Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Apologies in International Politics

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 18; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09636410903132987

1556-1852

Jennifer Lind,

Global Peace and Security Dynamics

Abstract This article examines the growing conventional wisdom that apologies and other acts of contrition are necessary for international reconciliation. I create and test a theory that connects a country's remembrance with that country's image—threatening or benign—in the eyes of former adversaries. I evaluate the theory in two post-World War II case studies: South Korean relations with Japan and French relations with Germany. This article offers three major findings. First, it substantiates the claim that denials inhibit reconciliation. Japanese denials and history textbook omissions have elevated distrust and fear among Koreans (as well as Chinese and Australians). Second, although whitewashing and denials are indeed pernicious, the conventional wisdom about the healing power of contrition must be seriously reconsidered. Evidence from the Japanese and other cases suggests that contrition risks triggering a domestic backlash, which alarms former adversaries. Finally, there is good news for the prospects of international reconciliation: countries have reconciled quite successfully without any contrition at all. West Germany actually offered very little contrition at the time of its dramatic reconciliation with France; many other countries have restored close and productive relations without contrition. The best course for reconciliation is to remember the past in ways that are unifying, rather than divisive, and minimize the risk of backlash. Jennifer Lind is an assistant professor of government at Dartmouth College. The author wishes to thank two anonymous reviewers, and seminar audiences at Dartmouth College, the John M. Olin Institute at Harvard University, and the University of Chicago Program on International Security Policy, for useful feedback. Special thanks to Stephen Brooks, Thomas Christensen, Eugene Gholz, Robert Jervis, Ned Lebow, Barry Posen, Daryl Press, Robert Ross, Richard Samuels, Jack Snyder, Benjamin Valentino, William Wohlforth, and Stephen Van Evera. Notes 1 “Japan's Burden,” Financial Times, 8 April 2005; “So Hard to Be Friends,” The Economist, 23 March 2005; Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking (New York: Penguin Books, 1998); “Iran's Holocaust Denial Advances Another Agenda,” USA Today, 13 December 2006; Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Problem of Memory,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (November/December 1998). 2 On U.S. and French legislation, see Norimitsu Onishi, “A Congressman Faces Foes in Japan as He Seeks an Apology,” New York Times, 12 May 2007; Steven Lee Meyers and Carl Hulse, “House Panel Raises Furor on Armenian Genocide,” New York Times, 11 October 2007; Thomas Crampton, “France Acts to Outlaw Denial of Genocide,” International Herald Tribune, 13 October 2006. On the EU see, Colin Nickerson, “EU Official Issues Warning on Turkey's Prosecution of Author,” Boston Globe, 16 December 2005. 3 See, for example, James L. Gibson, “Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumptions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (2004): 201–17; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,” Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4 (1996); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998). 4 William J. Long and Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003); Barry O'Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). 5 Norimitsu Onishi, “Denial Reopens Wounds of Japan's Ex-Sex Slaves,” New York Times, 8 March 2007; Kristof, “The Problem of Memory”; Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 49-80; Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): 114–54; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18 (Winter 1993/94): 5–33; Thomas U. Berger, “The Construction of Antagonism: The History Problem in Japan's Foreign Relations,” in Reinventing the Alliance: US-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change, ED. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 63–90. 6 Kristof, “The Problem of Memory”; Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep's Clothing”; Richard Ned Lebow, “Memory, Democracy, and Reconciliation,” in The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, ED. Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91): 7–57. 7 For discussions on levels of reconciliation, see Arie M. Kacowicz, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Ole Elgstrom, and Magnus Jerneck, eds., Stable Peace Among Nations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 8 Charles L. Glaser, Theory of Rational International Politics (Princeton, Princeton University Press, forthcoming); Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50 (October 1997); Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); David M. Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers,” Security Studies 12, no. 2 (Autumn 2002): 1-40. 9 On regime type, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael E. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” in Debating the Democratic Peace, ED. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 3–57; John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” in Debating the Democratic Peace, 116–54. Institutional membership is said to increase transparency and reduce uncertainty. See Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” in International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, ED. Robert O. Keohane (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 158–79; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa M. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 39–51. On territorial disputes, see John Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, “Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816–1992,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2. (2001): 123-38; Stephen A. Kocs, “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945–1987,” Journal of Politics 57, no. 1. (1995): 159–75. 10 On costly signals, see James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (February 1997): 68-90; Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited”. 11 Barry R. Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 80-124; Stephen Van Evera, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994). 12 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999); John G. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1998): 883. 13 Berger, “The Construction of Antagonism”; Lebow, “Memory, Democracy, and Reconciliation”. 14 Neta C. Crawford, “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships,” International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 134–35. See also Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” 13–34; Jonathan Mercer, “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics,” International Organization 59 (Winter 2005): 77–106. 15 This mechanism should not be expected to work in the other direction. That is, contrition should not create such powerful positive feelings that it leads observers to discount other threatening signs. 16 On education, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 26–35; Boyd Shafer, Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1972), 198. On commemoration, see John Bodnar, “Public Memory in an American City,” in Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, ED. John R. Gillis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 74–89. 17 Lebow, “Memory, Democracy, and Reconciliation”. 18 Jervis, The Logic of Images, 27. 19 Aaron Lazare, “Go Ahead, Say You're Sorry,” Psychology Today 28, no. 1 (1995): 40; Michael E. McCullough, Everett Worthington, and Kenneth C. Rachal, “Interpersonal Forgiving in Close Relationships,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73 (1997); Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). 20 For a statement to be apologetic it must admit perpetrating the crime and convey remorse. Reparations must specify an act for which the victims are being compensated. I treat the existence of war crimes trials as apologetic because the state typically asserts that individuals were complicit in heinous acts (admission) and that these acts should be punished (remorse). If, in a given case, the trials produce widespread acquittals, then perhaps they should not qualify as apologetic (this did not occur in the cases examined here). 21 Media coverage slants in the direction of its audience's beliefs. Matthew Aaron Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “What Drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers” (working paper 12707, National Bureau of Economic Research, 13 November 2006). 22 See Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2 (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1985), 21–58; Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). 23 I define capabilities both in terms of power and constraints. “Power” incorporates wealth, population, defense expenditures, and standing military forces. “Constraints” includes factors that prevent a state from bringing its power to bear (an occupier, offshore balancer, or the threat from a third party). 24 The selection of these cases, however, may introduce other elements of bias into the study. Because German and Japanese crimes were so egregious, this study may understate the palliative effect of contrition. However, as the case studies demonstrate, Franco-German reconciliation occurred prior to Germany's contrition, suggesting that even terrible violence does not impede reconciliation. 25 The early phase begins in 1952 when the U.S. occupation ended, and Japan regained sovereignty. 26 Won-Deog Lee, “Perception of History and Japan-Korea Relations,” in Korea and Japan: Past, Present, and Future, ED. Young-sun Ha (Seoul: Nanam, 1997), 83. These views were echoed by other Japanese officials and by official government histories of the colonial era. Yoshibumi Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right Has Delayed Japan's Coming to Terms with Its History of Aggression in Asia (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1999). 27 Tokyo established an annual ceremony on the day of the surrender to honor the nation's war dead. Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 658. Revealingly, the main national memorials to the war are at Hiroshima, the site of annual commemoration ceremonies every 6 August (ibid.). 28 Japan paid grants to Burma (1955), the Philippines (1956), Indonesia (1958), South Vietnam (1959), and Thailand (1963). James Morley, Japan and Korea (New York: Walker, 1965). On forced labor, see William Underwood, “Mitsubishi, Historical Revisionism and Japanese Corporate Resistance to Chinese Forced Labor Redress,” Japan Focus, 8 February 2006, http://www.japanfocus.org/-William-Underwood/1823. 29 Bix, Hirohito, 652. 30 Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan 1945–1952 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo's Court Challenges,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 30, no. 2 (1998); James J. Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001). 31 Lee, “Perception of History and Japan-Korea Relations,” 87. 32 Benfell, “Why Can't Japan Apologize?”; Dower, Embracing Defeat; Orr, The Victim As Hero. 33 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 491. 34 Maruyama Masao, “Shiso no Kotoba” [Words for Thought], Shiso 381 (March 1956): 322–25. 35 On coverage of the apology, see Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), chap. 2. On reparations, see Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, 194. Japan paid US$300 million in outright grants, US$200 million in government loans, and US$300 million in private commercial credits. At the time, US$800 million represented more than 25 percent of South Korean GDP. The World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 2004. 36 For these apologies, see A New Era in Korea-Japan Relations (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1984). 37 Yonhap Wire Service, 3 August 1982, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): South Korea. 38 The textbook also lauded pre-war education policies that emphasized Emperor-worship (the Imperial Rescript of Education). Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, 177–78. 39 Orr, Victim As Hero; Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education,” 42; Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 40 On Beheiren, see Yuki Tanaka, “Oda Makoto, Beiheiren and 14 August 1945: Humanitarian Wrath Against Indiscriminate Bombing,” Japan Focus, 30 September 2007, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=13923. For an important discussion of war responsibility, see Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, trans. I. Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). On wartime atrocities, see Yoshida Seiji, Chosenjin Ianfu to Nihonjin: Moto Shimonoseki Rohodoin Bucho no Shuki [Korean Comfort Women and the Japanese: A Former Shimonoseki Labor Conscription Manager's Memoir] (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Oraisha, 1977); Yoshida Seiji, Watashi no Senso Hanzai: Chosenjin Kyosei Renko [My War Crimes: Taking Koreans by Force] (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1983). 41 Saburo Ienaga, “The Glorification of War in Japanese Education,” International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94); Orr, Victim as Hero, 89–105. 42 Fujio Masayuki, quoted in Lee, “Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations,” 107. 43 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, 11. See also “Outspoken Tokyo Minister Resigns,” The Guardian, 14 May 1988. 44 Japanese apologies—of varying levels of admission and remorse—during this period include statements by Emperor Akihito and prime minister Kaifu Toshiki in 1989, prime minister Miyazawa Kiichi in 1992, and prime minister Murayama Tomiichi in 1994 and 1995. 45 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, 247–48. 46 The 1998 Joint Communique included a Japanese apology, South Korean acceptance of Japan's apology, and a pledge by both states to move forward. Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia, 256-58. 