Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Renegotiation in repeated games

1989; Elsevier BV; Volume: 1; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3

1090-2473

Joseph Farrell, Eric Maskin,

Game Theory and Voting Systems

In repeated games, subgame-perfect equilibria involving threats of punishment may be implausible if punishing one player hurts the other(s). If players can renegotiate after a defection, such a punishment may not be carried out. We explore a solution concept that recognizes this fact, and show that in many games the prospect of renegotiation strictly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be sustained. We characterize those outcomes in general, and in the prisoner's dilemma, Cournot and Bertrand duopolies, and an advertising game in particular.