T homas A quinas, P ierre R ousselot, and the Performative Aesthetics of Contemplative Theology
2013; Wiley; Volume: 63; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/heyj.12084
ISSN1468-2265
Autores Tópico(s)Medieval Philosophy and Theology
ResumoThe Heythrop JournalVolume 63, Issue 4 p. 676-690 Article Thomas Aquinas, Pierre Rousselot, and the Performative Aesthetics of Contemplative Theology Robert St. Hilaire, Robert St. Hilaire Niagara UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Robert St. Hilaire, Robert St. Hilaire Niagara UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 26 November 2013 https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.12084Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Notes 1 A. N. Williams, 'Mystical Theology Redux: The Pattern of Aquinas' Summa theologiae,' Modern Theology 13:1 (January 1997), pp. 53–74; 10.1111/1468-0025.00031 Google Scholarsee also A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 167–168; 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195124361.001.0001 Google Scholar Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by Bernhard Blankenhorn, O.P. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), esp. pp. 1–20; Google Scholar Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., 'St. Thomas Aquinas: Theologian and Mystic,' Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 4:1 (2006), pp. 1–16; Google Scholar Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 2: Spiritual Master, translated by Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), esp. pp. 1–21; Google Scholar Gilles Emery, O.P., The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, translated by Francesca Aran Murphy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. pp. 22–35; Web of Science®Google Scholar Gilles Emery, O.P., Trinity, Church, and Human Person: Thomistic Essays (Naples, Florida: Sapientia Press, 2007), esp. pp. 28–32 and 55–65; Web of Science®Google Scholar Fergus Kerr, ' Theology as Spirituality: Conflicting Views' in Exchanges of Grace: Essays in Honour of Ann Loades, edited by Natalie K. Watson and Stephen Burns (London: SCM Press, 2008); Google Scholar Fergus Kerr, 'Tradition and Reason: Two Uses of Reason, Critical and Contemplative,' International Journal of Systematic Theology 6:1 (January 2004), pp. 37–49; and 10.1111/j.1468-2400.2004.00118.x Google Scholar Nicholas M. Healy, Thomas Aquinas: Theologian of the Christian Life (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), esp. p. 21. Google Scholar 2 Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 35. Google Scholar 3 Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 10; Google Scholarsee also Torrell, Spiritual Master, p. 17. Google Scholar 4 Healy, Thomas Aquinas, p. 21. Google Scholar 5 Kerr, ' Tradition and Reason,' pp. 44–45. Google Scholar 6 Karen Kilby, 'Aquinas, the Trinity, and the Limits of Understanding,' International Journal of Systematic Theology 7:4 (October 2005), pp. 414–427; 10.1111/j.1468-2400.2005.00175.x Google Scholarsee also Karen Kilby, 'Is an Apophatic Trinitarianism Possible?' International Journal of Systematic Theology 12:1 (January 2010), pp. 65–77, esp. p. 74; and 10.1111/j.1468-2400.2009.00494.x Web of Science®Google Scholar Karen Kilby, 'Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with the Social Doctrine of the Trinity,' New Blackfriars 81 (2000), pp. 432–445, esp. pp. 443–4. 10.1111/j.1741-2005.2000.tb06456.x Google Scholar 7 Matthew Levering, 'Friendship and Trinitarian Theology: Response to Karen Kilby,' International Journal of Systematic Theology 9:1 (January 2007), pp. 39–54, esp. p. 52 and p. 54; 10.1111/j.1468-2400.2006.00228.x Google Scholarsee also Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), esp. pp. 28–46. For Kilby's response to Levering, 10.1002/9780470773918 Google Scholarsee Karen Kilby, 'Response to Levering,' International Journal of Systematic Theology 9:1 (January 2007), pp. 55–57. 