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Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs †

2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 29; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/02684527.2014.895593

1743-9019

Alexander H. Montgomery, Adam Mount,

International Relations and Foreign Policy

AbstractVarious policy options have been proposed for slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons, yet all rely on sound intelligence about the progress of nuclear aspirants. Historically, the United States' record of estimating foreign weapons programs has been uneven, overestimating the progress made by some proliferators while underestimating others. This paper seeks to catalogue and evaluate the intelligence work surrounding 16 of the 25 states that are thought to have pursued nuclear weapons and to provide a framework for evaluating the causes of distorted intelligence estimates of nuclear proliferation. In particular, we identify 12 specific hypotheses related to politics, culture, bureaucracy and organizational culture, then explore how they play out in practice through two case studies (North Korea and Israel). We find that the US has overestimated nuclear programs much more frequently than it has underestimated or correctly estimated them. AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank Avner Cohen, John Lewis, Jacques Hymans, Scott Sagan, the participants of the King's College London Conference on Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation, 3–5 June 2010, fellow panelists at the 2006 American Political Science Association Meeting in Philadelphia, as well as commenters at Reed College for helpful comments and guidance. This research was supported in part by an Alta S. Corbett Grant for Research on Public Policy Issues.NotesThe authors are equally responsible for the article; names appear in alphabetical order.1 Compare the estimate in Director of Central Intelligence, Prewar Status of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (1991) < http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/> p.3 which suggests the 'late 1990s' with David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997) p.327. For a contrary assessment, see Jacques E. C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians and Proliferation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2012).2 An appendix containing short case studies with provisional codings of the hypotheses in all 17 cases is available at < http://alexmontgomery.com/>.3 See, for example, Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, George Perkovich and Alexis Orton, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2004) < http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa = view&id = 1435>; Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States (Washington, DC: 2005) < http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/about.html>.4 Richard L. Russell, 'A Weak Pillar For American National Security: The CIA's Dismal Performance Against WMD Threats', Intelligence and National Security 20/3 (2005) pp.466–85.5 National Intelligence Council, 'Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities: Office of the Director of National Intelligence', November 2007. The intelligence community stood by the judgment in the face of Republican skepticism: see James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, 'US Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a Bomb', New York Times, 24 February 2012.6 Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence, from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (NY: Norton 2006).7 Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, 'The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test', Journal of Conflict Resolution 48/6 (2004) pp.859–85. They code a total of 23 countries between 1945 and the present, separating them in to 'exploring' and 'pursuing'; Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan add two. Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, 'Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: A Quantitative Model', Journal of Conflict Resolution 51/1 (2007) pp.167–94. They code 21 between 1941 and 2002, excluding Libya, Switzerland, Australia and Algeria due to a lack of a top-level decision to produce (rather than procure) weapons. On coding differences, see Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, 'The Perils of Predicting Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/2 (2009) pp.302–28.8 Levite includes additional countries in the 'tried but gave up' category: Egypt, Italy, postwar Germany and Japan, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway. He also notes that there have been assertions, but no data, on Finland, Greece, Spain and Turkey. Ariel E. Levite, 'Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited', International Security 27/3 (2002/2003) pp.59–88 (p.62).9 Except Libya and India, for which we use the Singh and Way pursuit coding, and Taiwan's second attempt, for which we use the Singh and Way explore coding.10 For a similar, more general endeavor, see Roger Zane George, 'Beyond Analytic Tradecraft', International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23/2 (2010) pp.296–306.11 Richard K. Betts, 'Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits' in R. K. Betts and T. G. Mahnken (eds.) Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (London: Frank Cass 2003).12 Sherman Kent, 'Estimates and Influence', Studies of Intelligence (1968) p.34.13 Harold P. Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating (Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1993).14 Uri Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Domestic States (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press 1995) p.11.15 Glenn Hastedt, 'The New Context of Intelligence Estimating: Politicization or Publicizing', in S. J. Cimbala (ed.) Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society (NY: Transnational Publishers 1987) p.8. Corruption, for Hastedt, is a function of 'personalities, closed and rigid belief systems, ulterior political motives' and the allowance of secrecy for analysts.16 For a recent example, see, Mark Mazzetti, 'Some in GOP Say Iran Threat is Played Down', New York Times, 24 August 2006.17 An excellent general discussion of ideological politicization can be found in Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention.18 Harry Howe Ransom, 'Intelligence and Partisan Politics', in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall and James M. Keagle (eds.) Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1985) p.26.19 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2000) p.124.20 Ibid., p.123. For an excellent summary of the changing executive-intelligence relationships (and also executive-DCI relationships) see Christopher M. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (NY: Harper Perennial 1996).21 Ransom, 'Intelligence and Partisan Politics', p.43.22 Jason D. Ellis and Geoffrey D. Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2007) pp.51–5.23 Melvin A. Goodman, Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 2008) p.123.24 Mark M. Lowenthal, 'The Burdensome Concept of Failure', in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall and James M. Keagle (eds.) Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1985) p.47.25 Arthur Hulnick, 'What's Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle', Intelligence and National Security 21/6 (2006) pp.959–79. He reminds us that human intelligence assets take years to recruit and implant – but even satellite telemetry cannot always be reprogrammed easily.26 Ransom, 'Intelligence and Partisan Politics', p.26; Lowenthal, 'The Burdensome Concept of Failure', p.49. The primary case here is the agreement of the USA not to maintain operations in the Shah's Iran led to surprise at his collapse.27 Roberta Wohlstetter, 'Slow Pearl Harbours and the Pleasures of Deception', in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr, Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg (eds.) Intelligence Policy and National Security (Hamden, CT: Archon Books 1981).28 Hastedt, 'The New Context of Intelligence Estimating'; Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention.29 Glenn Hastedt, 'The Organizational Foundations of Intelligence Failures', in Alfred C. Maurer, Marion D. Tunstall and James M. Keagle (eds.) Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1985) p.148.30 See Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, for some history of disclosures. Since then, a complex game has evolved in which disclosures may come from the executive or intelligence agencies themselves. Either possibility could affect the content of estimates.31 Ransom, 'Intelligence and Partisan Politics', p.43.32 Also Hastedt, 'The New Context of Intelligence Estimating', p.48; Ransom, 'Intelligence and Partisan Politics', p.43; Betts, ' Politicization of Intelligence'. For a more recent example, see Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen, 'Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime', Arms Control Today 38/6 (2008). The authors surmise that the White House overruled a previous agreement among intelligence agencies not to release the contents of the critical 2007 Iran NIE, and so the subsequent release had biased and unintended affects.33 William Ascher, Forecasting: An Appraisal For Policy-Makers And Planners (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1978) p.199.34 Handel, quoted in Ford, Estimative Intelligence, p.74.35 Lowenthal, 'The Burdensome Concept of Failure', p.49.36 Michael Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', in R. K. Betts and T. G. Mahnken (eds.) Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (Portland: Frank Cass 2003) pp.12–14; Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm 1979). Because the decision to build a nuclear weapon represents a failure of general deterrence, much of the work on that subject is informative here. For more on the importance of accurately appraising interest and intent, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (NY: Columbia University Press 1974); and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003).37 Recent quantitative studies have attempted to evaluate the extent to which assistance has affected states' nuclear programs. Matthew Fuhrmann, 'Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements', International Security 34/1 (2009) pp.7–41; and Matthew Kroenig, 'Importing the Bomb: Security Threats, Sensitive Nuclear Assistance, and Nuclear Proliferation', Journal of Conflict Resolution 53/2 (2009) pp.161–80. They argue that civilian and sensitive assistance respectively have accelerated nuclear weapons programs; for a counterpoint, see Alexander H. Montgomery, 'Stop Helping Me: When Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs', in Adam Stulberg and Matt Fuhrmann (eds.) The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2013) pp.177–202.38 Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, 'Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime', International Security 29/2 (2004) pp.5–49; Alexander H. Montgomery, 'Ringing in Proliferation: How to Dismantle an Atomic Bomb Network', International Security 30/2 (2005) pp.153–87.39 Hastedt notes additionally that the internal structure of an organization can cause distortion; these are omitted from the study as too difficult for an outsider to evaluate. He writes: 'hierarchy, specialization, and