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An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law

2005; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 36; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/00908320590909088

1521-0642

Jon M. Van Dyke,

Global Energy Security and Policy

Greece and Turkey have been unable to resolve interrelated disputes in the Aegean Sea involving the breadth of the territorial sea, the delimitation of the continental shelf, the demilitarization of certain islands, and the passage rights of ships and planes. This article examines the historical background of these disputes and offers recommendations for possible solutions. Keywords: Aegeanair defense zonescontinental shelfdelimitationdemilitarizationGreeceoverflightpassage rightsstraitsterritorial seatreaty interpretationTurkey The author would like to thank Seth R. Harris, Class of 2001, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa, for his assistance with research materials for this paper. Partial funding for this research was provided by the Greece Executive Commission of the National Committee for Strategic Research and Studies in Ankara, Turkey. The views presented herein are solely those of the author. Notes See, e.g.,Byron Theodoropoulos, The So-Called Aegean Dispute: What Are the Stakes: What Is the Cost? in Greece and the Law of the Sea 325, 327 (Theodore C. Kariotis ed. 1997): “In the case of the Aegean there is only one claimant party, namely Turkey, while Greece claiming nothing, is reduced to fending off an ever increasing number of Turkish claims.” See,e.g.,Aslan Gunduz, A Tentative Proposal for Dealing with the Aegean Disputes, in The Aegean Sea 2000 at 139–51 (Bayram Ozturk ed. 2000). 107 British and Foreign State Papers 656 and see also The Treaty of London, 1913, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos145.htm (site visited Sept. 12, 2001). 107 British and Foreign State Papers 893. In this document, the Great Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia) said that they had decided “de remettre a la Grece toutes les iles de la mer Egee actuellement occupees par elle, a l'exception de Tenedos, d'Imbros et de Castellorizo, qui doivent etre restitue” to Turkey. See Krateros M. Ioannou, The Greek Territorial Sea, in Kariotis, supra note 1, at 115, 151 n. 49. See,e.g.,Sevin Toluner, Some Reflections on the Interrelation of the Aegean Sea Disputes, in Ozturk, supra note 2, at 121–26. The 1914 Decision stated that the Greek government should give satisfactory guarantees that these islands “ne seront ni fortifiees ni utilisees pour aucune but naval ou militaire” (“will be neither fortified nor used for any naval or military purposes”). Natalino Ronzitti, The Aegean Demilitarization, Greek Turkish Relations and Mediterranean Security, in The Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects 295, 297 (Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 1989)(citing Simsir, Aegean Question, Documents, vol. II (1913–1914), Ankara, 1982, at 392–93). 28 L.N.T.S. 11 (1924), also published in 2 The Treaties of Peace 1919–1923 at 959 (Carnegie Endowment of Peace 1924). This treaty was between “the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, on the one part, and Turkey, on the other part.” The treaty was registered with the League of Nations on Sept. 5, 1924. The land boundary between Greece and Turkey is described in general terms in Article 2(2) of the Lausanne Treaty, and then Article 5 creates a Boundary Commission to define the specific boundary, using criteria provided in the first paragraph of Article 6. Article 14 of the Lausanne Treaty says that the Turkish islands of Imbros and Tenedos: shall enjoy a special administrative organisation composed of local elements and furnishing every guarantee for the native non-Moslem population in so far as concerns local administration and the protection of person and property. The maintenance of order will be assured therein by a police force recruited from amongst the local population by the local administration above provided for and placed under its orders. The agreements which have been or may be concluded between Greece and Turkey relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations will not be applied to the inhabitants of the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, http://www.pca-cpa.org (1998–1999), see infra text accompanying note 69. See infra text accompanying notes 24–27. 