47 “PM Koizumi Visit ROK President Kim Dae-jung; Protesters Rage,” Mainichi Shimbun, 15 October 2001. Koizumi apologized again in April 2005. 48 The “Asian Women's Fund” uses a combination of private and public funds to give each survivor approximately US$17,000. C. Sarah Soh, “Japan's Responsibility toward Comfort Women Survivors” (working paper, Japan Policy Research Institute, 2001). For criticism, see Norma Field, “The Stakes of Apology,” Japan Quarterly 42, no. 4 (October-December 1995). 49 See the series Japan in Modern History (Tokyo: International Society for Educational Information, 1996); Norimitsu Onishi, “In Japan's New Textbooks, Rising Nationalism,” New York Times, 17 April 2005. 50 Russell Skelton, “Comfort Women ‘Did it for money,”’ Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June 1996. 51 Underwood, “Mitsubishi, Historical Revisionism,” 15. 52 Paul Murphy, “Yasukuni Museum Tugs at Heartstrings to Keep Military Memories Alive,” International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shinbun, 15 August 2002; Howard W. French, “At a Military Museum, the Losers Write History,” New York Times, 30 October 2002. 53 “Partners Give Final Pitch on Yasukuni,” Asahi News Service, 11 August 2001. See also discussion in Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Who is Responsible? The Yomiuri Project and the Enduring Legacy of the Asia-Pacific War,” Japan Focus, 19 June 2007. 54 Don Kirk, “History Texts Divide Japan and South Korea Again,” International Herald Tribune, 10 July 2001; “Japan's Sins of Omission,” The Economist, 14 April 2001; “Backlash Erupts Over Textbook Contents,” Daily Yomiuri, 7 April 2005; “Japanese Schoolbooks Anger S. Korea, China,” Washington Post, 6 April 2005. 55 President Rhee to President Eisenhower, 29 December 1954, in Foreign Relations of the United States, Korea, VOL. 15, 1952-1954, part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 1937–41 (hereafter cited as FRUS Korea). 56 President Rhee, quoted in Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea: A Changing Influence Relationship (New York, Praeger, 1982), 26. Rhee argued that Japan was “a great menace than the communists.” President Rhee, quoted in “The Recent and Prospective Foreign Relations of Japan (1956–61),” Declassified Documents Collection, Office of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Report no. 7331, Department of State, 12 September 1956, 10. 57 Memorandum of Conversation, 17 October 1952, in FRUS Korea, VOL. 15, 1952–1954, part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984). 58 Kong Dan Oh, “Japan-Korea Rapprochement: A Study in Political, Cultural, and Economic Cooperation” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1986), 131–33. 59 For poll data, see Hong N. Kim, “Japanese-South Korean Relations After the Park Assassination,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 1 (December 1982): 86. 60 Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 1-2. 61 Lee Joo-hee, “Japan Textbook Changed For Worse,” Korea Herald, 2 April 2005. 62 Nam Si-uk, “Future of Korea-Japan Relations,” Korea Focus 3, no. 6 (1995): 28. 63 “Japan's View of History,” Korea Herald, 7 May 1994. 64 In a 1996 survey, Korean respondents described their feelings toward seventeen countries on a scale from zero (dislike) to 100 (like). Japan was ranked second to last (41), above North Korea (27), in the company of Libya and Iran. For poll data, see Sook-jong Lee, “Korea and Japan: Engaged but Distant,” in The Future of Korea-Japan Relations, ED. Robert Dujarric (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2002), 102. In 2001, Koreans reported that the countries they disliked the most were Japan (63 percent), followed by North Korea (11 percent), the United States (7 percent), and China (3 percent). Chun-ang Ilbo newspaper poll, 21 September 2001, http://bric.postech.ac.kr/bbs/daily/krnews (accessed October 2001). 65 Sung-hwa Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations under American Occupation, 1945–1952 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 40–45. 66 “Civic Group Calls for Mori's Apology for His Remarks on Tokdo,” Yonhap Wire Service, 6 October 2000, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea. 67 “Japan's Absurd Claim on Tokdo Island,” Dong-a Ilbo, 11 February 1996, trans. in Korea Focus 4, no. 1 (1996): 97-98. 68 President Rhee, quoted in Lee, Japan and Korea, 37. 69 President Rhee, letter published in Mainichi Shinbun , 21 December 1955, quoted in Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger, 1971), 44. 70 President Park, quoted in Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis, 45. 71 See articles in A New Era in Korea-Japan Relations. 