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Challenges and constraints for post-Soviet committees: exploring the impact of parties on committees in Ukraine

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 12; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13572330500484953

1743-9337

Sarah Whitmore,

European and International Law Studies

Abstract This study focuses on the impact of parliamentary parties on committees' structure and activity in the post-Soviet context. Through a case study of committees in Ukraine's Rada, the paper demonstrates that weak, fluid parties can act as a barrier to committees' efficacy by shaping their structure, leadership and by blocking ameliorating reforms. Although Ukraine's committees were formally allocated a significant role in the law-making process, in practice the realisation of this function was constrained by parties and also by context of the wider institutional uncertainty. Acknowledgments This research was conducted with the support of the ESRC (award no. R00429834861). The author would like to thank Edward Rakhimkulov and Pavlo Kutuev for providing reliable additional information and Oleh Protsyk and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Notes 1. For example, I. Mattson and K. Strøm, 'Parliamentary Committees', in H. Døring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), p.250; M. Shaw, 'Conclusion', in D. Lees and M. Shaw (eds.), Committees in Legislatures (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1977), pp.366–77. 2. M. Shaw, 'Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective', Journal of Legislative Studies, 4/1 (1998), p.228. 3. D.M. Olson and M. Mezey, Legislatures in the Policy Process: The Dilemmas of Economic Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.14–15. 4. D.M. Olson and W.E. Crowther (eds.), Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments: Comparative Institutionalisation (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2002), p.194. 5. E. Damgaard, 'How Parties Control Committee Members', in H. Døring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995), pp.308–25. 6. Shaw, 'Conclusion', p.416. 7. For example, Olson and Crowther, Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments; D. Olson and P. Norton (eds.), The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1996); and T. Remington (ed.), Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994). 8. Olson and Crowther, Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments, pp.173–89. 9. Prior research on Ukraine's parliamentary committees has been limited. The most extensive study to date is in S. Whitmore, State Building in Ukraine: The Ukrainian Parliament, 1990–2003 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 10. For example, Mattson and Strøm, 'Parliamentary Committees'. 11. For example, Lees and Shaw, Committees in Legislatures. 12. Practices are only reported if corroborated by at least two sources. 13. L. Way, 'The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20/1 (2004), pp.143–61. 14. K. Darden, 'Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma', East European Constitutional Review, 10/2–3 (2001), pp.67–71. 15. See M.S. Shugart and J. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.24. 16. See A. Wilson, 'Ukraine: Two Presidents and Their Powers', in R. Taras (ed.), Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.67–105. 17. M. Tomenko, 'Returns of the Recent Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine (Political Orientations and Preferences of Voters)', Political Thought, 2 (1998), p.115. 18. For example, Zerkalo Nedeli, 31 Aug. 2002, 26 Oct. 2002, Ukrayina Moloda, 9 Oct. 2002. 19. This majority finally fell apart in September 2004 as the presidential elections approached and certain sections of the majority sought to 'hedge their bets' in case the pro-presidential candidate, Yanukovych, failed to beat the opposition's Viktor Yushchenko. 20. It is difficult to establish the exact number of deputies with business interests because of the lack of a system of declaring such interests and the general opaqueness of business ownership in Ukraine. In 2000, the State Tax Administration announced that 364 (of 450) deputies derived incomes from commercial structures (Holos Ukrainy, 25 April 2000). The Rada elected in 2002 is widely believed to have a larger number of such deputies than its predecessor. For example see M. Tomenko, 'Iaki parlament potriben Ukrainy?' (What sort of parliament does Ukraine need?), http://www.deputat.org.ua, 21 June 2005. 