28 L.N.T.S. 21–23 (1924), also published in 2 The relevant language in Article 4 is as follows: The zones and islands indicated below shall be demilitarised: … (3) In the Aegean Sea, the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands. Convention for the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters Between the Coasts of Anatolia and the Island of Kastellorizo, 138 L.N.T.S. 243 (1933), registered with the League of Nations May 24, 1933, as No. 3191. The Special Agreement concluded on May 30, 1929, submitted the following question to the Permanent Court of International Justice: Whether according to the Treaty of Peace of Lausanne the following islets should be assigned in their entirety, to either of the parties: Volo (Catal Ada), Ochendra (Uvendire), Furnachia (Furnakya), Cato Volo (Katovolo), Prasoudi, Rho (San Giorgio), Maradi, Tchatulata (Catulata), Pighi (Pigi), Dassia (Dasya), Macri (Makri), Psomi, San Giorgio (Aya Yorgi), Polifados, Psoradia (Psoradya), Ipsili, Alimentaria (Alimentarya), Caravola (Karavola), Roccie Vutzachi (Roksi Vucaki), Mavro Poini and Mavro Poinachi (Mavro Poinaki). The Court was also asked to determine the sovereignty over the islet of Kara Ada in the Bay of Bodrum. The Kardak/Imia Rocks were not included in the listing given to the Court. See Ioannou, supra note 5, at 141 (quoting from P.C.I.J. Delimitation of the Territorial Waters Between the Island of Castellorizo and the Coast of Anatolia Case, Series C, No. 61, at 10). Ioannou, supra note 5, at 142. Id. See,e.g.,Ali Kurumahmut, A New Greek–Turkish Dispute: Who Owns the Rocks? in Ozturk, supra note 2, at 109, 113–14. See Greek Transmittal to Turkey, Feb. 16, 1996, in Ali Kurumahmut, Ege'de Temel Sorun, at EK-21 (1998) (tentative English translation). United States Delegation Journal, Forty-Second Meeting of the Political and Territorial Commission for Italy, October 4, 1946, 3:30 P.M., 3 Foreign Relations of the United States1946 at 665–66 (U.S. GPO 1970) and Report of the Political and Territorial Commission for Italy,Oct. 5, 1946, 4 Foreign Relations of the United States–1946 at 299, 310 (1970). See Yuksel Inan and Sertac H. Baseren, The Troubled Situation of the Aegean Territorial Waters,4:2 Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies55, 65 (1996) (“[D]uring the negotiations of the 1947 Paris Treaty, when Greece demanded a reference to be made to the mentioned [December 28, accord, Russia's objections and doubts about the validity of this accord led to the refusal of the Greek proposal… “). 173 L.N.T.S. 215 (1936). See Jon M. Van Dyke, Legal and Practical Problems Governing International Straits, in 12 Ocean Yearbook at 109, 110–12 (1996). See infra text and notes at notes 76–83. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Italy, Paris, Feb. 10, 1947, 49 U.N.T.S. 126, TIAS No. 1648, 61 Stat. 1245 (1950), Dept. of State Publication 2743, reprinted and discussed in European Peace Treaties After World War II (Amelia C. Leiss ed. 1954). One commentator has noted that although the Dodecanese Islands transferred from Italy to Greece in this treaty “lie just off the Turkish coast” and “had been Turkish until the Italian–Turkish War of 1912, there was little Turkey could do, given its neutral stance during [World War II], to prevent the transfer.” Lt.Col. Michael N. Schmitt, Aegean AngstThe Greek Turkish Dispute, 49:3 Naval War College Review 42, 47 (1996). The dispute over the Kardak/Imia Rocks is described and analyzed infra at notes 29–34 and 72. Kurumahmut, supra note 19, at 40 (citing an interview with Professor Sevin Toluner). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1265 (1982). Ioannou, supra note 5, at 140. Inan and Baseren, supra note 20, at 65. See supra text accompanying notes 11 and 26. Anna Lucia Valvo, The Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey: the Kardak Rocks and the Other Islands Never Given, in Ozturk, supra note 2, at 117, 117. Ioannou, supra note 5, at 143. Ibid., at 140. See David S. Saltzman, A Legal Survey of the Aegean Issues of Dispute and Prospects for a Non-Judicial Multidisciplinary Solution, in Ozturk, supra note 2, at 179, 182. Turkey denies that it has “acquiesced,” and has in recent years protested any NATO activity on the islets because of their disputed status. Ibid. at 182 n. 58. See Ioannou, supra note 5, at 151 n. 53 quoting Article 1 of the 1899 Cretan Constitution as saying that “L'ile de Crete avec les ilot adjacent constitue un Etat… .” Kurumahmut, supra note 18, at 112. For a more complete discussion of some of the material that follows, see Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea 17–20 (1997). Among the decisions that provide guidance regarding the rules that govern the ability of a nation to claim ownership of isolated uninhabited island features are: theArbitral Award of His Majesty the King of Italy on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty over Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico), Jan. 28, 1931, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. 