72 Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis. 73 “Foreign Ministers' Meeting with Japan Postponed,” Yonhap Wire Service, 8 September 1986, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea. Prime Minister Roh Shin-yong emphasized that the problem was not Fujio, specifically, but Japanese attitudes more broadly. “No Sing-yong, NKDP Discuss Fujio Remarks,” Yonhap Wire Service, 11 September 1986, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea. 74 “Japanese Absurdity,” Korea Times, 9 September 1986, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea. 75 “Firm Diplomatic Stance,” Korea Times, 10 September 1986, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea. 76 “What is Required Is to Immediately Take Corrective Action,” Hanguk Ilbo, 5 August 1982; “‘Stronger’ Reaction Urged,” Yonhap Wire Service, 3 August 1982, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea; “Rallies Protest Textbooks,” Yonhap Wire Service, 5 August 1982, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea; “Rallies Protest Textbooks,” Korea Herald, 11 August 1982. 77 Kim, “Japanese-South Korean Relations After the Park Assassination,” 83, 85. 78 Roh Moo-hyun, “Letter to the Korean People,” Korea.net, 25 March 2005. 79 “Editorial,” Chungang Ilbo, 22 April 2002, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea, 23 April 2002. Koreans were so embittered by Koizumi's visit to the shrine and by the textbook crisis, they ignored his remarkable apology in October after his shrine visit. See “Diplomacy with Japan,” Choson Ilbo, 15 October 2001. For other coverage of the Yasukuni issu, see “S. Korea's ruling party holds rally to protest Yasukuni visit,” Kyodo News Service, 17 August 2001, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: Japan; “Civic Groups Voice Opposition to Koizumi Visit,” Yonhap Wire Service, 24 February 2003; Jonathan Watts, “Japan's Asian Neighbors Outraged by Junichiro Koizumi's Custom-Breaking Tribute,” The Guardian, 14 August 2001. 80 “Japanese Diet Should Clarify Responsibility for Past Atrocities,” Dong-a Ilbo, 7 May 1994, trans. in Korea Focus 2, no. 3 (1994): 142–43. 81 Kim Kyong-min, “Why is Japan Distrusted?” Dong-a Ilbo, 8 May 1995. 82 Hahnkyu Park, “Between Caution and Cooperation: The ROK-Japan Security Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period,” Korea Institute of Defense Analysis, http://www.kida.re.kr/english/journal/park.htm. Koreans were particularly incensed about Watanabe Michio's statements. See 6 June 1995 editorials cited in “Watanabe Remarks on Japan Colonial Rule Decried,” trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea, 7 June 1995. 83 “Japan Attempts to Whitewash its Past,” Korea Herald, 15 September 2000; “Teaching Sadistic History?” Korea Herald, 22 February 2001; Shin Il-Chul, “Counting on Japan's Sense of Right and Wrong,” Dong-a Ilbo, 8 June 2001, trans. in Korea Focus 9, no. 4 (2001): 15–16; “Rocky Relations with Japan,” Chungang Ilbo, 9 July 2001, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea, 10 July 2001. 84 Roh, “Letter to the Korean People.” See also “Japanese Foreign Minister Scolded for History Comments,” Yonhap Wire Service, 25 April 2005. 85 “Japan Attempts to Whitewash its Past”; “Teaching Sadistic History?”. 86 President Rhee, quoted in Shin, “Counting on Japan's Sense of Right and Wrong”. 87 President Rhee to President Eisenhower, 29 December 1954, in FRUS Korea, VOL. 15, 1952–1954, part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 1937–41. 88 Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), memorandum to the Secretary of State, no. 665, FRUS China/Japan, VOL. 15, 1952–1954, part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 1465–69. 89 For example, Japan's move to patrol the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles was called “a positive response” to burden-sharing pressures from Washington. Korea Herald, 10 May 1981. A former Ministry of National Defense (MND) official wrote that in this period “a phenomenal expansion in Korean-Japanese military contacts is noticeable.” Yong-Ok Park, Korean-Japanese-American Triangle: Problems and Prospects (RAND Report P-7138, September 1985), 14. For details of Japanese-Korean cooperation in this period, see Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 90 Regarding the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance, in 1997 the United States and Japan signed the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, and Japan later became a more active participant in U.S. military operations, such as the U.S. occupation in Iraq. Elizabeth Becker, “Bush to Face Asian Fears of New U.S. Unilateralism,” New York Times, 17 October 2003. Regarding Korean threat perception, I assessed this in part through interviews conducted in South Korea in 2000 and 2001. A common sentiment was expressed by an MND official, who said, “Certainly I don't see Japan as a threat today.” Interview with the director of the MND's study group on military modernization, Ministry of National Defense, Seoul, October 2000. 