Intelligence, Crisis, and Democracy: Institutional Punctuations in Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India
2014; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 29; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/02684527.2014.915176
ISSN1743-9019
AutoresMarco Cepik, Christiano Cruz Ambros,
Tópico(s)Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
ResumoAbstractThis article analyzes why institutional crises are bound to happen and how they impact on national intelligence systems' development. Punctuated Equilibrium theory is reviewed and employed to explain one institutional crisis in each of Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and India. In Brazil, the case study is the fall of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) director in 2008, following the Satiagraha operation conducted by the Federal Police Department (DPF). In Colombia, the 2009 wiretapping scandal known as chuzadas is examined. In South Africa, the investigation in Project Avani (2006–8) is reviewed. Finally, in India the case study is the intelligence crisis following the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008. We found that institutional crises are inevitable because there are tensions between security and democracy, both being co-evolutionary dimensions of successful contemporary state building. However, the impacts of such crises vary across the four cases pending on three variables: (1) degree of functional specialization inside the national intelligence system; (2) degree of external public control over the national intelligence system; (3) whether effectiveness, legitimacy or both were the main drivers of the crisis. Our analysis of the four case studies suggests that the amount of positive institutional change in the aftermath of an intelligence crisis is greater in countries with more functional specialization and stronger external control mechanisms. AcknowledgementsWe are very thankful to Marina Caparini, Eduardo Estévez, Peter Gill and the anonymous reviewers of Intelligence and National Security for the insightful comments on earlier versions of this article. We also would like to express our gratitude to Airton Martins for his generous help throughout the editing process. Ana Julia Possamai, Bruno Kern, Gustavo Moller, Marjorie Stadnik, and Pedro Marques also gave much valued input. Peter Gill and Michael Andregg deserve extra thanks for their patience with our delays. The Brazilian National Research Council (CNPq) has supported our research on governmental intelligence for many years now, including this article.Notes1 To affirm that failures, scandals, and even crises are inevitable does not imply that those involved with them should not be held responsible for their acts and choices. We take seriously the ethical dilemmas associated with intelligence activities, but they are not the focus of this article. For a balanced discussion of such issues, we direct the reader to Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London: Frank Cass 2001) pp.201–27; Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity Press 2012) pp.125–47; Michael Andregg, 'Ethics and Professional Intelligence' in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of National Security and Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) pp.735–55. For a brief introduction to this topic in the United States, see Chapter 13 of Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQPress 2009). Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence (Washington: Brassey's 1995) pp.120–83, also covers ethical aspects of counterintelligence and covert actions.2 See Thomas Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, 'Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness', in Johnson (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of National Security and Intelligence, pp.757–73. We are mindful about the intrinsic limitations of a strict institutionalist approach towards the study of intelligence, but we also could argue that being governmental agencies, intelligence services are power-based institutions and should be analyzed as such. Of course, taking into account even the simplest relations between formal and informal aspects of institutional life would require another sort of comparative exercise. A better synergy between culturalist, contextual, and institutionalist research programs in the field of Intelligence Studies is necessary, even if beyond the scope of this article. See Amy Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2007); Marco Cepik, 'Preface' in Russell G. Swenson and Suzana C. Lemozy (eds.) Democratización de la función de inteligencia: El nexo de la cultura nacional y la inteligencia estratégica (Washington, DC: JMIC 2009); Peter Gill, 'Theories of Intelligence' in Johnson (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of National Security and Intelligence, pp.43–58; Stephen Welch, 'Political Culture: Approaches and Prospects' in Philip H.J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (eds.) Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage outside the Anglosphere (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2013) pp.13–26.3 On the impact of institutional designs, see, among others, Robert E. Goodin (ed.) The Theory of Institutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996); Bert A. Rockman and Kent Weaver, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1993); Kathleen Thelen et al., Structuring Politics (NY: Cambridge University Press 1993); and George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002).4 Notice that S.J. Gould and N. Eldredge, 'Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered', Paleobiology 3 (1977) pp.115–51, developed their punctuated equilibrium theory to explain discontinuous rhythms in the process of formation of species in geological time scales, not to explain even the whole evolutionary biology. However, in Section V (For a General Philosophy of Change) of their article, the authors also pointed out the similarities between their model and other criticisms to the slow and continuous evolution (p.145). Marxian theory of history and Kuhnian approaches towards Scientific Revolutions make good examples of such critical perspectives, but even they are dealing with huge scale social processes. Punctuated Equilibrium (PE) theory had a significant impact in many disciplines, including Sociology, Linguistics, and Political Science. Of course, when Political Science uses PE theory, the time frame for considering alternative states of equilibrium and transformation is measured in days, weeks, months, years, centuries, and millennia at most. Albert-Laszlo Barabási, Burst (NY: Dutton 2010) explains why this adaptation from the original geological time scale is correct. For the evolutionary dynamics in general, see Martin A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: Belkap-Harvard Press 2006). For an introduction to the complex adaptive systems literature, see John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, Complex Adaptative Systems (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2007). For an introduction to the study of scale-free networks, see Albert-Laszlo Barabási, Linked (NY: Plume 2003).5 See Richard K. Betts, 'Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable' in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates (NY: Routledge 2009) p.20.6 About theory in Intelligence Studies see, among others, Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996); Gregory Treverton, Seth Jones, Steven Boraz and Phillip Lipscy, Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation 2006); Michael Warner, 'Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems' in Gregory Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell (eds.) National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009); Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates (NY: Routledge 2009); and Gill, 'Theories of Intelligence', pp.43–58. Regarding intelligence failures, we direct the reader to Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (NY: Columbia University Press 2007); Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2004); and Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails? Lessons from Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2010). An article aiming at analyzing intelligence crises is J. McCreary and R.A. Posner, 'The Latest Intelligence Crisis', Intelligence and National Security 23/3 (2008) pp.371–80.7 When referring to intelligence agencies or any governmental bodies, we will use the full name in English, and the acronym following the official language of the country.8 The case of Indonesia is also comparable to the ones discussed here. See Peter Gill and Lee Wilson, 'Intelligence and Security-Sector Reform in Indonesia' in Davies and Gustafson (ed.) Intelligence Elsewhere, pp.157–79.9 See Marco Cepik, Espionagem e democracia: Agilidade e transparência como dilemas na institucionalização dos serviços de inteligência (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV 2003); Treverton and Agrell (eds.) National Intelligence Systems; Davies and Gustafson (eds.) Intelligence Elsewhere.10 Ian Leigh, 'The Accountability of Security and Intelligence Agencies' in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) Handbook of Intelligence Studies (NY: Routledge 2009) p.67.11 See Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War; Cepik, Espionagem e democracia; Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian and Shlomo Shpiro (eds.) Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches (Washington, DC: Praeger 2008); Treverton and Agrell (eds.) National Intelligence Systems.12 See Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999); Marco Cepik, 'Sistemas nacionais de inteligência: Origens, lógica de expansão e configuração atual', Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais 46/1 (2003) pp.75–127; Priscila Brandao, Serviços secretos e democracia no Cone Sul (Niteroi, RJ: Editora Impetus 2010); Eduardo Estevez, 'Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador Cases', paper prepared for the IPSA-ECPR (International Political Science Association – European Consortium for Political Research) Joint Conference, USP, São-Paulo-SP, Brazil, 2011.13 P. Pierson, 'The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change', Governance 13 (2000) pp.475–99.14 The prevalence of gradualist explanations rest in what Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould ('Punctuated Equilibria', p.145) once called a deep-rooted ideological preference, which was well captured by the statement attributed to Linnaeus – natura non facit saltum (nature does not make leaps). According to Eldredge and Gould's own theory of biological evolution published in the 1970s, reproducing species actually reveal little evolutionary change most of the time in a geological scale, lingering in a state called stasis (equilibrium). Stasis is characterized by incremental genetic changes, but it is interrupted (punctuated) by events (crises) producing transformation (disequilibrium), a process of speciation known as cladogenesis. Cladogenesis is the relatively abrupt process by which a species splits into two different ones, rather than gradually transforming into another (which is also known as phyletic gradualism).15 As pointed out by Kathleen Thelen: 'Increasing returns cannot tell the whole story because, in politics, losers do not necessarily disappear and their "adaptation" to prevailing institutions can mean something very different from "embracing and reproducing" those institutions, as in the worlds of technologies and markets'. Kathleen Thelen, 'How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis' in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer (eds.) Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003) p.231.16 Ibid.17 For the purposes of this article, we decided to use punctuation, crises, and disequilibrium as parts of a sequential process (burst) resulting in qualitative change (transformation).18 See Barabási, Linked, and Barabási, Burst.19 A technical definition of power-law as a polynomial relationship exhibiting scale invariance properties, as well as further elaboration of its huge implications and applications to many types of natural critical events, can be found in Didier Sornette, Critical Phenomena in Natural Science: Chaos, Fractals, Self-Organization and Disorder, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Springer-Verlag 2006). It is also relevant to note: 'Power functions are part of a class of probability distributions that are leptokurtic – they have strong central peaks and fat tails. The statistical signature of a disproportionate response model such as the friction model is straightforward: in response to a Normal distribution of real-world inputs, the decision-making process transforms the data by reducing those values below some threshold and by amplifying those values above the threshold. Such distributions are often called "fat tailed" or "extreme value" distributions and are not uncommon in many natural processes where friction models operate'. Frank R. Baumgartner, Christian Breuning, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Bryan D. Jones, Peter B. Mortensen, Michiel Nuytemans and Stefaan Walgrave, 'Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective', American Journal of Political Science 53/3 (2009) p.607.20 'Current models of human dynamics in areas such as risk assessment and communications assume that human actions are randomly distributed in time and are well approximated by Poisson process'; Barabási, Burst, p.38. The distinct applications and meanings of Poisson Process and Poisson Distributions in Statistics and Probability Theory are beyond our expertise. Suffice to say that events in a stochastic Poisson process take place continuously and autonomously of one another, as a collection of random variables with discrete probability distribution. For further elaboration, see Richard Durret, Essentials of Stochastic Processes (Berlin: Springer-Verlag 1999).21 'There's nothing smooth or random in the way life expresses itself, but bursts dominate at all time scales, from milliseconds to hours in our cells; from minutes to weeks in our activity patterns; from weeks to years when it comes to diseases; from millennia to millions of years in evolutionary processes. Bursts are an integral part of the miracle of life, signatures of the continuous struggle for adaptation and survival'; Barabási, Burst, p.240.22 Ibid., p.124.23 Ibid., pp.124–5.24 To be fair, the incrementalist/pluralist approach tends to be more concerned with power distribution among social groups and how their unequal access and influence affect the government decision process. See Charles Lindblom and Edward J. Woodhouse, The Policy Making Process, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall 1992).25 Edmund T. Rolls, Memory, Attention and Decision-Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008) is a very thorough book on emotion, information processing, memory, perception, attention, and decision making, using a multidisciplinary approach to understand how the human brain works.26 The main propellants in that research program are Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones. In the fourth part ('Agenda and Instability, Fifteen Years Later') of Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press 2009), the reader can find not only a review of their main claims and findings since their book was first published in 1993, but also a proposition regarding the importance of what the authors call disruptive dynamics in public policy, which is close to what we call crisis in this article. We also refer the reader to James L. True, Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, 'Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking' in Paul A. Sabatier (ed.) Theories of Policy Process, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2007) pp.155–87. In order to understand the role of information processing in the Punctuated Equilibrium approach in Political Science, it is important to review Herbert Simon's contribution regarding Bounded Rationality. Herbert Simon, Massimo Egidi, Robin Marris and Riccardo Viale, Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2008).27 Examples of political inputs are plentiful, from changed preferences to election results, from new social actors to technological innovations and media coverage from intelligence.28 B.D. Jones, T. Sulkin and H.A. Larsen, 'Policy Punctuations in American Political Institutions', American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.151–69.29 An earlier consideration of decision costs in the intelligence cycle was Loch K. Johnson, 'Decision Costs in the Intelligence Cycle' in A. Maurer, M. Tunstall and J Keagle (eds.) Intelligence: Policy and Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1985) pp.181–98.30 For a critical stance against the 'stages heuristics', see