The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Judicial Politics
2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 34; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01402382.2011.546578
ISSN1743-9655
Autores Tópico(s)European and International Law Studies
ResumoAbstract With its decision on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has handed over another landmark ruling on European integration. The ruling made Germany's ratification of the Treaty conditional upon the passage of a new law giving the Bundestag greater oversight of European affairs. This and the consequences of stronger parliamentary oversight for the German government and the way it conducts negotiations at European level have been the focus of most early comments on the decision. No less important, however, are the ruling's potential repercussions on European judicial politics. Coming after a series of highly controversial judgments by the European Court of Justice, the FCC's Lisbon decision is clearly meant as a warning to Brussels and, above all, Luxembourg. The decision could undermine the Court of Justice's authority and encourage non-compliance on the part of national courts, thus bringing about a constitutional crisis at European level. Alternatively, the decision may compel the Court of Justice to reconsider some of the most controversial aspects of its activist jurisprudence and to exert more restraint in the foreseeable future. Notes 1. Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 30 June 2009, text of the ruling available on the Court's website http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html 2. See http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html 3. Tighter parliamentary oversight, in general, means less bargaining power for the executive in conducting negotiations with other member state governments. Aware that parliamentary meddling may have the effect of weakening Germany's overall influence in EU policy-making, the FCC did not require that German MPs retain a veto on every single vote or action of the executive (see Kiiver 2009 Kiiver, Philipp. 2009. 'German Participation in EU Decision-Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedure'. German Law Journal, 10: 1288–96. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). In the summer parliamentary debate, however, some German politicians, most notably from the Christian Democratic CSU, propounded a variant of the Danish model under which the Bundestag would have held a veto in every policy area. A proposal that would have gone beyond the FCC's pronouncements, see 'Halteseile, keine Handschellen', Rheinischer Merkur, 16 July 2009; and 'Lissabon-Urteil: Ein Arbeitsreicher Sommer in Berlin', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 2009. 4. See the analysis of Martin Höpner in 'Spitzen gegen Brüssel', Frankfurter Rundschau, 2 July 2009. 5. Decision of 29 May 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271. 6. Decision of 22 October 1986, 73 BVerfGE 339. 7. Decision of 12 October 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155. 8. The concept of 'competence-competence' (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) refers to the supreme power of a polity or legislative body to define autonomously the limits of its law-making authority. Used by the FCC and German legal scholars to operationalise sovereignty, it goes back to the work of German jurist Paul Laband (1901 Laband, Paul. 1901. Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, Vol. 2. Tübingen: Mohr. [Google Scholar]: 64–7 and 85–8). 9. Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, Case 341/85, [1987] ECR 4199. 10. 89 BVerfGE 155 [210]. 11. Decision of 7 June 2000, 102 BVerfGE 147. 12. Para. 251 (translation is mine). 13. Para. 233 (translation is mine). 14. Para. 252 (translation is mine). 15. Para. 253–60. 16. Para. 263. 17. On this see the interview of Paul Kirchof in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, online edition, 30 June 2009. 18. Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000. 19. Article 18 of the directive. 20. Decision of 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm. 21. Para. 74. 22. Decision of 12 December 2006, Case C-380/03, Germany v. Parliament and Council. 23. Judgment of 13 September 2005, Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council; and Judgment of 23 October 2007, Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council. 24. Case C-176/03, at 47–8. 25. Judgment of 20 September 2001, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v. Centre public d'aide sociale [2001] ECR I-6193. 26. Judgment of 14 December 2006, Case C-97/05, Gattoussi v. Stadt Rüsselsheim. 27. Judgment of 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, International Transport Worker's Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union v. Viking Line ABP. 28. Decision of 18 December 2007, C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet. Here again the ECJ seemed to make light of received canons of textual construction. Indeed, Article 2 of the Posted Worker Directive (96/71 EC) explicitly provided that member states had to guarantee dispatched workers the terms and conditions of employment laid down by laws and collective agreements in the member state where they carry out their work. 29. Decision of 3 April 2008, Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüfert v. Land Niedersachsen. 30. Decision of 19 June 2008, Case C-319/06, Commission v. Luxembourg. 31. 'Stoppt den EuGh', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 September 2008. 32. See also his interview to the German weekly Die Mitbestimmung, 7 August 2008. 33. Para. 238. 34. Ibid. 35. Those groups were represented before the Court by academic lawyers from the more Eurosceptic side of the German legal community, namely Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider, Andreas Fisahn, and Dieter Murswieck. Meanwhile, the noted Europhiles Christian Tomuschat, Franz Mayer, and Ingolf Pernice argued the case on behalf of, respectively, the Bundestag and the federal government. 36. 'German Court to Hear Case against EU Treaty', Financial Times, online edition, 10 February 2009. 37. See the article 'Udo di Fabio: Ein Verfassungsrichter ringt ums europäische Ganze', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 June 2009. 38. In an interview to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the FCC's President, Hans-Jürgen Paper, had characterised the tendency of the ECJ to rely on 'general principle of community law' to strike down national policies as 'not unproblematic', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 July 2007. Some scholars dispute the view that the FCC's Lisbon decision was meant to send a warning to the ECJ (see Ziller 2009 Ziller, Jacques. 2009. 'Solange III, overro la Europafreundlichkeit del Bundesverfassungsgericht. A Proposito della sentenza della Corte Costituzionale Tedesca sulla ratifica del Trattato di Lisbona'. Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Communautario, 5: 973–95. [Google Scholar]). 39. Constitutional complaint 2 BvR 2661/06. 40. See also the former ECJ's advocate-general Otto Lenz, Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung, 20 July 2009; and Swiss law Professor Roland Bieber, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8 August 2009. 41. See the petition on the webpage of the Walter Halstein Institute: http://www.whi-berlin.de/documents/whi-material0109.pdf. Among the petition's signatories were the legal representatives of the government and the Bundestag before the FCC (Profs. Mayer, Pernice and Tomuschat) as well as other prominent academics such as Prof. Armin von Bogdandy, director of the prestigious Max Planck Institute for International Law. 42. Figures from Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home
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