Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation
2007; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 16; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/09636410701741070
ISSN1556-1852
Autores Tópico(s)Health and Conflict Studies
ResumoAbstract Nuclear weapons' defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. Sooner or later, however, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish; but if they are right, it is exploitative. Like big cars and cheap flights, nuclear deterrence benefits us at the expense of future generations. States that do not already have the bomb should not get it. Britain and France should consider disarmament, while Russia and the United States should slash their arsenals. Minimum deterrence should be equally stable, but most nuclear optimists, being neorealists who hold that war will continue, should want deep cuts even if it is not. Matthew Rendall is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham. He has written about democratic peace theory, defensive realism, and the Vienna system. His last article, “A Qualified Success for Collective Security: The Concert of Europe and the Belgian Crisis, 1831,” appeared in the June issue of Diplomacy and Statecraft. The author thanks his students (especially Tim Yearsley), Daniel Geller, Darryl Howlett, Mathew Humphrey, Will Lowe, Wyn Rees, Steven Rendall, Richard Stahnke, David Stevens, Bradley Thayer, William Walker, participants in the ECPR Joint Sessions, the ESRC Research Seminar Series on New Approaches to WMD Proliferation, the Research Seminar of the University of Nottingham's School of Politics and International Relations, and anonymous referees for comments. Notes 1John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 65; Bradley A. Thayer, “Nuclear Weapons as a Faustian Bargain,” Security Studies 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1995): 149–63. 2John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” in The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace: Expanded Edition, eds. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 168; Keith B. Payne, “The Case Against Nuclear Abolition and for Nuclear Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy 17, no. 1 (January–March 1998): 3–43; Michael Quinlan, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Policy for Western Possessors,” International Affairs (London) 69, no. 3 (July 1993): 485–96; C. Paul Robinson and Kathleen C. Bailey, “To Zero or Not to Zero: A U.S. Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament,” Security Dialogue 28, no. 2 (June 1997): 149–58; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731–45. 3 See notably Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” and Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), 3–45. 4 For arguments that nuclear weapons do not greatly reduce the risk of war, see Barry M. Blechman and Cathleen S. Fisher, “Phase Out the Bomb,” Foreign Policy 97 (Winter 1994/95): 79–96; Michael MccGwire, “Is There a Future for Nuclear Weapons?” International Affairs (London) 70, no. 2 (April 1994): 211–28; and John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” in Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Cold War and After, 45–69. The most influential critique of nuclear optimism is Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in Sagan and Waltz, Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 46–87. Surveys and commentaries on the nuclear optimism-pessimism debate include Peter D. Feaver, “Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 754–72; Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate,” Security Studies 12, no. 1 (Autumn 2002): 41–96; Peter R. Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 695–753; and Thayer, “Nuclear Weapons as a Faustian Bargain.” 5 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001); and Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). 6 Robinson and Bailey, “To Zero or Not to Zero,” 156. 7 Payne, “Case Against Nuclear Abolition,” 25. 8 Jefferson McMahan, “Nuclear Deterrence and Future Generations,” in Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions, ed. Avner Cohen and Steven Lee (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1986), 319–39; and Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 9 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), chap. 4. 10 Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 169. 