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Discovery of hidden profiles by decision-making groups: Solving a problem versus making a judgment.

1992; American Psychological Association; Volume: 63; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.426

1939-1315

Garold Stasser, Dennis D. Stewart,

Social and Intergroup Psychology

An information-sampling model proposed by Stasser and Titus (1985,1987) and observations of discussion content (Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989) suggest that face-to-face discussions often fail to disseminate unshared information. However, groups may be less prone to overlooking unshared information if they believe that their task has a demonstrably correct answer (Laughlin, 1980). University students read a murder mystery and then met in groups to discuss the case. Groups believed they had either sufficient (solve set) or insufficient (judge set) evidence to determine the guilty suspect. When critical clues were unshared before discussion, 67% of solve, but only 35% of judge, groups identified the guilty suspect. Discussion content analyses showed that solve groups focused more on the critical clues. Stasser, Taylor, and Hanna (1989) found that decision-making groups were much more likely to discuss information that members shared before discussion than to discuss information that was held by members individually. This finding was anticipated by an information-sampling model of discussion that was proposed by Stasser and Titus (1985,1987). The central idea in the model is that the probability of discussing an item of information increases as the number of members who can recall and mention the item increases. This is a fairly simple idea, but it has some disconcerting implications. For example, it suggests that group discussion may be an ineffective way of disseminating information; information that is known to only one or a few members will often be omitted from discussion. Moreover, Stasser, Taylor, and Hanna (1989) found that groups were not only more likely to mention information if it was distributed to all before discussion, but they were also more likely to bring it up repeatedly throughout discussion. These findings suggest that group decisions will often reflect the common knowledge shared by members before discussion and not the diverse knowledge emanating from their unique perspectives and experiences. Of particular interest in this article is the possibility that the failure of groups to consider fully unshared information may be due in part to how members construe their decision-making task. Members may view the task as a matter of judgment and let their discussion be. guided by the goal of reaching a consensus. Conversely, members may view the task as a problem to be solved and presume that there is a critical set of information that would allow them not only to identify the correct answer