21. For example, see 'Tomenko: Bude opryliudnenyi spysok deputativ, iaki otrymaly kvartyry za biudzhetni hroshi' (Tomenko: The list of deputies that received apartments from the state budget will be made public'), http://www.deputat.org.ua, 7 July 2005. For more on the mechanisms used by the regime, see A. Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2005). 22. K. Heidar and R. Koole, 'Parliamentary Party Groups Compared', in K. Heidar and R. Koole (eds.), Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies (London and New York:, Routledge, 1999), p.249. 23. A. Van Der Meer Krok-Paszkowska, Shaping the Democratic Order: The Institutionalisation of Parliament in Poland (Leuven and Apeldoorn: Garant, 2000), pp.117–20. 24. Whitmore, State Building in Ukraine, pp.49–50, 159. 25. For instance, deputies changed their faction/group affiliation 562 times in the 1998–2002 convocation. A. Wilson and O. Protsyk, 'Centre Politics in Russia and Ukraine: Patronage, Power and Virtuality', Party Politics, 9/6 (2003) p.705. 26. K. Heidar and R. Koole, 'Approaches to the Study of Parliamentary Party Groups', in Heidar and Koole, Parliamentary Party Groups, p.11. 27. This is demonstrated by the longitudinal statistical analysis undertaken by the NGO Laboratory F-4 since 1994, who analysed all roll-call votes (from 2000, nearly all votes were taken on a roll-call basis) using multidimensional scaling to plot the voting of factions and deputy groups on charts where the smaller the circle, the tighter the voting discipline. See Ye. Lapin et al., Ukrains'kyi Parlament 13-oho sklykannia – 2-a, 3-ia, 4-a sesii (Ukrainian Parliament of the 13th convocation, 2nd, 3rd and 4th sessions) (Kyiv: Laboratoriia perspektyvnykh rozrobok F-4, 1996) and issues of Verkhovna Rada – Weekly produced by Laboratory F-4 between 2000 and 2003. 28. P. Kopecky as mentioned in Van Der Meer Krok-Paszkowska, Shaping the Democratic Order, p.179. 29. M. Mezey, Comparative Legislatures (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), p.64. 30. For details of the powers of West European committees, see Mattson and Strøm, 'Parliamentary Committees'. 31. Law 'on committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine', 116/95-VR, 4 April 1995. 32. Comparative information about the experience of other legislatures was disseminated to the Rada by USAID's Parliamentary Development Project (from 1994). 33. There is no consensus among experts on why this occurred (four Ukrainian constitutional law experts were consulted on the author's behalf by Pavlo Kutuev, July 2005). In addition, Edward Rakhimkulov (in private correspondence with the author) pointed to the desire of the drafters to limit legislative initiative to political entities, thus excluding committees as a working organ of parliament. 34. Mattson and Strøm, 'Parliamentary Committees', p.260. 35. S. Smith and T. Remington, The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.79. 36. Olson and Crowther, Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments, pp.8, 14. 37. On the Russian case, see M. Haspel, 'Committees in the Russian State Duma: Continuity and Change in Comparative Perspective', Journal of Legislative Studies, 4/1 (1998), pp.192–3. 38. Interview with a senior member of staff of the European Integration Committee, Kyiv, Feb. 2003. 39. Interviews with deputies and senior committee staff, Kyiv, 2000 and 2003. 40. Mattson and Strøm, 'Parliamentary Committees', p.276. 41. Smith and Remington, The Politics of Institutional Choice, p.81. 42. On factions/groups internal divisions, see The Day, 5 and 18 June 2002, Ukrains'ka Pravda, 8 June 2002. 43. The election of the former head of the presidential administration Lytvyn was seen as critical for Kuchma to control the parliament and thus the conditions of his exit in 2004. For details of the tactics used, see I. Pohorelova, 'The Price of Lytvyn', UNIAN news agency, 20 May 2002. 44. For example, see Zerkalo Nedeli, 8 June 2002 and Den', 1 June 2002. 45. Den', 5 June 2002, Ukrains'ka Pravda, 8 June 2002. 46. Roll-call vote on resolution no.1174, 7 June 2002, http://www.rada.gov.ua. 47. Interviews with Communist deputies and staff, Kyiv, June 2000 and March 2003. 48. There was a general consensus of feeling on this issue. Interviews with deputies from the pro-presidential majorities, Kyiv, June and July 2000 and March 2003 and communist faction, June 2000. 49. On Russia, see J. Ostrow, Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures: A Theory of Institutional Design and Political Conflict (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2000), pp.105–6, on Estonia, see J. Ruus, 'The Estonian Riigikogu and Institutionalization of its Committees', in Olson and Crowther, Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments, p.125. 