11 Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent.” 12 Works on intergenerational justice include Bruce Edward Auerbach, Unto the Thousandth Generation: Conceptualizing Intergenerational Justice (New York: Peter Lang, 1995); Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek, Justice, Posterity and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Dieter Birnbacher, Verantwortung für zukünftige Generationen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1988), translated as La responsabilité envers les générations futures (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1994); Avner de-Shalit, Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations (London: Routledge, 1995); Energy and the Future, ed. Douglas MacLean and Peter G. Brown (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983); Fairness and Futurity: Essays On Environmental Sustainability And Social Justice, ed. Andrew Dobson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Obligations to Future Generations, ed. R. I. Sikora and Brian Barry (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), part 4; Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, ed. Ernest Partridge (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1981); and Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1989). 13 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 49–50, quotation at 50. 14 Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 279–91; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 206–209; Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 156–57; Barry R. Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Autumn 1993): 124; Thayer, “Nuclear Weapons as a Faustian Bargain,” 151–53; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 244–46; and Waltz, “More May Be Better,” 24–25, 30–31. 15 Mearsheimer, “Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent”; Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” in Lynn-Jones and Miller, The Cold War and After, 200; and Waltz, “More May Be Better.” 16 Cf. Knopf, “Recasting the Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate,” 48–49, 54. 17 Steven P. Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 139–40. 18 Waltz, “More May Be Better,” 17, 33; and Waltz, “Nuclear Myths,” 744. 19 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 20 Richard K. Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” in The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, ed. Victor A. Utgoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 73; Sagan, “More Will Be Worse”; and Scott D. Sagan, “Sagan Responds to Waltz,” in Sagan and Waltz, Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 155–84. 21 Waltz, “Nuclear Myths,” 740. 22 Rudolf Avenhaus et al., “The Probability of Nuclear War,” Journal of Peace Research 26, no. 1 (February 1989): 91–99. 23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_monkey_theorem (accessed 2 April 2007). 24 Avenhaus et al., “Probability of Nuclear War,” 91. 25 Ibid., 97. 26 Ibid., 91–92. 27 “The Risk of Nuclear War Does Not Belong to History,” in The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates, ed. Raimo Väyrynen (London: Routledge, 2006), 113–32, quotation at 121. For a critique of the view that World War I gives grounds for fearing accidental nuclear war, see Marc Trachtenberg, “The Coming of the First World War: A Reassessment,” in Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 47–99. 28 Michael MccGwire, “Shifting the Paradigm,” International Affairs (London) 78, no. 1 (January 2002): 12. 29 Victor A. Utgoff, “Proliferation, Missile Defence, and American Ambitions,” Survival 44, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 87–90. Nuclear proliferation may restrain some states from deliberately initiating war, but the risk of accidents will go up. Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, “Proliferation and the Probability of War: A Cardinality Theorem,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 206–14. 30 Sagan, “Sagan Responds to Waltz,” 167. 31 Philip Brenner, “Thirteen Months: Cuba's Perspective on the Missile Crisis,” in The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, ed. James A. Nathan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 193, 198–99; Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 39–41, 62–63 n. 96, 109; Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” 76. 32 Waltz, “More May Be Better,” 30–31. 33 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Waltz Responds to Sagan,” in Sagan and Waltz, Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 125–26, 151. 34 Robert E. Goodin, “Nuclear Disarmament as a Moral Certainty,” in Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy, ed. Russell Hardin, John J. Mearsheimer, Gerald Dworkin and Robert E. Goodin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 269–70; Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, 87–88. 35 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986), 63. 36 Lachlan Forrow et al., “Accidental Nuclear War: A Post-Cold War Assessment,” New England Journal of Medicine 338, no. 18 (April 30, 1998): 1327; Paul, “Risk of Nuclear War,” 124. 