Bringing ‘Nature of War’ into Irregular Warfare Strategy: Contemporary Applications of Clausewitz’s Trinity
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/14702436.2011.630176
ISSN1743-9698
Autores Tópico(s)Military Strategy and Technology
ResumoClick to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of War Since Clausewitz (New York: Free Press 1991); Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Penguin 2006). 2 See Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, MN: Zenith Press 2004), and Max G. Max Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College 2005). 3 See Max Manwaring (ed.), Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low-Intensity Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991); Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books 2003). 4 See Ben Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003) and Peter Hays, James Smith, Alan Van Tassel, Guy Walsh (eds.), Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and US National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill 2000) on the question of whether space technologies represent a 'revolution in military affairs' or an 'enabler' of such a revolution. Gregory Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2001) p.20: 'The use of non-violent digital attacks to achieve political objectives must be understood as a new form of warfare. Compared to other types of military force, digital warfare represents a type of microforce.' 5 See William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice (Novato, CA: The Presidio Press 1996) propounds 'the theory' of special operations, based on a quick and temporary measure of relative superiority that wanes as the operation proceeds; David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: Columbia UP 2007)advocates an organizational separation of special operations into kinetic and non-kinetic commands. 6 See Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (New York: Hurst & Columbia UP, 2007; Bard O'Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism (Washington DC: Brassey's 1990); Andrew Exum, Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment (Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dec. 2006). 7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP1989) p.89. 8 Ibid., pp.88–9. 9 Given the impact of the Renaissance on Clausewitz, he combines existentialism and rational instrumentalism in a comprehensive view on war. See the outstanding work of Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz's Puzzle: The Political Theory of War (Oxford: O UP 2007). For concise descriptions of philosophical terms, see Ted Honderich, The Oxford Guide to Philosophy (Oxford: O UP 2005. 'Violence' refers not only to the physical use of force, but also to psychological sources of it –- hatred, enmity, and passions. 'Chance' includes probability, degree of belief, relative frequency, propensity, and likelihood (Honderich, p. 134). 'Reason' involves the rational subordination of war as an active instrument to achieve a desired policy. 10 On an interpretation of 'Trinitarian war' that focuses on who wages it rather than its conditions as tendencies, see van Creveld, The Transformation of War (note 1) pp.35–42. 11 The 'three-block war' as described by retired General Charles Krulak, US Marine Corps, at a National Press Club in Washington DC, 10 Oct. 1997. 12 Amin Tarzi, 'The Neo-Taliban', The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2008) pp.274–310. See p.278: Former Taliban dispersed and jailed leaders were released as a result of this policy. 13 Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House 2008). 14 Giles Dorronsoro, 'Taliban Strategy in Afghanistan is Smart Politics, So US Needs to Wise Up', US News and World Report, 20 Feb. 2009. 15 Clausewitz, On War (note 7) p.117. 16 Mission type orders are instructions from a higher command to fulfill mission objectives without micro-managing exactly how to achieve them. Ideally, commanders will provide subordinates with clear objectives and adequate resources, but not dictate how to use the resources to the degree that would stifle innovation and initiative. 17 Constantin A. Coilponea and Cristian A. Iancu, 'Alternative Strategies for Iraq', US Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, June 2007, p.19: McCormick's Mystic Diamond model illustrates the conditions, dynamics, and complexity of an insurgency and prescribes the appropriate steps for successful counterinsurgency strategy. This application of this model has become popular in Naval Post Graduate School theses and beyond. 18 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: Public Affairs Books 2008) p.123. 19 Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army of Baghdad Shi'ites provide one example. 20 This is appears to be what happened when former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld envisioned and micro-directed a high-technology, rapid invasion of Iraq while suppressing planning for an insurgency phase in the war. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books 2006). 21 For an in-depth look at the types of processes arguably required for such advanced intelligence analysis, see, Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments (Denver, CO: Praeger Security International 2010). In the initial analytical process of 'decomposition,' for instance, analysts are enjoined to 'not quit the decomposition process just because they do not know how the resultant observables will be collected against' (p.91). 22 Peter R. Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2008) p.xx. 23 One of the criticisms of Clausewitz is that he gave short shrift to economic factors. In some insurgent situations, economic incentives may be as important as political goals. 24 What David Killcullen describes as 'political maneuver' informs a full strategy that considers local conditions before applying the four general principles of security, governance, development, and information. The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York: OUP 2009). See p. 71. 25 Joint Publication 1-02 and Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 (www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html, Dec. 2007)p.1: 'Foreign internal defense (FID) is defined as participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms).' FM 3-05.130 (Sept. 2008) p. 1-3, adds a restriction: 'Forces conduct FID with recognized HN regular forces.' 26 This term is used instead of 'lines of operation' to remind planners and practitioners in assorted activities of the common desired effects. 27 As of April 2008, all ethnic groups and 33 of 34 provinces were represented among the 700-plus cadets. Ethnic breakdown: 37% Pashto, 35% Tajik, 12% Hazara, 8% Uzbek, and 8% other ethnic groups. 28 See Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books 1971), Chapter 4, 'The Preparatory Period', pp.60–94. 29 That On War is an incomplete product presents an enduring interpretational challenge. However, the Book and Chapter that culminates in the Trinity is regarded to have been considered complete by Clausewitz. See Hew Strachan, Clausewitz's On War: A Biography (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 2007), p. 71: 'Much has to be inferred from the note written by Clausewitz in 1827, which Marie [Karl von Clausewitz's widow] cited, and which is published as an Introduction to every edition of On War ,and to a further note which was unfinished and undated, in which he says that he regarded only Book 1, chapter 1, as finished '"but will at least serve the whole by indicating the direction I meant to follow everywhere"'.
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