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Rousseau's Descartes: The Rejection of Theoretical Philosophy as First Philosophy

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09608788.2012.724651

1469-3526

Peter Westmoreland,

Historical and Literary Studies

Abstract Rousseau's Savoyard Vicar makes creative use of Descartes's meditative method by applying it to practical life. This 'misuse' of the Cartesian method highlights the limits of the thinking thing as a ground for morality. Taking practical philosophy as first philosophy, the Vicar finds bedrock certainty of the self as an agent in the world and of moral truths while distancing himself from Cartesian positions on the distinction, union and interaction of mind and body. Rousseau's Moral Letters harmonize with the Vicar's view. Descartes would reject the Vicar's appropriation, as real-life problems cannot wait on meditation to answer them. Keywords: DescartesRousseaumeditationdualismfirst philosophy Notes 1Citations of Rousseau's Emile (E) are to the Bloom translation. Citations of Descartes are to CSM(K) and AT editions. Citations of Rousseau's Moral Letters (ML) are to Rousseau on Philosophy, Morality, and Religion, ed. Kelly. 2It has been argued, especially by Bréhier, that Rousseau's understanding of Descartes was heavily influenced by Malebranche. This connection is unnecessary to this paper, which deals only with Rousseau and Descartes. As I make clear, Descartes is a major target in Emile. Malebranche passes unmentioned in that text. 3Rousseau as a character in Emile seems to accept the Vicar's teachings and affirm the truth of his arguments (E 294). In the Confessions, Rousseau writes endearingly of the person on whom he modelled this character and that his teachings 'planted a seed of virtue and religion in my heart' (92–3). I will argue that Rousseau shares some conclusions that the Vicar broaches and there is an affinity between their two views. In treating the Vicar as an extension of Rousseau's thinking, I am in concert with Dent (Rousseau: An Introduction to his Psychological, Social, and Political Theory, Oxford, 1988) and Cohen (Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals, New York, 2010). I do, however, believe that the Vicar as a character is designed to relate views geared toward specific purposes, and that as a result he holds views and gives arguments that may not be in total harmony with some of Rousseau's positions. That being said, why Rousseau uses the Vicar is a complex question that this paper cannot answer. 4While Rousseau is often situated in the early modern tradition in terms of his social and political philosophy, he is rarely considered with regard to other philosophical topics. I assume the reason is a combination of Rousseau's stated abhorrence of theoretical philosophy and 'systems', and the widespread though false opinion that the Vicar's Profession is not 'serious philosophy'. See O'Hagan, Rousseau, New York, 1999, 13–4. The standing exception to this treatment is Gouhier, Les Méditations Métaphysiques de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Paris, 1970, which gives Rousseau's theoretical work deserved notice but does not undertake the topical comparison that I investigate. I am not familiar with any secondary literature that makes the same comparison I make here or grounds the comparison, as I do, in the contrast between theoretical and practical conceptions of first philosophy. 5Compare to Descartes's tree of knowledge in the French Preface to the Principles of Philosophy and to the opening of the First Meditation. 6The allusion seems literary rather than philosophical as it sets the mood rather than securing the argument. 7'[I]t is to lift myself up to my source to meditate on You ceaselessly.' 8'In meditating on the nature of man…' This opening remark leads to a discussion of the nature of substance and the real distinction. 9'I will carry your discourse with me in my heart. I must meditate on it. If after having taken careful counsel with myself, I remain as convinced of it as you are, you will be my final apostle, and I shall be your proselyte unto death.' 10Sealing the connection with Descartes on this point, the Vicar tells the reader that, after reaching a state of total doubt akin to the one found at the end of the First Meditation, he 'meditated [Je méditais]' (E 267). 