37 Nye, Nuclear Ethics, 67. 38 “Friendly Dissuasion,” New York Times, 3 May 2001. 39 Avenhaus et al., “Probability of Nuclear War,” 92; Nye, Nuclear Ethics, 120. 40 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 10. 41 Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse,” 52; Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Beyond Nuclearism,” in Security Without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 29. 42 Payne, “The Case Against Nuclear Abolition,” 24. 43 Regina Cowen Karp, “Introduction,” in Karp, Security Without Nuclear Weapons, 19. 44 Quoted in Booth and Wheeler, “Beyond Nuclearism,” 23. 45 Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 172. 46 Stephen Dycus, “Nuclear War: Still the Gravest Threat to the Environment,” Vermont Law Review 25, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 753–72; Douglas Holdstock and Lis Waterston, “Nuclear Weapons, a Continuing Threat to Health,” Lancet 355, no. 9214 (29 April 2000): 1545; Alan Robock, Luke Oman and Georgiy L. Stenchikov, “Nuclear Winter Revisited with a Modern Climate Model and Current Nuclear Arsenals: Still Catastrophic Consequences,” Journal of Geophysical Research—Atmospheres 112, D13107 (2007); Theodore Rueter and Thomas Kalil, “Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Winter,” World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 588–90; and Carl Sagan and Richard Turco, A Path Where No Man Thought: Nuclear Winter and the End of the Arms Race (London: Century, 1990). 47 Waltz, “More May Be Better,” 17, 34–35, quotation at 17; Waltz, “Nuclear Myths,” 733. 48 Booth and Wheeler, “Beyond Nuclearism,” 41; Nye, Nuclear Ethics, 62–63. 49 Colin Gray, “To Confuse Ourselves: Nuclear Fallacies,” in Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, ed. John Baylis and Robert O'Neill (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 18. 50 Mearsheimer, “Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” 65. 51 Sagan and Turco, A Path Where No Man Thought, chap. 12. 52 Douglas P. Lackey, Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 187. 53 Van Evera, “Primed for Peace,” 200. 54 Van Evera, Causes of War, 248–50. Van Evera is less confident than other optimists, holding that nuclear weapons may prove “a curse or a blessing.” Ibid., 254. 55 Auerbach, Unto the Thousandth Generation, 3. 56 Stephen M. Gardiner, “The Real Tragedy of the Commons,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 30, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 387–416; Peter Graf Kielmansegg, “Können Demokratien zukunftsverantwortlich handeln?” Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken 57, no. 7 (July 2003): 583–94; Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni, “Legacies, Immortality, and the Future: The Psychology of Intergenerational Altruism,” Research on Managing Groups and Teams 8 (2006): 248; and Wade-Benzoni, “Thinking About the Future: An Intergenerational Perspective on the Conflict and Compatibility Between Economic and Environmental Interests,” American Behavioral Scientist 42, no. 8 (May 1999): 1395–96, quotation from 1396 (emphasis in original). 57 Brian Barry, “Intergenerational Justice in Energy Policy,” in Douglas MacLean and Peter Brown, Energy and the Future, 29; Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, quotation at 5. On the externalization of costs to future generations, see Birnbacher, Verantwortung für zukünftige Generationen, 247–48, n. 71. 58 R. Routley and V. Routley, “Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future,” Inquiry 21, no. 2 (Summer 1978): 136. 59 I set aside the question of whether nuclear power may harm future generations less than continuing to devour fossil fuels. 60 Some critics may invoke what Derek Parfit calls the non-identity problem. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chap. 16. Nearly any major public policy affects who is born and who is not. If we rely on nuclear weapons, different people will be born than if we had relied on conventional deterrence instead. Hence, even if this leads to disaster, so long as postwar people find their lives even minimally worth living, we will not be able to identify specific individuals whom nuclear weapons have harmed. Philosophers have suggested a variety of responses to the non-identity problem. Perhaps the best response is that it violates our basic moral intuitions. It means, for example, that squandering resources harms no one in the far future, since different people will be born than if we conserve. Such claims, as Parfit himself says, are scarcely plausible. Ibid., 378. In any case, for the non-identity problem to apply, future people must find life worth living. If their lives are wretched—as could well be the case after nuclear war—they could blame us for creating the conditions for them to be born at all. 61 Volkert Beekman, “Sustainable Development and Future Generations,” Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics 17, no. 1 (January 2004): 8–9; Ronald M. Green, “Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Environmental Responsibility,” in Partridge, Responsibilities to Future Generations, 91–101. 