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Reply to Roy Sorensen, 'Knowledge-lies'

2011; Oxford University Press; Volume: 71; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1093/analys/anr021

1467-8284

Julia Staffel,

Free Will and Agency

Sorensen offers the following definition of a 'knowledge-lie': 'An assertion that p is a knowledge-lie exactly if intended to prevent the addressee from knowing that p is untrue but is not intended to deceive the addressee into believing p.' (2010: 610) According to Sorensen, knowledge-lies are not meant to deceive their addressee, and this fact is supposed to make them less bad than ordinary lies. I will argue that standard cases of knowledge-lies, including almost all the cases Sorensen considers, do in fact involve deception, contrary to what Sorensen claims. And while there are cases of non-deceptive knowledge-lies, such cases are deviant, either because it is only incidental that the knowledge-preventing assertion is a lie, or because it is only incidental that the lie doesn't deceive. Here's an example of a knowledge-lie: Dr Head is considering firing Dr Appendix because of his weak research. But he doesn't want to fire Appendix unless he knows that Appendix's research isn't good, and so he consults Dr Heart. Head knows that if Appendix's research is good, then Heart will tell the truth and say so, whereas if Appendix's work isn't good, then Heart may or may not tell the truth. Hence, if Heart doesn't say that Appendix's work is good, Head will know it isn't, and so he'll fire Appendix. But Heart wants to prevent Appendix from being fired, and so he lies and says his work is good. Heart knows that by doing so, while he won't make Head believe that Appendix's work is good, he will prevent him from knowing that it isn't, and so he'll prevent Head from firing Appendix.