390 (1932); the Arbitral Award Rendered in Conformity with the Special Agreement Concluded on January 23, 1925, Between the United States of America and the Netherlands Relating to the Arbitration of Differences Respecting Sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (Miangas), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (April 4, 1928), reprinted in 22 Am. J. Int'l L. 867, 909 (1928) [hereafter cited as Palmas arbitration]; the decisions by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in theMinquiers and Ecrehos Case (France/United Kingdom), [1953] I.C.J. Reports 47, and the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), [1992] I.C.J. Reports 351 [hereafter cited as Gulf of Fonseca case]; and the recent arbitral decision in the Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, supra note 10. Judge Huber was at the time the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, supra note 10, 1998 Award, para. 104. Palmas Island Arbitration, supra note 39, 2 R.I.A.A. 829 at 867. Ibid. at 893–94. Minquiers and Ecrehos case, supra note 39. Each group contains “two or three habitable islets, many smaller islets and a great number of rocks.” Ibid., at 53. The Court noted that “even if the Kings of France did have an original feudal title” to the adjacent Channel Islands, “such a title must have lapsed as a consequence of the events of the year 1204 and following years.” Ibid., at 56. “To revive its legal force to-day by attributing legal effects to it after an interval of more than seven centuries seems to lead far beyond any reasonable application of legal considerations.” Ibid. at 57. “What is of decisive importance, in the opinion of the Court, is not indirect presumptions deduced from events in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups.” Ibid., at 57 (emphasis added). Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, supra note 10, 1998 Award, para. 450. The United Kingdom submitted evidence that the Jersey courts had exercised criminal jurisdiction over the Ecrehos and Minquiers islets during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that the few habitable houses on the islets had been required to pay property taxes, that deeds conveying property had been registered in Jersey, that custom-houses had been established by Jersey officials in both islet groups, and that Jersey officials visited the islets on occasion to license boats, collect census data, and supervise construction of maritime safety facilities. 1953 Minquiers and Ecrehos case, supra note 39, at 65–66, 69. Ibid., at 53, 67, 72. Ibid., at 71. Gulf of Fonseca case, supra note 39. Ibid., at 380–81, para. 29, and 558, para. 333. Ibid., at 380–81, para. 29. The Chamber quoted, as what it described as “a classic dictum,” the opinion of Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas case: “‘Practice, as well as doctrine, recognizesthough under different legal formulae and with certain differences as to the conditions requiredthat the continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty (peaceful in relation to other States) is as good as a title’ (United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. II, p. 839).” Ibid., at 563, para. 342. The Chamber then went on to say with regard to the dispute before it: Where the relevant administrative boundary was ill-defined or its position disputed, in the view of the Chamber the behaviour of the two newly independent States in the years following independence may well serve as a guide to where the boundary was, either in their shared view, or in the view acted on by one and acquiesced in by the other… . This aspect of the matter is of particular importance in relation to the status of the islands, by reason of their history. Ibid. at 565, para. 345. Ibid., at 566, para. 347. Ibid., at 566–70, paras. 348–55. Ibid., at 570, para. 356. Ibid., at 570–79, paras. 356–68. Honduras made one protest in 1991, but the Chamber viewed this effort as untimely. Id. at 575–77, paras. 362–64. The Chamber also emphasized that Honduras should have protested a delimitation of the Gulf of Fonseca that had the effect of casting doubt on Honduras's claim of sovereignty over Meanguera. Id. at 577–78, paras. 365–66. Ibid., at 579, para. 368. Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, supra note 10, 1998 Award, para. 450, citing Minquiers and Ecrehos, supra note 39, at 47. See generally Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Future of Islands in the Light of the Eritrea/Yemen Awards (paper presented to the SEAPOL Interregional Conference, Bangkok, March 21–23, 2001). Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, supra note 10, 1998 Award, para. 239. Ibid., paras. 451–52. Ibid., paras. 507–08. Ibid.,paras. 509–24. Ibid., para. 458. Ibid., paras. 