62 Brian Barry, “Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations,” in Sikora and Barry, Obligations to Future Generations, 243; Barry, “Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice,” in Dobson, Fairness and Futurity, 98, 106; Paul M. Wood, “Intergenerational Justice and Curtailments on the Discretionary Powers of Governments,” Environmental Ethics 26, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 421. 63 Terence Ball, “The Incoherence of Intergenerational Justice,” Inquiry 28, no. 8 (September 1985): 328; Lukas H. Meyer, “More Than They Have a Right To: Future People and Our Future-Oriented Projects,” in Contingent Future Persons: On the Ethics of Deciding Who Will Live, or Not, in the Future, ed. Nick Fotion and Jan C. Heller (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 148. 64 Cf. Annette Baier, “The Rights of Past and Future Persons,” in Partridge, Responsibilities to Future Generations, 176. Some claim that people that do not yet exist cannot have rights (e.g., Beckerman and Pasek, Justice, Posterity and the Environment). Yet a terrorist who sets a time bomb that kills a dozen children eighty years later violates their rights even though the children were not born when the bomb was set and the bomb-maker is no longer alive when it goes off. Even an unborn child, as Joel Feinberg points out, can have the right to property, “contingent upon his birth, and instantly voidable if he dies before birth …. Assuming that the child will be born, the law seems to say, various interests that he will come to have after birth must be protected from damage that they can incur even before birth.” That temporal logic precludes a future person from demanding his or her rights, whereas babies are merely physically and intellectually incapable of doing so, seems a morally irrelevant distinction. See Birnbacher, Verantwortung für zukünftige Generationen, 98–99; Feinberg, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations,” in Partridge, Responsibilities to Future Generations, 146; and Clark Wolf, “Intergenerational Justice,” in A Companion to Applied Ethics, ed. R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 281. 65 Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations. 66 Nye, Nuclear Ethics, 45, 65, quotation at 65. 67 Sagan and Turco, A Path Where No Man Thought, 72. 68 Barrie Paskins, “Deep Cuts are Morally Imperative,” in Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Geoffrey Goodwin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 94. 69 Nye, Nuclear Ethics, 64. 70 James Woodward, “The Non-Identity Problem,” Ethics 96, no. 4 (July 1986): 819–20. Utilitarianism might require earlier generations to make disproportionate sacrifices, as Birnbacher (Verantwortung für zukünftige Generationen, 111–17) concedes. 71 Baier, “Rights of Past and Future Persons,” 176. 72 Birnbacher's Verantwortung für zukünftige Generationen develops a detailed utilitarian theory of intergenerational ethics. 73 Alan Robock, “Scénario de notre dernier hiver: comment les hommes pourraient, un jour, s'autoeffacer de la surface de la terre,” Le temps stratégique 80 (1998). 74Thus Michael Desch holds that if states follow realist prescriptions, this will be best for the world. Michael C. Desch, “It is Kind to be Cruel: the Humanity of American Realism,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 3 (July 2003): 415–26. Even Hans Morgenthau held that national survival was a precondition for achieving universal goods. In his view, A. J. H. Murray notes, “national self-preservation is a moral duty, but only ‘in the absence of an overriding moral obligation.”’ His defense of the national interest thus “possesses a derivative justification.” A. J. H. Murray, “The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau,” Review of Politics 58, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 103–4. 75 Thanks to a referee for suggesting this point, as well as the example of Israel in footnote 80. 76 David Lewis, “Finite Counterforce,” in Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint: Critical Choices for American Strategy, ed. Henry Shue (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 93. 77 I am not sure I do. Suppose that during a famine a trustee steals $8 million from an heiress's $10 million trust fund and uses it to save several hundred people's lives. I would not condemn him. 78 Bradley A. Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” Security Studies 4, no. 3 (Spring 1995): 486–93. 79 This assumes that State B's conventional weapons cannot threaten its nuclear force. 80 McMahan, “Nuclear Deterrence and Future Generations.” One might argue that people in the far future will not belong to the same nation, and that states therefore owe a greater obligation to the next few generations. Reasoning along communitarian lines, Avner de-Shalit holds that our positive obligations to future people diminish as they become more distant. Nevertheless, he holds that “to people of the very remote future we have a strong ‘negative’ obligation—namely, to avoid causing them enormous harm or bringing them death, and to try and relieve any potential and foreseeable distress.” De-Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, 13, 54, 63–65, quotation from 13. Nuclear deterrence flunks this test. The exception might be if a state's enemies are bent on genocide. Suppose Israelis fear that in the absence of nuclear weapons their enemies would murder the Israeli nation. If they are right, then nuclear deterrence could serve the interests even of future generations of Israelis. Despite the near-inevitability of eventual nuclear war, Israelis might consider this a lesser risk than that of Arab genocide. Before acting on such a conclusion, Israel should explore every conceivable alternative, including a conventional military build-up, appeasing the Arabs or even shutting down the Zionist enterprise and moving to other parts of the world. If none of these is a feasible means of securing Israelis' physical survival, then building a small nuclear arsenal might be justified. For an insightful discussion, see Henry Shue, “Liberalism: The Impossibility of Justifying Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 139-62. 81 Lewis, “Finite Counterforce,” 74. 82 Goodin, “Nuclear Disarmament as a Moral Certainty,” 274. 83 Quoted in David S. Yost, “New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States,” International Affairs (London) 81, no. 1 (January 2005): 89. 84 Sagan and Turco, A Path Where No Man Thought, 126. 85 “Waltz Responds to Sagan,” 154–55, emphasis added. 86 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy: Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1989), 431–32. 87 McMahan, “Nuclear Deterrence and Future Generations.” 88 MccGwire, “Is There a Future for Nuclear Weapons?” 215. 89 Jonathan Schell, “The Folly of Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 5 (September/October 2000): 44. 90 Charles L. Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament,” Survival 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 115–18; Lee, Morality, Prudence and Nuclear Weapons, 39–40, 298–99. 91 “Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament,” 123. The more troubling question is whether states that can build them quickly ought to do so before a crisis erupts. 92 If “tacit knowledge” is essential for building nuclear weapons, after some decades states might require years to reinvent them. See Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons,” American Journal of Sociology 101, no. 1 (July 1995): 44–99. Thanks to a referee for raising this point. 93 Cited in J. J. Gertler, Some Policy Implications of Nuclear Winter, Rand Corporation P-7045 (1985): 10 n. 2. States might also be tempted to use ERW for offense and compellence, reducing stability. Goldstein, Deterrence and Security, 281, n. 43. 94 S. T. Cohen, “Enhanced Radiation Warheads: Setting the Record Straight,” Strategic Review 6, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 16. 95 Nye, Nuclear Ethics, 111–14. 96 Harold A. Feiveson et al., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 113; and Sagan and Turco, A Path Where No Man Thought, 126, 131, 186, 199–203. 97 Sagan and Turco, A Path Where No Man Thought, 131–32, 380, n. 13.25. 98 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security 26, no. 1 (Summer 2001), 40–92. 99 Robock, Oman, and Stenchikov, “Nuclear Winter Revisited,” D13107. 100 David Goldfischer, “Rethinking the Unthinkable After the Cold War: Toward Long-Term Nuclear Policy Planning,” Security Studies 7, no. 4 (Summer 1998): 165–94. 101 In David Lewis, “Finite Counterforce,” Lewis argues that counterforce should not be destabilizing if combined with modest arsenals. In Harold A. Feiveson, “Finite Deterrence,” in Shue, Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, 286–87, Feiveson points out that counterforce could still have pernicious effects, but his criticisms would not apply to a counterpower strategy such as Nye advocates. 