Strategic Analysis and Social Problems
1965; Oxford University Press; Volume: 12; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.2307/798837
ISSN1533-8533
Autores Tópico(s)Game Theory and Applications
Resumowhatever I meant. So with the uneasy feeling that it had just been used on me, I set out to characterize the strategic approach. Let me illustrate what I have in mind. First consider a jury that must unanimously find a man guilty of murder or acquit him, and may unanimously recommend clemency if they find him guilty. It matters which vote comes first. If twelve find him guilty and only six then vote for clemency, some among the six may wish they had held out for acquittal. If they knew they would lose the second vote they might hold out for acquittal on the first vote, setting free a man they'd rather see in jail. If the clemency vote is taken first, the result to be applied in case they later find him guilty, some who oppose clemency may vote for it to secure unanimity when it's time to find him guilty. If the rules do not permit clemency to be taken up before a man is found guilty, some jurors may announce themselves for clemency to induce a unanimous vote of guilty. And if clemency then requires only a majority vote, an open ballot rather than a secret one may make such promises more enforceable by at least letting it be seen whether they are kept. Next consider the recent announce-
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