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Thomas Aquinas, Esse Intentionale, and the Cognitive as Such

2011; Philosophy Education Society Inc.; Volume: 64; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

2154-1302

Robbie Moser,

Medieval and Classical Philosophy

IT IS POPULAR AMONG AQUINAS SCHOLARS to present esse intentionale as the mode that distinguishes cognizant from noncognizant beings. St. Thomas says something is cognizant just in case it is able to possess, in addition to its own form, the form some other thing. (1) When I am actually knowing, I possess the form the thing known. The form the thing known has a mode being in the knower--which mode is the distinguishing mark the cognitive as such--and many scholars say this distinguishing mode is esse intentionale. In this paper, I argue against this reading this part Aquinas's doctrine knowledge. Thomas does not feature esse intentionale as the mark the cognitive, but rather assigns it more a subordinate status. The view that esse intentionale is the definitive mark the cognitive does not properly highlight the way it features for Thomas as something a junior partner to the more fundamental esse immateriale. Here I wish to question a popular line reasoning for reading Aquinas as saying that esse intentionale is the mark the cognitive. In what follows, I take John Haldane's work as offering a view representative this sort reasoning. I raise some problems for maintaining that Thomas held this view, both from within Haldane's approach specifically and from Thomas' texts more generally. In the first section the paper, I show why Thomas might be thought to present esse intentionale as the defining mark knowledge as such. In the second section, I raise a problem specifically for Haldane's reading the texts, but also, I think, a more general problem for any view that takes Aquinas as saying esse intentionale is uniquely mental. In the third section I highlight an often overlooked distinction Aquinas makes between modes intentional being. This distinction shows that Thomas is concerned with allowing esse intentionale to exist extramentally as such in an imperfect being. In section four, I sketch a picture cognition that includes such extramental being, although this sketch goes only part the way toward achieving a plausible and perspicuous description Thomas's metaphysics cognition. In the concluding section, I describe why and how the present reading best fits with the largely acknowledged, broader reading Thomas as thoroughly unconcerned with a Cartesian problematic. I Thomas says something is cognizant just in case it is able to possess, in addition to its own form, the form some other thing. (2) The form the thing known has a mode being in the knower, a representational mode which is the distinguishing mark the cognitive as such. John Haldane stands with many scholars who say this distinguishing mode is esse intentionale. (3) In this section I present what I take to be the strongest case for their reading. Throughout Haldane's various presentations, it is always clear why he thinks Thomas holds that esse intentionale is the mark the cognitive. The primary reason is that esse intentionale is the bearer the feature representation or intentionality: a cognitive represents, or is about, some other thing, while a noncognitive cannot represent or be about anything else. This feature aboutness is what Thomas means by the knower's possessing the form of another thing: the form possessed is itself of another. (4) It is representative something other than itself. For Haldane, the cognitive mode being, the mode that is intrinsically representational, is esse intentionale: (5) species in esse intentionali represents an extramental form in esse naturali, and as such, esse intentionale is the representational mode proper to cognizance. (6) On this view, the distinction between the cognizant and the noncognizant is the same as the distinction between the representational esse intentionale and the nonrepresentational esse naturale. …