe, ‘The South African Defense Force and Political Reform’, Journal of Modern African Studies 32/1 (1994) p.45 and Bruce Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004) p.81. 6. First-past-the-post or winner-take-all elections are a possible exception. 7. Ian S. Spears, ‘Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing’, Journal of Democracy 13/3 (2002) p.126. 8. For the literature on spoilers, see Stephen John Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, International Security 22/2 (Fall 1997) pp.5–53; Marie-Joelle Zahar, ‘Reframing the Spoiler Debate in Peace Processes’ in J. Darby and R. MacGinty (eds) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) and Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, ‘The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords’, International Security 31/3 (2006/07) pp.7–40. 9. Lijphart (note 1); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985) pp.597–600; Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (eds), Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 1998) p.9 and Timothy Sisk summarizes the Lijphart and Horowitz approaches in Chapter 3 of his short volume Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington: United States Institute of Peace 1996) pp.33–45. 10. Marina Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States’, Development and Change 35/5 (2002) p.1005. 11. Ibid. p.1006. 12. Consider the ability of African leaders to circumvent efforts to reform political systems. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa’, Journal of African Economies 9/3 (2000) p.288. 13. Daniel Sullivan, for example, demonstrates the problem of applying ‘segmental autonomy’ to Burundi, where the ‘segments’ (Hutu and Tutsi) are closely intertwined by intermarriage and by the fact that they have commonalities in language, culture, and faith. See Daniel P. Sullivan, ‘The Missing Pillars: A Look At the Failure of Peace in Burundi Through the Lens of Arend Lijphart's Theory of Consociational Democracy’, Journal of Modern African Studies 43/1 (2005) p.85 14. Donald Rothchild and Michael W. Foley use the terms ‘proportionality’ and ‘moderation’ in their discussion of African coalition politics. See their essay ‘African States and the Politics of Inclusive Coalitions’, in The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder: Westview 1988) pp.234–5, 236. 15. See, for example, Philippe Le Billon, ‘Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts’, Journal of International Development 15 (2003) pp.413–26. 16. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: WW Norton 2000) p.266. 17. Jeremy Ginifer, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (New York: United Nations 1995) p.55. 18. Ibid. p.55. 19. Snyder (note 16) p.266. 20. Ibid. p.308 and 309; Herbert Howe, ‘The South African Defence Force and Political Reform’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 32/1 (1994) p.45. 21. See F.W. de Klerk, The Last Trek: A New Beginning (London: Trans-Atlantic 2000) p.356. 22. ‘Final Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea’ in The United Nations and the Independence of Eritrea (A/2188, 17 October 1952), (Blue Book Series), Document 9, p.133. 23. African Recorder (3–16 Dec. 1962) p.345. 24. Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, ‘Conclusion: The Long and Difficult Road to Peace’ in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (eds) Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2004) p.399. 25. Human Rights Watch, ‘Summary’ of Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process (3 Sept. 1999). 26. Bruce Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2004) p.69. 27. For Bruce Jones's own analysis on how spoilers might have been managed in the Rwandan case, see his excellent chapter ‘Civil War, the Peace Process, and Genocide in Rwanda’ in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews (eds) Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 1999) especially pp.78–81. 28. John Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2001) p.82. 29. Ibid. p.89. 30. Ibid. p.89. 31. Rothchild and Foley (note 14) p.233. 32. Brendan O'Leary, ‘Forward: The Realism of Power-Sharing’ in Michael Kerr (ed.) Imposing Power Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon (Dublin: Irish Academic Press 2006) p.xxxiv. 33. Some scholars cite other historical factors to explain Africa's institutional weaknesses. Drawing on the work of Charles Tilly, the arguments of Jeremy Weinstein and Jeffrey Herbst claim that an absence of interstate war among African states has led to weak or absent locally generated political institutions. A reluctance to tolerate secession or otherwise reform the African system of colonial borders has also meant that states remain large and ethnically diverse territories, characteristics which exert unmanageable Procrustean demands on those institutions which do exist. See Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000) and Jeremy Weinstein, Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective, Center for Global Development Working Paper #57 (April 2005). 34. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, ‘Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa’, Comparative Politics 16/4 (1984) pp.424–5. 35. Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Washington: Brookings 2008) p.4. 36. While the issue of personal rule has been widely discussed, the most significant study remains Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocratic, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press 1982). 37. See Alex de Waal, ‘Mission Without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace’, International Affairs, 85/1 (2009) pp.99–113 and Ken Menkhaus, ‘Governance Without Government in Somalia’, International Security 31/3 (Winter 2006/07) p.78. 38. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford and Bloomington: James Currey and Indiana University 1999) p.28. 39. J.P. Olivier de Sardan, ‘A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 37/1 (1999) p.34. 40. Chabal and Daloz (note 38) p.30. 41. Jackson and Rosberg (note 36) p.439. 42. Ibid. pp.438–9. 43. Anthony W. Gambino, ‘Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress’, Council Special Report 40 (Council on Foreign Relations: October 2008) p.20. 44. Jackson and Rosberg (note 36) p.429. 45. See, for example, Dennis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, ‘The Hidden Cost of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa,’ African Affairs 104/416 (2005) pp.375–98. 46. Specifically, this lack of comprehensiveness is a violation of Lijphart's claim that a coalitions involve ‘participation by leaders of all significant segments in governing a plural society’, see Lijphart (note 1) p.48 47. The most obvious recent example of this trend is the experience of Kenya since the election of Mwai Kibaki in December 2002. 48. Danny Hoffman, ‘The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, Military Strategy, and Humanitarian Intervention’, African Affairs 103 (2004) pp.212, 214. 49. Consider the descriptions offered on Somalia as published in the International Crisis Group reports from 2002 to the present. In spite of various reformulations of the government, critics have argued that respective leaderships have failed to ‘reach out’. See, for example, ‘Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report 170 (21 Feb. 2011). 50. Binyavanga Wainaina, ‘No Country for Old Hatreds’, New York Times 6 Jan. 2008, p.13. For perspective on how violence at the local level can be brought to bear on the leadership, see also Johan de Smelt, ‘“No Raila, No Peace!” Big Man Politics and Election Violence at the Kibera Grassroots’, African Affairs, 108/433 (2009) pp.581–98. 51. Similarly, in Angola, UNITA used violence in an effort to lever itself into a power-sharing agreement after it lost elections in 1992. Believing that the ruling MPLA ‘would sacrifice anything to keep the peace’, UNITA leaders maintained that their superior military power would compel the ruling MPLA to negotiate make equal room for the rebels in a unity government. See ‘The Diaries of UNITA's Jeremias Chitunda’, Foreign Broadcast Information Service – Africa, 93-018-S. 52. Conflicts are rarely if ever events of all against all, the Kenyan case being no exception. It is notable, however, that between December 2007 and August 2008, the number of Kenyans who agreed with the statement that ‘sometimes [it is] necessary to use violence in support of a just cause’, went up from just 12 per cent to 21 per cent. Given the prevalent view among Odinga supporters that the election was stolen by Kibaki, it is unclear whether part of the intent of the perpetrators was to overturn the outcome or to force the ODM back into a political process. According to one survey, 20 per cent of respondents said a coalition government was their preferred option, though most of these would likely have been among supporters of Odinga, the announced loser; supporters of the announced winner, Kibaki, are unlikely to have preferred a coalition government but accepted it as a means to make peace. See Stefan Dercon and Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero, ‘Triggers and Characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan Electoral Violence’, World Development 40/4 (2009) pp.735–9. 53. Maina Kiai, ‘The Crisis in Kenya’, Journal of Democracy 19/3 (2008) p.164. On the generous salaries received by Kenyan parliamentarians, see Xan Rice, ‘Kenya MPs Raise Their Monthly Pay by 25 per cent’, Guardian Weekly 9–15 Jul. 2010, p.6. The article also notes that ‘MPs often complain that they spend much of their pay in their constituencies, where they are expected to help with school fees and funeral costs’. ‘An MP uses this money to serve his expectant people’, Aden Duale, an assistant minister who will be paid around $14,000 [per month], told the Star newspaper. ‘Let us reward people for the good work they do.’ 54. Lijphart (note 1) p.243. 55. Noted by O'Leary (note 32) p.xxi. 56. Delegates eventually faced the threat that their hotel bills would no longer be paid by third parties when it became clear that an inclusive peace process was not producing peace. ‘Hotel Throws Out Somali Delegates’, Somaliland Times, 15 May 2004; Cathy Majtenyi, ‘Rising Frustration Could End Somali Peace Process’, Voice of America News 21 Apr. 2004 and ‘Somali Warlord Charged Over Fight’, BBC News 30 Jan. 2003. 57. Geoffrey York, ‘Mugabe: Wily Old Fox or Mellowed Conciliator’, Globe and Mail 18 Mar. 2009, p.A14. 58. Ken Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare’, ENOUGH Strategy Paper (Sept. 2008) p.6. 59. Joshua Nkomo's early resistance to overtures from Robert Mugabe is recorded in the ZAPU leader's memoir. See Joshua Nkomo, Nkomo: The Story of My Life (London: Methuen 1984), especially p.213. 60. Barry Bearak, ‘Mugabe Vows to Go to War Before Ceding Post’, New York Times 15 Jul. 2008, p.8. 61. See Innocent Madawo, ‘How Robert Mugabe Laid His Trap’, Globe and Mail 7 Aug. 2008, p.A17 and Celia W. Dugger, ‘In Zimbabwe Power-Sharing Talks, Who Will Get the Real Power?’ New York Times 27 Jul. 2008. 62. Anthony W. Gambino, ‘Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress’, Council Special Report 40 (Council on Foreign Relations: Oct. 2008) pp.15–6. 63. Stef Vandeginste, ‘Power-Sharing as a Fragile Safety Valve in Times of Electoral Turmoil: The Costs and Benefits of Burundi's 2010 Elections’, Journal of Modern African Studies 49/2 (2011) p.333. 64. Ottaway (note 10) p.1005. The term ‘autonomous recovery’ comes from Jeremy Weinstein, Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective, Center for Global Development Working Paper 57 (Apr. 2005).