references in Paul A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of Policy Process, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2007) pp.6–8. For a brief summary of various classifications of policymaking stages, see Wayne Parsons, Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 1995) pp.77–81.31 See Baumgartner et al., 'Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective'.32 Note that institutional constraints, including limited ability to adapt and to process issues are not the same as what was originally called 'goal displacement' by Robert Merton, 'Bureaucratic Structure and Personality', Social Forces 17 (1940) pp.560–8, when people in complex and bureaucratic organizations start to value means over ends, when formalistic goals become more important than the main substantive goal of an organization. For a refutation of Merton's argument, see James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (NY: Basic Books 1989) pp.50–71.33 See Vidar W. Rolland and Paul G. Roness, 'Mapping Organizational Units in the State: Challenges and Classifications', International Journal of Public Administration 33/10 (2010) pp.463–73, to better understand the classification of State's organizational units.34 Another important research program that is also related with PE Theory is organized around the Operational Code Analysis. For a review, see Stephen G. Walker, 'Operational Code Analysis as a Scientific Research Program: A Cautionary Tale' in Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman (eds.) Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge: BCSIA 2003) pp.245–76.35 See Baumgartner et al., 'Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective', p.606.36 Jones, Sulkin and Larsen, 'Policy Punctuations in American Political Institutions', p.155.37 'The issue may be systematically tracked and a specialized agency or bureau may even be created to focus on it. Attention to the problem becomes institutionalized, and this may induce a second inefficiency. Not only is government slow to pay attention to new policy problems, but, once established, policies may be continued long after the severity of the problem which justified them in the first place has declined. Reactions to improvements in the state of the world, by reallocating attention or resources to other areas with more severe problems, or more rapidly growing ones, are slow'; Baumgartner et al., 'Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective', p.608.38 There are tentative uses of PE theory to explain war and armed peace (see Bahar Leventoglu and Branislav Slantchev, 'The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War', American Journal of Political Science 51/4 (2007) pp.755–71, as well as terrorism and homeland security (see David B. Cohen and Alethia Cook, 'Institutional Redesign: Terrorism, Punctuated Equilibrium, and the Evolution of Homeland Security in United States', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Political Science Association, 2002). It is certainly our fault, but the authors are not aware of literature connecting Punctuated Equilibrium theory and Intelligence Studies.39 Many in the field of Intelligence Studies would accept the dual nature of intelligence (as information and power). Unfortunately, few try to pursue the theoretical consequences. Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, provide exemplary effort in that direction. Note how the authors treated intelligence systems as complex networks, taking into account actors such as state agencies, business firms, organized crime, and others.40 For a more complete and accurate description, see Treverton and Agrell, National Intelligence Systems, as well as Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War.41 See Russell Swenson and Suzana Lemozy (eds.), Intelligence as a Profession in the Americas: New Approaches, 2nd ed. (Washington: JMIC Edition 2004).42 See Zegart, Flawed by Design.43 'All these things give government agencies room to maneuver. Presidents and member of the Congress listen to bureaucrats because they cannot afford to do otherwise. Armed with expertise, extraordinary incentives, shrinking mechanisms and public appeals, government agencies do not have to remain the servile subjects of their political masters (…) While institutional incentives push presidents toward action, institutional constraints work to hold them back. Although it is possible in theory to ignore the bureaucrat's interests and concerns, it is impossible to do so in practice. Agency's officials hold more cards than the statute suggest'; Zegart, Flawed by Design, p.52.44 Institutional reform can be seen as a low-priority issue: 'the chief executive faces severe time constraints. Presidents have at most eight years to achieve their major domestic and international policy goals and secure their place in history. While bureaucratic reforms may be important, even instrumental, in achieving those goals, it is not something for which great leaders are likely to be remembered'; ibid., p.48.45 Marina Caparini, 'Comparing Intelligence Democratisation in East Central Europe and the Western Balkans', paper prepared for the IPSA-ECPR (International Political Science Association - European Consortium for Political Research) Joint Conference, USP, São-Paulo-SP, Brazil, 2011, is a good and recent example of a comparative exercise on intelligence democratization designed to observe commonalities between East Central Europe and the Western Balkans intelligence reform processes. About the logic of comparison and research using Most Similar System Designs (MSSD), see Paul Pennings, Hans Keman and Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Doing