10.1111/j.1468-2400.2007.00247.x Google Scholar 8 Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, p. 37; cf. Google Scholar Torrell, Spiritual Master, pp. 17–18. Google Scholar 9 Pierre Rousselot, L'Intellectualisme de saint Thomas, 3rd edition (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1936 [original edition 1908]). Throughout this article, unless otherwise noted, I rely on the following translation: Google Scholar Pierre Rousselot, Intelligence: Sense of Being, Faculty of God, translated by Andrew Tallon (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999). Where the French is cited, the numbers in brackets refer to the page of the third edition. Google Scholar 10For an overview of Rousselot's life, work, and influence, see Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 67–83; for a detailed study of Rousselot's entire corpus, 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229642.001.0001 Google Scholarsee John M. McDermott, S.J., Love and Understanding: The Relation of Will and Intellect in Pierre Rousselot's Christological Vision (Rome: Gregorian University, 1983). Google Scholar 11 Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, p. 137; Google Scholarsee also Christophe Potworowski, Contemplation and Incarnation: The Theology of Marie-Dominique Chenu (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), pp. 10–11, 12 and 49. Google Scholar 12 Fergus Kerr, 'A Different World: Neoscholasticism and Its Discontents,' International Journal of Systematic Theology 8:2 (April 2006), pp. 144–145. 10.1111/j.1468-2400.2006.00187.x Google Scholar 13 Summa theologiae [ST], 2-2 q.4 a.1: '… [S]peramus beatificari quod videbimus aperta visione veritatem cui per fidem adhaeremus …'; Google Scholarsee also ST 2-2 q.1 a.5 and q.1 a.6. Throughout this article, for the Latin texts of Thomas's works, I rely upon the following website: St. Thomas Aquinas, Corpus Thomisticum: S. Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia (Fundación Tomás de Aquino, 2009) (1 December 2012). All translations are my own. Google Scholar 14Unfortunately, the secondary literature on Rousselot is sparse, especially concerning his work of 1908. The most comprehensive, although in many regards flawed, treatment of this earliest phase of his career is Part I of McDermott's Love and Understanding (cited above); but Google Scholarsee also Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology, pp. 67–73; Google Scholar Gerald A. McCool, S.J., From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1992), pp. 39–58; and Google Scholar Gerald A. McCool, The Neo-Thomists (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994), pp. 97–116. As helpful as some of these expositions in places are, none of them attempt to assess Rousselot as an interpreter of Thomas, as I mean to do here. Google Scholar 15In his thesis, Rousselot relies upon an impressive array of writings from Thomas. For the reader's convenience, when citing Rousselot, I will also reference select (but by no means all) representative texts supporting his interpretation from the Summa theologiae, Summa contra Gentiles (SCG), and Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (de Ver.). Google Scholar 16 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M Doran (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1997 [originally 1967]). This book first appeared as a series of articles published in the 1940's. 10.3138/9781442683037 Google Scholar 17 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 1, 7, 8 and 195. Google Scholar 18 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 7 and esp. 30–35, where Rousselot relies on Book III of the Summa contra Gentiles to show that for Thomas all created beings, even material, have an intellectual end in God. (This interpretation, it should be noted, is quite debatable.) On the 'value' of intelligence for Thomas, Google Scholarsee also Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 34; cf. pp. 11, 41–46. Google Scholar 19 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 2 [v]. Google Scholar 20 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 2, 7, 39–40 and 56. Google Scholar 21 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 50 and 81 [95]. Google Scholar 22 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 30. Google Scholar 23See Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 24; Google Scholarsee de Ver. q.8 a.16 ad 11. Google Scholar 24 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 7, 8, 39–40, 55–8, and especially 64–8, where Rousselot vigorously asserts the infallibility of simple intellectual apprehensions, the first principles of reason, and all proper deductive reasoning. Google Scholar 25 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 8, 113–115, 127 and 182. For some observations on how Rousselot balances his critique of human intelligence with his insistence on its capacity to know being, Google Scholarsee McDermott, Love and Understanding, pp. 33–38; Google Scholarcf. Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 26, 26–7 33, 79–80. Google Scholar 26See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 2–6; for an overview of French spiritualism and Catholic Modernism as well as their place in the intellectual climate of Rousselot's day, Google Scholarsee Frederick Copleston, S.J., A History of Philosophy, vol. IX, From the French Revolution to Sartre, Camus, and Levi-Strauss (New York: Doubleday, 1994), pp. 155–177 and 216–49; Google Scholar Roger Aubert, Le Problème de l'acte de foi: Données traditionnelles et résultats des controverses récentes, 2nd edition (Louvain: Warny, 1950), pp. 267–7 and 294–337; Google Scholar Gerald A. McCool, From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1992), pp. 44–48; and Google Scholar Pope Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis (1907) (1 December 2012). Google Scholar 27 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 50–53; see ST 1 q.58 a.3. Google Scholar 28 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 54–55; see 2 SCG 96.10. Google Scholar 29 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 18 and 23–5; see ST 1 q.55 a.3. Google Scholar 30See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 15 and 50–51; see ST 2-2 q.180 a.6 ad 2. Google Scholar 31See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 16–18 and 50–51; see 4 SCG 11.5 and ST 2-2 q.180 a.6 ad 2. Google Scholar 32See, e.g., Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 8 [12] and 40 [40]; for Thomas's use of the term intuitus, see, e.g., ST 2-2 q.180 a.6 ad 2. Google Scholar 33 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 52–54, esp. 54 14 and 65; see ST 1 q.58 a.3. Google Scholar 34 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 53 [58]; see ST 2-2 q.49 a.5 ad 2: '[C]ertitudo rationis est ex intellectu, sed necessitas rationis est ex defectu intellectus, illa enim in quibus vis intellectiva plenarie viget ratione non indigent, sed suo simplici intuitu veritatem comprehendunt, sicut Deus et Angeli'; Google Scholarsee also Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 25, 52 and 65; and ST 2-2 q.49 a.5 ad 3. Google Scholar 35 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 69–70; see ST 1 q.12 a.12. Google Scholar 36See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 18, 23–5 and 79; and ST 1 q.55 a.3; 2 SCG 98.12; de Ver. q.8 a.10. Google Scholar 37 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 78–81; see ST 1 q.84 a.7. Google Scholar 38 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 140 [172]; Google Scholarsee also pp. 10, 25, 50 and 123. Google Scholar 39 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 50; Google Scholarsee also p. 140; and 3 SCG 45.5. Google Scholar 40 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 8 [xii], 12 [xvii], 55 [60] and 69 [78] (my translations); Google Scholarsee also pp. 66, 110 and 123. It is unclear why Rousselot prefers such terminology. The reason may, once again, have to do with the influence of Kant. The language of compensation and imitation seems to call attention to the manner in which intellectus functions as ratio's regulative ideal (cf. Google Scholar Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Werner S. Pluhar [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1996] B 596ff.). Google Scholar 41See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 8, 12, 55 and 69. Google Scholar 42 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 113; see ST 1-2 q.94 a.4. Google Scholar 43 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 110, 118 and 119. Google Scholar 44 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 123. Google Scholar 45 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 122 and 123–4. Google Scholar 46 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 82–90; see ST 1 q.13 a.1. Google Scholar 47Rousselot singles out the work of L. C. Bourquard, Joseph Kleutgen, Matteo Liberatore, and Thomas Maria Ziglaria (Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 194–195; Google Scholarsee also pp. 38, 54, 126 and 129); on common neo-Scholastic epistemological assumptions, Google Scholarsee McDermott, Love and Understanding, pp. 58–60. Google Scholar 48If there is any doubt about the defectiveness of human intelligence according to Thomas, see his explanation in 1 SCG 4 for why God chooses to reveal divine truths that are in principle accessible to natural reason. Google Scholar 49In this vain, it is worth mentioning also Lonergan's brief but insightful assertion that Rousselot played a key part among Thomists in de-emphasizing the role of concepts in the act of understanding (Lonergan, Verbum, p. 224). Google Scholar 50 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 17–18, 22, 26 and 158–60. Google Scholar 51 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 35. Google Scholar 52 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 35–37 and 40; see 3 SCG 51. For a detailed treatment the beatific vision according to Thomas, including God's union with the created intellect, Google Scholarsee Michael M. Waddell, 'Aquinas on the Light of Glory,' Tópicos: Revista de Filosofia 40 (2011), pp. 105–132. 