472, 476–80 citing, among other things, Article 6 of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, supra note 7, to support the presumption that islands within territorial waters are under the same sovereignty as the nearby mainland. Ibid., para. 525. At another point (paragraph 446), the tribunal said: “there is the problem of the sheer anachronism of attempting to attribute to such a tribal, mountain and Muslim medieval society the modern Western concept of a sovereignty title, particularly with respect to uninhabited and barren islands used only occasionally by local, traditional fishermen.” Ibid., para. 165. In paragraph 445, the tribunal characterized the islands as being in “an objective state of indeterminancy.” The International Court of Justice agreed that less in the way of formal displays of sovereignty are required for uninhabited or thinly populated areas in the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. Reports 12, 43 (1975). See Daniel J. Dzurek, Southeast Asian Offshore Oil Disputes, in 11 Ocean Yearbook at 157, 170 (1994). See,e.g.,Toluner, supra note 6, at 121–26 and Sertac Hami Baseren, Legal Status of the Islands, Islets and Rocks in Aegean as Determined by International Treaties, in Kurumahmut, supra note 19. The Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, concluded that islets within 12 nautical miles of the Eritrean coast (utilizing the breadth of the territorial sea accepted for that region) belonged to Eritrea. Eritrea–Yemen Arbitration, supra note 10, 1998 Award, para. 472 citing D. Bowett, The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law 48 (1978) and Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law 7 (1926), for the proposition that it is presumed that islands within territorial waters are under the sovereignty of the mainland state). See supra text and notes at notes 6–13. Tozun Bahcheli, Greek–Turkish Relations Since 1955 at 146 (1990). 173 L.N.T.S. 215 (1936). “Theories abound whether the Montreux Convention relieves Greece of the obligation to demilitarize.” Saltzman, supra note 35, at 182. Schmitt, supra note 25, at 63. The Protocol to the Convention explicitly said that “Turkey may immediately remilitarise the zone of the Straits as defined in the Preamble to the said Convention.” This language has been understood to permit Turkey to remilitarized the three islands near the mouth of the Dardanelles that were awarded to Turkey in the 1913–23 treaties and agreements. See Henri Adam, Military Status of the Aegean Islands, in Ozturk, supra note 2, at 205. See Sevin Toluner, The Pretended Right to Remilitarize the Island of Lemnos Does Not Exist (Limni Ada'sinin Hukuki Statusu ve Montreaux Bogazlar Konvansiyonu) (1987). The factual context and meaning of the Montreux Convention is also complicated by a statement the Turkish foreign minister made to the Turkish Grand National Assembly that the “provisions concerning the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, which belong to our friend and neighbor, Greece, and which had been demilitarized by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, are abolished also by the Treaty of Montreux,” discussed infra text accompanying notes 124–126. Toluner, supra note 6, at 124. See also Gunduz, supra note 2, at 144: “The demilitarisation which was the pre-condition of the transfer to Greece of the ownership of the islands is now seriouslyde facto changed or revised by Greece.” Masahiro Miyoshi, The Aegean Sea and the Aegean Islands in Historical Perspective, in Ozturk, supra note 2, at 86, 87. Adam,supra note 79, at 206. But see Ronzitti, supra note 6, at 298–99, who supports Professor Toluner's position that the Montreux Convention did not alter the demilitarized status of Lemnos. Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute16 (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 155, 1979). Schmitt, supra note 25, at 62. Bahcheli, supra note 75, at 147. Schmitt, supra note 25, at 62. Bahcheli,supra note 75, at 147 citing Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Views on the Demilitarized Status of Lemnos and the Eastern Aegean Islands 10. Schmitt, supra note 25, at 62 citing Rinn S. Shinn (ed.), Greece: A Country Study316 (U.S. GPO 1986). The buildup on Lemnos raises particular concern for Turkey, because this island was used as a staging area against Turkey during World War I. Ronzitti, supra note 6, at 300 citing U.N.Doc. S/11672, April 14, 1975. George P. Politakis, The Aegean Dispute in the 1990s: Naval Aspects of the New Law of the Sea Convention, in Kariotis, supra note 1, at 291, 307 and George P. Politakis, The Aegean Agenda: Greek National Interests and the New Law of the Sea Convention, 10 Int'l J. Marine & Coastal L. 497 (1995). Schmitt, supra note 25, at 62. Greece has apparently intentionally repudiated the demilitarization provisions of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. Prime-Minister Andreas Papandreau said on April 7, 1985: “Did we violate the Lausanne Treaty by militarizing the islands? Yes we did.” Saltzman, supra note 35, at 181 n. 54. Saltzman,supra note 35, at 180. See also Athanassios G. Platias, Greek Deterrence Strategy, in The Aegean After the Cold War 61, 83 (Chircop, Gerolymatos and Iatrides eds. 2000). Bahcheli, supra note 75, at 149. See also http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/bilateral/aegean.htm> where the following statement of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs is found: “The right of legitimate defense, one of the fundamental rights of the international legal order, possesses the character jus cogens. Article 103 of the U.N Charter states that the right of legitimate defense contained in Article 51 overrides any conventional obligation to the contrary.” Turkey responds to this argument by pointing out that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter authorizes countries to take only temporary steps for self-defense, and only if they are subjected to an “armed attack,” and requires threatened countries to report their threat to the United Nations Security Council, seeking its assistance. Greece has not gone to the Security Council for assistance. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27. Article 62(2)(a) says that “A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary… .” See Major General J. H. Marshall-Cornwall,Geographic Disarmament, A Study of Regional Demilitarization170 (1935). Ibid. Ibid., at 54–55. Ibid., at 60. Ibid., at 54–55. Ibid., at 58. See generally Anders Gardberg, Aland Islands: A Strategic Survey (Finland National Defence College 1995). Convention on Demilitarization of the Aland Islands, March 30, 1856, reprinted in Gardberg, supra note 103, at 87. See Adam, supra note 79, at 210. Convention Relating to the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of the Aaland Islands, Oct. 20, 1921, 1922 L.N.T.S. 213, reprinted in Gardberg, supra note 103, at 90; and see Marshall-Cornwall, supra note 97, at 150. The 1921 treaty was ratified by Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, the British Empire, Sweden, Italy, Poland, and Latvia. It prohibited all military activity, but Article 6 allowed Finland to lay mines and take “measures of a maritime nature as are strictly necessary” in times of war in the Baltic. Treaty Between Finland and the Soviet Union Concerning Aland Islands, Oct. 11, 1940, in Gardberg, supra note 103, at 95. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Finland, Article 5, Dept. of State Publication2743, reprinted in Leiss, supra 24; and see Adam, supra note 79, at 210. Adam, supra note 79, at 211 citing Marcel Sibert, Traite de Droit International Public, vol. 1, p. 401 (Paris, 1951). Ronzitti, supra note 6, at 295 citing, respectively, 51 British and Foreign State Papers1053 and De Martens, Nauveau Recueil general de Traites, III serie, vol. 7, pp. 323–41, Art.1. Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia, signed at Portsmouth, 5 September 1905, reprinted in C. Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 199, at 144. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Versailles Treaty), signed 28 June 1919, reprinted in United Kingdom Treaty Series 4 (1919). See “Versailles, Treaty of,” Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 99(1999). See Marshall-Cornwall, supra note 97, at 150. Treaty of Peace between Russia and Estonia, signed at Tartu, 2 February 1920, reprinted in 11 L.N.T.S. 30 (1922). Peace Treaty between Finland and Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, signed at Dorpat, 14 October 1920, reprinted in 3 L.N.T.S. 65 (1921). Convention between Finland and Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic regarding Measures taken in Order to Secure Peace at the Frontier, signed at Helsinfors, 1 June 1922, reprinted in 16 L.N.T.S. 337 (1923). Treaty of the Delimitation of the Frontier between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, signed at Santo Domingo, 21 January 1929, reprinted in 105 L.N.T.S. 207 (1930). 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, supra note 24, Articles 49–50. Ronzitti, supra note 6, at 295–96 citing Natalino Ronzitti, Demilitarization and Neutralization in the Mediterranean, Italian Y.B. Int'l L. 35–38 (1985). Ibid., at 296. 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, supra note 24, Article 11(2). Ronzitti, supra note 6, at 296. Young-Koo Kim, Northeast Asian Maritime Boundaries and Islands Disputes, in Maritime Boundary Issues and Islands Disputes in East Asian Region 71–72 (1997). See United Nations Charter, Article 51: “Nothing the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” See Greek and Turkish comments set out at supra note 95. The text of Article 13(2) is provided above between notes 11 and 12. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 96, Article 60(1), “entitles the [non-breaching] party [in a bilateral treaty] to invoke [a material] breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.” Greece has ratified the Vienna Convention, but Turkey has not. Most commentators view the Vienna Convention as codifying the customary international law of treaties, and thus as binding on all countries, whether they have ratified or not. The Vienna Convention was drafted after the treaties at issue were completed, but the concepts of “material breach” and “fundamental change of circumstances” were previously-existing norms of customary international law that were codified in the Vienna Convention. A “fundamental change of circumstances” can be invoked for treaty termination if “(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed under the treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 