11The personalization of the natural light – 'mes' not 'les'– reminds us of the personal nature of knowing that Rousseau emphasizes often across his writings. The natural light is not an independent authority, but the expression of one's own authority as a knower. This position allows the Vicar to take a jab at the authority of philosophical systems, when he announces that the inner light 'will lead me less astray than [philosophers] lead me astray' (E 269). Obviously, such an inner light differs substantially from the Cartesian natural light, which is impersonal. There is more about the contrast between the Vicarian inner light and the Cartesian natural light below. 12Reason for the Vicar does some of the work of supplying the truths that the inner light confirms as indubitable (E 290). Thus, the Vicar's doubt does not bar the use of reason as Descartes's does; however, reason alone does not guarantee the certainty of a belief. This is in part because knowledge is a judgment for the Vicar that may overstep the information provided by the senses (E 290, 271). Note that this theory of knowledge is an obvious descendent of Descartes's theory of truth and error in Meditation Four. 13The inner light finds that the 'first and most common [ideas are] also the simplest and most reasonable' (E 269). Thus, simplicity and reasonableness are marks of the kind of truths that are confirmed to be certain by the inner light, just as simplicity (though not reason) is a mark of clarity for Descartes. 14The Vicar's target in this passage is John Locke and the thinking matter hypothesis. While the topic goes beyond the scope of this paper, we may say a few words about it. What makes the Vicar's critique worth considering is its relationship to freedom and morality. In his objection to thinking matter, the Vicar contrasts the free will with enslavement, not with determinist necessity (E 280). The Vicar's driving concern here, then, is not metaphysical intricacies, but moral implications. In modus tollens form: If matter could think, it could make moral choices. Matter cannot make moral choices (Rousseau takes this point to be self-evident); thus, matter cannot think. Construing the contrast between matter and mind in this way indicates how significantly different the human being – a mind-body union – is from things that are matter alone: it is conceptually incoherent to hold that matter can be enslaved, and matter has no morality or freedom. It is for ethical, not metaphysical, reasons that the immateriality of the soul and substance dualism must be supposed. 15Rousseau may be hinting at a view similar to those expressed in Hoffman, Essays on Descartes, New York, 2009. 16For a valuable interpretation of this passage related to self-awareness, see Grimsley, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Study in Self-Awareness, Cardiff, 1969, 157–8. 17O'Hagan, op. cit. Neuhouser (Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition, New York, 2008) omits the Vicar from his recent book. Cohen Citation(2010) acknowledges the Vicar's Profession is important, but treats it in only a few paragraphs. Perhaps they too find the Vicar's arguments underwhelming. 18O'Hagan, op. cit. 19For a general defence of Rousseau's philosophical acumen, consistency, and coherence, see Dent Citation(1988). 20Rousseau and the Vicar comment repeatedly on the limits of human knowing. See especially E 268, 276. See Dent (Rousseau, New York, 2005) for stress on the limits of human knowing in Rousseau's thinking. 21For further elaboration of the structure of the self, see Westmoreland, Citation2010, 'Rousseau's Phenomenological Model for the Co-Constitution of Self and World,' in Phenomenology 2010, Vol. 5: Selected Essays from North America, Part 1: Phenomenology within Philosophy, edited by Michael Barber, Lester Embree, and Thomas J. Nenon (Bucharest, 2010). 22The active taking up of sentiments of existence occurs even in the savage of the Second Discourse. In the twenty-first paragraph of the First Part, Rousseau writes that savage's soul reflexively 'gives itself' (se livrer) to the sentiment of existence, not that it experiences the sentiments passively. 23This is not the first time that Rousseau has been implicated in arguing for the limits of reason. Cassirer (Rousseau, Kant, and Goethe, translated by James Gutmann, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, Princeton, 1945) charged him with providing the impetus for the entire Kantian critique of reason (Cassirer seems uninterested in Hume's role in this matter, at least in that work). 24 Second Discourse, Second Part, paragraph 57. 25See the Second and Seventh Replies to the Meditations. 26See the Principles' French Preface and the Passions' Prefatory Letters. 27See also the translator's footnote on CSM1, 289, about moral certainty as the 'certainty sufficient for ordinary practical purposes.' My use of the language such as 'practical' and 'ordinary' is in keeping with this usage.