10.21555/top.v40i1.88 Google Scholar 53See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 18 and 35; see 4 SCG 11.5. Google Scholar 54 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 40; see, e.g., ST 1 q.12 a.1. Google Scholar 55 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 40–41; see ST 1 q.12 a.4, 1 q.12 a.7, 3 SCG 55.6. On how Thomas distinguishes the creature's immediate knowledge of God's essence in the beatific vision from comprehensive knowledge of God's essence, Google Scholarsee Gregory P. Rocca, O.P., Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), pp. 40–47, although Rousselot does not seem to find the doctrine as difficult as this author does. As I judge it, Rocca's basic conclusions regarding Thomas's teachings on what the creature knows of the divine essence on earth and in heaven are nearly identical to Rousselot's ( Web of Science®Google Scholarsee Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, pp. 47–48). Google Scholar 56 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 34 54; see 3 SCG 39.6: 'Ultimus autem finis omnis cognitionis humanae est felicitas. Illa igitur cognitio Dei essentialiter est ipsa felicitas, qua habita non restabit alicuius scibilis desideranda cognitio.' Google Scholar 57Although Rousselot is perfectly aware that according to Thomas grace is necessary to effect the heavenly vision of God, nevertheless he argues that the capacity for the divine essence must be regarded as in some sense 'natural' to created intelligence (Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 38; see ST 3 q.6 a.2, 3 SCG 54.9, 3 SCG 57; cf. Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 147 18 and ST 1 q.62 a.2). This claim serves as the basis for Rousselot's suggestion that for Thomas the intelligent creature has – paradoxically – a natural desire for the supernatural vision of God ( Google Scholar Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 147–149; see 3 SCG 25, 3 SCG 50, and 3 SCG 57.4). Rousselot's position here would become heavily influential to Henri de Lubac and his famed resistance to the concept of 'pure nature' (see Google Scholar Henri de Lubac, S.J., The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed [New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1967], pp. 9–10, 25, 27–8, 101, 177 41 and 188–9; for Rousselot's influence on de Lubac more generally, Google Scholarsee Henri de Lubac, At the Service of the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances That Occasioned His Writings, trans. Anne Elizabeth Englund [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993], pp. 19–20 and 34; and Google Scholar John M. McDermott, S.J., 'De Lubac and Rousselot,' Gregorianum 78:4 [1997], pp. 735–759). Google Scholar 58On the contemporary fashionableness of Thomas's apophaticism and some problems with such an emphasis, see Kevin Hector, 'Apophaticism in Thomas Aquinas: A Re-reformulation and Recommendation,' Scottish Journal of Theology 60:4 (2007), pp. 377–393. 10.1017/S0036930607003705 Web of Science®Google Scholar 59ST 1-2 q.3 a.8 ad 1. Cf. Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), Part I. 10.2307/j.ctvpj7637 Google Scholar 60 Conor McDonough, O.P., 'Grounding Speech and Silence: Cataphaticism and Apophaticism in Denys and Aquinas,' Irish Theological Quarterly 76:1 (2011), p. 75. 10.1177/0021140010387977 Google Scholar 613 SCG 59.4: 'Quamvis videntium Deum unus alio perfectius eum videat … quilibet tamen ita perfecte eum videt quod impletur tota capacitas naturalis …' Google Scholar 62Although the defectiveness of ratio is overcome in the beatific vision, one should not conclude that this earthly mode of cognition is entirely done away with. For Thomas, of course, the blessed will ultimately share in the resurrection; it follows that their intellects will at least to some extent retain their bodily ties. Rousselot points out that for Thomas the resurrected body intensifies the heavenly union with God (Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 59 24), but perhaps more pertinent here is Thomas's claim that for those who see God, there is an 'overflowing' [redundantia] of the beatific vision from the intellect to the body and its senses, on which ratio relies (ST 2-2 