50. In the US House of Representatives, committees are authorised to have 18 specialists and 12 clerical staff. At the other end of the spectrum, committees in Canada, Argentina and Mexico have just one member of staff. National Democratic Institute, Committees in Legislatures: A Division of Labour (National Democratic Institute: Legislative Research Series, No.2, 1996), pp.15–17. 51. By 2003, in interviews with the author, most deputies were quick to credit Lytvyn with successfully attracting more resources to the Rada. Also see Pohorelova, 'The Price of Lytvyn'. 52. Interviews with the author, Kyiv, Feb.–March 2003. For more on resources and workload differentials between committees, see Whitmore, State Building in Ukraine, pp.136–42, 169–70. 53. R. Packenham, 'Legislatures and Political Development', in P. Norton (ed.), Legislatures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.97–124. 54. D. Olson, Democratic Legislative Institutions: A Comparative View (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1994), p.134. 55. The other six per cent of government bills were initiated by the president. Indiana University Parliamentary Development Project, Weekly Update on the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 19 Jan. 2004, p.2. 56. This was mentioned by deputies and staff in numerous interviews (March–Aug. 2000 and Feb.–March 2003) and in the finance and banking committee report: S. Buriak and Ie. Diatlov, Zvit pro robotu komitetu Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan' finansiv i bankivs'koi diialnosti za II sesiiu (veresen' 2002–sichen' 2003 roku) (Report on the work of the committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on questions of finance and banking activity for the 2nd session (September 2002–January 2003), p.3. 57. For example, in the 7th session (Feb.–July 2005), the Rada examined 680 laws and adopted 122 of these. 'S'oma sesiia zakinchylasia' (The 7th session has finished), http://www.deputat.org, 11 July 2005. 58. V. Lytvyn, 'Speech at the opening of the third session of the Supreme Rada of the fourth convocation', http://www.rada.kiev.ua/Lytvyn-Speech-Feb03.htm, 7 Feb. 2003. 59. This was evident in observations of parliamentary sessions in 2000 and 2003, but is supported by deputies' opinions. In a survey of 193 deputies (of 450) proportionally representing all factions and committees conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 10 Feb.–15 April 2002, 70.5 per cent of deputies stated that the key deliberations on legislation took place in committees, while only 6.4 per cent believed it to take place in plenary sessions and 3.4 per cent thought this occurred in factions. Parliamentary Development Project, Opinions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; Comparative Survey Results of the 2nd and 3rd Convocations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Kyiv: PDP, 2002), p.9. 60. Interview with a head of a committee staff, Feb. 2003. 61. Parliamentary Development Project, Opinions of the Verkhovna Rada, p.33. 62. Interviews with heads of committee secretariats, Kyiv, Feb.–March 2003. 63. [Razumkov Centre] 'Ukraine's Parliament: The Main Lines and Stages of Evolution', National Security and Defence, No.2 (2003), p.11. 64. For plenary attendance, see http://www.rada.gov.ua. Regarding committee attendance, in interviews deputies from the majority and opposition commented on this, March–July 2000 and Feb.–March 2003. 65. Wilson, Virtual Politics, pp.177, 236–45. 66. For example, see Holos Ukrainy, 28 Dec. 2002. 67. Interviews with committee staff and deputies, March 2003. 68. Interviews with a committee head of secretariat (June 2000 and March 2003) and the deputy who drafted the version of the bill that failed in 2000 (July 2000). 69. Article 4.2.4 of the standing orders, amended 16 March 2000. 70. Laboratory F-4, Verkhovna Rada – Tyzhden', weekly bulletins 2000–03. See note 27. 71. Interviews with senior faction staff, May 2000 and Feb. 2003. 72. For example, see Ukrains'ka Pravda, 26 Nov. 2003. 73. Zerkalo Nedeli, 5 April 2003. 74. Den', 21 Sept. 2000. 75. Deputies were very consistent on this in interviews, Feb.–March 2003. 76. Materials given to the author by staff of the Socialists, Our Ukraine and Communist factions, Feb. 2003. 77. Interview with a head of a committee secretariat, Feb. 2003. 78. Zerkalo Nedeli, 8 June 2002. 79. Damgaard, 'How Parties Control Committee Members', p.312. 80. Ostrow, Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures.