Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution
2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 33; Issue: 12 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/1057610x.2010.523860
ISSN1521-0731
Autores Tópico(s)Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
ResumoAbstract The inner organizational structure of Al Qaeda within the expanded framework of the "Global Jihad movement" has been a subject of much debate between scholars. As will be elaborated later, the "Global Jihad movement" is composed of several elements that possess radical Islamic ideology and conduct operational activity in different regions in the world under the banner of Jihad. The dominant factor within the "Global Jihad movement" is by no doubt Al Qaeda. The purpose of this article is to focus solely on Al Qaeda and present the formal internal structure of the organization. The article argues that Al Qaeda is first and foremost, an infrastructural organization with a formal echelon, hierarchy, sub-departmental division, and duties distribution reflecting characteristics of a guerilla and terrorist organization. The article portrays the formal layout of Al Qaeda, composed of the main command apparatus, and names the different personalities who fill the more important positions within Al Qaeda's hierarchy from its days of inception until today. The authors are grateful to Anders Nielsen, former Research Fellow and Head of the Middle East Desk at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; Mr. Ronald Sandee, Director of Research and Analysis at NEFA Foundation, New York, NY; Akanksha Mehta and Dr. Arabinda Acharya for their valuable comments. Due to the rapid change in the dynamics and characteristics of terrorism-related issues, especially when referring to Global Jihad entities, this article should be regarded accurate as of 5 September 2010. Notes 1. For the Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman debate, see Bruce Hoffman, "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism," Foreign affairs (May–June 2009). Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63408/bruce-hoffman/the-myth-of-grass-roots-terrorism 2. Refer to Marc Sageman's work, Leaderless Jihad: The Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century and Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press). 3. Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," Political Psychology 21(2) (June 2000), pp. 405–420. 4. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," Comparative Politics 13(4) (July 1981), pp. 379–399. 5. Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," Orbis 29(3) (Fall 1985), p. 466. 6. Jacob N. Shapiro, "Terrorist Organizations' Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies," in Jean K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 59. 7. Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," p. 468. 8. C. H. Levine, "Organizational Decline and Cutback Management," Public Administration Review 38(4) (1978), pp. 316–325. 9. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), p. 167. 10. Jessica Stern and Amit Modi, "Organizational Dynamics of Survival," in Thomas Biersteker and Sue Eckert, Countering Financing of Terrorism (New York and London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 27–28. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. C. Jones, W. Hesterly, and S. Borgatti, "A General Theory of Network Governance," The Academy of Management Review 22(4) (October 1997), p. 923. 14. J. Fearon and D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review 97(1) (February 2003), pp. 75–90. 15. M. Crenshaw, P. Wilkinson. J. Alterman, and T. Schaffer, "How Terrorism Ends," Special Report 48 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 25 May 1999), p. 3. 16. Todd H. DeGhetto, "Precipitating the Decline of Terrorist Groups: A System's Analysis," Unpublished Master's thesis. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California (1994). 17. Ibid. 18. Salaf in Arabic literally means ancestors and refers to the friends of prophet Mohamed that choose to follow him on his famous Hijra (voyage of emigration) from Mecca to Medina, which is considered to be the establishment of Islam. According to Muslim tradition Mohamed and his friends (the "salafs") established an ideal and pure community, which should be the ultimate goal of every society. 19. Yaakov Shimoney and Evyatar Levin, The Political Lexicon of the 20th Century (Jerusalem: Bet Ha'hoza'a Ha'yerushalmi, 1971), pp. 18–19. 20. Ibid. 21. According to the current assessment the supporters of the Salafi ideology over the Muslim world does not exceed 5 perent. The Salafi-jihadists are about 5 percent of the total Salafi adherents. If these percentages are transferred into numbers, about 50 million Muslims believe that Sharia law should be implemented worldwide, not only in Muslim lands, and up to one million Muslims are ready to use militant Jihad (total Jihad) to achieve this goal. 22. Thomas Hegghammer, "Abdallah Azzam'Imam of Jihad," in Gilles Kepel and Jean Pierre Milelli, eds., Al Qaeda in Its Own Words (Boston: Harvard university Press, 2008), p. 82. 