centralization can be identified as the major sources of distortion' in the organizational sphere. Hastedt, 'The Organizational Foundations of Intelligence Failures', p.141.40 Handel, ' Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', p.42.41 Authors who have discussed the compromise and domination dynamics include Bar-Joseph, Intelligence Intervention; Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', pp.28, 44; and Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.122.42 Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', p.35.43 A general account of these dynamics can be found in James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (NY: Basic Books 1989). While this study explicitly eschews psychological explanations of estimative distortion, when these dynamics are encouraged by organizational culture in an aggregate sense, these effects might be classified as organizational.44 Wohlstetter, 'Slow Pearl Harbours and the Pleasures of Deception'; Lowenthal, 'The Burdensome Concept of Failure', p.49.45 Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 1985) pp.116–17; Hastedt, 'The Organizational Foundations of Intelligence Failures', p.143. Note that in Turner's formulation, this bias might well be bound up with Hypothesis 5.46 Robert Jervis, 'Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq', Journal of Strategic Studies 29/1 (2006) pp.3–52. He discusses this bias in relation to the estimates on the Iraqi program.47 Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', p.41.48 On the issue of forecasting intelligence, see Roger George, 'Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis', International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17/3 (2004) pp.385–404; Stephan Lefebvre, 'A Look at Intelligence Analysis', International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17/2 (2004) pp.231–64 (p.243); Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', p.43; Woodrow J. Kuhns, 'Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology', in R. K. Betts and T. G. Mahnken (eds.) Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (Portland: Frank Cass 2003) p.90; in international politics generally, see Charles F. Doran, 'Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in International Relations and Economics', International Studies Review 1/2 (1999) pp.11–41; Nazli Choucri and Thomas W. Robinson (eds.), Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman 1978); for a treatise on economic forecasting, see Ascher, Forecasting.49 Handel, 'Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise', p.45.50 Kuhns, ' Intelligence Failures', p.88.51 Ascher, Forecasting, pp.202, 211.52 In 1956, Israel requested 10 tons of heavy water from the AEC but later abandoned the request; this information was not transmitted to the intelligence community. Director of Central Intelligence, 'Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability: Central Intelligence Agency', 27 January 1961 < http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/israel/documents/reveal/01-01.htm>.53 Avner Cohen, Israel and The Bomb (NY: Columbia University Press 1998) p.81.54 Director of Central Intelligence, 'Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60', p.7.55 Ibid., p.10.56 Ibid., p.8.57 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p.87.58 Office of Strategic Intelligence, 'Nuclear Energy Activities in Foreign Countries: Central Intelligence Agency', 1956 < http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000198160.pdf> pp.39–43.59 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp.231–2.60 Director of Central Intelligence, 'Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK', 1961 < http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/index.htm> p.2.61 Albright et al., Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, pp.257–62.62 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p.107.63 Ibid., pp.175–94.64 Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p.265.65 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p.193.66 Avner Cohen and William Burr, 'Israel Crosses the Threshold', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62/3 (2006) p.2.67 Cohen and Burr, ' Israel Crosses the Threshold'. It should be noted that many observers think that American intelligence estimates afterward did not improve and that Mordechai Vanunu's assertions of Dimona's upgrade and increased production caught many in the intelligence community by surprise, though the present level of declassification cannot verify this and in any case these estimates fall beyond the scope of this study.68 Director of Central Intelligence, 'Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60', pp.7–8.69 Ibid., p.5.70 Ibid., p.2.71 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p.84.72 Director of Central Intelligence, 'Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60', p.2.73 Ibid., pp.2–3.74 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p.84.75 See Mark Hibbs, 'North Korea Thought to Have Separated PU in the 1970s with Soviet Help', Nuclear Fuel 17/13 (1992) pp.15; and David Albright and Kevin O'Neill (eds.), Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security 2000). They note this separation, which the North Koreans later admitted.76 On the North Korean program from 1945–80, see Michael J. Mazarr, 'Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea', International Security 20/2 (1995) pp.92–122.77 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, 'North Korea's Nuclear Infrastructure', Jane's Intelligence Review 6/2 (1994); Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, 'Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure – Part One', Jane's Intelligence Review 11/7 (1999); Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, 'Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure – Part Two', Jane's Intelligence Review 11/8 (1999); Albright and O'Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, 'Lifting the Lid on Kim's Nuclear Workshop', Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 November 2002.78 On the operating history of the 5MWe reactor and estimates of the plutonium extracted, see Albright and O'Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.79 Nuclear Threat Initiative, 'North Korea Nuclear Chronology, May 2012 < http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/>.80 Min Yu, 'South Korean Paper Quotes Russian Report on North's Nuclear Intentions', Seoul Sinmun, 6 January 1996.81 Robert A. Wampler, 'North Korea and Nuclear Weapons: The Declassified US Record: National Security Archive', 2003 < http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/> Documents 1, 2, 4.82 Director of Central Intelligence, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints: Central Intelligence Agency', 1985, p.17.83 Wampler, 'North Korea and Nuclear Weapons', Document 7.84 Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p.357.85 Wampler, 'North Korea and Nuclear Weapons', Document 15; Andrew Mack, 'North Korea and the Bomb', Foreign Policy 83 (1991) pp.87–104.86 Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, p.52287 Ibid., p.52388 Ibid., pp.522–4.89 National Intelligence Council, 'Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate', 2001 < http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf> p.9; Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center, 'Untitled CIA Estimate to Congress', 2002 < http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/cia111902.html>; Jonathan D. Pollack, 'The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework', Naval War Review 56/3 (2003) pp.11–49 (p.12).90 Montgomery, ' Ringing in Proliferation'.91 Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, pp.527–9.92 Larry A. Niksch, 'North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program', Congressional Research Service, 2005.93 CIA, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 2001.94 Nobuyoshi Sakajiri and Yoshihiro Makino, 'US Knew of North Nukes Plan in 2002', Asahi Shimbun, 6 June 2005; Carla Anne Robbins and Zahid Hussain, 'North Korea Had Russian Parts Suppliers', Wall Street Journal, 21 October 2002.95 CIA, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 2001.96 Joby Warrick, 'N. Korea Shops Stealthily for Nuclear Arms Gear; Front Companies Step Up Efforts in European Market', Washington Post, 15 August 2003, p.A19.97 'Musharraf: Khan Supplied "Probably a Dozen" Centrifuges to Pyongyang', Agence France Presse, 14 September 2005.98 David Albright, 'North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes', Institute for Science and International Security, 2007 < http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf>.99 CIA, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2008) p.6.100 Jeffrey Lewis, 'The Scoop and the Dupe: NYT Navel Gazes on Bogus NORK Nuke Test Prep', Arms Control Wonk (2005) < http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/698/the-scoop-and-the-dupe-nyt-navel-gazes-on-bogus-nork-nuke-test-prep>.101 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Excerpts) (2001) < http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>; George W. Bush, 'State of the Union Address' (2002) < http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2002/>; National Security Council, National Security Strategy (2002) < http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.102 Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006).103 Director of Central Intelligence, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints (Washington, DC: 1985) p.7.104 Ibid., pp.12–13.Additional informationNotes on contributorsAlexander H. MontgomeryAlexander H. Montgomery is an associate professor of Political Science at Reed College. He has a BA in Physics from the University of Chicago, an MA in Energy and Resources from the University of California, Berkeley, and an MA in Sociology and a PhD in Political Science from Stanford University. While at Stanford, his work was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship. He has been a joint International Security Program/Managing the Atom Project Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and a post-doctoral fellow and a visiting assistant professor at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. During 2012–3, he was Council on Foreign International Affairs Fellow in Nuclear Security in the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction division of OSD(P) in the US Department of Defense, and during 2013–4 he was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He has published articles on nuclear proliferation and on the effects of social networks of international organizations on interstate conflict, most recently in International Organization and the Journal of Conflict Resolution. His research interests include political organizations, social networks, weapons of mass disruption and destruction, social studies of technology, and interstate social relations.Adam MountAdam Mount is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. His dissertation explains US commitments to nuclear disarmament that have been offered in formal settings as responses to a moral disarmament norm. His current applied research considers technical steps the US can take now to better leverage extant disarmament commitments by increasing their credibility. Previously, he worked at the Council on Foreign Relations and the RAND Corporation. His work has appeared in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas and Security Dialogue.