102 Cf. Tom Milne and Joseph Rotblat, “Breakout from a Nuclear Weapons Convention,” in Nuclear Weapons: The Road to Zero, eds. Joseph Rotblat and Frank Blackaby (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 151. 103 James N. Miller, Jr., “Zero and Minimal Nuclear Weapons,” in Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe, eds. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T. Allison and Albert Carnesale (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger), 26; Michael MccGwire, “Comfort Blanket or Weapon of War: What Is Trident For?” International Affairs (London) 82, no. 4 (July 2006): 647–48. 104 Cf. Lee, Morality, Prudence and Nuclear Weapons, 404, n. 18. 105 Cf. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 200. 106 Graham Barral, “The Lost Tablets: An Analysis of the Concept of Minimum Deterrence,” Arms Control: Contemporary Security Policy 13, no. 1 (April 1992): 79. 107 Waltz, “Waltz Responds to Sagan,” 141–42. 108 Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov, “On the Balance of Power,” International Affairs (Moscow) no. 8 (1989): 9; and Feiveson et al., Nuclear Turning Point, 52. 109 Stansfield Turner, “The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 17. 110 Rajesh M. Basrur, “International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence,” India Review 4, no. 2 (April 2005): 125–43; Goldstein, Deterrence and Security, 44–54. Basrur takes this too far, however, when he argues that states can afford to be relaxed about their arsenals' survivability. Ibid., 136. The risk is not that vulnerable arsenals will encourage aggression, but that an enemy believing it is under attack will preempt. Rather than winning a bloodless victory, its hope would be to limit a catastrophic loss. 111 Waltz, “More May Be Better,” 22–23. 112 Bogdanov and Kortunov, “On the Balance of Power,” 9. 113 Roger W. Barnett, “What Deters? Strength, Not Weakness,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 27. 114 Cf. Basrur, “International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence,” 143 n. 41. 115 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 33, 38. 116 Lieber and Press, “The End of MAD?” 11, 38. The possibility that the Soviet Union considered an attack on Chinese nuclear bases in 1969 may provide stronger support for the claim that first strikes on a nuclear state are thinkable, but it is unclear whether the Soviets were bluffing or in earnest. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Revised Edition (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994): 237–38. 117 Miller, “Zero and Minimal Nuclear Weapons,” 32; Walter B. Slocombe, “Strategic Stability in a Restructured World,” Survival 32, no. 4 (July/August 1990): 308. 118Cf. Richard H. Ullman, “Minimum Deterrence and International Security,” in The Arms Race in an Era of Negotiations, ed. David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 89–91. While arguing that cheating would likely have little strategic impact if the other state's forces were invulnerable, Ullman opposes cuts to very low levels, chiefly on the grounds that the discovery of cheating “could bring on a crisis in the domestic politics of the detecting state.” Yet the result would almost certainly not be war but an arms build-up. Political tensions would rise, but deterrence should remain stable. Given the importance of deep cuts for limiting damage, this seems a risk well worth taking. 119P. K. Ghosh, “Deterrence Asymmetry and Other Challenges to Small Nuclear Forces,” Contemporary Security Policy 25, no. 1 (April 2004): 43. 120 While warning that Russia's existing deterrent is becoming increasingly vulnerable, Lieber and Press note “Russia could keep 50 mobile missiles on continuous peacetime alert or substantially increase its nuclear submarine patrols. Either step would dramatically reduce Russia's vulnerability.” They argue that it would be hard for Moscow to do this. Lieber and Press, “The End of MAD?” 34. Deep cuts, however, would free resources to protect the remaining weapons, assuming that Russia received Western aid to offset the cost of reductions. 121 “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War,” in A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Desirable? Feasible? eds. Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger, and Bhalchandra Udgaonkar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 45. 122 Feiveson et al., Nuclear Turning Point, 200; 123 Sagan and Turco, A Path Where No Man Thought, 229–40; and cf. Robock, Oman, and Stenchikov, “Nuclear Winter Revisited,” D13107. 124 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this point. 125 Basrur, “International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence,” 136–37. 126 Senate hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., 1st sess.; 7 October 1
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