Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism
2012; Wiley; Volume: 86; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00597.x
ISSN1933-1592
Autores Tópico(s)Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
ResumoPhilosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 86, Issue 3 p. 533-562 Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism Matthew McGrath, Matthew McGrath University of MissouriSearch for more papers by this author Matthew McGrath, Matthew McGrath University of MissouriSearch for more papers by this author First published: 25 July 2012 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00597.xCitations: 9Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Bergmann, Michael (2006), Justification without Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Broome, John (1999), “Normative Requirements,” Ratio 12, 398–419. Broome, John (2002), “ Practical reasoning,” in José Bermùdez and Alan Millar (eds.) Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 85–111. Burge, Tyler (1993), “Content Preservation,” Philosophical Review 102, 4: 457–88. Chisholm, Roderick (1982), The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press). Cohen, Stewart (2007), “Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 2, 417–430. Davies, M. (2000), “ Externalism and Armchair Knowledge,” in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Davies, M. (2004), “Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission, and Easy Knowledge,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78: 1, 213–245. Dancy, Jonathan (2000), Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Feldman, Richard (2003), Epistemology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall). Feldman, Richard (2004), “ The Ethics of Belief,” in his Evidentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 166–96. Klein, Peter (1995), “Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails,” Philosophical Topics 23: 213–236. Markie, Peter (2005), “Easy Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70, 1: 406–416. Moore, G.E. (1959), “ Four Forms of Skepticism,” in Philosophical Papers (London: Allen and Unwin), 196–226. Plantinga, Alvin (1993), Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Pollock, John (1986), Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Towata, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield). Pryor, James (2000), “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Nous 34: 517–49. Pryor, James (2004), “What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument,” Philosophical Issues 14: 349–378. Pryor, James (2005), “ There is Immediate Justification.” in Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, (New York: Blackwell). Pryor, James (forthcoming), “ When Warrant Transmits,” in Annalisa Coliva (ed.) Wittgenstein, Epistemology and Mind: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Pryor, James (manuscript), “ Uncertainty and Undermining. Searle, John (1983), Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Silins, Nicholas (2008), “Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2: 108–140. Stroud, Barry (1984), The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Turri, John (2010), “On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume 80: 2, 312–326. Weatherson, Brian (2007), “The Bayesian and the Dogmatist,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 169–85. White, Roger (2006), “Problems for Dogmatism,” Philosophical Studies 131, 3: 525–557. Williamson, Timothy (2000), Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Wright, Crispin (2004), “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free),” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78: 1, 167–212. Wright, Crispin (2007), “ The Perils of Dogmatism,” in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (eds.) Themes from G.E. Moore, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 25–47. Citing Literature Volume86, Issue3May 2013Pages 533-562 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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