Research in Political Science: Comparative Methods and Statistics (London: Sage 2003).46 The subordination of the ABIN to the GSI is interpreted by some (Roberto Numeriano, A inteligência civil do Brasil, Portugal e Espanha, doctoral thesis (Recife 2007); Jorge Zaverucha, 'De FHC a Lula: A militarização da Agência Brasileira de Inteligência', Revista de Sociologia Política 16/31 (2008) pp.177–95) as evidence of the maintenance of political prerogatives of the military in the civilian democratic regime. On the other hand, to Marco Cepik and Thomas Bruneau, 'Brazilian National Approach Towards Intelligence: Concept, Institutions and Contemporary Challenges' in Farson et al., Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, p.11: 'the case for subordinating ABIN to GSI, although this is a distortion of the spirit of the 1999 law (since the director of ABIN is a civilian whose name must be approved by the Senate and the head minister of GSI is an Army general appointed by the President of the Republic), is justified by the need to guard the President from the daily managerial demands and the potential crises resulting from scandals and/or tensions inherent to the relation between intelligence and democracy'.47 See Cepik and Bruneau, 'Brazilian National Approach Towards Intelligence'.48 See Brandao, Serviços secretos e democracia no Cone Sul; Joanisval Brito Gonçalves, Atividade de inteligência e legislação correlata (Niterói, RJ: Impetus 2010).49 According to Ariel Macedo de Mendonça, A proposta de reformulação do Sistema Brasileiro de Inteligência (Rio de Janeiro: ESG 2010) p.116, two weeks before Jobim's testimony, the Army acquisitions office released an official statement saying that the ABIN's equipment was only for the location of wiretapping attempts, not to conduct wiretapping. The same conclusion was reached by the National Institute of Criminology of the Federal Police Department in mid-September 2008. According to the same source, even the manufacturer, US Electronic Research International, issued a technical report confirming that the equipment, called Omni-Spectral Correlator (Oscor 5000), was only capable of detecting transmitters for counter-surveillance purposes.50 By September 2013, Mr Trezza remained the ABIN's director in the midst of another intelligence crisis, prompted by Snowden's leaked documents including ones on US National Security Agency (NSA) spying on Brazil. See 'As Brazil's Uproar over NSA Grows, US Vows to Work through Tensions' < http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/11/world/americas/brazil-nsa/index.html> (accessed 11 September 2013).51 Soon after president Dilma Rousseff took office, a group of ABIN Intelligence Officers delivered a letter to the new incumbent, complaining about the subordination of the ABIN to the GSI and demanding closer access to the President. See 'Abin repudia controle militar em carta a Dilma e rejeita ser "Tropa do Elito"' < http://www.estadao.com.br/estadaodehoje/20110208/not_imp676571,0.php> (accessed 24 July 2011).52 See Carlos Ataides, 'La visión de Brasil sobre la Comunidad de Inteligencia Sudamericana y la Experiencia de la ABIN en los servicios de Inteligencia del Estado' in Freddy Velez Rivera (ed.) Inteligencia estratégica y prospectiva (Quito: FLACSO-SENAIN-AECID 2011) pp.127–36.53 See UNODC, The Global Study on Homicide (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011).54 As Steven Boraz, 'Colombia' in Farson et al. (eds.) Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, pp.130–45, points out, Samper's term as president (1994–8) was a very troubled one, mainly because of the strained relations with United States. For a thorough review of intelligence in Colombia, see Alexander Arciniegas, 'Inteligencia en democracias: La crisis del servicio de inteligencia colombiano' in M. Cepik (eds.) Inteligência governamental: Casos nacionais e desafios contemporâneos (Niterói, RJ: Impetus 2011) pp.97–114; Steven Boraz, 'Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Colombia', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19/2 (2006) pp.84–109; Boraz, 'Colombia', 2008; and Douglas Porch 'Taming a "Dysfunctional Beast"' – Reforma in Colombia's Departamento Administrativo de Securidad', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22/3 (2009) pp.421–51.55 Porch, 'Taming a "Dysfunctional Beast"', p.445.56 Boraz, 'Colombia', p.137.57 Porch, 'Taming a "Dysfunctional Beast"', p.422.58 < http://www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/2009/ley_1288_2009.htm> (accessed 27 October 2011).59 As of October 2011, the DAS continued to exist in its previous incarnation. See < http://www.das.gov.co> (accessed 13 October 2011).60 Arciniegas, 'Inteligencia en democracias', p.104.61 According to Porch, 'Taming a "Dysfunctional Beast"', p.442: 'this probably contributed to the international outcry that surrounded operación fénix, the killing of FARC's "foreign minister", Raúl Reyes, on Ecuadorian soil in February 2008. Much of the ruckus was orchestrated by Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, certainly, but the focus on HVTs appears to have blinded President Uribe to the strategic repercussions of his "tactical" action'.62 The full text of executive decrees, law projects, and legislation is available at < http://www.senado.gov.co/az-legislativo>. The full text of the Colombian Constitutional Court rule (Sentencia C-913/10) is available at < http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co> (accessed 12 October 2011).63 This is not as obvious as it seems. During the context of profound political change, as during the transition to democratic regimes, the intelligence subsystem usually is marginalized or even excluded from the democratization and security sector reform agendas. For an interesting view about the constitution as a primary frame of the maintenance and the transformation of South Africa's Intelligence, see Laurie Nathan, 'Intelligence Bound: The South African Constitution and Intelligence Services', International Affairs 86 (2010) pp.195–210.64 See < www.gov.za/ministry/intelligence.php> (accessed 23 July 2011).65 Lauren Hutton, 'Looking Beneath the Cloak: An Analysis of Intelligence Governance in South Africa', ISS Paper 154 (2007) pp.1–24.66 Keneth Dombroski, 'Transforming Intelligence in South Africa' in Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (eds.) Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press 2007) pp.241–68. See also Nathan, 'Intelligence Bound', pp.195–210.67Batho Pele is a Sesotho word meaning 'People First'. It was an initiative launched in 1997 to transform the South African Public Service at all levels. In the Armed Forces and the Intelligence it also meant to amalgamate the former enemy organizations into a new and cohesive system.68 For a historical analysis of South Africa's intelligence services since the Apartheid period and during the transition towards the democratic regime, see Dombroski, 'Transforming Intelligence in South Africa', pp.241–68, and also Kevin O'Brien, 'South Africa' in Farson et al. (eds.) Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, pp.619–48.69 See Greg Hannah, Kevin O'Brien and Andrew Rathmell, Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform, Technical Report Prepared for United Kingdom's Security Sector Development Advisory Team (Rand Report, June 2005).70 Laurie Nathan, 'Lighting up the Intelligence Community: An Agenda for Intelligence Reform in South Africa', African Security Review 18/1 (2009) pp.91–2.71 Nathan, 'Intelligence Bound', p.199.72 For a historical analysis of South African intelligence accountability mechanisms, see Kevin O'Brien, 'Controlling the Hydra: A Historical Analysis of South African Intelligence Accountability' in H. Born, Lock Johnson and Ian Leigh, Who's Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Washington, DC: Potomac Books 2005); Hutton, 'Looking Beneath the Cloak', pp.1–24; Lauren Hutton, 'Intelligence and Accountability in Africa', ISS Policy Brief no. 2 (2009).73 'In the wake of the crisis Kasrils took three measures aimed at preventing further acts of illegality, all of them expressly promoting the constitution as the primary basis for the good conduct, socialization, and reform of the intelligence services. First, he issued a statement entitled "Five principles of Intelligence service professionalism" (…) Second, Kasrils instructed the intelligence chiefs to develop a civic culture education programme for the services in order to promote and entrench a culture of respect for the constitution and the rule of law'; Nathan, 'Intelligence Bound', p.201. See more about these measures in Ronnie Kasrils, 'To Spy or Not to Spy? Intelligence and Democracy in South Africa' in Lauren Hutton (ed.) To Spy or Not to Spy? Intelligence and Democracy in South Africa (Pretoria: ISS Monograph 157 2009).74 Nathan, 'Lighting up the Intelligence Community', p.93.75 Additional Proclamations 912, 913, 914, and 915 were made to address each of the former independent agencies as they were transformed into SSA branches. The proclamations were made under the Presidential authority provided by the National Intelligence Act, 1994 < http://www.ssa.gov.za> (accessed 10 September 2013).76 Address by the Minister of State Security, Dr Siyabonga Cwele on the occasion of state security budget vote, 2 June 2011 < http://www.nia.gov.za> (accessed 23 September 2011).77 See Robert Henderson, International Intelligence Yearbook, 2nd ed. (Washington: Brassey's 2004).78 See Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, 'India' in Farson et al. (eds.) Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, pp.211–29.79 IBPUS, India: Intelligence & Security Activities and Operations Handbook, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: International Business Publications 2008) p.55.80 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, 'India', 2009.81 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2009) pp.9–12.82 For a more detailed description of the relationship between intelligence and security in India see N.C. Ashtana and Anjali Nirmal, Intelligence and Security Management (Jaipur: Pointer 2004), especially parts IV and V.83 C. Christine Fair, 'Prospects for Effective Internal Security Reforms in India', 2011 < http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1885488> (accessed 20 August 2011).84 Ibid.85 Subhash Sharma and Devendra Mishra, 'Terrorism: Problem and Prospects', The Indian Police Journal 58/3 (2010).86 Fair, 'Prospects for Effective Internal Security Reforms in India', p.25.87 Ibid, p.26. See also 'Centre May Make Fresh Attempt to Push NCTC' < http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-07-09/india/40467981_1_anti-terror-body-nctc-national-counter-terrorism-centre> (accessed 14 September 2013).88 Warner, 'Building a Theory of Intelligence Systems', p.37.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMarco CepikMarco Cepik is Professor of Comparative Politics and Strategic Studies at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Porto Alegre, Brazil, and Director of the Center for International Studies on Government (CEGOV).Christiano AmbrosChristiano Ambros is a PhD candidate in Political Science at UFRGS and Analyst at the State Investment and Development Agency (AGDI-RS).
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