q.175 a.3 ad 2 and a.4 ad 1). Thus, it seems ratio, too, in the manner that it can, participates in the heavenly vision. Google Scholar 63ST 1 q.1 a.1; 1 SCG 3. This is not to say, of course, that God's revelation does not also include some truths that are in principle accessible to ratio, such as the existence of God (see, e.g., 1 SCG 4). Google Scholar 64ST 2-2 q.1 a.8; cf. ST 1 q.32 a.4 and 2-2 q.1 a.6 ad 1. Google Scholar 65See ST 2-2 q.1 a.2; 1 SCG 5; cf. ST 2-2 q.8 a.2; For Thomas, to have faith or believe in something is precisely not to know or understand it (see, e.g., ST 2-2 q.1 a.4 and a.5). Knowledge can begin only where faith ends (see ST 2-2 q.1 a.2 ad 3 and corresponding objection). In fact, Rousselot observes that Thomas so stresses the darkness of faith that he manages to avoid a blind fideism only through his insistence that miracles provide rational warrants for belief (Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 155; see ST 2-2 q.1 a.4 ad 2). In his later work, Rousselot would famously explore Thomas's doctrine of the lumen fidei, or 'light of faith,' in which Thomas indicates that believers have a specialized 'understanding' of matters of faith through grace ( Google Scholarsee Pierre Rousselot, S.J., The Eyes of Faith and Answer to Two Attacks, translated by Joseph Donceel, S.J., and Avery Dulles, S.J. [New York: Fordham University Press, 1990]; in Thomas, see, e.g., ST 2-2 q.1 a.4 ad 3, ST 2-2 q.1 a.5 ad 1). As Rousselot's study implicitly demonstrates, this is a rather complex teaching, and its exact meaning is hard to discern ( Google Scholarsee also Avery Dulles, S.J., The Assurance of Things Hoped for: A Theology of Christian Faith [New York: Oxford University Press, 1994], pp. 110–112, 113 and 212). What remains apparent, however, is that the light of faith leaves the divine mysteries utterly obscure (see, e.g., ST 2-2 q.1 a.4 ad 2 and ST 2-2 q.8 a.2). Google Scholar 66In addition to the references given previously, see also, e.g., ST 2-2 q.1 a.8, ST 2-2 q.180 a.4, and 1 SCG 8 (this last passage is treated at length below). Google Scholar 67See, e.g., Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 152–157. Google Scholar 68ST 1 q.1 a.2, a.7, and a.8. Google Scholar 69Although Rousselot insists ratio in the present state can achieve no knowledge of the divine essence or the mysteries of faith, he does not claim human intelligence, as a form of intellectus, is entirely denied such apprehensions here on earth. Indeed, he points out that for Thomas human intelligence is capable of brief, supernatural intuitions of God – 'mysticism' in the narrow sense of the term – which anticipate or approximate the beatific vision (Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 159–160 43). Rousselot mentions the example of prophesy (ST 2-2 q.173), but he might also have highlighted rapture (ST 2-2 q.175, esp. a.3). He further remarks, however, that Thomas says very little on this subject; typically, when speaking of contemplative activity, Thomas has in mind ratio or cognition that is at least in some significant way dependent on the bodily senses (see, e.g., ST 2-2 q. 180 a.5 ad 2; Google Scholarsee also ST 2-2 q. 180 a.3 and ad 1). The qualitative difference between rational contemplation and mystical experience is worth stressing here: although Thomas will at times use the term contemplatio to refer to both theological reflection and the ecstasy of Paul (see ST 2-2 q.180 a.5), the former is an exercise of ratio while the latter is an instance of intuition. Google Scholar 70See, e.g., Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 156–157 and 160–161. Google Scholar 71See, e.g., Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 130 and 132. Google Scholar 72 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 128–129. Google Scholar 73See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 127–128 and 130. Of course, the divine truths yielded by theology, like any other truths ratio can discover, not even God can contradict ( Google Scholarsee Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 56–57). Google Scholar 74One way to express this point in more technical terms is to say that for Thomas ratio cannot arrive at any intellectus (i.e., intellegentia) or scientia of the mysteries given 'directly' [directe] under faith (see, e.g., ST 2-2 q.1 a.5 and a.6; and q.8 a.2). Rousselot's assumption that theology can make intellectual advances regarding the divine mysteries without ever yielding comprehension of them rests on Thomas's well-known definition of theology as a 'subaltern' science (see Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 127). It is beyond the scope of this article to explore this topic fully, but for a recent and exceptionally clear account, Google Scholarsee Torrell, Spiritual Master, pp. 7–9 and 15–16; for some helpful passages in Thomas, see, e.g., ST 1 q.1 a.8, ST 1 q.32 a.4, and de Ver. q.14 a.9 ad 3. Google Scholar 75See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 129–131; on Thomas's definition of demonstration [demonstratio] and its ties to deductive reasoning, comprehension, and certitude, Google Scholarsee Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 110–116. Google Scholar 76 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 130–131; see, e.g., 1 SCG 9. Google Scholar 771 SCG 8: 'Humana igitur ratio ad cognoscendum fidei veritatem, quae solum videntibus divinam substantiam potest esse notissima, ita se habet quod ad eam potest aliquas verisimilitudines colligere, quae tamen non sufficiunt ad hoc quod praedicta veritas quasi demonstrative vel per se intellecta comprehendatur. Utile tamen est ut in huiusmodi rationibus, quantumcumque debilibus, se mens humana exerceat, dummodo desit comprehendendi vel demonstrandi praesumptio: quia de rebus altissimis etiam parva et debili consideratione aliquid posse inspicere iucundissimum est …' (cited by Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 132). Google Scholar 78 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 132 [162]; cf. p.130. Google Scholar 79 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 131–132. Google Scholar 80ST 1 qq.27–43. Google Scholar 81 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 131. Google Scholar 82ST 1 q.32 a.1, esp. ad 2; Google Scholarsee also ST 1 q.42 a.2 ad 1. Google Scholar 83ST 1 q.32 a.1: 'Cum enim aliquis ad probandam fidem inducit rationes quae non sunt cogentes, cedit in irrisionem infidelium, credunt enim quod huiusmodi rationibus innitamur, et propter eas credamus.' Google Scholar 84For further instances of Thomas's illusory demonstrations, see Rousselot's discussion of divine omnipotence, providence, and related attributes (Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 126–127 and 10), although it should be noted that he considers Thomas's treatment of these issues to belong more properly to a philosophical rather than theological context. Google Scholar 85Rousselot holds that many of Thomas's medieval contemporaries, like Thomas himself, often took for granted the imitative and performative character of theological discourse (Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 129–131). Unfortunately, Rousselot offers no historical or textual evidence to defend this broader claim. Google Scholar 86A number of scholars have recently pointed out that Thomas regularly speaks – sometimes rather boldly – of the kind of 'knowledge' of the faith that can be gained in the here and now through theological reflection. Thus, he declares that theology is 'a certain stamp of divine knowledge' [quaedam impressio divinae scientiae] (Torrell, Spiritual Master, p. 16, quoting from ST 1 q.1 a.3 ad 2); that theology allows believers 'to conceive in some fashion [utcumque concipere]' the inner life of God ( Google Scholar Emery, Trinity, Church, and the Human Person, pp. 52–53, quoting from 4 SCG 11.8); and that it is the task of theology to 'manifest' [manifestare] divine truth (Emery, Trinity, Church, and the Human Person, p. 58, quoting from 1 SCG 9.4). Yet Thomas also consistently qualifies such remarks by insisting that no rational knowledge of God, however advanced or sophisticated, constitutes a genuine comprehension of the divine mysteries themselves. The intellectual pleasure that comes from rational contemplation on the mysteries proper, then, necessarily derives not from understanding (which never occurs), but rather love of that which is contemplated (see ST 2-2 q.180 a.7, where Thomas distinguishes the delight of comprehension from that of love, and ST 2-2 q.180 a.5, where he makes clear that rational contemplation cannot attain the vision of the divine essence). Additionally, if we take a lesson from Rousselot and remember that theology for Thomas is first and foremost preparation for the beatific vision, then we must realize that all knowledge of God gained from such reflection is necessarily, sub specie aeternitatis, of relatively little worth ( Google Scholarsee Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 157 and 160). On the value of theological discourse in the here and now, cf. Google Scholar Emery, Trinity, Church, and the Human Person, pp. 23–24, 49, 55–6, and 58; Google Scholar Torrell, Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 9–10; and Google Scholar Torrell, Spiritual Master, p. 16. Google Scholar 87 Kilby, ' Response to Matthew Levering,' p. 57. Google Scholar 88'Faith in statu scientiae: the meaning of the words is forcibly distorted in this paradox. Faith means assent to testimony concerning an absent object; science is knowledge based on, and governed by, evidence' (M.