23. Ibid., pp. 93–94. 24. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (Or Yehuda: Zmora-Bitan, 2006), p. 117. 25. For example, see the Indonesian "ngurki ponduk" graduates (that later became the base for the Southeast Asia "Jama'a Islamiyah") that were allocated to Abd Al Rasul Sayaf's group and trained and fought over there. See Sidney Jones, "Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous," International crisis group Asia Report No. 63 (26 August 2003), p. 3. 26. Osama bin Laden's father was a Yemeni citizen who migrated to Saudi Arabia during the early 1930s. In Saudi Arabia he was able to establish himself as a businessman and make close connections with local Saudi sheikhs from the royal family. Using his connections he became the owner of the largest construction company operating at the time in Saudi Arabia. The family kept Islamic tradition but held a pro-Western approach and provided family members with Western education at leading educational institutions. They also spent summer vacations in select resorts on the European continent. Osama bin Laden's father was killed in a plane accident in 1967, leaving a very large sum of money as inheritance. Each one of his over 50 children (from several women) received dozens of millions of U.S. dollars. See Lawrence (See note 24 above). pp. 76–96. 27. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House Trade paperback, 2003), p. 101. 28. Azzam wanted to end Jihad in Afghanistan first but bin Laden, urged on by Egyptian hard-liners, decided to use the momentum of the Jihad following its success in Afghanistan. 29. Founding documents of Al Qaeda recovered from Bosnia, ICPVTR Database (Singapore, January 2008); Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 219; Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (London: Free Press, a Division of Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 80. 30. Abdallah Azzam, "Al-Qa'idah al-Sulbah," Al-Jihad magazine (Afghanistan) (no. 41 April 1988), pp. 46–49. 31. Hegghammer, "Abdallah Azzam'Imam of Jihad," p. 95. 32. The 9/11 Commission Report. Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/chap2.pdf, p. 58. 33. For example, see Abu Hamza Al-Masri's reference to the Bosnian "Jihad arena" at Evan F. Kohlmann, "The Afghan-Bosnian Mujahideen Network in Europe." Available at http://www.fhs.se/upload/Webbadmin/Organisation/CATS/Kohlmann.doc 34. Following the war in Afghanistan, the Mujahidin groups began an internal struggle for supremacy over Afghanistan. Since the mid-1990s the violent struggle over Afghanistan was conducted by the Taliban against a coalition of the other forces forming the "Northern front." Global Jihad fighters allied with the Taliban considered Afghanistan a "Jihad arena" against the Northern front. For an example see the Prepared Statement of John Walker Lindh to the Court, 4 October 2002, United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, VA. Available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/lindh100402statment.html 35. Al Qaeda in Arabic literally means "the base." 36. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, p. 124 37. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 60. 38. The initiators of this pressure were the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa (Egypt, Jordan, and Algeria) who suffered from bin Laden's logistical support to their own local Muslim radicals. 39. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 62. 40. The activity of this group in the international arena in the first half of the 1990s was professional. They were responsible for the deadliest attacks and the most ambitious plans of the period: the first attempt to collapse the World Trade Center in New York using a car bomb in the parking lot of the towers (26 February 1993, 6 killed and about 1,000 wounded); and the "Bojinka plot" an ambitious attempt to crash 11 American commercial jets into the Pacific Ocean in one day. Ibid., pp. 146–150. 41. Among those leaders who became fugitives were Hambali, an Indonesian citizen that later on became the military chief of the "Jama'a Islamiyah of Southeast Asia"; and more importantly, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM) who later on joined Al Qaeda (late 1998) and became the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. See "Hambali," Rotten library Biographies. Available at http://www.rotten.com/library/bio/crime/terrorists/hambali/ 42. Despite the fact that they worked separately at this stage in completely different entities, they knew each other from Afghanistan (the "melting pot"). The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 148–149. 43. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp. 195–197. 44. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 115–116. 45. A first attempt a year earlier failed as the dingy full of explosive sank on its way to hit the U.S.S. Sullivan. 46. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 181, 190–191. 47. Available at http://www.fata.gov.pk/ 48. The agencies are: Bajaur, Kyhber, Kurram, Mohmand, Oraksai, and North and South Waziristan. The frontier provinces include: Peshawar, Kohat, Tank, Banuu, Lakii, and Dera Ismail Khan. FATA is 450 kilometers by 250 kilometers with an area of 27,220 square kilometers. It is cut off from the rest of the world, even from mainland Pakistan. While the rest of the world has progressed so much, FATA has been left behind with limited access to development assistance. Even compared to other parts of Pakistan or Afghanistan, FATA has not received or garnered the same attention. 49. The Islamic term "Jihad arenas" refers to arenas in which Muslims fight Non-Muslims. In recent years these networks mostly involved the transfer of activists into Iraq. See Philip Carter, "Al Qaeda and the Advent of Multinational Terrorism: Why "Material Support" Prosecutions are Key in the War on Terrorism" (12 March 2003). Available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/student/20030312_carter.html and Anthony Barnett, Jason Burke, and Zoe Smith, "Terror Cells Regroup and Now Their Target is Europe," The Observer (11 January 2004). Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/11/alqaida.terrorism 50. For the role of Mohamed Gerbouzi in the attack see Elaine Sciolino, "Morocco Connection is Emerging as Sleeper Threat in Terror War," The New York Times (16 May 2004). Available at http://www.hvk.org/articles/0504/73.html 51. This has happened in some cases as a result of directions given by Al Qaeda and in other cases through their own initiative. 52. As a side note, the Afghan arena served as a "melting pot" for various jihadists from across the world. They received training and fought together, and subsequently maintained their relations following their returning to their home countries. There they established the so-called local groups to fight the "infidel" local regimes. 53. For example, see Nelly Sindayen, "Abu Sayyaf—Beyond the Kidnap Game," Time Magazine Asia (18 November 2002). Available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/1101021125/abu_sayyaf.html 54. The "Itihad Al Islami Al Afghani" camp Sadah led by the Afghan leader Abd AL Rasool Sayyaf served as the melting pot for The Baluchi Khalid sheikh Mohamad (KSM), the Indonesian Radwan Ismail Al Din (better known as Hambali), the Philippine Abd Al Razeq Janjelani, and the Pakistani Hafiz Al Saeed. As KSM became the chief of Al Qaeda special operations unit, Hambali became the military chief of the "Jamm'a Islamiyah" of Southeast Asia, Abd Al Razeq Janjelani founded and headed the Philippine group Abu Sayyaf (Sayyaf—in the honor of Abd Al Rasool Sayyaf), and Hafez Al Saeed established and headed the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Toyba (LET). This allowed for the Al Qaeda special operations unit to operationally cooperate with JI, ASG, HUJA, and LET. See "Global Jihad Entities Cooperation—Where it all Began." Available at http://www.ceifit.com/?categoryId=41118&itemId=60829 55. "Suicide Bombers Hit Embassies in Uzbekistan," ABC News, 31 July 2004. Available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200407/s1165972.htm 56. Senior members in the newly established IJU were mostly influenced by Al Qaeda senior leader Abu Layth Al Libi. See Giudo Steinberg, "Uzbekistan/Turkey: The Islamic Jihad Union." Available at http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-561617 and Ronald Sandee, "The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)," NEFA Foundation. Available at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefaijuoct08.pdf, p. 3. 57. "KSM's Transatlantic Shoe Bomb Plot," NEFA Foundation. Available at http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/shoebombplot.pdf 58. For example, Lashkar-e-Toyba's involvement in a plot to blow up a nuclear facility in Australia. See BBC News, 15 March 2007. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6454373.stm 59. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Kennedy-GSPC-041207.pdf. 60. Jane Novak, "Arabian Peninsula al Qaeda Groups Merge," The Long War Journal, 26 January 2009. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/arabian_peninsula_al.php 61. "Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI)," Naval Post Graduate School. Available at http://www.nps.edu/Library/Research/SubjectGuides/SpecialTopics/TerroristProfile/Current/AlQaidaIraq.html 62. Arabinda Acharya and Thomas Quiggin, "Whatt is Al Qaeda Today?" Global Grief, 22 June 2009. Available at http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2009/06/22/what-is-the-al-qaeda-network-today/ 63. Bill Roggio, "Libyan Islamic Fighting Groups Joins Al Qaeda," The Long War Journal, 3 November 2007. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/11/libyan_islamic_fight.php 64. For the full list of AQIY engagement in attacking foreign targets see NEFA Foundation. Available at http://www1.nefafoundation.org/documents-area-yemen.html. 65. For the full detailed engagement of AQIM in attacking Western targets see NEFA Foundation. Available at http://www.nefafoundation.org/documents-area-north-africa.html 66. "AQIM Statement on Attack on the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott," NEFA Foundation. Available at http://www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaaqim0208-2.pdf 67. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was not a member of Al Qaeda until late 2004. He was a Jordanian prisoner released following the general amnesty proclaimed in Jordan after the death of King Hussein in 1999. He arrived in Afghanistan and tried to join Al Qaeda but was refused. With the help of Al Qaeda he moved to the Afghan city of Herat and established his own organization, Jund Al-Sham (the Soldiers of Sham); he recruited from the Levant region (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine). Following the U.S. coalition offensive in Afghanistan al-Zarqawi and his fighters left and moved to northern Iraq into the Kurdish region of under the sponsorship of the Kurdish radical Islamic organization, Ansar Al-Islam. Al-Zarqawi was the first to react to the U.S. invasion of Iraq with terrorist attacks executed by his fighters and gained success, and subsequently joined Al Qaeda. He was nominated by bin Laden as the "Amir" (leader) of Al Qaeda in Iraq in late 2004. "Profile: Abu Musab Al Zarqawi," BBC News, 10 November 2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3483089.stm. The differences between his policy and Al Qaeda directives are revealed in "Harmony Papers Data Base," Combat Terrorism Center at West Point. Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf 68. The most known attack of "Iraqi elements" outside of Iraq was the simultaneous attack on hotels in the Jordanian capital (November 2005), resulting in the deaths of 70 innocent Muslim civilians, which brought antagonism and criticism to Al Qaeda and the global Jihad throughout the Arab and Muslim world and heavily undermined the legitimacy of Al Qaeda. See Scott Macleod, "Behind the Amman Hotels Attack," Time, 10 November 2005. Available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1128209,00.html and http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369839 69. "Harmony Papers Data Base." 70. Abu Ayub AL Masri Profile, Global Security Archive. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_ayyub_al-masri.htm and ICPVTR Personality Profile on Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. 71. "Al Qaida Interview with Abu Hamza AL Muhajer in Iraq," NEFA Foundation, 24 October 2008. Available at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaabuhamza1008.pdf, p. 8. 72. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/18/al-qaida-world-cup-plot-denied 73. Available at http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_terror0420_05_17.asp 74. The "homegrown" individual's knowledge of Jihad or Salafism is relatively low. The only analogy that comes to mind goes back to the 1970s and 1980s while most of the terrorist organizations—Japanese Red Army, the different Palestinian groups, the European Bader Meinhof, Red brigades, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), as well as the Latin groups of south and central America (Carlos the jackal's gang)—operating in the international arena possessed extreme leftist ideologies but the junior activists of these groups did not memorize all the works of Marx and Trotsky. See Dana Harman, "Radical Islam Finds Unlikely Heaven in Liberal Britain," The Christian Science Monitor, 5 August 2002. Availabe at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0805/p01s03-wogi.html 75. Van Gogh criticized the radical elements of Islam in his publications, following which he was brutally assassinated as he strolled the streets of Amsterdam by a member of a radical gang called the "Hofstadt" group that met in Amsterdam Mosques and private homes of the group members. See Dr. Albert Benschop, "Chronicle of Political Murder Foretold—Jihad in the Netherlands." Available at http://www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_en.php 76. The Madrid attack was carried out by low-level criminal Muslim activists who came together in one of the main Madrid mosques. They were able to get explosives (standard) by dealing drugs and they learned how to set it as a charge through an Internet website. Available at http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369921 77. Available at http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373485 78. For example see "The L.A. Plot to Attack U.S. Military, Israeli Government, & Jewish Targets," NEFA Foundation. Available at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/LA_Plot.pdf, p. 3. 79. It should be noted that Palestinian groups or Shi'ite groups such as Hezbollah are not associated with the "Global Jihad movement." Only groups that possess radical Sunni ideology and political affiliation with Al Qaeda can be considered part of the global Jihad. 80. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-000078-Trans.pdf and http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-000080-Trans.pdf 81. Ahmad Mussa, "Exclusive of 10 Episodes of Written Al Qaeda Documents," Nahdat Misr in Arabic (Cairo), 11 September 2004, p. 3. 82. United States of America vs. Usama Bin Laden. Available at http://www.elastic.org/~fche/mirrors/cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm 83. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-000080-Trans.pdf 84. There were numerous unverified reports concerning the medical situation of OBL. These reports suggest bin Laden suffers from diabetes as well as severe kidney malfunction, which force him to go through dialysis treatment on a short-term basis. Bin Laden also disappeared almost completely from the media. During the last years he conducted several audio addressees but only one video performance compared to numerous appearances (video and audio) in the years before. 85. It seems that OBL was not very involved with the new policy of Al Qaeda, laid down in a letter sent by al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and that the influence of al Zawahiri is much larger with new nominations inside Al Qaeda. In addition, the vast majority of the public statements of Al Qaeda made in recent years were by al-Zawahiri. See "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/CTC-Zawahiri-Letter-10-05.pdf 86. Ronald Sandee, "Al Qaida and Europe: The Case of the German Pakistani Aleem Nasir," NEFA Foundation (June 2009). Available at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefa_AleemNasirNetwork0609.pdf, p. 3. 87. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-000080-Trans.pdf 88. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an Egyptian terrorist organization that operated in Egypt through the 1980s and 1990s and joined forces with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Its leader throughout its existence was Ayman al-Zawahiri. 89. Ronald Sandee, "Al Qaida and Europe," p. 4. 90. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-000080-Trans.pdf 91. Abu Basir Al Yamani is currently the head of the Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula organization (AQAP). See Abdul Hameed Bakier, "Al Qaeda leaders in the Arabian Peninsula Speak Out," Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus 6(3) (28 January 2009). Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34420 92. Available at http://www.msnbc.com/modules/wtc/wtc_globaldragnet/sought_alqaida.htm and Global Security Archive. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_basir_al-yemeni.htm and Jane Novak "Arabian Peninsula Al Qaeda Groups Merge," The Long War Journal. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/01/arabian_peninsula_al.php and http://armiesofliberation.com/archives/2007/06/24/new-al-qaeda-leader-in-yemen/ 93. "Wadih Al Hagge Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/wadih_el_hage.htm 94. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-000080-Trans.pdf 95. "Abu Hafs Al Masri Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/mohammed_atef.htm 96. United States of America vs. Usama Bin Laden. Available at http://www.elastic.org/~fche/mirrors/cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-02.htm 97. "Abu Fadhl Al Makki Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_fadhl_al-makkee.htm 98. Al Sharqi al Awsat in Arabic, London, 9 January 2003, p. 3. 99. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/Al%20Adl%20Letter_Translation.pdf 100. Available at http://www.answers.com/topic/saif-al-adel 101. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD30Df01.html 102. Even though there is no clear cut evidence of Abu Gheith's position within the command council, it seems that he had a significant view within Al Qaeda senior leaders internal dispute that was raised over the 11 September attacks. This reflects, according to the authors' assessments the important role of Abu Gheith within the command council. See The 9/11 Commission Report. Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/sec7.pdf, p. 251. 103. "United States of America vs. Usama Bin Laden." Available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/binladen/indict.pdf, p. 7. 104. Ibid., p. 7. 105. Bill Roggio, "Senior Al Qaeda operative Abd Al Hadi AL Iraqi Captured," The Long War Journal. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/04/senior_al_qaeda_oper.php 106. United States of America v. Abdul Zahir Aka Abdul Baki. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060120zahir.pdf 107. "Abd Al Hadi Al Iraqi Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abdul_hadi_al-iraqi.htm 108. "Amar Al Baluchi Biography." Available at http://www.odni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf 109. "Shaikh Sai'd Al Masri Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/shaikh_saiid_al-masri.htm 110. "Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khaled Sheikh Mohamed)." Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf 111. Pepe Escobar, "Middle East-The Roving Eye Brave New (Middle Eastern) World Part 2: The Iranian Equation," Asia Time On Line, 22 September 2002. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/DI20Ak02.html Abu Hafs Al Mauritania's position as a member of the command council of Al Qaeda is not clearly verified. Even though his position as head of an Al Qaeda committee and his liberty to express criticism over bin Laden's decision of the 11 September attacks suggests that his position was very senior within Al Qaeda leadership and that he was probably a member of the "Majlis Al Shura" (the command council). See The 9/11 Commission Report. Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf, p. 251. 112. "U.S Attack Killed Al Qaeda Leader's Kin." The China Daily, 13 February 2006. Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-02/13/content_519567.htm. According to the present assessment, referring to his senior position, it seems that he was also a member of Al Qaeda command council (Majlis al shura). 113. Khabib's role as head of the overall military committee can be seen in a unique publication of Al Sahab (the media wing of Al Qaeda) commemorating one of the organization's martyrs in Afghanistan—in which Habib was titled as the commander of military operations. See "Qaedat Al Jihad (Al Sahab): Commander Abu Al Hasan Jihad and Martyrdom." Available at http://theunjustmedia.com:80/clips/afgha/July08/abu/abu3.htm, part 3. 114. Sandee, "Core Al Qaeda in 2008," NEFA Foundation. Available at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefa_AQin2008.pdf, p. 3. 115. Sandee "Al Qaida and Europe," p. 4. 116. "Hamza Rabi'a Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamza-rabia.htm According to our assessment, referring to his senior position, it seems that he is also a member of Al Qaeda command council (Majlis al Shura). 117. "Abd Al Aziz Al Masri Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abd_al-aziz_al-masri.htm. 118. "Abu Khayr Al Masri Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_khayr.htm 119. "Al Jihad (Al Sahab)." 120. An expression that refers to someone that memorizes the Qor'an. 121. Wright, The Looming Tower, p. 189; in addition to the aforementioned figures of Al Qaeda's leadership the following activists were also members of the council at one point or another. Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, an Al Qaeda former senior operative, mentioned in his testimony more names of activists that were members of the Command Council. The current position and whereabouts of these activists is not known. Those activists are Abu Faraj Al Yamani, Abu Ayoub Al Iraqi, Khalifa Al Muskat Al Omany, Saif Al Libi, and Abu Burhan Al Iraqi. See "United States vs. Usama Bin Laden," p. 205. 122. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/AFGP-2002-000078-Trans.pdf 123. "Abu Ubeida Al Banshiri Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/abu_ubaidah_al-banshiri.htm 124. "Abu Hafs Al Masri Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/mohammed_atef.htm 125. Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3339840/ and Al Sharqi al Awsat in Arabic, London, 9 January 2003, p. 3. 126. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/Al%20Adl%20Letter_Translation.pdf 127. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD30Df01.html 128. "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal-Al Libi, Abu Faraj." Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ISN10017.pdf#1. From these allegations, which refer to his involvement with Al Qaeda operations both internally and externally, one can conclude that he was at that time the military chief of Al Qaeda. 129. Khaled Habib was the chief of the General Section, responsible for Al Qaeda's internal (Afghanistan–Pakistan border zone) military activity. See "Khaled Khabib Profile." Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/khalid_habib.htm. There is one unconfirmed report that Habib was also involved with international operational activity. See Mark Mazzeti, "New Leadership is Seen on Rise within Al Qaeda," Afghanistan News Center. Available at http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2007/april/apr22007.html#4. This report suggests that Habib might be holding the position of Al Qaeda overall chief of the military committee (responsible for both internal and external operations), a position that was not occupied since the arrest of Abu Faraj Al Libi. The mid-2008 Al Sahab publication Abu Hasan Jihad and martyrdom titled Khabib as head of military operations. "Qaedat Al Jihad (Al Sahab): Commander Abu Al Hasan Jihad and Martyrdom." Available at http://theunjustmedia.com:80/clips/afgha/July08/abu/abu3.htm 130. "Harmony Papers Data Base." Available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq
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