96, Article 62(1). See Greek comments supra note 95. Bahcheli,supra note 75, at 148 quoting from The Journalists Union of Athens Daily Newspapers, Threat in the Aegean 33 (Athens). See also Toluner, supra note 80, at 81 translating the Aras statement as follows: “This would mean that the provisions concerning Lemnos and Samothrace belonging to our neighbor and friend Greece which had been demilitarized by the Lausanne Convention of 1923 is also being lifted by the Montreux Convention, about which we rejoice similarly.” Turkish officials explain the Aras statement by saying that it “has to be read, as an expression of goodwill in the light of the international political climate prevailing at that time which cannot change, in any way, the provisions of international treaties.” Bahcheli, supra note 75, at 148 quoting from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Views on the Demilitarized Status of Lemnos and the Eastern Aegean Islands9. Professor Toluner, supra note 80, at 82 explains that the Aras statement was not made in response to a Greek question and did not constitute a unilateral act, and thus does not bind Turkey under the cases of Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, (1933) P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, p. 71, or Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment of Dec. 20, 1974,[1974] I.C.J. Reports253, 267–69, paras. 43–51. Toluner, supra note 80, at 83–84. See also supra text accompanying notes 87–91. Schmitt, supra note 25, at 64. Leiss, supra note 24, at 61. Ibid. quoting from a statement made by Senator Tom Conally in U.S. Congress, 79th Cong., 2d sess. S. Doc. 243, at 5. Ibid. again quoting from Senator Conally's statement. Bahcheli,supra note 75, at 148. Ibid. Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 34 (3rd ed. 1999). Ibid. at 37 citing A.E.David, The Strategy of Treaty Termination at ix (1975). Janis also explains, at 38, that: Only rarely is the legality of a unilateral denunciation tested by an international court or arbitral tribunal. More frequently, one state's denunciation of a treaty and its legal justification is simply countered by another state's objection of illegality; both claims are ultimately left dangling and unresolved. Objecting states may, of course, retaliate by denouncing other treaty commitments. Ronzitti, supra note 6, at 298. Ibid. Bahcheli,supra note 75, at 148. Ibid., at 148–49. Toluner, supra note 80, at 57. Ibid., at 61–85. Toluner, supra note 80, at 64 citing Lord McNair,The Law of Treaties 255 (1961). See supra text at notes 61–69. Janis, supra note 139, at 34–35 citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 96, Article 44(1) and (3). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 96, Article 34. As explained above, supra at notes 77–81, it is clear that some of the demilitarization requirements in the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty have been modified, namely the limitations on Turkish islands and territories, so the reciprocity found in that treaty no longer exists. Also of importance is the action of Italy in remilitarizing its islands, despite the language in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. See supra text accompanying notes 118–122. Law No. 230 of Sept. 17, 1936, Official Gazette (Greece), vol. A. No. 450/1936. When Greece increased its territorial sea claim in 1936 from three to six nautical miles, the United Kingdom objected, but Turkey did not. Greece and Turkey were on friendly terms at that time, and were being threatened by Italy, and some ideas were being exchanged regarding the possibility of the formation of a confederation. When Turkey extended its Aegean territorial sea to six nautical miles in 1964, Greece objected, arguing that this extension interfered with Greek fishing practices. Statement of Ambassador Namik Yolga, at the Aegean Issues Conference, Istanbul, Jan. 20, 1995. See Ioannou, supra note 5, at 130 explaining the Greek enactments and quoting from Article 2 of Greek Law 2321/1995, which arose from ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, and said that “Greece has the inalienable right, in application of Article 3 of the Convention which is being ratified, to extend at any time the breadth of its territorial sea up to a distance of 12 nautical miles.” See,e.g.,Gunduz, supra note 2, at 150 and Ioannou, supra note 5, at 118. Some of the material that follows in this section is adapted from Jon M. Van Dyke, The Aegean Sea Dispute: Options and Avenues, 20 Marine Policy 397, 401–02 (1996). Politakis, The Aegean Dispute, supra note 92, at 294 and Ioannou, supra note 5, at 132. Some articles give different figures, depending, perhaps, on how the Aegean is defined. See,e.g.,Theodore C. Kariotis, The Case for a Greek Exclusive Economic Zone, 19 Marine Policy3, 5 (1990) stating that Greece currently exercises sovereignty over 43.5% of the Aegean, Turkey has 7.5%, and 49% is high seas, and Inan and Baser