-D. Chenu, ' What is Theology?' in Faith and Theology, translated by Denis Hickey [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968], p. 16). This essay, originally entitled 'Position de la théologie' (1935), is brilliantly analyzed by: Google Scholar Jürgen Mettepenningen and Ward De Pril, 'Thomism and the Renewal of Theology: Chenu, Charlier, and Their Ressourcement,' Horizons 39:1 (Spring 2012), pp. 50–68. Given Rousselot's general influence on Chenu and the similarities of emphasis between them, it seems to me indisputable that Chenu borrows heavily from Rousselot in formulating his view of theology. 10.1017/S0360966900008537 Web of Science®Google Scholar 89See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 130, 133 and 135. Google Scholar 90 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 133; Google Scholarsee pp. 122–123, 127, 133 and 139. Google Scholar 91 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 122–123 and 133. Google Scholar 92See Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 123–124 and 133. In broadest terms, Thomas divides theological reasoning into deductive demonstrations and probable arguments. While the former can achieve scientific certitude, the latter cannot (see, e.g., 1 SCG 9 and ST 1 a.1 a.8). It should be noted here that the sorts of imitative reasoning discussed earlier that can create the false appearance of demonstration necessarily fall under the category of probable reasoning. Google Scholar 93See Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 131; and 4 SCG 42. Google Scholar 94 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 124 and 134; see pp. 9–10. Google Scholar 95 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 123, 134 and 138. Google Scholar 96 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 124 [151-2] and 133; see de Ver. q.22 a.11 ad 8, where Thomas cites Dionysius in refuting the notion that theological metaphors or symbolica theologica have any demonstrative value. Google Scholar 97 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 134; see ST 1 q.70 a.2 ad 5 and ST 1-2 q.102 a.5 ad 5. Google Scholar 98 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 122–123; ST 3 q.31 a.4: '… [Q]uia per hunc modum completur omnis diversitas generationis humanae. Nam primus homo productus est ex limo terrae sine viro et femina; Heva vero producta est ex viro sine femina; ceteri vero homines producuntur ex viro et femina. Unde hoc quartum quasi Christo proprium relinquebatur, ut produceretur ex femina sine viro.' Google Scholar 99 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 124; see p. 137. Google Scholar 100 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 123–124 and 135; see ST 1-2 q.101 a.2 ad 2. Google Scholar 101 Rousselot, Intelligence, pp. 123 [150], 124, 127, 133–5, 135 [166] and 138; Google ScholarCf. Gilbert Narcisse, O.P., Les Raisons de Dieu: Argument de convenance et Esthétique théologique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin et Hans Urs von Balthasar (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1997). Google Scholar 102Thomas stresses, however, that even the most earnest and strongest probable arguments regarding the divine mysteries are still too weak to be convincing to skeptics (see 1 SCG 9.4). Google Scholar 103 Rousselot, Intelligence, p. 136 [167]. Google Scholar 104If for Thomas the normal rule of thumb is that every negation is based on an affirmation (omnis negatio fundatur in aliqua affirmatione; see ST 1 q.33 a.4 ad 3 and ST 1-2 q.72 a.6), theology seems almost to reverse this principle, piling up positive statements about the divine mysteries even though ratio has no grasp of them. (On the relationship between Thomas's positive and negative discourse in general, see Mark Johnson, 'Apophatic Knowledge's Cataphatic Dependencies,' The Thomist 62 [1998], esp. pp. 522–527). 10.1353/tho.1998.0001 Google Scholar 105See ST 2-2 q.180 a.4; cf. Williams, ' Mystical Theology Redux,' p. 61; and Google Scholar Kerr, ' Theology as Spirituality,' p. 126. Google Scholar Volume63, Issue4July 2022Pages 676-690 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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