91 Ralph Cossa, ED., U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building toward a ‘Virtual Alliance’ (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 1999). 92 President Rhee, quoted in Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment, 27–28. 93 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism, 32. 94 On Korean support for Japan's expanded military role in the 1980s, see Sang-il Han, “Japan's Defense Capability and Defense Policy,” Korea and World Affairs 7, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 677–709; Chongwhi Kim, “Korea-Japan Relations and Japan's Security Role,” Korea and World Affairs 12, no. 1 (Spring 1988). For Korea's support in the 1990s, see “ROK Foreign Ministry Welcomes U.S.-Japan Security Declaration,” Yonhap Wire Service, 18 April 1996, trans. in FBIS Daily Report: South Korea; Han Sung-joo, “New U.S.-Japan Security Ties,” Dong-a Ilbo, 28 April 1996; Kim Woo-sang, “New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines,” Joong-ang Ilbo, 12 June 1997, trans. in Korea Focus 5, no. 4 (1997). 95 “ROK Foreign Ministry Welcomes U.S.-Japan Security Declaration”. 96 Rhee Kyu-ho, “A Review of Korea-Japan Relations,” Shin Dong-A Monthly, February 1995, trans. in Korea Focus 3, no. 2 (1995): 21. 97 A minority of Koreans say that Japan is a current threat, with 21 percent expressing this view in 2001 and 37 percent in 2005. Other polls suggest, however, that a larger fraction of Koreans view Japan as the most likely future threat. In 1996, 54 percent of Koreans said Japan posed the “greatest future danger to Korea's military security,” and another poll that same year found that 60 percent of Koreans identified Japan as their country's next security threat. For the 2001 poll results, see http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/printerfriend/index.asp?PID=218 (accessed July 2006). For the 2005 results, see Chungang Ilbo, 17 April 2005. The first 1996 poll is from Norman D. Levin, The Shape of Korea's Future: South Korean Attitudes Toward Unification and Long-Term Security Issues (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), 18. For the second 1996 poll, see http://bric.postech.ac.kr.bbs.daily/krnews/200109_2/20010921_4.html (accessed October 2000). For additional public opinion data, see Sook-Jong Lee, “Korean Perceptions and National Security,” Korea Focus 3 (1995): 13-23. 98 “National Security and the Defense Budget in the 21st Century,” memorandum, August 2000, Korean Ministry of National Defense. Portions of document were published in Dong-a Ilbo, 19–20 August 2000; “New Interests Spur Force Development,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 May 1996. 99 After World War II, East Germany offered no contrition for Nazi crimes and was resolutely hostile toward Israel. This article examines only West German remembrance. 100 Herf, Divided Memory, 207, 282. 101 Otto R. Romberg and Heiner Lichtenstein, Thirty Years of Diplomatic Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel (Frankfurt: Tribune Books, 1995). Calculation is DM 3.5 billion, then US$800 million. In 1952, US$1 = DM 4.195. Historical exchange rates from PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca. Deflators from U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2005. 102 “BEG” is an abbreviation for Bundesentschädigungsgesetz, or the Supplementary Federal Law for the Compensation of the Victims of National Socialist Persecution, passed 1 October 1953. The law was supplemented later by the “BRüG” law, or the Federal Restitution Law (Bundesrückerstattungsgesetz). See German Information Office website, http://www.germany-info.org. 103 Herf, Divided Memory, 282. 104 Norman Frei, Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past, trans. Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 105 Jeffrey Herf, “Legacies of Divided Memory for German Debates About the Holocaust in the 1990s,” German Politics and Society 17, no. 52 (Fall 1999): 15. 106 Richard J. Evans, In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 11. See also Alfred Grosser, The Colossus Again: Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament, trans. Richard Rees (New York: Praeger, 1955), 166–67. 107 Herf, Divided Memory. 108 Ibid., 284. 109 R.J.B. Bosworth, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War 1945-1990 (London: Routledge, 1993); Harold Marcuse, Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933–2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 210, 217; Evans, In Hitler's Shadow, 113-14, 73–74. 110 David C. Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Frei, Adenauer's Germany; Robert G. Moeller, “War Stories: The